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vFOREWORD
In recent years, regional trade agreements have been proliferatingamong and between developed and developing countries.Currently there are around 300 bilateral and regional agreements,
of which more than 100 contain commitments on competition policies
with implications at both regional and national level. To date, little is
known about the impact and role of such regional initiatives and
there is growing awareness among developing countries, including
the least developed countries (LDCs), of their special needs in this
area.
Along with many other UNCTAD research and technical
cooperation activities over more than three decades in the
competition policy field, this publication is a contribution to address
these needs and implement UNCTAD’s mandate. UNCTAD was
mandated in Paragraph 104 of the São Paulo Consensus to “further
strengthen analytical work and capacity building activities to assist
developing countries on issues related to competition law and
policies, including at a regional level”. In response to this
strengthened mandate, the publication covers a wide range of regional
experience that should lead to a better understanding of competition
provisions in RTAs for trade and competition policy makers and
authorities that implement such policies. With its focus on regional
trade agreements, this book complements last year ’s publication
“Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing
Countries”, which was launched at UNCTAD XI.
The chapters collected in this publication shed light on the
competition provisions found in different types of RTAs in order to
support and guide policy makers on the negotiation and
implementation of regional and bilateral agreements with respect to
competition policies. The publication makes a number of policy
recommendations and identifies institutional arrangements needed
to promote synergies between trade and competition at regional level.
A fundamental message to be derived from the empirical findings
and policy experiences presented in the publication is that
competition provisions at regional level can act as a major
complement to the current efforts to develop an open, rule-based,
predictable, non-discriminatory trading system, with a fair
distribution of benefits for all developing countries.
vi
In recognition of the relevance of this fundamental message, this
publication is being launched at UNCTAD’s Fifth United Nations
Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices in Turkey, November 2005. It is my hope that it will raise
awareness and enhance expertise among public policy officials,
private sector stakeholders, consumer organizations and civil society
in general about the crucial importance of competition law and policy
cooperation at national, regional and multilateral levels for creating
competitive enterprises in developing countries.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC) for its invaluable support in
carrying out this research project.
Supachai Panitchpakdi
Secretary-General of
UNCTAD
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Lakshmi Puri
Director on International Trade in Goods and Services, and
Commodities
  UNCTAD
During the last decade, national, regional and internationalinitiatives aimed at promoting competition policy haveproliferated. In particular, of the around 300 bilateral and
regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force or in negotiation, over 100
include competition-policy related provisions. About 80% of the over
100 have been negotiated in the last decade and are part of a trend
for ‘deeper’ RTAs which often include articles for liberalizing trade
in services, investment, labour and other trade-related provisions.
Interestingly, developing countries negotiate about as many RTAs
among themselves (‘South-South’ RTAs) as with developed countries
(‘North-South’ RTAs), and about 65% of the South-South RTAs
completed since 1995 contain provisions related to competition policy.
In this connection, important questions come to mind. What are
the reasons for including competition law and policy provisions in
RTAs?  What are the main types of such provisions? Are countries
receiving any special and differential (S&D) treatment from a trading
partner that is more developed? Can developing countries reasonably
expect to benefit from effective provisions in sensitive sectors? How
costly is it to implement a RTA’s competition provisions? What has
been the experience of competition agencies of developing countries
with RTAs?
Answers to these questions and others are summarized below
by drawing on the 13 chapters of this publication, which have been
written by competition practitioners or academics that focus on
developing country concerns. The chapters are divided into two parts:
Part 1 contains cross-regional analyses, and; Part 2 contains region-
or sector-specific experiences.
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RTA competition provisions exist for several reasons
Competition provisions in RTAs have many objectives. Nearly
all RTAs with competition provisions state that such provisions are
needed so that the benefits of trade and investment liberalization are
not compromised by cross-border anti-competitive practices.  The
full benefits of free trade can be enjoyed only if state-constructed
trade barriers are not substituted by other forms of private restrictive
practices (such as for instance market-sharing or price-fixing
agreements).
A second reason for including competition issues in RTAs was
to create region-wide competition policies and institutions that seek
greater levels of integration including, in the limit, forming common
markets or economic and political unions. RTAs characterized by a
higher level of trade integration are more likely to contain competition
provisions.  If parties to an RTA are seeking an integrated common
market (such as the EU), then anti-competitive practices must not
replace government restrictive schemes within the integrated market
for the initiative to bear fruit.
Also with the opening of domestic markets to foreign
competition, countries become susceptible to anti-competitive
practices originating outside their national border. These include:
cross-border competition concerns, international cartels, and mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) that risk monopolizing or creating dominant
power in the internal market. The latter may arise from both cross-
border M&A and M&A within one country (usually in the developed
world) which consequently combines their subsidiaries in another
Figure 1 The spectrum of RTA competition provisions
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country (including those subsidiaries in a developing country). Either
form of merger may result in positions of dominance and may lead
to anti-competitive abuse.
Developing countries may be particularly vulnerable to anti-
competitive practices. They have generally smaller consumer markets
with less depth (both in terms of the quantity and range of products)
which can be abused by dominant companies.  Also developing
countries may not have the competition law or may not have the
resources and expertise in prosecuting international cartels. Hence
developing countries may be an easy target for international cartels
because of their weaker enforcement of competition laws.
Yet at the same time, the increased flow of goods associated
within a RTA, could hurt developing countries that may have
benefited from international price discrimination. Arbitrage and flow-
back (as for instance in pharmaceuticals from Africa back to Europe)
becomes more problematic in a RTA. Companies may no longer be
able to discriminate among markets in order to price their products
according to the ability to pay. Some techniques such as vertical
restraints (e.g. manufacturer-distributor agreements) used to
discriminate between markets may or may not constitute an anti-
competitive practice that may infringe the competition provisions of
a RTA.
Developing countries and their policy makers – dealing with trade
and competition matters – should be concerned about the
implications of competition provisions in RTAs for development and
for access of the poor to essential goods and services. Why? Because
to ensure that trade liberalization and markets work towards the goals
of RTAs, complementary measures to liberalizing trade policies must
be taken by governments in the area of competition policy. These
measures are sometimes purely domestic but they can involve
international cooperation.
RTA competition provisions vary widely
In this publication, RTA competition provisions were classified
in several ways (See Chapters 1 through 3) encompassing a wide
spectrum of potential obligations. Some RTAs simply have ‘best
endeavours’ measures to adopt, maintain and apply competition law.
xThe language used in some other RTAs is more legally binding than
best endeavours. Either language can apply to non-discrimination,
due process or transparency in the statement and/or application of
competition law. There may also be provisions for cooperation or
coordination of activities by competition law enforcement bodies.
Although not often found in RTAs, a competition authority of one
trading partner can, under some conditions and reasonable
expectations, request proceedings in the jurisdiction of the other
partner against a national of that partner (positive comity) or be
required to advise the other partner of proceedings against a national
of the trading partner (negative comity) (for a more rigorous
description, see Chapters 1 and 6). At the deeper end of obligations,
there can be an independent dispute resolution or consultation
mechanism, a supra-national authority that can apply competition
law directly on private entities within the RTA (such as the EU), or
limits put on the application by RTA partners of trade remedies (such
as anti-dumping).
There is some consistency on provisions in North-South RTAs
depending upon the developed country partner. Canada and US RTAs
emphasize cooperation of competition authorities. EU RTAs
emphasize harmonization of competition law including establishing
a supra-national agency (Chapter 2 and 3).
Despite the various countries’ eagerness to sign RTAs with
competition provisions, there is very little experience concerning their
implementation and their effectiveness with regards to improving
competition. Particular care must be taken not to draw erroneous
conclusions on what might be useful for a particular developing
country, bearing in mind the diversity of development objectives.
RTA competition provisions should match its members’
integration expectations but follow-through is needed
The expected level of trade integration intended for a RTA tends
to dictate the existence and depth of its competition provisions. For
example, about three quarters of all association RTAs (principally
the EU partnership agreements) have competition provisions and
yet only about 40% and 20% of the bilateral and plurilateral free trade
agreements have such competition provisions (Chapter 1).
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Such a correlation is understandable. Typically RTAs
characterized by higher levels of trade integration are more likely to
contain competition provisions to ensure coherence between trade
and competition objectives. At the extreme end of integration
expectations, a few RTAs have limited their members’ ability to use
trade remedies such as anti-dumping, replacing them instead to use
competition principles. Such a provision requires extensive policy
integration and is considered by some as the deepest of obligations
imposed by a RTA’s competition provisions (Chapter 3).
But a warning is appropriate. There have been cases where the
textual interpretation of the competition provisions implies deep
integration but the effectiveness of such provisions has been wanting.
A case in point may be the Caribbean’s CARICOM agreement which
after a revision in 2001, calls for extensive integration including
effective implementation of regional competition policies. However,
implementation does not seem to have matched expectations because
of capacity constraints at the national level or a reluctance to
relinquish sovereignty (Chapters 9 and 10).
The textual interpretation of dispute settlement mechanisms
(DSMs) may also suggest more integration than perhaps effective
integration. In a questionnaire to developing country competition
authorities, related institutions and experts, respondents were
generally unenthusiastic about DSMs. DSM is viewed as a mechanism
for cooperation rather than enforcement. Some form of DSM may
assist countries in complying with competition agreements, and deter
cross-border conspiracies, but this was not seen as an immediate
priority (Chapter 4).
S&D treatment within RTA competition provisions may have a
particularly useful role
One interesting aspect of RTA competition provisions is the use
of S&D treatment. They broadly conform to four main types: (i)
provisions that safeguard the interests of less-developed partners;
(ii) exceptions and exemptions from some obligations; (iii) transitional
time periods, and; (iv) technical assistance (Chapter 5).
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S&D treatment within the North-South RTA’s competition
provisions does make sense. Many developing countries do not as
yet have a domestic competition law or have yet to effectively
implement such law. It has been argued that competition provisions
in RTAs may directly impact domestic industries and hence
developing countries may need the S&D treatment to ensure
reasonable adjustment for their industries.
S&D treatment also makes more sense in these circumstances
because it is frequently the anti-competitive practices of foreign
companies – which tend to be more established globally vis-à-vis
developing country companies – that affect the developing countries’
domestic market and the domestic countries’ exports into foreign
markets. For addressing these practices then, the developing countries
may need extra cooperation from the developed countries.
The growth of international trade may increase the potential for
international cartels. Hence, competition authorities must cooperate
in order to successfully identify and prosecute cross-border anti-
competitive practices. But relative technical competence is a concern.
Some developed countries resist divulging case-specific information
with their trading partner if their competition authority’s competence
in keeping confidential information is perceived as inadequate
(Chapters 4 and 19). To overcome this possible imbalance in
competence, special measures such as transition periods and
unilateral technical assistance from the developed partner are often
included within the RTA competition provisions.
The existence of S&D provisions within RTAs shows, at
minimum, that weaker partners feel that there is a necessity for S&D
and that it is beneficial to them. This also supports UNCTAD’s
position in the UN Set of Competition, which is that unilateral
provisions in favour of developing countries may be necessary for
their social and economic development.
But not only developing countries want to protect national
champions
While S&D may provide policy space for development of critical
industries, even the countries with the oldest and most advanced
xiii
competition law systems do not apply the same standards to every
sector of the economy. Agriculture and energy are two example sectors
frequently exempted from the full application of competition law.
For instance export cartels in both sectors are not only tolerated but
actively promoted in some developed countries. The structure of these
industries and their strategic significance to the national economy is
cited as justifying the special treatment.
There are implications for developing countries. First is that these
sectors such as agriculture and energy that are resilient to reforms
under multilateral trade liberalization, are likely to resist reform under
RTA competition principles. In a sector as sensitive and vital (at least
to developing countries) as agriculture, private trade barriers such
as refusals-to-purchase and abuse of dominance by retailers in
developed countries can substitute for, or add to dwindling tariff
and non-tariff protection. This is a concern particularly for developing
countries to ensure market access for their agriculture products in
developed countries.
If S&D would be really meaningful,  it  should involve
undertakings by more advanced countries to eliminate exemptions
and deregulate sectors before their developing-country counterparts.
Developed countries should set an example in liberalizing sectors
before developing countries, and without expecting immediate
reciprocity (Chapter 13).
Another consideration for some infrastructure service sectors is
that natural monopolies arise because of economies of scale. Such
natural monopolies (for instance energy transmission) are typically
regulated either in lieu of, or in addition to, being subject to
competition authorities.
Cost-benefit considerations for competition provision obligations
assumed within RTAs can be very complex.
The costs and benefits of a RTA’s competition provisions will
vary depending on the nature of the agreement and on the objective
intended. The challenge for any country is to enter into agreements
in which the agreement’s burdens do not exceed its potential benefits
(Chapter 6).
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The benefits are hard to estimate. They will depend upon the
structure of the domestic and foreign industries and the state of the
wholesale and consumer markets both at home and abroad. There
are examples of international cartel costs on developing countries.
One estimate values total imports to developing countries of 16
cartelized products at over $80 billion making up 6.7% of all imports
to developing countries and equal to 1.2% of their combined GDP.
Specific cartel examples of vitamins, heavy electrical equipment and
graphite electrodes used in steel, were noted as particularly affecting
some developing countries (Chapters 4, 10 and 12). The difficulty in
estimating the benefits of better competition policy is that the
projected costs of anti-competitive practices and the probabilities of
successfully addressing them are speculative.
But the benefits of signing onto a RTA’s competition provisions
may extend beyond detection and correction of anti-competitive
practices. Companies operating within a region that apply RTA
competition provisions may have less costs of compliance. For
instance, a RTA’s M&A provisions might clarify costs and time
required for an approval of a merger. Several RTAs are incorporating
‘one-stop shop’ approaches to merger analysis, for example the EU
and COMESA (Chapters 9 and 11). Such clarity and transparency
may encourage mergers and acquisitions that improve efficiencies,
better allocate resources and reduce consumer prices. To the extent
that these companies are from countries in South-South RTAs, it may
encourage developing internationally competitive companies with
sufficient economies of scale amongst the developing countries.
The costs of abiding to RTA competition provisions will vary
greatly depending upon the current competence of the competition
authority within the country and the prior commitments already
made. Those countries with existing competition legislation and
commitments in other RTAs may find the cost of agreeing to another
RTA’s competition provisions marginal if the provisions between the
RTAs overlap in their obligations (Chapter 6).
For developing countries, S&D treatment may help achieve a
proper balance between costs and benefits. A delay, exemption or
technical and financial assistance in implementing a RTA’s
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competition obligations would reduce the effective cost. Developed
countries are offering technical assistance willingly in the framework
of a RTA (Chapter 4). It is hoped that with this technical assistance,
developing countries without a domestic competition law may be
able to establish the domestic legislation and related authorities more
cost-effectively.
Adopting regional competition rules can act as interim domestic
legislation.
Establishing an effective competition regime in a small
developing country is a lengthy process. This entails (i) enacting the
appropriate legislation and physically establish the authority; (ii)
building the competence and credibility to avoid the political
economy appeal of industrial policy measures which use anti-
competitive practices; and (iii) coordinating effectively with other
foreign competition authorities to address cross-border practices
which distort competition in the domestic market.
An alternative for some jurisdictions without domestic
competition law is to adopt a RTA’s competition provisions directly
into domestic law. For instance those member states of West Africa’s
UEMOA which have not yet adopted a domestic competition law,
may apply within their boundaries regional competition law even to
practices which do not have a trade effect. Similarly Latin America’s
Andean Community rules are applicable in Bolivia and Ecuador and
could be used to challenge domestic anti-competitive practices
(Chapters 4 and 9).
A similar circumstance was proposed for East and South Africa’s
COMESA as part of implementation guidelines. It was suggested that
if a COMESA member did not have a domestic competition law, then
the regional body might investigate cases even if there was no cross-
border impact. Those are the cases typically handled at the national
level. This should probably be considered only an interim step
because anti-competitive practices are likely to thrive where there is
no national law (Chapter 11).
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RTA cooperation on competition rules may be useful but informal
cooperation may be more effective.
In practice, there is a limit on the effectiveness of competition
provisions contained in any agreement, particularly if competition
policy officials are not involved in the discussion of the trade
agreements.  As a result, it is not surprising that the questionnaire
discussed in Chapter 4 noted that competition officials found other
less formal methods more effective than the formal RTA cooperation
competition rules. Some believe that formal agreements such as
agency-to-agency agreements (ATAs) or Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters Treaties (MLATs) that are directly negotiated and
implemented by the legal competition authorities of the respective
countries may have more relevance. The contact between competition
authorities resulting from membership in the International
Competition Network (ICN) was also particularly noted.  Even when
two countries were party to a RTA with competition cooperation
provisions, informal cooperation depended upon the closeness of the
competition authorities rather than the textual wording of the
agreement. It was also noted that the proliferation of RTAs with
competition provisions is also having a network effect. Two
competition authorities may effectively cooperate even if not
intended, simply because they are both signatories to RTAs which
have a common third party.
The EU modernization package may not be readily applicable for
developing countries
The EU modernization package was enacted in May 2004 to more
effectively combat anti-competitive practices in the EU. It consisted
of five elements: (i) a reallocation of cases shifting more competence
to the national authorities; (ii) a more explicit mandate to exchange
information (including confidential information) between national
competition authorities; (iii) a cooperation arrangement whereby
national authorities are required at times to assist in investigations;
(iv) various articles outlining when the Commission will control
enforcement of EU law by national authorities, and; (v) a revised
definition of the relationship between the Commission and national
courts.
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How applicable is the EU modernization package to other RTAs?
In considering the possible adaptation of these main elements into
two Latin American regional agreements (the Andean Community
and MERCOSUR), West Africa’s UEMOA and CARICOM, the
conclusion was that this was currently not very much. None of the
four regional agreements enforce regional law concurrently with the
national authorities. The most important lesson may be the system
of cooperation among national and regional institutions using their
European Competition Network (ECN). This could be emulated by
other RTAs. However, the fundamental problem may be the
inexperience of competition officials at the national level amongst
members in the other regional agreements. This was emphasized for
COMESA (Chapter 11).
There is an essential role for the consumer advocates
Amongst the EU and USA RTAs other than the EU itself, there
may only be two agreements (EU-ACP and USA-Australia) with
explicit consumer protection provisions. Having said that, a RTA
which requires domestic commitment to implement consumer
protection laws and policies may make sense particularly in countries
where there is little record of implementing consumer protection laws
successfully. Consumer policy cooperation with its demand side
orientation may complement the supply-side focus of competition
policies.  It may also have increasing relevance with the growing use
of e-commerce.  Consumers are more often purchasing and shipping
goods across borders even though the current share of international
trade is relatively low (Chapter 7).
Possibly more constructive, is the potential role of consumer
organizations in representing the interests of consumers – typically
the beneficiaries of freer trade – in the RTA process. They can be
advocates both at the time of negotiation and implementation to
balance the protectionist interests of some producers.  As an example,
the competent European Consumers’ Organization has been very
successful in recent years raising competition issues at the EU in part
because of the European Commission’s openness to civil society.  Two
other RTAs investigated (Chapter 8), Caribbean’s CARICOM and
Eastern and South Africa’s COMESA have had less success involving
consumer civil society organizations. Both RTAs suffer because the
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civil society organizations are not sufficiently organized in making
the difference, but also the COMESA regional body has yet to
significantly encourage such involvement.
Policymaking requires coherence for effective implementation
Many of the arguments against a multilateral agreement on
competition policy in the WTO seem to have lost their significance
in a regional context, as often the same countries opposing a binding
WTO agreement on competition have accepted various competition
provisions at the regional level. These RTAs may be the stepping-
stones necessary so that competition law and policy may be advanced
further at multilateral level (Chapter 2).
Trade and competition have an important nexus. Trade is
frequently the instigator of competition in markets and benefits RTA
members usually with better resource allocation, higher efficiencies
and improved productivity. But it is often the potential of increased
competition that provokes protectionist sentiment and damages the
political will to enter into trade agreements. Competition is a trade
policy makers’ best friend but at the same time, competition in local
markets for local producers is a concern for trade policy makers. One
of the interesting highlights from the questionnaire (Chapter 4) is
the apparent disconnect between trade and competition policy
makers.  Yet their objectives are very much intertwined. They may
need to have greater cooperation and coordination in fulfilling their
complementary roles.
Drawing on all the above, a conceptual framework might be
considered for negotiating and implementing RTAs with competition
provisions (Figure 2).
The first step in the negotiation process is to define regional
integration and competition objectives that are compatible in terms
of their ambition. Once such objectives are defined, one needs to
ensure that the expected benefits arising from RTA formation exceed
costs. If there are reasons to believe that this is not the case, or if
developing country RTA members will have difficulties in complying
with some of the competition-related RTA requirements, special and
differential provisions may need to be actively pursued during actual
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negotiations. In their absence, countries need to rethink the RTA
objectives.
When the cost-benefit analysis is favourable (with or without the
need for S&D provisions), the RTA can be concluded and members
can then proceed with implementation. In the implementation phase,
setting up the necessary institutional infrastructure (enactment or
amendment of appropriate legislation, establishment or upgrading
of competition agencies, as necessary) becomes a key ingredient for
an efficient and cost effective control of anti-competitive practices.
In such a case, it can be considered that the RTA achieved its trade
and competition objectives but it needs frequent monitoring and
benchmarking against other countries.
If anti-competitive practices are not corrected in an efficient
manner, then this can be due to either deficient implementation of
existing regional competition provisions or to the lack of appropriate
competition provisions. If deficient implementation is the reason,
then consultation or dispute settlement mechanisms, if any, may be
used to address the outstanding issues. If, on the contrary, the existing
Figure 2 Conceptual approach to negotiating and implementing
RTA competition provisions
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provisions are per se unable to tackle the anti-competitive practices
that have a negative impact on intra-regional trade, or if effective
implementation can be achieved, then members may need to
reconsider the RTA objectives.
In all cases in which the RTA has to be rethought, a possible
mechanism is a recent advent of an evolving or revision clause
designed to give flexibility to the parties to jointly amend their RTA
(Chapter 1).  Circumstances can change: new economic conditions,
technologies, techniques or industrial organizations can be
introduced. Such may require policy makers - both trade and
competition - to reconsider the role and objectives of their competition
provisions within their RTAs.
More potential avenues for research
As emphasized at the beginning of this Executive Summary and
in Chapter 1, these RTAs and particularly those with competition
provisions are proliferating especially for developing countries. As
argued by many authors, it may be too soon to draw conclusions on
what might be useful for a particular developing country, given their
diverse development objectives.
This growing phenomenon offers many more potential avenues
for research.  Many authors have identified in their individual
chapters topics for further research and many more related questions
could be thought of.
There are for instance economic questions. The estimation of
economic benefits from competition provisions in RTAs is particularly
complex. The private-sector benefits of regional competition rules
are hard to assess. Clearer rules not only reduce the costs of
compliance but may improve economic efficiencies through greater
regional merger activity but estimates are difficult and guidance may
be appropriate. Yet at the same time, the limitations on sovereignty
and the loss of flexibility for a small developing country is also a cost
hard to estimate. The costs can also be compounded by the potential
of smaller developing countries devoting a large part of their
resources to information requests stemming from RTA competition
provisions that require them to cooperate with other more established
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competition authorities. There are also various questions with regards
to competition provision effectiveness to address anti-competitive
practices as they differ between goods and services. Anti-competitive
practices in the infrastructure services (e.g. telecom, distribution
services) may have negative spill-over effects on market access
opportunities for developing countries in other sectors including
trade in goods. They may also have implications for universal access
to essential services such as water and electricity. These are important
issues to tackle, which explains why many RTAs contain sector
specific competition provisions.  However when signing such RTAs,
developing countries must strive for a fair balance between foreign
market access and domestic interests.
There are also many legal questions. What is the legal practicality
of using regional trade rules in lieu of domestic legislation? This may
differ by type of law and even by country.  Furthermore, as the
evidence in this publication suggests, it would be interesting to assess
why the more informal arrangements (bilateral or otherwise)
cooperative arrangements are possibly more effective than textual
obligations of RTA competition provisions? Some questionnaire
respondents seem to have been expecting more from regional
competition provisions than they experienced in effectiveness. Was
this justified?  What measures could be envisaged to redress this gap
and improve the implementation record of regional competition
provisions?
These are a few of the many questions still of interest.  This
publication hopes to make a seminal contribution to the knowledge
about the impact and role of such regional initiatives on the
enforcement of competition rules, but there are many more to be
answered.
Lakshmi Puri
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1.  The proliferation of RTAs and the advent of
'deep integration'
Since the mid-1990s, the number of regional trade agreements(RTAs) has significantly increased, with virtually all countriesbeing part of one or more RTAs.  Regionalism, defined as both
an increase in intra-regional trade flows and in the number of RTAs,
has progressed rapidly in many regions, especially in Europe and
the Western Hemisphere.  The exact number of RTAs currently in
operation worldwide is not known precisely. However, various
assessments (including World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates)
place the total number of RTAs between 250 and over 300.
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These new developments in RTA formation have led to a renewed
interest in RTAs, with many academics questioning the impact RTAs
have had on members and third countries. The early theoretical and
empirical work started in the 1950s with Viner’s seminal work (Viner,
1950). Viner advanced that the welfare effects stemming from the
formation of an RTA are ambiguous. In a simple partial equilibrium
model under perfect competition, an RTA may increase the level of
trade between members at the expense of less efficient domestic
producers (trade creation) but also to the detriment of more efficient
third countries (trade diversion). The net effect of an RTA on trade
and economic welfare thus depends on the relative size of these two
effects. Further refinements were brought when dynamic effects were
incorporated into this stylized static approach to regional integration.
One dynamic effect resulting from regional integration usually cited
is the competition effect. The model assumes that RTA formation leads
to increased intra-RTA competition and such dynamic effects of
regional integration are often used to justify and explain the
proliferation of RTAs.1
Recent economic integration tends to encompass partners that
are economically and geographically diverse. Overall, new RTAs are
increasingly expanding to other regions and becoming more complex
inter-regional integration systems between countries at different
stages at development (Figure 1.1). For instance, almost one quarter
of RTAs signed in the post-1990 period are inter-continental. New
inter-continental integration projects with a potentially significant
impact on global trade and investment have been proliferating. EU-
induced regionalism has extended to countries and regions outside
of Europe. At the same time, 65 per cent of them are signed between
partners at different stages of development (North-South, North-East,
or South-East). Developing countries are also major players in this
trend, being partners in more than half of all the RTAs formed as
part of the ‘new wave of regionalism’. North-South RTAs with
reciprocal commitments between developed and developing
countries are becoming more frequent in all regions. These include
agreements with the United States and the EU as the ‘Northern’
partner, but also agreements between Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and Japan and developing countries, particularly in Asia
and Latin America.   The countries in transition in Central and Eastern
Europe have also adopted an active role in regional integration (42
per cent of post-1990 RTAs), not only vis-à-vis the EU, but also among
3
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themselves, reformulating their mutual relationships as market
economies to forge new trade relationships after the collapse of
communism.
Paralleling these theoretical predictions, the ‘new wave’ of
regionalism is not only characterized by an increased dynamism but
also by more ambitious levels of integration, taking steps towards
integration that go beyond tariffs or non-tariff border measures.  Deep
integration, defined as ‘beyond the border measures’ (Lawrence,
1996), place considerable emphasis on liberalization of services,
investments and labour markets, government procurement,
strengthening of technological and scientific cooperation,
environment, competition-related provisions (CRPs) or monetary and
financial integration.  These are among the distinguishing
components not only of RTAs among developed countries but also
Figure 1.1 Trends in post-1990 RTA formation
Legend: Intra-continental RTAs refer to agreements between countries belonging to the same
geographical region; Inter-continental RTAs counts the number of new RTAs between countries
situated on different continents; Inter-RTA agreements refer to those trading arrangements between
two or more existing RTAs; North-North RTAs refer to agreements involving developed-only, while
South-South and refer to developing-only; North-South RTAs refer to agreements between developing
and developed countries. Mixed RTAs refers to RTAs among transition economies or between them
on the one hand, and developed or developing economies, on the other.
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of those between developed and developing countries. Among the
early manifestations of this ‘new regionalism’ were the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercado Común del Sur
(MERCOSUR), the ‘deepening’ of EU integration through the Single
Market programme, and the ‘widening’ of integration towards the
East, all of which took place in a relatively short period.  Regionalism
has moved far beyond pure trade/tariff or market integration
associated with free trade areas or customs unions. Integration has
now become much deeper, much more multifaceted and multi-
sectoral, encompassing a wide range of economic and other political
objectives (Bora and Findlay, 1996; Whalley, 1996).  Thus, recent RTAs
include not only tariff abolition or reduction on goods, but also
provisions on a broad range of areas such as competition-related
provisions.
The recent proliferation of massive international mergers, the
existence of international cartels and their potentially negative impact
on developing countries (Evenett, 2003) puts forward a case for all
countries to equip themselves with the tools needed to deal with the
increased market power of multinational companies and their anti-
competitive practices. Such evidence suggests that, once the ‘deep
waters’ of government-imposed trade barriers are gradually removed,
the ‘mountain peaks’ of trade-related private anti-competitive
practices become even more apparent. Since national competition
policies are usually poorly equipped to deal with such potential
negative influences as cross-border anti-competitive practices, and
in the absence of a binding multilateral framework on competition
policy, the importance of regional competition policies becomes
apparent.
As a result of this and other more complex motivations, the
number of RTAs with CRPs increased significantly in the last two
decades. Thus, the number of RTAs containing CRPs reached a peak
of 141 agreements (Figure 1.2). Most of these agreements have been
enacted since the mid-1990s. An often-stated rationale for including
CRPs in RTAs is that during the 1990s, many economies came to
recognize the importance of competition policy to ensure that the
benefit of RTAs is not thwarted by anti-competitive practices.
However, as seen from Figure 1.2, in the last three years, the pace
of formation of RTAs containing CRPs is less steep than that of total
5
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Figure 1.2 The evolution of RTAs with CRPs, 1958-2005
Source:  Based on Crawford and Fiorentino (2005), WTO (2003a) and author’s compilations.
The figures for 2005 are to date (as of June 2005).
Figure 1.3 Annual formation of RTAs, in the post-1990 period
Source:  Based on Crawford and Fiorentino (2005), WTO (2003a) and author’s compilations.
The figures for 2005 are to date (as of June 2005).
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RTAs, implying that, although a fashionable trend, most recently
many more RTAs that entered into force did not contain CRPs.
Incidentally, this relative decline in the trend of RTAs containing CRPs
coincides with the post-Cancun difficulties faced in the WTO on trade
and competition issues.2
2. The motivation for this study
However, despite progress being made on these issues, far less
is known about the types of ‘deep integration’ provisions such as
CRPs in RTAs, their rationale and impact on members. Recent
noteworthy attempts in this regard are OECD studies (2002, 2005a).
The OECD (2002) study covered several themes, such as the extent of
co-ordination of substantive competition standards and rules, the
treatment of monopolies and enterprises with special and exclusive
rights, the mechanisms for consultation, co-operation and
enforcement, and the relationship of competition policy rules to the
application of trade remedies.  The OECD (2005a) study focused more
specifically on the various types of competition provisions included
in selected RTAs.
The inclusion of CRPs in RTAs, particularly those signed by
developing and transition economies, is also justified by the fact that
competition law plays a more important complementary role to trade
liberalization than in developed countries. In less mature markets,
as is the case of many developing and transition economies, given
the inadequacy of business infrastructure (poor physical
infrastructure, dysfunctional legal and regulatory frameworks, legacy
of excessive state intervention and weak governance, and so on) there
is a much greater proportion of ‘localized’ markets and ‘non-tradable’
products. Furthermore, developing country trade is constrained by
more limited distribution channels and other public and private
barriers that cannot be disciplined by import competition. Therefore,
merely removing conventional trade barriers among RTA partners
may not necessarily lead to increased trade, in the absence of
complementary competition provisions (either as competition
advocacy or enforcement actions).
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Therefore, what seems to emerge at this stage is that countries
have been eager to ink an ever-increasing number of RTAs containing
CRPs, with different levels of ambition and among countries at
various levels of development. Such CRPs provide for different types
of actions ranging from adoption of national competition laws, to
cooperation, positive comity and even dispute settlement. Given this
diversity, one legitimate question would be to know what CRPs
provide the best prospects for successfully contributing to the broader
integration objectives of RTAs. Is there a correlation between level of
trade integration, stage of development and type of regional CRPs?
Is there any synergy between various trade provisions and CRPs or
among various CRPs? For instance, does the inclusion of CRPs affect
the ability to implement other trade-related policies at regional level?
More specifically, do certain CRPs (for instance soft convergence and
‘policy transfer’ provisions) increase the ability of RTA members to
make use in a more effective manner of other CRPs (such as
consultation, exchange of information, positive or negative comity)?
Lastly, what are the relationships between the proliferation of CRPs
in RTAs and the discussions on trade and competition issues at
multilateral level?
Notwithstanding the relevance of such questions, answering them
or, more generally, evaluating the implementation and enforcement
record of CRPs in RTAs is no easy task. Despite this CRP and RTA
diversity, there is, however, astonishingly little information available
about RTA members’ readiness to act and implement such CRPs. The
use of CRPs by RTA members is generally not published, and few
competition authorities include information about international
cooperation in their public annual reports. This lack of information
would suggest that most of these CRPs are still to be tested.
In such conditions, definite answers about ‘best-practices’ in
negotiating and implementing CRPs in RTAs would be premature.
Therefore, apart from offering preliminary answers to some of the
questions and testing several hypotheses formulated above, the main
purpose of this chapter is to create a taxonomy of CRPs found in a
large variety of RTAs based on multiple criteria that would account
for the recent trends in RTA formation: (i) various levels of integration
and trade-related objectives (bilateral free trade areas, customs
unions, or more ambitious forms of integrations such as the creation
of common markets or EU accession); (ii) competition-related
8
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provisions (ranging from simple cooperation procedures to more
advanced forms of cooperation, including comity principles or
harmonization of national competition laws); and (iii)  development
criteria taking into account the development status of RTA members
(developed, developing, transition economies) and their specific
needs.  Based on this taxonomy, a number of distinctions can be drawn
regarding the coherence between the level of trade integration, the
development status, and the most appropriate competition provisions
that would suit the needs of RTA partners and enhance their trade
potential.
In order to arrive at a general taxonomy of competition policy
regimes at regional level and to identify certain trends, the next
section briefly describes the theoretical framework used in this
chapter and presents a number of working hypotheses. Section 4 will
test empirically these hypotheses using several statistical indicators
with regard to the key trade-competition-development linkages
characterizing the plethora of existing RTAs. After testing these trade
and development hypotheses, a more in-depth analysis of specific
competition provisions in selected RTAs will be provided in Section
4.3. The final section provides an overview of the likely role that CRPs
in RTAs could play in addressing their stated objectives concluding
with some tentative thoughts on the shape of the future policy debate
on the role and impact of competition policy provisions in regional
trade agreements.
3. Towards a taxonomy of CRPs: brief
methodological considerations
The landscape of RTAs containing CRPs is characterized by great
diversity. Agreements differ along many important dimensions,
including:
• on trade-related objectives: elimination of tariffs on goods,
adoption of common external tariffs, liberalization of trade in
services, creation of a customs union, liberalization of factor
movements, and so on;
• with regard to their membership (bilateral agreements vs. regional
agreements, agreements among developed countries, between
developing and developed countries, and so on);
9
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• on institutional arrangements (supranational institutions, joint
committees, and so on); and
• on types of competition provisions (general consultation, formal
cooperation, comity, establishment of supranational competition
rules, harmonization, dispute settlement, and so on).
In order to understand the ways in which these multiple
dimensions are reflected by existing RTAs containing CRPs, a tri-
dimensional taxonomy is constructed. The three pillars of such a
taxonomy are: trade-related characteristics, development dimension
and main types of competition-related provisions.
3.1 The trade dimension
On the trade dimension, RTAs can be grouped into the following
categories:
• bilateral free trade agreements (BFTAs) – agreements aimed at
eliminating trade barriers between two trading partners;
• plurilateral free trade agreements (PFTAs) - agreements aimed at
eliminating trade barriers between more than two trading
partners;
• customs unions (CUs) – agreements aimed at eliminating border
measures among partners and the establishment of a common
custom territory;
• association agreements – bilateral agreements that reflect the special
role played by the EU, and to a lesser extent the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA), in proliferating RTAs in general, and
those containing CRPs, in particular. Although they do not adopt
a common trade policy, such agreements aim for a high level of
integration in various trade-related areas with neighbouring
countries, such as Central and Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean region; and
• common markets and economic unions – agreements aimed at further
integration beyond trade policies, including free movement of
capital and labour, as well as regulatory convergence and
supranational economic governance.
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The trade dimension is important since trade and competition
objectives, although to a large extent overlapping, may differ,
depending on the level of ambition of regional integration. The
inclusion of competition provisions in a trade agreement does have
implications. In certain instances, the trade policy may conflict with
the objectives set out by the competition policy, pointing to the need
for a coherent approach to trade and competition provision at
regional level. One, mentioned above, is the scope of the competition
rules in relation to the trade objectives being pursued.
There is a difference in the type and applicability of competition
provisions required in an agreement limited to free movement of
goods and one whose aim would be to liberalize trade in services. If
the RTA only applies to trade in goods, for instance, CRPs contained
therein do not apply to trade in services. This has potentially a major
implication for the benefits that could be derived from RTA formation,
given the fact that the services sector accounts for a large share of
most developed markets and coincidentally many services sectors
are significantly affected by non-negligible cross-border competition
issues that may have negative spillover effects even for the good
functioning of a free trade area for goods.3 A new set of issues comes
into play when regionalism leads to the establishment of a common
market or economic union. When investment and labour issues are
taken into account, regional trade and competition provisions may
lead to conflicting objectives or adverse welfare effects
(Vandenbussche, 2000).
Therefore, based on the above-mentioned considerations, the
following hypotheses can be formulated:
H1: RTAs characterized by a higher level of trade integration
are more likely to contain CRPs.
Based on this hypothesis,  one could assume that RTAs
characterized by a higher level of trade integration tend to contain
specific CRPs that would ensure coherence between various regional
policies. This is the case for instance in anti-dumping rules. Actions
that may look legitimate from a trade policy perspective may turn
out to be illegal from a competition policy perspective.4 In the absence
of strong competition policy provisions in a bilateral FTA, for
instance, anti-dumping actions may be instigated by cartel members
11
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against competitors from RTA partners that refuse to join or otherwise
distort the functioning of the cartel.5 Anti-competitive effects are even
more likely when price undertakings are used instead of anti-
dumping duties (Veugelers and Vandenbussche,  1999).
Therefore, effective CRPs that could trump anti-dumping rules
when necessary would have a strong trade creation effect. Well-
designed CRPs may also induce a harmonizing effect on anti-
dumping or other trade policies, such as countervailing duties.
Assume, for instance, that an RTA member may take action against
intermediate imports (for example steel or chemical products)
benefiting from state aids that distort or threaten to distort
competition in its own market. However, if the other RTA partner
has more lax policies vis-à-vis state aids that allow domestic producers
to use such subsidized inputs, when final products incorporating
such subsidized intermediate inputs are exported to the other RTA
partner with stricter state aid rules, this may be considered an anti-
competitive practice that affects trade between RTA members. In such
cases, corrective actions could be required, including the need to
further harmonize other aspects of trade policies.
Thus, a second hypothesis on the level of trade integration and
existence of specific CRPs is the following:
H2: RTAs characterized by a higher level of trade integration
are more likely to contain CRPs that ensure coherence
between trade and competition objectives, for example on
anti-dumping rules.
Given this interdependence between the type of RTA, the level
of integration and the competition provisions, the trade-related
hypotheses will be tested against the existing evidence on regional
CRPs in Section 4.
3.2 The development dimension
A second important feature refers to the level of development of
RTA members. A typical distinction in this regard is between
agreements among developed countries (North-North RTAs) and
12
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agreements among developing countries (South-South RTAs). A
further category of agreements is the one between developed and
developing countries (North-South RTAs). Lastly, an additional
dimension is obtained when taking into account the agreements
formed by transition countries among themselves (East-East), with
developed countries (North-East) or with developing countries (East-
South).
Several analyses have drawn a distinction between the expected
trade-creation and diversion effects of RTAs, depending on the
development level of the participants. Several authors concluded that,
whereas North-South RTAs are usually benign, South-South regional
blocs are problematic in several respects (Schiff, 1997; Yeats, 1998;
World Bank, 2000).6 The above discussion however does not consider
whether CRPs could make a difference to the functioning of the
different types of RTAs.
When competition policy is introduced as an additional
dimension in South-South and North-South RTAs, several additional
hypotheses can be formulated. Although all types of RTAs share, to
some extent, common objectives with regard to the promotion of
competition, several specificities can be highlighted. CRPs in North-
South RTAs for instance, may be shaped by the different objectives
pursued by developing and developed countries at regional level.
For developing countries, tackling anti-competitive practices
originating in developed countries is a major priority. It has often
been argued in many fora (such as UNCTAD, WTO, OECD, ICN)
that developing countries are exposed to a range of anti-competitive
practices (in particular international cartels and abuses of dominant
position) by large multinational companies located in developed
countries (see Levenstein et al., 2003, for instance). If this is the case,
and in the absence of other more effective frameworks for cooperation
on competition policy at international level, developing countries
should try to negotiate specific CRPs that would deal with such anti-
competitive practices. Such CRPs could range from simple
notification procedures to exchange of confidential information and
positive comity provisions whereby competition agencies in
developed countries will safeguard market competition in RTA
partners.7
13
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For developed countries, such provisions (for example tackling
export cartels or abuse of dominance by domestic firms in RTA
partners) tend to be less important. In contrast, developed countries
might be more interested in ensuring that their developing country
RTA partners adopt national competition laws. Furthermore, it will
be more fruitful for developed country RTA members if their
developing country counterparts would adopt a similar approach to
the one used in developed countries (soft convergence).
Hence, based on these specificities, two hypotheses related to
CRPs in North-South RTAs could be formulated:
H3: From the viewpoint of developing countries, North-
South RTAs would require CRPs dealing with cooperation
(for example consultation, notification, and so on) on anti-
competitive practices affecting developing countries.
H4: Developed countries would tend to include in North-
South RTAs provisions regarding the adoption and
implementation of national competition laws in developing
country RTA members.
In the case of South-South RTAs, the focus of attention should
be rather different. Many of these South-South RTAs in Africa and
Latin America contain CRPs, at different stages of implementation.
Given that many South-South RTAs aim for a high level of economic
integration (customs unions, common markets, and economic
unions), the focus of such RTAs should be to create an effective
regional competition enforcement mechanism and the promotion of
competition at national level in those RTA members lagging behind
in this regard.
Under these assumptions, the following pattern is expected to
be observed from the empirical analysis:
H5: South-South RTAs tend to focus more on fostering their
competition-related ‘deep integration’ objectives.
In turn, RTAs signed by transition economies have their own
specificities. East-East RTAs, for instance, were deemed necessary to
preserve the economic links forged during the communist period,
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either as part of the former USSR or the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (COMECON). Furthermore, during the difficult
restructuring process from socialism to market economies, enhanced
preferential access to neighbouring countries was considered a major
advantage for transition economies suffering from significant
reductions in the level of economic activity during the early 1990s.
For Central and Eastern European countries, North-East RTAs were
also encouraged and deemed essential, as part of their accession
process to the European Union (EU). In both types of agreements,
given the institutional legacy of Central and Eastern European
countries, East-East and North-East CRPs played an important role
in ensuring a level playing field among RTA partners that were
dominated by state monopolies and largely dependent on state aids
and other interventionist policies. Hence, one would expect to see
many references to state aid in agreements signed by transition
economies with other RTA partners eager to reduce the trade
distortion impact of state aids.
On the other hand, from the transition economies’ viewpoint,
such RTAs should also contain more stringent disciplines on the use
of anti-dumping. Transition economies have the highest intensity of
anti-dumping cases against them (Finger et al., 2001).8 Their non-
market economy status in many countries of the world is the decisive
reason for disproportionately high anti-dumping cases against these
countries by both developed and developing countries. Given these
potentially discriminatory trading relations, it would seem reasonable
for transition economies to discipline the use of anti-dumping
procedures by their RTA partners, particularly if the level of trade
integration is high.
Therefore, based on these two considerations one could assume
the following specificities for agreements signed by transition
economies:
H6: RTAs of transition economies tend to have disciplining
CRPs on state aid and the use of anti-dumping.
Such an hypothesis should be valid in the case of Association
FTAs, given their ambitious objectives, but also other North-East and
East-South agreements.
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3.3 The competition dimension
So far, the previous discussion has drawn some hypotheses
regarding the various implications of trade and development
dimensions on the type of competition provisions that should be
present in RTAs. However, beyond an appropriate balance between
trade and competition policy provisions at regional level, a key aspect
that has to be taken into account are the specificities of CRPs
themselves.
In dealing with specific competition provisions in RTAs, rather
that formulating general hypotheses as in previous sections, a more
in-depth analysis of key competition provisions in selected RTAs will
be carried out in Section 4.3. Such competition provisions include
general provisions against various anti-competitive practices,
adoption of national competition law requirements, harmonization
of national competition rules, consultation provisions, comity
principles, sectoral exemptions, dispute settlements, and so on.
For instance, it will be interesting to see the extent to which RTAs
seek co-ordination of competition standards and rules. Similarly,
information on the extent to which regional CRPs contain obligations
to adopt and enforce competition laws or lead to convergence and
harmonization of specific competition standards and rules among
RTA members would provide useful information and would allow
an assessment of the degree of coherence between the level of trade
integration contemplated by the various agreements and the CRPs
contained therein.
4. Empirical analysis of CRPs in RTAs: trade,
competition and development considerations
In this section, the taxonomy described above will be used to
guide the empirical work on the existing landscape of RTAs with
CRPs. The statistical analysis will in turn try to test empirically some
of the hypotheses formulated in Section 3. Based on this tri-
dimensional taxonomy, more than 300 RTAs are analysed. The data
set on RTAs is based on several sources. The WTO database on
notified RTAs was supplemented with information collected from
16
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various sources on non-notified RTAs, as well as agreements among
some non-WTO members. The final data set that served for the
remainder of this analysis comprised 141 RTAs containing various
competition policy provisions. However, due to the fact that EU
enlargement led to the abrogation of a large number of RTAs with
CRPs signed by former Central and Eastern European countries prior
to EU accession, the subsequent analysis is based only on those RTAs
that are currently in force.
4.1 The trade dimension
On the trade dimension, as stated in Hypothesis 1, a direct
correlation between the level of trade integration and existence of
CRPs is expected. The statistics confirm this hypothesis to a large
extent (Figure 1.4). Virtually all Association FTAs contain competition
provision. Similarly, a significant proportion of existing common
Figure 1.4 RTAs with CRPs, by RTA type
Source:  Author’s compilations.
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markets or economic unions (60 per cent) and half of the customs
unions contain CRPs. In contrast, only 38 per cent of total existing
BFTAs and 18 per cent of PFTAs contain CRPs.
Unlike Hypothesis 1, the second hypothesis is not confirmed by
the empirical evidence. Only a handful of RTAs (for example EU,
EEA, EFTA, Chile-Canada FTA and ANZCERTA) have eliminated the
ability of members to use anti-dumping rules on their internal trade.9
All other bilateral FTAs, particularly among countries at different
levels of development, have maintained the possibility to use anti-
dumping rules on intra-RTA trade. Moreover, South-South RTAs that
have more ambitious objectives than just a bilateral FTA have
maintained the applicability of anti-dumping on trade among
members. In the case of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), for
instance, WTO anti-dumping rules have been explicitly included in
the recent protocol signed in March 2000, which amends the original
CARICOM treaty on matters related to competition policy, consumer
protection, dumping and subsidies.10 In such cases, it is still possible
for anti-dumping actions to trump competition policy considerations.
This leaves open the possibility of conflicts between trade and
competition policy objective, as mentioned in Section 3.1.
Beyond this statistical evidence, two interesting examples offered
by the EU and US experiences with regional CRPs would further
illustrate how trade and competition issues interact. In the case of
US, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 provided a
new impetus for RTA negotiations. Thus, this led to several bilateral
trade agreements (with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain,
SACU, CAFTA). One of the objectives sought in regional trade
negotiations by the US is to conclude trade agreements that anticipate
and prevent the creation of new trade barriers that may put US
exports at a competitive disadvantage. Anti-competitive practices are
one such example.
However, there is little evidence in favour of a clear nexus
between existing anti-competitive practices affecting US bilateral
relations and a deliberate policy to include competition policy
provisions in recent US FTAs, in the first place, or to make subsequent
use thereof. For instance, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) publishes annually a compendium entitled the National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, covering, inter alia, anti-
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competitive barriers negatively affecting US exports. Over the years,
the various issues of the report described anti-competitive practices
that the US Government believed may have restricted market access
for US exports in many countries (for example China, Egypt, Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, Poland, South Africa, Switzerland,  Turkey, and
so on). Yet, in only a few instances were explicit linkages made
between such alleged anti-competitive practices and attempts to use
CRPs in existing or future RTAs to address these practices. One such
example refers to alleged private anti-competitive practices and
governmental measures having an equivalent effect in several services
sectors (for example telecom, banking, insurance) in Guatemala,
which were considered as priorities in the Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) negotiations (USTR, 2004:177-78), even
though CAFTA does not contain general CRPs. Instead of using
existing CRPs in RTAs or attempting to negotiate new ones, trade
disputes settlement mechanisms at multilateral or bilateral level (or
unilateral trade measures such as Section 301 in the case of the US)
have been used more often than cooperation provisions on
competition to address such alleged anti-competitive problems.
However, the case of US-signed RTAs is not unique. The EU, for
instance, despite having concluded the largest number of RTAs
containing often very detailed CRPs, seems to have made little use of
such provisions in addressing alleged anti-competitive practices
abroad.11 In the annual report published by the DG-IV Competition
on international cooperation, the only agreements cited as being used
are the ones with the US, Canada and Australia. Instead, as in the
case of US RTAs, various trade disciplines, such as anti-dumping,
are likely to be used more often than CRPs.
4.2 The development dimension
On the development dimension, as discussed in Section 3, a
number of hypotheses were advanced for various types of RTAs. The
statistical analysis brings some prima facie evidence in favour of
Hypothesis 3. Figure 1.5 shows the number of RTAs with CRPs
pertaining to consultation mechanisms and their share in the total
number of RTAs with CRPs. As intuitively predicted, a large
19
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Figure 1.5 RTAs with CRP consultation provisions
Legend:  In this and subsequent figures, N, E and S stand for North, East and South,
respectively.
Figure 1.6 RTAs with notification provisions
Legend:  In this and subsequent figures, N, E and S stand for North, East and South,
respectively.
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proportion of North-South RTAs have some sort of consultation
provisions, compared to East-East, East-South or South-South RTAs.
Another specific CRP that can provide developing countries with
further information on anti-competitive practices having a negative
impact on their intra-RTA trade are notification procedures. The data
presented in Figure 1.6 show that a relatively large share of North-
South RTAs (38 per cent) contains such notification procedure,
proportionately more than North-North (31 per cent), South-South
(14 per cent) or North-East RTAs (10 per cent).
However, such analysis is too aggregated to look into the details
of each type of consultation procedure and conclude whether they
provide an adequate basis for developing countries to safeguard their
interest against anti-competitive practices originating in developed
RTA partners. However, given the lack of information on their
implementation, it is highly unlikely that such provisions have been
so far used successfully in tackling intra-RTA anti-competitive
practices.
Figure 1.7 RTAs with national CRP requirements
Legend:  In this and subsequent figures, N, E and S stand for North, East and South,
respectively.
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Hypothesis 4 regarding the inclusion of national competition law
requirements is also upheld by the data (Figure 1.7).
Fifty-nine percent of North-South agreements with CRP
provisions contain reference either to the adoption of national
competition laws or their effective enforcement. As discussed in
greater detail in Section 4, this confirms the hypothesis that developed
countries make use of RTAs to promote a competition culture in
developing country RTA partners that will go beyond CRPs applicable
to intra-RTA trade.
Another hypothesis advanced in Section 3.2 concerned South-
South RTAs. The a priori prediction of Hypothesis 5 was that South-
South RTAs should focus on promoting their deep integration
objectives. This hypothesis can be tested by looking at the percentage
of different types of South-South RTAs (free trade areas, customs
unions, common markets and economic unions)  containing CRPs in
the total number of South-South RTAs (Figure 1.8).
Figure 1.8 South-South RTAs with CRPs by different level of
economic integration
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Figure 1.8 shows that a large proportion of ‘deeper’ integration
RTAs (50 per cent of South-South common markets/economic unions
and 43 per cent of South-South customs unions) contain CRPs in
comparison with 10 per cent of bilateral and 7 per cent of plurilateral
South-South FTAs. However, although the large proportion of deep
South-South RTAs that contain CRPs seems encouraging, the evidence
presented above does not reflect their implementation, which could
be considered, at best, as mixed. In certain cases, many CRPs are still
to be operationalized, whereas in others enforcement agencies are
poorly equipped to implement the various CRPs. Therefore, this
suggests that there is still room for improvement in South-South
RTAs, not only in adopting CRPs in those agreements that lack such
provisions but also in improving their implementation record in those
agreements that have already adopted CRPs.
Lastly, the theoretical expectation about RTAs signed by transition
economies was that they will contain detailed CRPs aimed at
disciplining the trade-distorting effects of state aids and anti-dumping
or countervailing procedures (Hypothesis 6). The evidence is mixed.
On the one hand, virtually all RTAs involving transition economies
contain detailed provisions on state aid, often with special and
differential treatment provision in their favour, in the case of
Accession FTAs (see Chapter 5 by Brusick and Clarke in this
publication for a more detailed discussion). However, despite such
provisions aimed at disciplining the use of trade-distorting state aid
by transition economies, there was no competition-related
disciplining provision on anti-dumping or countervailing duties in
North-East RTAs or East-East RTAs (see Chapter 3 by Holmes et al.
in this publication for more evidence on this).
4.3 The competition dimension
After discussing the various trade and development
considerations regarding the existing CRPs in RTAs with different
levels of integration objectives signed by developed, developing or
transition economies, another major dimension that needs to be
explored in greater detail is the relationship between such trade and
competition dimensions and specific competition provisions. In this
section, the statistical analysis is supplemented by selected examples
from various RTAs with regard to competition provision such as
23
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national competition law requirement, harmonization effects, abuse
of dominant position, consultation provisions, exchange of
confidential information, comity principles, sectoral exemptions and
dispute settlements.
4.3.1  National competition law requirements
One distinct feature of several RTAs is the inclusion of specific
provisions with regard to existence and enforcement of national
competition laws. Twenty-one agreements (three EU agreements, 13
bilateral FTAs, three customs unions, and two RTAs) contain such
requirements. From a development perspective, a large majority of
these agreements (76 per cent) are North-South agreements. Hence,
North-South RTAs can be seen to act as ‘national competition policy-
transfer’ mechanisms from developed to developing countries.
The language referring to the need to adopt national competition
laws and policies varies from reference to the proper functioning of
existing institutions entrusted with competition law enforcement (for
example the Canada-Israel FTA) to provisions requiring a party to
put in place the necessary legal and institutional infrastructure. For
Figure 1.9 RTAs containing a requirement to adopt and implement
national competition laws
Legend:  In this and subsequent figures, N, E and S stand for North, East and South,
respectively.
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instance, in the case of the US-Singapore FTA, the adoption of a
national competition law by Singapore is ‘hardwired’: Article 12 of
the agreement stipulates that Singapore should enact general
competition legislation by January 2005.12
Having a national competition law is important for the manner
in which CRPs are included in RTAs. In the absence of a domestic
law, there is no legal basis for a member to take any action against
practices organized in another Member State in respect of the effects
upon its own territory, no matter how difficult it may be to actually
enforce such a law against non-resident actors.
In the case of South-South agreements, several agreements
containing national competition law requirements (for example the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), MERCOSUR) have not
been successful in implementing these provisions in all Member
States.
4.3.2  Harmonization effects
One typical case of harmonization provision on competition
policy by way of RTA formation is provided by the EU agreements
with Central and Eastern European countries (Europe Agreements),
as part of the broader objective of EU membership. However, the
Europe Agreements are not alone in having harmonization
provisions. In the case of the EU-Morocco Agreement there is also a
harmonization effect regarding the rules governing anti-competitive
practices. The relevant provisions included in the EU-Morocco
Agreement state that the Association Council is charged to adopt,
within five years of the entry into force of the agreement, the necessary
rules against anti-competitive practices covered by the EU-Morocco
Agreement. Most importantly, Article 36(2) states that such anti-
competitive practices ‘…shall be assessed on the basis of criteria
arising from the application of the rules of Articles 85, 86 and 92 of
the Treaty establishing the European Community’.13 Hence, the rules
governing anti-competitive practices having an impact on the trade
between FTA members are ‘hardwired’ to follow the EC competition
principles, although to a lesser extent than those contained in the
agreements between the EU and acceding Central and Eastern
European countries.14
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Less explicit but potentially equally ambitious provisions are also
contained in several agreements between the EU and the former
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). One example is provided
by the EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which
provides in Article 43(4) for parties ‘…to examine ways to apply their
respective competition laws on a concerted basis in such cases where
trade between them is affected.’ The harmonization and ‘policy-
transfer’ elements are present also in other parts of Article 43 of the
EU-Armenia agreement that calls for ‘soft harmonization’ of
competition rules through the provision of technical assistance on
competition law and policy, including exchange of experts and aid
for the translation of relevant EC legislation.
One interesting hypothesis that deserves further analysis is that
such competition-related harmonization, ‘policy transfer ’ and
convergence provisions contained in RTAs would lead to a more
effective implementation of other regional CRPs or to increased
cooperation among national competition agencies. However, so far
there is little available evidence, if any, in support of such a
hypothesis. Furthermore, the evidence included in other chapters in
this publication (in particular Chapters 3 and 4 by Alvarez et al. and
Holmes et al., respectively) seems to invalidate this hypothesis.
4.3.3  Abuse of dominant position provisions
Provisions on abuse of dominant position are contained in EU
agreements or EU-shaped agreements among former Central and
Eastern European countries (CEECs) or CIS countries, as well as a
few South-South agreements. Figure 1.10 offers a breakdown of RTAs
containing dominant position provisions, by trade and development
criteria. As can be shown, the largest number of RTAs containing
abuse of dominant position provisions are North-South Agreements,
which are all agreements signed by the EU and EFTA with mostly
Euro-Med partners (the only exceptions being the EU-Turkey CU and
the EFTA bilateral agreements with Turkey and Singapore).
However, prior to EU enlargement, the most prevalent type of
RTAs containing abuse of dominant position (more than the total
number of RTAs with such provisions currently in force) were
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agreements signed by CEECs among themselves and with former CIS
countries (36 agreements) and with EU and EFTA (24 agreements).
In the case of South-South RTAs, this logic was not followed.
The few South-South RTAs that have included CRPs related to abuse
of dominant position are usually aiming at a more ambitious level of
economic integration (custom unions, common markets). In addition,
some of them (for example the Andean Community, the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), CARICOM) have
also advanced at different degrees towards the adoption and
implementation of region-wide competition rules.
The merits or demerits of dominant position provisions in South-
South RTAs can be debated. Given the limited implementation record
of such provisions in South-South RTAs, it is premature to assess
their usefulness and the relative importance for other types of South-
Figure 1.10 RTAs containing dominant position provisions
Legend:  In this and subsequent figures, N, E and S stand for North, East and South,
respectively.
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South RTAs such as bilateral free trade agreements, particularly
among countries without a national competition law, to follow the
example of East-East or North-East RTAs and consider the adoption
of such provisions at regional level. However, for a developing
country forming an agreement with a developed country, having
provisions on abuse of dominant position may be an advantage, in
so far as such provisions provide for effective cooperation among
competition agencies to curb potential abuses of dominant positions
by large companies located in the developed trading partner.
4.3.4 General consultation provisions
Fifty-four RTAs including 22 EU agreements, 27 bilateral FTAs
and two customs unions provide for general consultation mechanisms
regarding competition issues. Such consultations could be conducted
in an ad hoc manner or, in certain cases, could be facilitated by the
institutional architecture of the RTA (for example the Association
Councils and Committees in the case of EU agreements).
Interestingly enough, general provisions on consultations are
found in Association agreements, essentially EU or EFTA agreements
with non-EU members in Central and Eastern Europe, Euro-Med
region, Singapore and South Africa and Mexico.
Figure 1.11  RTAs containing provisions for general consultations on
competition policy
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Other specificities of consultation provisions across RTAs can
be highlighted. For instance, the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA
and the CARICOM-Costa Rica FTA provide for the creation of a
Standing Committee on Anti-Competitive Business Practices (Articles
XIV and I.08, respectively). The Committee is mandated, inter alia, to
monitor the implementation of the CRPs contained in the agreement
or its annexes, to consider all matters relating to competition policy,
including such matters as may be referred to it by the FTA members,
to consult on competition issues of mutual concern that arise in
international fora, to facilitate information exchange among FTA
members, to create working groups or convene expert panels on
topics of mutual interest, and so on. There is no predefined schedule
of meetings of the Committee (the agenda is to be agreed by its
members) and the Committee can regulate its own proceedings.
However, the evidence so far suggests that these institutional
arrangements have not been used in practice (see Chapter 10 by
Stewart in this publication).
Similarly, Article 14-05 of the Chile-Mexico FTA provides for the
formation of a Committee on Trade and Competition that would
convene at least once a year. The Committee is requested to report
and make recommendations on matters regarding the relationship
between competition laws and policies and trade in the FTA.
However, as with other such Committees, despite their potential
usefulness, little is known about their actual impact.
4.3.5 Confidentiality
Most agreements do not provide for the exchange of confidential
information. However, even without the exchange of such
information, there is still room for meaningful cooperation on
competition matters among RTA partners. Therefore, the mere
inability of prospective RTA partners to agree on the exchange of
confidential information should not be construed as an argument
against the inclusion of CRPs in RTAs.
4.3.6  Comity principles
Comity principles are rarely found in RTAs. One notable
exception in this regard is the EU-South Africa Agreement.
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Article 38 of the EU-SA FTA provides for the following positive
comity actions:15
1. The Parties agree that, whenever the Commission or the
South African Competition Authority has reason to believe
that anti-competitive practices, defined under Article 35, are
taking place within the territory of the other authority and
are substantially affecting important interests of the Parties,
it may request the other Party’s competition authority to take
appropriate remedial action in terms of that authority’s rules
governing competition.
2. Such a request shall not prejudice any action under the
requesting authority’s competition laws that may be deemed
necessary and shall not in any way encumber the addressed
authority’s decision-making powers or its independence.
3. Without prejudice to its respective functions, rights,
obligations or independence, the competition authority so
addressed shall consider and give careful attention to the
views expressed and documentation provided by the
requesting authority and, in particular, pay heed to the nature
of the anti-competitive activities in question, the firm or firms
involved, and the alleged harmful effect on the important
interests of the aggrieved Party.
The same agreement also contains what could be best coined as
negative comity.16 Article 38(4) states:
When the Commission or the Competition Authority of South
Africa decides to conduct an investigation or intends to take
any action that may have important implications for the
interests of the other Party, the Parties must consult, at the
request of either Party and both shall endeavour to find a
mutually acceptable solution in the light of their respective
important interests, giving due regard to each other’s laws,
sovereignty, the independence of the respective competition
authorities and to considerations of comity.
4.3.7  Sectoral exemptions
Most EU agreements and agreements among EU ‘spokes’ in
Central and Eastern Europe and the Euro-Med area contain explicit
exemptions from regional CRPs for agricultural products. Apart from
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agriculture, few agreements explicitly exempt sectors from
competition-related provisions included in RTAs.17 When read in
conjunction with the sovereign application of national competition
laws (with their own exceptions and exemptions), this implies that
such sectoral exemptions are unaffected by the RTA. This issue
becomes particularly important in cases where RTAs cover trade in
services, in particular services sectors that are within the realm of
sectoral regulators. With the exception of telecommunications, there
are few, if any, sector-specific CRPs included in RTAs.
4.3.8 Dispute settlements
RTAs have adopted two broad strategies to address bilateral trade
disputes. One strategy is a legalistic, formal dispute settlement
process, such as the ones adopted by the EU or NAFTA.  However,
many RTAs do not have a legalistic dispute settlement mechanism.
Instead, they rely on a more diplomatic mechanism.  Trade disputes
are referred to a joint body (often called the Joint Committee) to solve
trade disputes between parties.
In the case of competition, the majority of RTAs exclude CRPs
from the purview of formal dispute mechanisms. Several EU
agreements, however, allow for dispute settlements. A limited dispute
settlement mechanism is also provided for in the US-Singapore FTA.
However, interestingly enough, the US-Singapore FTA explicitly
exempts from dispute settlement issues related cooperation and
consultation procedures on competition issues.
Another unusual example is the Australia-Thailand FTA. Unlike
most other BFTAs, non-compliance with the CRPs, including
provisions on transparency and information requests regarding
government enterprises and designated monopolies, is subject to
dispute settlement.
It is difficult to say which model is more appropriate to diffuse
competition disputes. Information on disputes referred to joint
committees is not readily available and therefore their efficiency or
deterrent properties cannot be assessed.   On the other hand, some
RTAs that rely on joint committees rather than on formal legalistic
arrangements (such as the Europe Agreements for instance) have so
31
Cernat
far avoided trade disputes at multilateral level. Yet, unlike the Europe
Agreements, other RTAs have not excluded the potential for acute
trade tensions among their members, either at multilateral or at
regional level.
5. Conclusions
The analysis carried out in this chapter was based on a
combination of theoretical discussion of the trade-development-
competition nexus and the ways in which this could be pursued in a
coherent manner by various types of RTAs (free trade areas, customs
unions, common markets, and so on). A descriptive statistical analysis
tested the theoretical predictions formulated based on the trade-
development-competition nexus. A detailed analysis of key CRPs also
led to a number of insights. This chapter has shown in great detail
that in recent years countries at different levels of development
(developed, developing, transition economies) have been eager to
ink RTAs containing a wide range of CRPs. Various justifications for
the inclusion of CRPs in RTAs were given, many of them reflected in
the actual shape of CRPs negotiated in RTAs.
Despite this negotiating dynamism, little action has been
recorded in the implementation phase of such CRPs. Therefore, it
seems that RTA partners are more eager to ink CRPs in RTAs than to
put them into practice. The actual impact of this gap between
negotiations and implementation efforts is obviously difficult to
quantify. In theory, the adoption of competition law and policy (CLP)
rules at regional levels should be welcomed, but what is their practical
impact? What is the actual use of such CLP provisions (negative/
positive comity, notification, and so on)? Are economic operators,
for instance, aware of the benefits that they could gain from efficiently
invoking such provisions? Do they file complaints to the appropriate
competition authorities that could then be subject to CRP
implementation?
In the absence of such ex post data regarding the performance of
various CRP provisions in safeguarding the integration objectives of
RTA members, these questions cannot easily be answered. Things
are easier to assess when it comes to the requirement to have a
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national law or establishing adequate regulatory frameworks. In such
instances, a causal relationship between CRPs in RTAs and the track
record of implementing agencies may be more easily established.
However, beyond these difficulties stemming from inadequate
information about implementation record, a more difficult question
arises from the theoretical ambiguity of RTA formation, pointed out
by Viner (1950) and mentioned earlier in this chapter. When imperfect
competition is taken into account, there is a wide consensus that anti-
competitive practices can impair or even nullify the predicted welfare
benefits and the dynamic competition effects as a result of RTA
formation. Hence, RTAs need to contain CRPs. However, in terms of
net trade effects (trade creation vs trade diversion), the impact of
such provisions on the trade and welfare effects of RTAs is dependent
on the specificities of the CRPs. Despite these analytical advances,
however, the initial Vinerian ambivalent conclusion that RTAs could
enhance or reduce welfare remains. The issue of the net effect of RTAs
on the welfare of the Member States and on the world economy is
therefore an empirical issue. Moreover, even if there were a clear-cut
analytical answer to the question of the sign of the effects, the
magnitude of these effects would still be of interest.
For instance, an RTA that provides for members to adopt national
competition laws and apply them in a non-discriminatory manner
vis-à-vis national, intra-RTA, and third-party firms will, ceteris paribus,
have trade creation effects. On the other hand, an RTA that only
contains CRPs that would tackle anti-competitive practices in so far
as they may affect trade between RTA members, has a de jure discriminatory
effect on non-RTA firms and may induce an additional trade diverting
potential against competitive third-party producers.
Two other trade and competition issues that may be of relevance
for RTAs are worth mentioning: merger control and evolving clauses.
Firstly, despite the growth in cross-border mergers and acquisitions
and its obvious implications at regional level, with the exception of
those RTAs establishing regional competition rules, explicit
provisions in this field are virtually non-existent.18 Given the
disparities in capacities, approaches and objectives of domestic
competition policies among RTA members with regard to merger
control, this gap is not entirely surprising. However, for streamlining
merger control, as well as for other competition provisions with
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significant economic implications at regional level, including an
evolving clause allowing members to adopt a gradual approach to
enlarge the scope of regional competition provisions may introduce
an additional flexibility. However, despite their potentially useful role
(in both South-South and North-South RTAs), as in the case of merger
control, the number of RTAs containing such evolving clauses remains
limited.
Another important question that stems from the great variety in
terms of scope, objective, membership characteristics, and specific
CRPs included in the recent RTAs is the interrelationship between
trade and competition provisions at regional and multilateral levels
in the WTO context. Such an interrelationship can act both ways: (i)
the impact of RTAs on the multilateral process; and (ii) the impact of
the trade and competition at multilateral level on the various CRPs
adopted at regional level. Regarding the first aspect, given this variety
of approaches at regional level, it seems that there is no emerging
regional model that could currently serve as a major driving force in
the discussions on trade and competition issues at multilateral level.
On the second aspect, one way to identify the impact of
multilateral processes on regional integration would be to identify
regional CRPs that reflect the discussions regarding a WTO
multilateral framework on competition. Such a comparison is further
justified by the fact that the discussion in the WTO Working Group
on Trade and Competition (WGTC) and the proliferation of RTAs
with CRPs happened simultaneously. However, rather surprisingly,
out of the multitude of RTAs signed in recent years, very few RTAs
include discernable references to issues raised at multilateral level.
Among them, Canada-Costa Rica, Australia-Thailand, Australia-
Singapore, and Mexico-Japan FTAs contain explicit reference to WTO
principles, as evolved through the work of the WGTC.
For instance the Australia-Thailand FTA states in Article 1203
that ‘… any measures taken by a Party to proscribe anti-competitive
practices, and the enforcement actions taken pursuant to those
measures, shall be consistent with the principles of transparency,
timeliness, non-discrimination, comprehensiveness and procedural
fairness.’ Although the FTA does not make any explicit reference to
the WTO work on competition or its broader competition-related
objective, based on the similarity of the wording used in the FTA and
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that of Australia’s submissions to the WGTC, it would be reasonable
to believe that such CRP provisions were induced by the WTO
discussion on trade and competition. Furthermore, the Australia-
Singapore FTA contains competition provisions applicable to the
telecom sector that seem, prima facie, to be similar to the provisions
contained in the WTO Reference Paper, although somewhat stronger
in certain respects.
However, given the relatively small number of RTAs containing
CRPs similar to the ones discussed at multilateral level, it seems that
the inclusion of CRPs is not greatly influenced by the debates held at
multilateral level, despite the fact that the inclusion of CRPs at both
regional level and on the multilateral agenda was advocated by the
EU. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the lack of consensus
on trade and competition issues at multilateral level seemed to have
had a ‘chilling effect’ in recent years on the inclusion of CRPs at
regional level.
While some aspects related to the design and implementation of
competition policy may still deserve further investigation, the
discussion in the previous sections resulted in one clear conclusion:
the available evidence shows that countries are eager to ink RTAs
with CRPs but are far less eager to implement them. This weak
implementation record can be partly explained by the fact that RTAs
with CRPs is a relatively new phenomenon. The history of regional
integration has shown that ‘deep integration’ rules, such as
competition provisions, need time to fully materialize, particularly
in RTAs involving developing countries. However, expeditious
progress can only be expected if strengthening of implementation
capacity in developing and transition RTA members is accompanied
by reinforced commitment from developed countries to effectively
address the main competition-policy concerns of their trading
partners.
35
Cernat
NOTES
1Both the European Union project and NAFTA have been justified on economies
of scale that not only allowed RTA members to increase their intra-regional
exports but also their trade with the rest of the world.
2Another possible factor accounting for this effect may be the EU enlargement
and the termination of all the agreements signed by newly acceded countries
prior to enlargement.
3Take for instance the possibility of anti-competitive practices negatively
affecting the transport or distribution sector of goods within the RTA. Such
anti-competitive practices will certainly reduce or even nullify the expected
trade creation effects as a result of RTA formation and would maximize the
potential for trade diversion effects, rendering regional exporters less
competitive. Moreover, a large number of services are characterized by
monopolies subject to sectoral regulation, which may prevent the
applicability of regional or domestic competition rules.
4There is a significant theoretical and empirical literature on the potential anti-
competitive effect of anti-dumping rules. See for instance Staiger and Wolak
(1989, 1992) for a game-theoretical argument, Prusa (1992) for an analysis
of US anti-dumping actions or Messerlin (1990) for the case of the EU.
5Although not directly related to the functioning of any US-signed RTA, the
case of the ferrosilicon cartel in the US is an illustrative example of how
cartel members can disguise their activities and successfully benefit from
the imposition of anti-dumping duties. The likelihood of such actions is
increased in the case of RTA formation that generates trade creation effects,
given the fact that RTA members would have preferential market access
leading to lower prices and increased competition with domestic producers.
6For an argument in favour of the positive trade-creating effects of South-South
RTAs see for instance Cernat (2001).
7See Hoekman and Saggi (2003) for further details on a similar argument about
the negotiation of effective development-friendly CRPs at multilateral level.
8Finger et al. (2001) define anti-dumping intensity as a measure of how many
cases were initiated against a country per dollar of exports.
9The Canada-Chile FTA provides a distinctive example on how anti-dumping
measures can be eliminated in an RTA that is otherwise rather ’shallow‘
both on trade integration and competition policy objectives.
10See for instance Article 30 of Protocol VIII amending the treaty establishing
the Caribbean Community.
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11In addition to CRPs contained in various types of trade agreements, the EU
has forged a multitude of other competition-related cooperation relations
with more than 130 countries.
12In accordance with its commitments, Singapore enacted the Competition Act
2004. The Act will be implemented in three phases, beginning with the
establishment of a Competition Commission on 1 January 2005, followed
by completion of implementing regulations (except for mergers and
acquisitions) by approximately January 2006, followed by implementing
regulations for mergers and acquisitions by approximately January 2007
(USTR, 2005).
13Similar provisions are found in the EU-Tunisia Euro-Med Agreement but not
in the EU-Egypt agreement for instance. Instead, the EU-Egypt Euro-Med
Agreement contains a ‘soft harmonization’ provision stating that the future
national competition law of Egypt should take into account the competition
rules developed within the European Union (Joint Declaration on Article
35).
14The degree of intensity it would seek to achieve with respect to the convergence
of competition rules in the context of the Euro-Med Partnership is unclear.
According to Geradin (2004),  such convergence may range from a voluntary
approximation of the EU model on competition policy to the transposition
of EC competition rules in domestic competition laws by the Euro-Med
partners.
15The OECD (1999:17) describes positive comity ‘…as the principle that a
country should (1) give full and sympathetic consideration to another
country’s request that it open or expand a law enforcement proceeding in
order to remedy conduct in its territory that is substantially and adversely
affecting another country’s interests, and (2) take whatever remedial action
it deems appropriate on a voluntary basis and in considering its legitimate
interests’.
16According to the OECD (1999:18), negative comity may be described as the
principle that a country should (i) notify other countries when its
enforcement proceedings may have an effect on their important interests,
and (ii) give full and sympathetic consideration to possible ways of fulfilling
its enforcement needs without harming those interests.
17See Chapter 13 by Desta in this publication for a more detailed discussion of
this topic.
18Notable exceptions are the EU-Mexico and Canada-Costa Rica FTAs, for
instance.
2
What can we really learn from the
competition provisions of RTAs?
SIMON J. EVENETT
Professor of International Trade and Economic Development, Department of Economics,
University of St Gallen and Research Affiliate, CEPR. The author thanks Ana-Maria
Alvarez and Lucian Cernat for their guidance in the preparation of this Chapter. Com-
ments from Stefan Amarasinha, Oliver Solano Castro, Pierre Horna, Anestis Papadopoulos,
John Preston, and David Round were gratefully received.  The views expressed in this
Chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNCTAD
Secretariat.
1.  Introduction
When considering the negotiation of international bindingrules on competition law, competition policy, and associatedenforcement matters, something of a paradox has emerged
in recent years. On the one hand, the members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) decided not to negotiate a binding multilateral
framework on competition policy during the Doha trade round.  Yet,
many of the same countries have signed, in principle, binding
international rules on competition law and policy in regional trade
agreements.  Even though it did not claim to be comprehensive, one
analysis (OECD, 2005a) identified competition policy-related
provisions in 47 recently concluded regional trade agreements (RTAs).
Relatedly, the number of RTAs has mushroomed in recent years, and
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competition provisions are often part of such initiatives. This
seemingly paradoxical outcome raises a number of questions not all
of which, admittedly, will be pursued here. One question that is
considered here, however, is what are the implications of the recent
proliferation of competition law provisions in RTAs for the
negotiation of potential future multilateral agreements on competition
law and policy? This chapter examines various possible answers to
this question and offers a note of caution about what lessons can be
properly drawn from the recent experience with rule making on
competition law and policy in RTAs.
Section 2 of this chapter summarizes the principal components
of competition provisions in RTAs and makes some comparisons with
a leading proposal for a multilateral framework on competition policy
advanced in 2002-03. Section 3 poses a number of questions that might
help establish the implications of rule making in RTAs for future
multilateral decision making. Section 4 attempts to answer some of
those questions, drawing on the factual record established in Section
2. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.
2.   An overview of the competition provisions of
recent RTAs
Depending on how one counts RTAs in 2005, the cumulative
number of such agreements signed lies between 225 and 275 (World
Bank, 2005:27).1 The number of such agreements that were concluded
rose sharply after 1990 with 10-20 agreements typically signed
annually. In certain years in the mid- to late-1990s, the number of
RTAs signed exceeded 25, indicating that a significant amount of rule
making was taking place outside the auspices of the WTO.
Many of the recently signed RTAs contain provisions on
competition law and policy. Recently the OECD Secretariat analysed
the competition provisions of 47 RTAs and this has shed considerable
light on their prevalence and content (OECD, 2005a).
Notwithstanding concerns about the representative nature of this
sample of 47 RTAs, a point the OECD Secretariat properly
acknowledges, in what follows here extensive reference is made to
this OECD study. Readers are cautioned that the interpretations given
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here to the evidence presented are the author’s own and any criticism
of these interpretations should be directed at the author and not at
the OECD Secretariat.2
The OECD analysed 47 RTAs, 36 per cent of which are between
developing countries (which are often referred to as South-South
agreements), 3 per cent were between industrialized economies (the
so-called North-North agreements), and the remainder have
signatories from developing and industrialized economies (the so-
called North-South agreements.) Eight types of competition policy-
related provisions were identified in these 47 RTAs. It is important
to appreciate that not every agreement contained all eight types of
competition provisions, although to be included in the OECD study
presumably at least one such provision must have been present. The
classification of competition provisions in the OECD study was as
follows:3
1. ‘Measures’4 relating to the adoption, maintenance, and
application of competition law;
2. Provisions relating to the cooperation and coordination of
activities by competition law enforcement bodies;
3. Provisions relating to anti-competitive acts and measures to
be taken against them;
4. Provisions relating to non-discrimination, due process, and
transparency in the statement and application of competition
law;
5. Provisions to exclude the use of anti-dumping measures against
the commerce of signatories;
6. Provisions concerning the circumstances and conditions under
which recourse to trade remedies (such as anti-dumping
measures, countervailing duties, and safeguards) are
permitted;
7. Provisions relating to the application of dispute settlement
procedures in competition policy-related matters;
8. Provisions relating to flexibility and progressivity, sometimes
referred to as special and differential treatment (SDT)
provisions.5
It should be evident from the above list that certain provisions
are related to others. For example, the first and third provisions could
be similar, and the fifth and sixth provisions address similar (but not
identical) matters. Care must therefore be taken when interpreting
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the summary statistics concerning the prevalence of different types
of provisions that are presented below. Any analysis of this kind is
likely to raise questions about the nature of the classifications used,
misclassification errors, and double-counting, points that the reader
may want to bear in mind.
As the OECD study notes, the overwhelming impression is that
of the substantial diversity in the competition provisions adopted in
RTAs. Having said that, one common feature of the agreements
analysed was that statements that anti-competitive acts, orchestrated
by both the state and the private sector, could frustrate the broad
liberalizing objectives of the RTA in question. It seems, therefore,
that the competition provisions were included not for their own sake,
or because of their own intrinsic value or merit to signatories, but
rather as an important measure to support the barrier-reducing
objectives of the RTA. This is a statement about the purported
rationale for including competition provisions in RTAs and not about
the effects of such provisions which, in principle, need not be
confined to influencing cross-border commerce.
Broad agreement on the ends, however, does not imply agreement
on the means. As the OECD study shows, the types and prevalence
of competition commitments taken on vary markedly across RTAs.
The following provisions were found in at least 35 of the 47 RTAs
considered in the OECD (2005a): provisions relating to the exchange
of evidence and information, provisions relating to the abuse of
dominance or monopolization, provisions relating to anti-competitive
agreements between firms such as cartels, provisions relating to non-
discrimination (in particular as they relate to state monopolies), and
provisions establishing, or encouraging, consultation mechanisms for
the resolution of disputes on competition policy-related matters.
In contrast, the following provisions were found in five or fewer
of the 47 RTAs studied: provisions relating to negative comity,
provisions relating to positive comity, provisions relating to anti-
competitive mergers, provisions relating to the elimination and use
of anti-dumping measures between signatories, provisions relating
to less-than-full reciprocity of commitments for lesser developed
signatories,6 and provisions directly related to exemptions and
exceptions for lesser developed signatories.
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It would seem, then, that the recent batch of RTAs contains
relatively more provisions on anti-competitive practices than on
forms of special and differential treatment, as well as more provisions
on consultations and broader cooperation mechanisms between
competition enforcement agencies than specific obligations relating
to negative and positive comity, the latter often being thought of as
‘deeper’ forms of inter-agency cooperation on competition matters.
Given that a majority of the agreements analysed in the OECD
study are North-South agreements, and that the Northern parties are
often the United States, Canada, or the European Communities and
its Member States (EC), the diverse picture alluded to above does
include certain similarities across distinct groups of RTAs.7 The OECD
(2005a) notes that agreements involving the EC tend to be oriented
more around substantive rules than around cooperative provisions,
the latter being found more in agreements involving Canada and the
USA. Two broad ‘families’ of competition provisions can, therefore,
be identified (OECD, 2005a:14).8 Having said that, readers should
note that a clear majority of RTAs in the OECD study do not include
the EC, the USA, or Canada as a signatory, and these RTAs do not
necessarily fall into the two families identified above. Diversity, it
would seem, is the dominant attribute of RTA provisions on
competition law and policy.
Since the principal matter to be addressed in this chapter is the
potential lessons of rule making in RTAs for future multilateral
initiatives on competition law and policy, it would be remiss not to
compare the above findings with the ill-fated proposals for a
multilateral framework on competition policy that were advanced
before the Cancun Ministerial Meeting of WTO members in 2003.
Although a number of WTO members made submissions concerning
the potential elements of such a multilateral framework, the European
Community and its Member States advanced the most comprehensive
set of proposals in this respect and here they will form the comparator
to the RTAs analysed in the OECD study.
The EC proposed that a binding multilateral framework on
competition policy should have the following components: a
commitment to ban so-called hard-core cartels and to take measures
at national or regional level to give effect to such a ban, a commitment
to adhere to so-called core principles (of non-discrimination, due
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process, and transparency) in the statement of national competition
laws, modalities for voluntary cooperation between agencies
responsible for the implementation of competition law, and
progressivity and flexibility, including technical assistance and
capacity building, for developing country members of the WTO. It
was also argued that dispute settlement would only apply to the first
two of the above elements. This, in turn, implies that the application
of competition law would not be subject to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) of the WTO, at least under the provisions of
the multilateral framework proposed by the EC.
In a few respects, the proposed multilateral framework would
have gone further than the competition provisions negotiated in RTAs
in recent years. Special and differential treatment provisions are
relatively scarce in the latter9, as are provisions relating to the core
principles (although, in so far as they concern state monopolies and
state aids, they are quite common in recent RTAs.) The dispute
settlement provisions of the proposed multilateral framework stand
in contrast to the consultation mechanisms and arbitration
procedures found in most RTAs.
Conversely, most recent RTAs do not confine their provisions on
anti-competitive practices to hard-core cartels and typically refer also
to abuses of a dominant position and to state monopolies and
enterprises. Indeed, in this respect, it is worth noting that the
substantive provisions that the EC proposed for inclusion in a
multilateral framework are in fact narrower than those they often
negotiate in RTAs with trading partners.10 It would be unwise,
therefore, to conclude that the principal proponent of a multilateral
framework on competition policy was seeking to ‘multilateralize’ the
provisions that it had agreed to in numerous bilateral and regional
trade agreements. Rather, the proposed multilateral framework on
competition policy would have taken international rule making in
yet another direction. This framework would have added to the
diversity of international rules on competition law and policy rather
than replicated or merely extended those competition provisions
found in RTAs.
In the light of the recent competition policy-related rule making
in RTAs, it is interesting to note the objections from developing
country officials and analysts to the ill-fated proposals for a
43
Evenett
multilateral framework on competition policy.11 At first some argued
that hard-core cartels were not a concern for developing countries, a
view that was tempered once the range and extent of the international
cartels prosecuted in the 1990s began to be better understood. Later,
some argued that the multilateral framework would not do enough
to tackle the harm done by such cartels to developing countries.
Others argued that abuses of a dominant position, rather than cartels,
were more important for developing countries and that the proposed
multilateral framework did not reflect this priority. A different group
argued that rule making of this nature was not directly related to the
market-opening objective of the multilateral trading system, while
others saw such proposals as attempting to prise open markets in
developing countries ‘through the back door’ (presumably through
tackling import-impeding anti-competitive practices.)
Some opponents in developing countries felt that the proposed
non-discrimination provisions would compromise their government’s
ability to influence mergers and acquisitions on the grounds of
industrial policy and the like. Concerns about implementation costs
worried others, as well as fears that developing countries did not
have enough expertise to negotiate in ‘new’ areas such as competition
policy. Insufficient attention to special and differential treatment in
the proposed framework, it was said, was another ground for
opposition. The proposed cooperation provisions of the multilateral
framework, essentially being voluntary, were felt to offer little benefit
to developing countries. Others argued that negotiations on a
multilateral framework should not advance because of a lack of
progress in other areas of the Doha Round. Moreover, those WTO
members that never really wanted the Doha Round in the first place,
which according to some careful observers in Geneva could account
for over half of the WTO membership, were a natural constituency
to oppose negotiations on multilateral rules on competition policy
or on any of the Singapore Issues for that matter.
It might be useful to ask what the grounds for opposing the
multilateral framework might reveal about the true level of support
by developing countries for rule making on competition policy in
RTAs. For the sake of argument, let us take the criticisms of the
multilateral framework at face value,12 putting aside the possibility
that some of these criticisms were advanced merely for tactical
reasons. It would seem that developing countries’ emphasis on the
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abuse of dominant position does manifest itself in the competition
provisions in recent RTAs. Of the RTAs involving developing country
signatories in the OECD study (OECD, 2005a) only COMESA omits
such provisions.13 In contrast, more RTAs involving a developing
country—five in fact—omit provisions on anti-competitive
agreements, including hard-core cartels. (Interestingly, most of those
five agreements involve Chile as a party.)
Moreover, developing country concerns about general non-
discrimination provisions do seem to find counterparts in recent
RTAs. Only the agreements between Bulgaria and Israel, between
Canada and Costa Rica, between the members of CARICOM, and
between Chile and the USA appear to contain broad non-
discrimination provisions. The other RTAs involving poorer countries
do not. These two considerations may account, in part, for the
opposition of developing countries to a multilateral framework, yet
their willingness to sign RTAs with competition provisions. (If this is
the case then the paradox alluded to in the Introduction of this chapter
may well be resolved.14)
Yet, if their opposition to a multilateral framework is anything
to go by, certain aspects of the competition provisions in recent RTAs
cannot surely find favour with developing countries. First, the special
and differential treatment provisions of most RTAs are limited or
non-existent. Where they do exist, according to the OECD (2005a)
study, almost all refer to transition periods and to technical assistance,
not to less-than-full reciprocity.15 This is true of both North-South
and South-South agreements.
Developing country opposition to a multilateral framework on
the grounds of market opening sits very oddly with the fact that most
RTA competition provisions are explicitly motivated by the desire to
support other market-opening measures, such as tariff reductions.
Moreover, developing country agreement to take on substantive
provisions on hard-core cartels in RTAs (and in other areas of
competition law for that matter) is hard to square with their concerns
about implementation costs. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the
voluntary cooperation provisions of many RTAs are pretty limited,
yet developing countries agreed to them while they opposed what
they regarded as insufficiently robust provisions on voluntary
cooperation in the proposed multilateral framework. It could be
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argued, of course, that unsatisfactory experiences in RTAs were the
reason why developing countries opposed similar provisions at the
multilateral level. If this is the case, then one also ought to see greater
opposition to such provisions in negotiations over future RTAs.
A further perspective on these matters can be obtained by asking,
given the arguments made by developing country officials against a
multilateral framework, what they imply for their ‘real’ view of the
two families of competition provisions in RTAs identified in the OECD
study.16 The broader range of substantive obligations that is a
characteristic of RTAs in which the EC is a signatory is, on the basis
of what was said about the proposed multilateral framework, a mixed
blessing. The inclusion of abuse of dominance provisions would
appear on this metric to be a plus, but concerns about the
implementation costs of taking on a number of substantive provisions
(many of which are based on intra-EU experience) is a negative.
Meanwhile, the so-called North American family of agreements, with
their emphasis on cooperation provisions and on fewer substantive
provisions, and a tendency to exclude competition provisions from
dispute settlement, might be attractive to developing countries in
saving them implementation costs and limiting the enforceability of
the competition provisions. But such agreements are unlikely to allay
any fears about the likelihood of precious little cooperation actually
resulting from these RTAs.
To summarize, this section has described the principal
characteristics of competition provisions in RTAs and contrasted
them with the components of the ill-fated multilateral framework on
competition policy, which was proposed by the EC. Even though there
is a broad agreement on the goal of the former, there was significant
diversity in their legal content. It was also argued that the latter was
neither a direct expansion, nor a multilateralization, of the
competition provisions that the EC has negotiated in recent RTAs
with its trading partners.
Moreover, the grounds stated by many developing countries for
opposing the multilateral framework on competition policy were used
to assess what they might reveal about the developing country’s
preferences concerning competition provisions in RTAs. It would
seem that the recent batch of RTAs contains provisions that do not
match up with the stated preferences of many developing countries,
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a finding that may reflect the give and take of commercial diplomacy.
This finding also holds in RTAs among developing countries, and
therefore cannot be attributed solely to the limited bargaining power
of developing countries when negotiating with industrial countries
over the terms of an RTA.17 This finding concerning South-South RTAs
is unfortunate, as there appears to be no set of current RTAs whose
experience, if deemed over time to be satisfactory, could satisfy the
developing country critics of the previous multilateral initiative on
competition policy.
3.   Questions raised by the recent rule making in
RTAs on competition policy
The purpose of this section is to describe the questions that might
arise in thinking through the implications for future multilateral rule
making on competition law and policy of the recent proliferation of
RTAs containing such rules. The next section will go some way to
answering those questions. The separation of the discussion of
questions from answers is deliberate as readers may be more
persuaded of the arguments made in one section than in the other.
A number of important preliminary comments are in order as
they provide some context and boundaries to this investigation. First,
in thinking through the lessons for possible future multilateral rule
making, one should be clear what institutional parameters a new
multilateral initiative might add to. For example, have the lessons
drawn taken account of the potential future relationship between a
multilateral initiative and the set of RTAs that prevail at that time?18
A number of logical possibilities present themselves here. Do the
lessons drawn imply that a future multilateral agreement would
substitute for or strengthen the competition provisions in prevailing
RTAs? Or, implicitly, are the lessons being drawn on the assumption
that the potential multilateral initiative will operate independently
of the prevailing set of RTA provisions? A related matter would
concern the sequencing of any potential future multilateral and non-
multilateral initiatives on competition law and policy. Moreover, the
standing of the latter’s provisions in any future multilateral agreement
would have to be thought through.19
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Another preliminary comment is that, a priori, the circumstances
of WTO members differ so markedly and this ought to condition the
lessons we draw from the competition provisions in existing RTAs.
A competition provision in a given RTA may be successful, but to
what extent is the success due to the characteristics of the RTA
signatories, the circumstances that those signatories have faced, or
the provision itself? Likewise, a competition provision in a given RTA
may be barely used or used with few positive results, but does this
imply that the provision would perform as well in every RTA or
indeed if incorporated into a future multilateral framework?
Separating out the effects of different influences to draw generalizable
lessons is very difficult, especially as little is known about the
operation of competition provisions in more than a few RTAs.
(Hopefully initiatives such as this book and others will remedy this
deficiency over time.20) We should not be surprised, therefore, that
most of the arguments made are of a conceptual nature or involve
reasoning by analogy.
When discussing lessons from RTAs, it is worth noting that
multilateral initiatives could differ along (at least) the following
important dimensions: membership, the inclusion and nature of
substantive provisions to enact or enforce certain competition laws
(recognizing that there are a variety of anti-competitive acts, including
state-induced acts),  the inclusion and nature of cooperation
provisions, the inclusion and content of provisions for special and
differential treatment, mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, and
provisions relating to the statement and enforcement of competition
laws in general. The fact that a multilateral initiative could differ
along any of these dimensions suggests that there is a wide range of
logical possibilities that readers should bear in mind. Therefore, if
an analyst argued that an RTA’s experience with competition
provisions undermined the desirability or viability of one type of
multilateral initiative, this does amount to a case against all
multilateral initiatives. Moreover, readers might ask themselves
whether the multilateral initiatives or initiatives being considered
by an analyst are comprehensive, representative, or illustrative of
the potential future set of such initiatives.
In interpreting recent experience another factor to bear in mind
is that many bilateral, regional, and cross-regional initiatives on
competition law and its enforcement between 1996 and 2003 have
48
What we can really learn from competition provisions in RTAs
been influenced by the discussions in the WTO concerning the
possible negotiation of a multilateral framework on competition
policy. Some opponents, often found in the community of competition
law practitioners and enforcers, preferred to see international
cooperation take place outside of international trade fora.21 As a result,
the amount of effort that went into designing, negotiating, and
eventually using the competition provisions in RTAs was almost
surely less than could have been the case. Indeed, the growing number
of bilateral accords between competition enforcement agencies and
the prominence of the International Competition Network stand as
evidence of where many in the competition law community have
placed their efforts in recent years.22
Related factors were at work when RTAs including competition
provisions were negotiated. It has been said that some developing
country negotiators were well aware of the potentially precedent-
setting nature of competition provisions in RTAs for discussions on
a multilateral framework in the WTO. In addition, others have noted
that linkages between competition provisions and trade remedies,
such as anti-dumping, that were found in some earlier RTAs were
avoided in subsequent RTAs precisely because such linkages might
be explored in a multilateral context.
In short, it would be unwise to evaluate the content and
performance of the current set of competition provisions in RTAs
without bearing in mind the multilateral context in the run-up to the
Cancun meeting of WTO ministers in September 2003, when a
decision on the modalities for negotiations on competition policy in
the WTO was made. To the extent that that decision and the prior
debate condition current discussions on the efficacy of competition
provisions in RTAs, including, in particular, the Economic
Partnership Agreements between the European Union and selected
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, the drawing of appropriate
lessons from experiences after Cancun can be challenging too.
So what are the questions raised by the competition provisions
in RTAs that may be relevant to the design of potential future
multilateral initiatives on competition law and policy? In what
follows, these questions have been organized around four themes.
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The first theme concerns the rationale for multilateral rules. Here
the following questions arise: What do the actual and stated rationales
for competition provisions in RTAs imply about the appropriate
rationale, or rationales, for a multilateral framework? ‘Appropriate’
here could be taken to mean ‘widely acceptable’, ‘coherent’,
‘economically important’, ‘consistent with the long-standing goals
of the multilateral trading system’, and ‘value adding’, all of which
are distinct, yet in some cases related, criteria for evaluating a
proposed rationale for multilateral rules. The value-added criteria,
for example, should make an analyst ask whether future multilateral
rules are needed, given the current set of RTAs and other inter-
governmental or inter-agency accords on competition law and related
matters. Analysts should also be open to the possibility that the
appropriate rationale differs across different types of anti-competitive
activity. Moreover, the logical possibility that a rationale may be
appropriate for a multilateral initiative without being an appropriate
rationale for competition provisions in an RTA cannot be ruled out.
The second theme concerns the impact of competition rules in RTAs
on non-signatories and whether this provides a rationale for
multilateral action. Ever since the path-breaking research of Jacob
Viner, RTA analysts have considered the possibility that these accords
effectively discriminate against non-signatories, with possibly
detrimental effects. In the present context, the question arises as to
whether competition provisions in RTAs introduce discrimination
(differential treatment) between WTO members? If so, what form does
that discrimination take? Does it represent a violation of the Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle? Moreover, is there any evidence,
or means to suppose, that the discrimination harms the commercial
interests of non-signatories? If so, are there any non-discriminatory
alternatives to the discriminatory provision that can attain the same
legitimate goals as the latter? Or, is there another discriminatory
provision that attains the same goals as the latter but does less harm
to the commercial interests of non-signatories? Should any plausible
alternatives exist to the discriminatory provision, can a ranking be
established among them in terms of their desirability for inclusion in
a multilateral initiative?
Analysts should also be open to the logical possibility that the
commitments to non-discrimination in competition provisions are,
in fact, implemented in such a way as to benefit all WTO members.
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In which case one might ask whether, given the prevailing set of RTAs,
there is much additional bite from implementing generalized non-
discrimination provisions in a multilateral initiative on competition
policy? Here much would turn on the nature of the non-
discrimination provisions in prevailing RTAs, whether there are
differences in such provisions across RTAs, as well as the substantive
content of non-discrimination provisions in a multilateral framework.
A third theme concerns the effectiveness of certain competition policy-
related provisions of RTAs that the debate over the proposed multilateral
framework on competition policy from 1996 to 2003 revealed to be of
particular interest to developing countries such as the provisions that
relate to cooperation between signatories and the provisions relating
to special and differential treatment. With respect to voluntary
cooperation, the nature and likely extent of such cooperation is of
interest,  as are the factors conditioning the degree of such
cooperation. It would be useful in this respect to know if ‘harder’
(that is more demanding) obligations to cooperate actually induce
more cooperation, or at least make non-cooperation more costly or
more transparent.
With respect to special and differential treatment, the following
questions arise. In any particular RTA, were the transition periods
appropriately tailored to the circumstances of, and technical
assistance received by, the developing country signatory?23 Did the
transition periods merely postpone compliance to the last minute or
were the transition periods used to nurture capacity (perhaps through
programmes of capacity building and technical assistance) in the
developing country? What factors, perhaps unrelated to the RTA
itself, affected this outcome? Concerning less-than-full reciprocity
provisions, to what extent, if at all, were the benefits of the RTA
compromised by the signing of such provisions? For example, are
there reasons to believe that certain anti-competitive practices exist
that reduce the value of the RTA to its signatories and that could
only effectively be tackled by full reciprocity on the part of a
developing country signatory or signatories? Analysts should also
be open to the possibility that the effective types of special and
differential treatment vary across developing countries, and that the
effects of different types of special and differential treatment depend
critically on the other provisions contained in an RTA or in a future
multilateral initiative.
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The fourth theme concerns the lessons for the political economy of
successfully negotiating a potential future multilateral initiative. Within
signatories to an RTA it would be useful to know which interest
groups, if any, were galvanized to support the inclusion of, and
subsequent compliance with, the competition provisions of an RTA?
The answer to this question might provide important clues as to the
circumstances under which such interest groups would support a
similar multilateral initiative. (The word ‘similar’ is used here with
care, as surely any multilateral initiative must add value along some
dimension to the set of prevailing RTAs for interest groups to support
the former.) Analysts should be open to the possibility that an RTA
indirectly strengthens the popular or interest group-based support
for the enforcement of competition law in a signatory country through
reinforcing the legal status of the competition enforcement agency
and the resources that the national legislature gives to such an agency.
Thus, the political economy linkages within signatories may be more
varied than support for, or opposition to, a competition provision in
an RTA at the time of negotiation or ratification.
There are also political economy factors at international level
worth exploring. It would be useful to know which signatories to  an
RTA were keen on the inclusion of competition provisions, and which
were opposed. How ‘deep’ was the opposition of any signatory and,
relatedly, what if anything did these parties obtain in return for
acquiescing to the inclusion of the competition provisions? Did
proponents of such provisions come to regret their inclusion and, if
so, why? Did initial opponents or sceptics change their view after
the RTA was signed and, if so, why? How significant were concerns
about negotiating and implementation costs in determining the level
of support for competition provisions? Were concerns about
implementation costs assuaged by the provision of technical
assistance, capacity building, aid, or by weak dispute settlement
provisions? Are there concerns that multiple RTA negotiations have
placed too great costs on developing country parties and have
increased the potential for adopting conflicting, or at least
inconsistent, obligations? Alternatively, have trade negotiators in
developing countries become more comfortable with competition
provisions in RTAs as they have negotiated more such RTAs?
Other political economy questions relate to the relationship
between existing provisions in RTAs and potential multilateral
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initiatives. To what extent has the emergence of two families (recall
the OECD Secretariat’s finding of the so-called EU and US families)
of competition provisions in RTAs imposed additional costs on
signatory countries? What multilateral initiatives, if any, would be
consistent with both families of RTA provisions? To what extent, if at
all, would negotiators of a multilateral initiative be willing to
substitute one set of competition provisions in RTAs for another set
of provisions?
This section has argued that, while there is a wide range of
interesting questions concerning the lessons for multilateral rule
making of competition provisions in RTAs, there are a number of
important factors that condition our ability to effectively answer them.
Moreover, the efficacy of any future multilateral initiative on
competition policy is likely to depend on some factors wholly
independent of the experience of competition provisions in RTAs.
These points ought to be borne in mind when considering the
arguments advanced in the next section and in the rest of this book.
4.   Some thoughts on the lessons from
competition provisions in existing RTAs
As the OECD (2005a) study made clear, the often-stated
motivation for competition provisions in RTAs is to ensure that the
gains from implementing such agreements are not undermined by
anti-competitive practices. Often this is articulated in market access
terms, where the fear is that state-erected impediments to local
markets are replaced by private anti-competitive acts.24 It is worth
dwelling on this rationale for international collective action, exploring
what multilateral initiatives it appears to be consistent with and also
those it is inconsistent with. In this respect the following points could
be made. First, this motivation could be interpreted as being only
concerned with a subset of the possible cross-border spillovers created
by anti-competitive practices. Specifically, it is concerned solely with
the effects of those acts on a country’s export interests in so far as
those interests can, or are attempting to, supply overseas markets.
From this perspective, therefore, such a rationale would not consider
as relevant the effects of anti-competitive practices in markets where
a country’s export interests source parts, components, or services.
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Nor would this rationale place any weight on anti-competitive acts
that harmed a country’s consumers, including its government (which
is typically a large purchaser of goods and services.)
Arguably, such a narrow conception of the purpose of multilateral
competition rules would sit well with the long-established practice
in trade negotiations whereby reciprocal exchanges of market access
take place. Moreover, such multilateral rules would, in preserving or
ensuring that previously agreed market access is secured, not be out
of place with other WTO provisions that discourage Member States
from nullifying or impairing the effects of reductions in border
barriers.
Such a narrow conception would logically focus on those anti-
competitive acts that block the entry into, or that directly impair the
competitive position of those firms attempting to enter, overseas
markets whether by direct exporting, by foreign direct investment,
or by other legitimate means. Arguably, therefore, the focus here
would be on some of the anti-competitive practices that fall under
the heading of abuse of a dominant position and on anti-competitive
vertical restraints. Cooperation provisions, including negative and
positive comity provisions, could reinforce presumptions to take
enforcement action against market access blockages.
A challenge faced by this approach is that the same mercantilist
calculus that might encourage a government to seek the removal of
privately inspired market access impediments abroad is the same
calculus that seeks to delay, avoid, or prevaricate in investigating
such practices at home. This consideration places a significant burden
on the dispute settlement provisions of an agreement based on this
narrow motivation for multilateral competition rules. Any arbitration
or dispute resolution mechanism would have to judge the degree of
inaction, or the ineffectiveness of action, of a signatory against an
alleged blockage to market access. Judging whether a signatory has
gone far enough, or has acted in good faith, is a lot harder than
judging whether a government has done something at all. The nature
of such disputes would be extremely contentious. These concerns
would be exacerbated if the agency tasked with enforcing the
competition law and associated international obligations rejected the
mercantilistic calculus in favour of a welfare standard. Employing
either a total welfare standard or a consumer welfare standard is
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unlikely to satisfy the demands of a trading partner whose sole
interest in any market access-related investigation is going to be the
interests of its exporters.
It would be useful to examine how well the current set of RTAs
has fared in the face of these challenges. In particular, in jurisdictions
with independent competition agencies, many of whose officials
would openly reject a mercantilistic calculus, surely there are doubts
as to how effective the competition provisions have been in clearing
market access blockages? This is an empirical question and it would
be helpful to know more about the factual record in this regard.
Another way of looking at this matter is to note that a multilateral
framework based on a narrow market access perspective would
almost surely require a change in the competition laws of signatories
so as to entrench the market access objective. In this way, even
independent competition agencies would be forced to consider
market access objectives when examining complaints of firms in the
import-competing sector. (Of course, if the competition agency has
multiple objectives, as many do, the agency could still find reasons
to demote the market access objective.) These points are mentioned
not because competition agencies should as a general proposition
take on market access-related objectives, but because it seems that
the logic of the narrow market access conception of multilateral rules
would almost surely require that steps be taken to ensure that
competition agencies take those objectives seriously. These
considerations, and the others detailed above, would surely become
important if the market access objective of current RTAs was to be
generalized into a multilateral agreement.
Although a narrow market access motivation for a multilateral
framework aligns well with the traditional emphasis on border barrier
reduction in the WTO system and its predecessor, developments
during the latest round of multilateral trade negotiations suggest that
an exclusive focus on market access may no longer command
universal support. At the Doha Ministerial meeting in 2001, WTO
members added promoting economic development as an explicit
objective to the multilateral trading system. Without doubt the export
opportunities of developing countries, and the private anti-
competitive acts that may impede them, have some bearing on the
economic development prospects of poorer countries. But other cross-
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border competition-related knock-on effects do too, and a
development focus might therefore provide a rationale for a
multilateral initiative on competition policy that goes beyond securing
market access. (Of course, what is logically possible need not be
uppermost in the minds of trade negotiators at the moment, or indeed
at any future point in time, and the following remarks should be
seen in that light.)
The first point to be made in this regard is that many developing
country exporters do not sell directly to customers in industrialized
countries. Instead, they often sell to intermediaries, some of which
are large oligopolistic trading companies. These intermediaries may
have good access to the markets of industrialized countries while at
the same time exerting considerable buyer power over suppliers
located in developing countries. The potential for abuses of a
dominant position by these intermediaries could motivate a different
type of multilateral initiative on competition policy. Very recent World
Bank research that has tried to demonstrate how little benefit non-
reciprocal preferences are to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific
countries has placed considerable weight on buyer power-related
arguments. In their discussion of the determinants of the value of
non-reciprocal preferences Hoekman and Prowse (2005:5) argue that:
“to the extent there is market power on the part of either
importers/distributors (Francois and Wooton, 2005) or the
transport and logistics sector (Francois and Wooton, 2001),
the benefits of preferential tariff reductions will be captured
at least in part by those intermediaries with market power
rather than the exporters. If preferences apply to highly
protected sectors in donor countries, they will result in high
rents for those able to export free of trade barriers. However,
the existence of these rents  will be known to buyers, and if
they have the ability to set prices (have market power), the
rents may predominantly be captured by distributors or other
intermediaries (Tangermann, 2002). There is evidence, based
on the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA
preference scheme, that the pass through of preference
margins is indeed partial at best. Olarreaga and Özden (2005)
find that the average export price increase for products
benefiting from preferences under AGOA was about 6 percent,
whereas the average MFN tariff for these products was some
20 percent. Thus, on average exporters received around one-
third of the tariff rent. Moreover, poorer and smaller countries
tended to obtain lower shares—with estimates ranging from
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a low of 13 percent in Malawi to a high of 53 percent in
Mauritius. In the case of market power, the result is a simple
redistribution of the benefits of preferences: rents are
transferred to importers.”
It would be useful to see if other research and experience reinforce
these findings.
The second non-market access-related spillover that could
influence the development prospects of poor countries is that related
to cartels with cross-border consequences. There is now a growing
body of literature on these matters, which is quite well known, and
there is no need to repeat all of the findings here.25 National decisions
about cartel enforcement can generate two cross-border spillovers,
which may form the basis for international collective action. Non-
enforcement of a cartel law, or more simply non-enactment of such a
law, may encourage internationally minded cartels to organize and
hide evidence in that jurisdiction—so harming those trading partners
whose consumers and producers source goods from cartel members.
In contrast, the successful prosecution of an international cartel by a
jurisdiction may result in the cessation of its activities in other
jurisdictions, either directly through the collapse of the cartel or
indirectly through other jurisdictions taking measures to prosecute
the cartel and to demand an end to its anti-competitive acts. Either
way, the latter jurisdictions have benefited from the prosecution in
the original jurisdiction. Both spillovers imply that, in the absence of
a global norm to enact and seriously enforce a cartel law, there will
be a sub-optimal degree of cartel enforcement. To the extent that the
victims of such sub-optimal enforcement are the poor and the
defenceless, then a development-related rationale for a multilateral
initiative could be advanced.
The third cross-border spillover created by anti-competitive acts
that could motivate international collective action relates to mergers
and acquisitions that have international reach. The effects of
consolidation on markets need not be confined to the jurisdictions
where the headquarters of the participating firms are located. Given
the resurgence in merger and acquisitions activity after the first
quarter of 2005, and the last wave of such activity between 1995 and
2000, these matters deserve at least some thought, even if action is
unlikely to result in the foreseeable future. Now, it could be argued
that, like industrialized economies, developing countries could
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undertake merger reviews that evaluate the effect of the proposed
transaction within their jurisdiction and, where appropriate, place
conditions on the approval of the transaction. This argument is not
without its problems, however. Leaving aside concerns that
developing countries may not have the technical expertise to evaluate
complex transactions, from the perspective of the merging parties
and their legal counsel surely there are concerns that the decisions
of many competition agencies might conflict, that the total impact of
the remedies sought by such agencies individually are sub-optimal
compared to other alternatives, and that delays and expenses are
greater than otherwise.
These factors suggest that firms with international operations
may have an interest in some international coordination and
cooperation on merger enforcement (that arguably goes well beyond
the current approaches pursued by members of the International
Competition Network). Competition enforcement agencies may see
advantages in coordinating and sequencing investigations, and even
in specializing in certain types of investigations, much in the same
way that certain national competition law enforcement agencies in
the same jurisdiction cooperate with one another. Arguably, the
current discussions on international cooperation on competition law
and enforcement are a long way from this type of outcome, but the
goal here is not to show what is practicable immediately but where
the logic of internalizing cross-border spillovers leads to in terms of
international collective action.
To summarize, so far in this section it has been argued that the
narrow market access-related perspective that has apparently
motivated many competition provisions in RTAs would face
significant (principally implementation-related and political
economy-related) challenges if generalized at the multilateral level.
The first challenge is created by the fact that market access objectives
are not entrenched in the competition laws of many countries.
Difficulties are likely to arise in reconciling—or at least
accommodating—a new objective with existing ones. The second
challenge relates to the fact that preserving and expanding market
access is no longer seen as the sole legitimate goal of the multilateral
trading system. The inclusion of development objectives implies that,
as far as anti-competitive acts are concerned, a multilateral initiative
that is confined to market access-related cross-border spillovers is
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likely to be seen now as too limited in scope. Indeed to the extent
that, as a general proposition, multilateral competition provisions
stimulate inter-firm rivalry within national markets then one should
expect non-trade-related developmental benefits to accrue also.26
Turning now to a different matter, what are the implications for
multilateral initiatives on competition policy of the fact that many
RTAs involving developing countries have few competition-specific
provisions relating to special and differential treatment? Should we
infer from this that developing country calls for such treatment at
the multilateral level are all smoke without fire? One should be
cautious about drawing this conclusion as the following four
explanations could account for the factual record in this regard.
First, developing countries may have found in negotiations on
RTAs that they could not persuade richer counterparts to accept
special and differential treatment provisions on competition matters.
Relatedly, developing countries may well feel more confident of
successfully demanding these provisions in multilateral negotiations
where there are more like-minded parties arguing together. Second,
the generalized special and differential treatment provisions of RTAs
may, from the perspective of developing countries, satisfactorily cover
the competition obligations of those agreements and so additional
competition-specific SDT provisions are unnecessary. Third,
developing countries may not have demanded strong special and
differential treatment provisions in RTAs, or at least acquiesced in
having few of them, precisely because the binding competition
obligations in an RTA were covered by limited dispute settlement
provisions. Finally, developing countries may well have acquiesced
in having few SDT provisions in RTAs precisely because they received
something valuable in return somewhere else in the agreement (which
might include preferential market access to the large economy of
another signatory.) In the absence of a significantly large non-
competition-related payoff in ongoing multilateral negotiations, this
may well account for developing countries sticking to their demands
for elaborate provisions on special and differential treatment.
Likewise, does the fact that few RTAs have strong dispute
settlement provisions relating to their commitments on competition
policy imply that a future multilateral framework on competition
policy must have similarly weak (often taken to mean limited in scope
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and non-binding) mechanisms for resolving disputes between parties?
Here it is worth noting that, with a few exceptions, generally RTAs
have much weaker dispute settlement procedures than WTO
agreements. Therefore, there may not be anything intrinsic about
competition provisions in trade agreements that call for alternative,
weak, or no dispute resolution methods. Second, the strength of
dispute settlement procedures required is often a function of the
nature of the provisions taken on in a trade agreement, not the least
of which is whether the provisions are binding at all. To the extent,
therefore, that competition provisions in RTAs contain few binding
commitments of what to do, and what not to do, by signatories, there
may be little point in seeking strong dispute settlement procedures
for these provisions. An ambitious future multilateral initiative would,
based on this logic, probably have to include robust dispute
settlement provisions, and there may be little to learn from the current
set of RTAs in this regard.
5.   Concluding remarks: some notes of caution
It is not surprising that policy makers, government officials,
practitioners, and scholars are interested in establishing lessons from
one type of international rule making on competition law and policy
for other potential international initiatives, especially given the
differential rates of progress in agreeing competition-related measures
in bilateral, regional, cross-regional, and multilateral fora. Indeed,
as suggested in Section 2 of this chapter, there are a substantial
number of policy-relevant questions that arise, in particular if one is
exploring the lessons for future multilateral rule making from recently
agreed RTA.
It has also been argued repeatedly, however, that our ability to
draw solid inferences may at the moment be more limited than one
might otherwise think. Not only is the available evidence on the
operation of competition provisions in RTAs limited—arguably a
concern that will be mitigated over time by research projects, such
as those assembled in this book—but it must be recalled that many
such provisions were negotiated at a time when the ultimately ill-
fated proposals for a WTO multilateral framework on competition
policy was being discussed. The legacy of those proposals is being
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felt to this day, not least in negotiations over the Economic Partnership
Agreements between the European Commission, on behalf of the
European Union Member States and their  former colonies.
Furthermore, the nature and extent of one set of competition
provisions agreed to in  an RTA may well have depended on the nature
of the other competition provisions in that agreement, and on other
factors; this consideration again qualifies what conclusions we might
draw about the preferences of signatories concerning international
competition commitments and the associated implications for
multilateral rule making.
It is also worth bearing in mind that the case for future
multilateral rule making may well be made independently of
developments in RTAs. Although there may be relationships between
decision making in different international fora, and potential lessons
to be learned from initiatives in each fora, care should be taken not
to focus on these matters to the exclusion of other factors that might
independently account for future international collective action on
competition law and its enforcement.
NOTES
1The number of reported RTAs varies across studies for the following reasons:
not all RTAs are reported to the WTO; RTAs involving countries that accede
to the European Union are not always treated the same way by researchers;
some RTAs that do not involve the creation of a free trade area on
‘substantially all trade’ are nevertheless included in some counts. For further
discussion of the number of RTAs notified to the WTO in recent years, see
the contribution of Alvarez et al. to this volume (Chapter 4).
2Readers may also want to bear in mind that this OECD study focuses on the
nature of the competition provisions in RTAs and not on whether those
provisions have been used, whether the parties to RTAs are satisfied with
their use, or on other analyses of the effectiveness of such provisions.
Generally, limitations in data availability seem to constrain the ability to
address the latter points.
3It should be noted that the OECD study further sub-divided the following eight
types of provision into component provisions, providing an even richer
taxonomy of the competition provisions of RTAs.
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4The word ‘measures’ here is taken to mean ‘best endeavour’ clauses and other
promises as well as formal commitments to enact and enforce certain
competition laws.
5The question does arise as to whether special and differential treatment (SDT)
as traditionally understood in the context of trade negotiations and
agreements is the appropriate way to think about the potential role and
form of special and differential treatment in the competition law context.
For example, some have argued that, in the trade context, SDT is motivated
by the goal of deferring or avoiding international obligations and that, in
the competition law context, SDT is motivated by the goal of furthering the
effective implementation of competition law. The differences in goals, it is
argued, may have implications for the different types of SDT deemed
appropriate in a given situation.
6Here the phrase ‘lesser developed signatory’ is taken to mean a signatory to
an RTA that is at an earlier stage of development than another signatory,
and should not be confused with the United Nations classification of Least
Developed Countries.
7Of the just under 30 North-South RTAs analysed, at least 18 include the USA,
Canada, or the EC as one of the signatories.
8The differences between these two families may be less than they appear at
first because many of the RTAs involving the EC, in fact, tend to refer to
existing legislation and the anti-competitive practices referred thereto. The
author thanks Stefan Amarasinha for drawing attention to this point.
9Readers may wish to note that, in Chapter 5 of this volume, Brusick and Clarke
find that 13 per cent of the 157 RTAs that they examined include some type
of flexibility for the less-developed partners. Brusick and Clarke also
provide an interesting discussion on the difficulties in classifying provisions
as being related to special and differential treatment, which ought to be
borne in mind when counts of such provisions are presented.
10These points can be inferred from the statistics presented in the OECD (2005a)
study.
11In what follows a pretty comprehensive list of the objections raised is
presented. Readers should not assume that every critic of the proposed
multilateral framework subscribed to each of the objections listed here.
12In doing so it should not be assumed that this author endorses those criticisms.
13Information provided in Dean (2004) and on the relevant web page of COMESA
would, however, seem to contradict this finding of the OECD study. (The
competition policy web page of COMESA is http://www.comesa.int/trade/
issues/policy/). If the latter information is correct, then it reinforces the point
made here, namely, that the concerns of developing countries about abuse
of a dominant position have found themselves incorporated into the RTAs
that they have signed. This is not to say that those RTA provisions have
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satisfactorily addressed those developing country concerns, just that those
provisions exist in the first place.
14The author thanks Pierre Horna for drawing attention to this point.
15Again, the manner in which legal provisions are classified appears to matter.
In their contribution to this volume (Chapter 5), Brusick and Clarke found
14 instances of provisions in RTAs that ‘safeguard [the] interests of less-
developed partners’, seven provisions relating to exemptions and
exceptions, another seven provisions relating to transitional time periods,
and only one provision relating to technical assistance (see Table 5.1 of
Brusick and Clarke).
16Here readers are encouraged to bear in mind the point made in Footnote 11.
17The matter of asymmetries in bargaining power is taken up again under the
fourth theme addressed in Section 3 of this chapter.
18A similar question might be asked of the relationship between any future
multilateral initiative and the bilateral agency-to-agency cooperation
agreements on competition law and enforcement matters. The author thanks
Stefan Amarasinha for drawing attention to this point.
19The author thanks David Round for the reminder about these important points
concerning sequencing.
20Marsden and Whelan (2005a,b,c) and Acevedo (2005) are promising examples
of the latter.
21 Amarasinha (2004) evaluates the criticisms levelled by some in the
competition law community towards the proposals for a multilateral
framework on competition policy.
22In less than five years the International Competition Network (ICN) has
undertaken work on a number of important competition law and
enforcement-related matters, including merger notification and review,
cartels, the implementation of competition law (including analyses of
technical assistance and capacity building programmes), and antitrust
enforcement in regulated sectors. In the coming year, a working group will
be established on matters relating to abuse of a dominant position, a long-
standing concern of certain prominent developing country participants in
the ICN. The rate of progress made in the ICN stands in contrast to the
developments in other non-binding fora. Having said that, it is too early to
say whether the ICN membership can sustain the current level of momentum
or whether all of its membership is satisfied with the resulting degree of
international cooperation and convergence on competition law and
enforcement matters.
23In answering this question, analysts might consider the views of private-sector
practitioners and scholars. These parties may view the transition times and
technical assistance necessary to meet the obligations in an RTA differently
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from the trade negotiators representing a given country.
24One’s view of the merits of such arguments may depend on whether the
competition provisions are supposed to ensure that previously agreed to
market access concessions are not impeded by private anti-competitive
practices or whether such provisions are supposed to expand market access
beyond previously agreed levels.
25See, for example, Levenstein and Suslow (2003).
26The author thanks Oliver Solano Castro for the reminder about this important
point.
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1.   Introduction
1.1 The proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements
(PTAs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)1
The adoption of RTAs is not a new phenomenon in theinternational arena. The first RTA was the German Zollverein,signed by 18 small states in 1834 (Cho, 2001:420). Furthermore,
in the second half of the 19th century a number of agreements, which
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were based on the most favoured nation clause, were signed between
European countries (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1971:75–8), and this
same clause was used by the US at the beginning of the 20th century
in a number of bilateral Treaties of Commerce, Trade and Navigation
(Krueger, 1999:105). A second wave of RTAs emerged in the 1930s.
Following the Great Depression, the idea of liberalizing international
trade by reducing the level of tariffs imposed on foreign imports
prevailed in the US, which during 1934-45 concluded a total of 32
reciprocal trade agreements (Trebilcock, 1999:20).
More recently, and following the successful experiment of the
European Union (EU), the establishment of plurilateral regional trade
agreements proliferated mainly in the 1990s. EFTA (European Free
Trade Area), EEA (European Economic Area), NAFTA (North America
Free Trade Area), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation),
MERCOSUR (the Southern Common Market), CAN (the Andean
Community), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern
African), CARICOM (the Caribbean Community), WAEMU (West
African Economic and Monetary Union), and CAFTA-DR (Central
America Free Trade Agreement) are examples of such agreements.2
The main characteristics of these agreements are that they are
concluded by more than two countries and that the signatories  are
neighbouring countries, so the regional element is dominant.
On the other hand, and mainly since the second half of the
1990s and throughout the last five years, it seems that there has been
a tendency by industrialized and developing countries to be involved
in bilateral free trade agreements with selected trade partners. The
prominent example here is the EU, which has been involved in
agreements with countries that pursued (and pursue) EU accession,3
with Mediterranean countries, with Eastern European and Central
Asian countries (countries formerly members of the USSR), and lately
with Mexico, Chile and South Africa. Most of these agreements have
been signed in the context of the EU’s neighbourhood policy,4 and
thus encompass strong regional elements, nonetheless with regard
to the agreements signed with Mexico, Chile and South Africa, the
regional element is absent.5  The US has also concluded a number of
bilateral free trade agreements lately, namely with Australia, Bahrain,
Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Singapore.6 As is obvious, and
given the involvement of the US in NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, both
concluded with neighbouring countries, US bilateral free trade
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agreements have been signed with selected trade partners, which
geographically are distant from the US. Furthermore, Canada has
also used this instrument by signing agreements with Chile, Costa
Rica, and Israel. Australia has signed agreements with Singapore,
Thailand, the US, and New Zealand.7
1.2 Competition provisions in RTAs
The importance of RTAs in the world trading system is clearly
increasing.
As a recent World Bank study has highlighted, the total
number of such agreements has quadrupled since the 1990s and trade
between RTA member states currently accounts for 40 per cent of
global trade (World Bank, 2005:27). In terms of competition, Alvarez
et al. have shown in this volume that there are more and more RTAs
with competition rules (Alvarez et al., 2005). The study of competition
rules in RTAs is not a new trend in the related literature. For instance,
Bellis was among the first commentators to review a number of
bilateral and plurilateral RTAs and to examine their competition
provisions and their relationship with anti-dumping measures and
subsidies (Bellis,  1997). Hoekman (1998b) also reviewed the
competition elements of a number of plurilateral RTAs and their
relationship with anti-dumping measures.
The establishment of the WTO working group on trade and
competition in 1996 unavoidably shifted the interest of the observers
of the relationship between trade and competition to the analysis of
the possible inclusion of competition rules in the WTO context.
Nonetheless, and given the decision by WTO member states in
Cancun not to proceed with negotiations on competition, the study
of the operation of competition rules in RTAs has gained more
attention lately.8
This Chapter aims to explore the reasons for which
competition provisions have been included in RTAs and the
relationship of these provisions with anti-dumping measures and
subsidies countervailing duties. Section 1 of this Chapter discusses
general issues regarding the importance of competition provisions
in RTAs and includes a general analysis of the main arguments
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presented on the possible interrelation between competition law and
anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing duties.
Section 2 examines a number of bilateral agreements in detail.
Specifically, the Australia-New Zealand (ANZCERTA), Canada-Chile,
Canada-Costa Rica, EU-Poland, EU-Turkey, EU-Croatia, EU-Mexico,
and EU-South Africa agreements have been reviewed. Several reasons
have led to the choice of these particular agreements. First, with the
exception of ANZCERTA, all the agreements reviewed here are signed
between developed and developing or transition states. Hence, it has
been possible to make useful observations as to the particular function
of competition provisions in RTAs, mainly from the less-developed
contracting party. Furthermore, two of these agreements (namely
ANZCERTA and Canada-Chile) have abolished the application of
anti-dumping measures between the contracting parties and are thus
definitely important with regard to the examination of the
interrelation between competition and trade measures. The case
studies will try to cover, albeit briefly, a number of other dimensions
of these RTAs.
Economists since Viner have argued that the only valid reason
for the use of anti-dumping measures is to combat predatory pricing,
and this has led to considerable discussion about the use of
competition provisions in RTAs as a way to abolish anti-dumping.
The authors shall argue with Hoekman (1998b) that anti-dumping
addresses issues quite different from predation, and that competition
provisions in RTAs cannot be expected to be a substitute for anti-
dumping. However, they also agree with Mathis (2005b) that this
should not be the main focus of discussions about regional
competition policy.  The value of competition provisions in an RTA
must surely depend on their effectiveness in promoting competition
as such rather than the impact on contingent protection.
2.   Competition and RTAs:  why so important?9
There is a clear link between trade policy and competition
policy. Competition policy sets the parameters for the intensity of
competition between producers within the national market including
foreign investors, while trade policy sets the rules for competition
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from foreign-based suppliers, including those owned in the home
country. It is customary for economists to suppose that competition
policy is generally designed to promote a stronger degree of
competition than the unregulated market would deliver but that trade
policy, as it is usually understood, implies the use of instruments
that restrict competition compared to a situation of free trade. Trade
negotiations in this perspective are seen as seeking to reduce the use
of the anti-competitive instruments.  Trade policy makers see the
world slightly differently. They argue that unregulated trade does
not create an efficient competitive market, and certainly not a ‘fair’
one. They see instruments such as anti-dumping and safeguard
measures as designed to correct problems arising from alleged
distortions in trading partners.
In any case, it is widely accepted that the aim of competition
law and policy in an RTA is to ensure that the benefits expected from
trade liberalization of intra-regional trade are not frustrated by
restrictive business practices conducted by private firms (Mathis,
2005b)
In reality, domestic competition policy often contains
elements intended to promote the idea of a ‘level playing field’, for
example the promotion of small business through greater toleration
of agreements among them in the EU, or black empowerment in South
Africa.   Neither trade nor domestic competition rules have aims
that address efficiency alone.
Regional trade agreements have some special features that are
midway between domestic and multilateral provisions: they open up
additional competition between the partners but they reduce the
scope for external sellers to compete on equal terms as a result of
their preferential, and occasionally trade diverting, character.  As
will be seen, these features create special issues for RTAs that are
different from those relating to multilateral liberalization.
2.1 The growth of competition-related provisions in
RTAs
The decision of the WTO member states in Cancun not to
proceed with negotiations on the Singapore issues is likely to intensify
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the pursuit of bilateral agreements. Some countries feared that the
EU, which was the most prominent supporter of a WTO agreement
on competition, was seeking additional market access commitments
over and above those which countries were ready to give. Other
countries were concerned about an excessive harmonization to norms
that might not be suitable for developing countries. Others felt that
even if the principle of linking trade and competition was acceptable
in principle, the EU’s proposals at the WTO did not address the key
issues relating to cooperation on international anti-competitive
behaviour.  In fact, the authors’ own earlier work (Mathis et al. in
Winters and Mehta (eds) 2003) suggests that the position of the EU
and its arch-opponent India were not as far apart on the principle as
it seemed. India argued that they would accept a WTO agreement
based on UNCTAD’s United Nations Set Of Principles And Rules On
Competition,10 and in fact, when carefully examined, the EU’s
proposals were not far removed from those principles.  India was
sceptical about the degree of development-related cooperation that
was likely to be realized as a result of the EU’s proposals. Examination
of the EU’s arrangements with its closest partners sheds some light
on EU practice where it is in a position to define the terms of
competition provisions in trade agreements.
The decisions of WTO members on the trade and competition
agenda is likely to create additional pressure to go down a bilateral
or a regional route, and the discussion now turns to what is specific
to that agenda.
2.2 What is special to competition provisions in RTAs
as such?
Regional or preferential trade agreements create challenges
and opportunities that do not exist in the multilateral context:
opportunities for agreement may be easier among fewer parties but
challenges remain because firms have an incentive to try and frustrate
market opening, and to preserve rents.
With a small regional group of countries involved, it is more
likely that there are common perspectives and common problems
and the ability to develop a framework for common rules. The
literature on regional integration distinguishes shallow and deep
integration (Hoekman, 1998b; Lawrence, 1998), or negative versus
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positive integration.  Shallow or negative integration refers to the
removal of barriers to trade at the border, such as tariffs and quotas,
and excessive administrative burdens. Deep integration refers to the
inclusion in RTAs of measures to address non-tariff barriers – it
becomes positive integration when common policies are adopted, as
opposed to negative integration when unnecessary rules are simply
abolished without any common element. So a firm commitment to
ensure national treatment in competition rules is a form of deep but
negative integration. The establishment of common norms is both
positive and deep.
An active competition policy is more likely to be needed to
address imperfect competition in an RTA than in cases of non-
discriminatory market opening because there is less pro-competitive
pressure from a more limited number of new entrants than would be
the case from multilateral market opening (Bilal and Olarreaga, 1998).
Moreover, not only can an RTA promote competition less than
non-discriminatory market opening, but it also may even create
incentives for new anti-competitive forms of behaviour. There are
likely to be risks of:
• cartels being formed at regional level to prevent the erosion of
the natural market-sharing arrangements arising from border
barriers
• barriers to entry being created by firms in each country in order
to keep out firms from their partners via collusion.
• predation which means that one part of the RTA contains
dominant firms with high profits
• vertical marketing agreements to segment the RTA market,
making price discrimination possible
• mergers designed to create pan-RTA dominant positions.
These effects are all linked to the risk of trade diversion.
As will be seen, competition provisions in RTAs can take
many different forms. They can:
• improve market access – directly, by removal of private barriers
to entry and pure ‘obstacle’-based barriers, and indirectly, by
creating bases for other policies that can allow market access so
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that contingent protection can be lessened, especially anti-
dumping and countervailing duties.
• harmonize competition law, including the establishment of
supranational agencies.
• facilitate cooperation without harmonization.
As shown in Chapter 1 of this volume (Cernat, 2005), there
are two sets of competition provisions that can be found in RTAs.
Provisions that provide for harmonization of competition rules of
the contracting parties, and/or provisions that provide for
cooperation on competition-related issues.  EU bilateral agreements
are the main examples of RTAs that provide for harmonization of
competition rules of the contracting parties. In contrast, bilateral
RTAs signed by the US and Canada include provisions that provide
for cooperation on competition matters (Holmes et al., 2005).
‘Harmonization’ can clearly be at a number of different
possible levels. One limited form of harmonization is where countries
take on similar obligations to modify or apply their laws with specific
reference to preventing practices that affect cross-border trade. The
prominent example is bilateral agreements signed between the EU
and accession, candidate and Mediterranean countries. The common
characteristic of these agreements is that they include a standard set
of provisions, which oblige the partners to have or adopt competition
rules either identical or similar to the rules of the EU Treaty (Articles
81 and 82).11 In addition, in the agreements with Eastern European
and Central Asian countries, the parties commit themselves to
approximate their competition rules (among others); however, only
three of these agreements12 include specific commitments to EU co-
signing parties to adopt competition legislation.13
In contrast, the agreements themselves do not include detailed
provisions for cooperation between the parties. Some of the
agreements only provide for exchange of non-confidential
information, and only a small number of them include provisions
relating to technical assistance on competition matters.14 The EU–
Chile, EU–Mexico and EU-South Africa agreements are exceptions
to this general observation, since they include a detailed list of soft-
law measures that could enhance cooperation between the two signing
parties on competition law and policy.15
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It is clear that harmonization of laws at one level or another
is the main strategy of the EU in the field of bilateral RTAs, which
include competition law and policy elements. This strategy is
obviously different from that of other developed countries, which
mostly pursue cooperation on the enforcement of competition rules
rather than harmonization of these rules. An illustrative example is
the US which has traditionally been the most frequent user of self-
standing enforcement cooperation agreements on competition
(Papadopoulos, 2005). In addition, as noted above, only three of the
bilateral RTAs signed by the US (the agreements with Australia, Chile
and Singapore) include particular provisions on competition. These
agreements oblige the signing countries to have and enforce
competition rules, irrespective of whether these rules are similar or
not. They further express a commitment by the parties to cooperate
on competition issues.  The cooperation-on-competition model has
been also used by Canada in its bilateral RTAs.  As shown below,
similar provisions have been included in the agreements Canada
signed with Chile and Costa Rica.
Even if two states have similar competition laws, this does
not necessarily imply they will accept a supranational regime to deal
with cross-border issues, nor does it even mean that the two
harmonized regimes will cooperate or exchange information, as we
shall see graphically from the EU-Turkey and EU-Poland cases.
Turkey’s agreement explicitly requires Turkey to have a competition
authority (though the Polish EA did not include this). These pre-
accession agreements did not make any explicit provision for formal
cooperation or information exchange.  The Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs) had to wait for accession and the creation
of the European Competition Network (ECN) to be allowed to
exchange information. In fact, the authors understand that there was
limited information exchange within the EU before the creation of
the ECN.
The more integrated the markets of an RTA, the more likely
it is that cross-border competition issues will arise. In fact, the
obligations in EU RTAs are strong and require close partnership, in
particular with candidate countries. Geradin and Petit (2003, 2004)
argue that stronger rather than weaker convergence of competition
laws in the Euro-Med region would assist economic integration, and
they note that these agreements all contain competition law
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harmonization obligations which are much softer than in the case of
the ex-CEECs and Turkey.
The implementation of such measures should of course
effectively reduce distortions and promote the so-called level playing
field, thus allowing for reduction in other forms of ‘retaliatory’ state
protection. The role of competition policy in addressing anti-dumping
and countervailing duties is now examined.
2.2.1 Anti-dumping, countervailing duties and competition
policy
Anti-dumping
Anti-dumping duties were traditionally seen by economists
(such as Viner, 1923) as a way of addressing the risk for the cases of
monopolists in one country using their domestic market power to
enable predatory pricing, that is cutting prices in another market to
drive local firms out of business thus extending the dominant firm’s
monopoly.  Such an outcome is unlikely if the higher profits the
dominant firm can earn can attract new entry (see Bilal and Olarreaga,
1998; Bourgeois and Messerlin, 1998) but, in the case of an RTA, there
are barriers against third country firms. If there are no effective
competition laws, pressure will mount for anti-dumping to be used.
Hoekman (1998b) has argued very strongly that most anti-
dumping actions have nothing to do with the absence of cross-border
competition rules.  Rather the aim of current anti-dumping is ‘to level
the playing field’, that is to say compensation for unequal market
conditions that give firms in one territory an allegedly unfair
advantage over another, whether via tax systems, distorted fuel prices,
situations that are not dealt with by competition laws at all – and
only in exceptional cases lack of effective controls on a dominant
position.
The GATT anti-dumping code does not require proof of any
predatory intent, nor even evidence that prices are below cost:
dumping is defined since GATT 1947 as sales below the normal value
in the home market, so that profitable exports can be said to be
dumped if the profit margin is less than at home.
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Anti-dumping addresses some issues that competition policy
cannot. For example, anti-dumping may be introduced in cases of
distortions that are not all actionable under countervailing duty codes,
such as energy prices. Plus, anti-dumping duties are often levied on
steel or petro-chemical exports of countries that are alleged to allow
energy prices to prevail that are below world prices, hence creating
an alleged but not WTO-illegal subsidy.
Bourgeois and Messerlin (1998) argue that there have been
almost no cases where dumping could have been caused by predatory
pricing.  Belderbos and Holmes (1995) argue that the US colour
television (CTV) case might just possibly have constituted an
exception here, but the main lesson of that case is that anti-dumping
and antitrust laws treated the same facts differently, meaning that
conduct penalized under trade law was judged acceptable under
competition law. Interestingly in the CTV case, the US applied an
anti-dumping law (based on the legislation of 1921) that was not
congruent with antitrust rules, but the courts did not find any
violation of the original 1916 US Anti-Dumping Act, which was based
on antitrust principles. But the EU has successfully challenged the
decision concerning the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 at the WTO.16
Thus, one can indeed say that the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS)
system has determined that basing anti-dumping laws on competition
principles is against the spirit of GATT. (In fairness the condemnation
of the 1916 Act was not simply because it was based on competition
principles.)
There are in fact only very rare cases where anti-dumping is
in the hands of competition authorities; for example, EU post-
accession transition periods between new and old Member States,
and ANZCERTA. In addition, only the EU (internally), ANZCERTA
and the Canada-Chile agreement abolish the use of anti-dumping
measures between members of these agreements, (see also OECD,
2002).
Essentially as Hoekman (1998a) argues, anti-dumping is
defined to offset a whole range of practices that can be termed
‘industrial policy’ and which may create a privileged market for one
set of producers.17  Hence it is only when all the conditions such as
state aids rules, special tax regimes, and industry specific regulations
are harmonized that one can expect a strong partner to give up the
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right to use anti-dumping.18 This principle is clearly stated in the
EU’s often-repeated statement of its conditions for opening the
internal market to pre-accession partners.
Once satisfactory implementation of competition and state
aids policies (by the associated countries) has been achieved,
together with the application of other parts of Community
law linked to the wider market, the Union could decide to
reduce progressively the application of commercial defence
instruments for industrial products from the countries
concerned, since it would have a level of guarantee against
unfair competition comparable to that existing inside the
internal market.19
It is clear from a EU perspective that a competition policy is
necessary but not sufficient for the removal of anti-dumping. It is
worth noting that the abolition of anti-dumping in the European
Economic Area Agreement only applies to sectors where the entire
acquis are applied by partners, hence the possibility of anti-dumping
action against Norway on salmon fisheries is being excluded from
the harmonization.
Hoekman (1998a) therefore argues that competition policy
framework is only one small feature of what is necessary for removal
of anti-dumping and countervailing duties (CVDs).
Even far-reaching regulatory commitments (deep integration)
that extend beyond antitrust per se may not be sufficient to
make elimination of anti-dumping feasible (e.g. the Europe
Agreements).
However, he goes on to say that a competition provision is
not only not sufficient, but it is also not necessary in circumstances
where distortions due to private anti-competitive behaviour are a
minor part of any intra-regional trade barriers.
Examples can also be found where intra-regional free trade
was attained without any move towards incorporation of rules
on antitrust regimes (e.g. Canada-Chile).
But in fact Canada and Chile did include some competition
provisions in the RTA and they did subsequently sign a Competition
agreement. In fact, Canada and Chile have not been major users of
anti-dumping against each other, so the mutual elimination of anti-
dumping may have been relatively uncontroversial.
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Countervailing Duties (CVDs) and competition policy
Countervailing duties are designed to deter and compensate
for direct subsidies. Under the WTO/GATT subsidy code, some aids
are declared violations of the code and can lead to DS action: others
are legal but can be countervailed. Other types are allowed and are
not countervailable.
Countervailing duties are extensively used by the US but
much less by the EU.  Within the EU state aids are strictly policed
and illegal aids must be repaid, with no use of CVDs. It is clear that
a tough and enforced subsidy code in an RTA can prevent GATT-
legal but countervailable subsidies from giving rise to actions.  The
EU has clearly included state aids rules into its Europe agreements,
but retains the right to use CVDs. Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian
Authority and Tunisia have committed themselves to applying EU
state aids laws eventually.20
The EU-Egypt agreement provides for the eventual
elimination of CVDs if state aid competition rules are agreed, but as
far as the authors are aware this has not come into effect yet.  The
EU–Turkey agreement requires Turkey to inform the EU of all state
aids and allows the EU to object to any that go against EU rules, but
does not appear to make any provision for eliminating CVDs.
The danger of course is asymmetry of rules, e.g. restricting
legitimate policies21 that may be appropriate to less-developed
partners.
2.2.2 Dispute settlement on competition in RTAs
Another important aspect of the operation of competition
provisions in RTAs is the conflict resolution mechanism these
agreements provide for. It could be argued that there are two main
models of conflict resolution mechanisms provided. First, some
plurilateral RTAs provide for the establishment of a central enforcing
institution (competition authority), to enforce the competition rules
of the agreements. They also provide for the establishment of a
regional court to review the decisions of the central competition
authority. The main example of agreements that have been based on
this centralized model is the EU, which has been exceptional in the
degree to which the European Commission was given powers to
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police anti-competitive behaviour that affected trade between
Member States. Other such examples are CARICOM and COMESA;
they both provide for the establishment of a regional competition
authority.
On the other hand, bilateral RTAs usually provide for a
dispute settlement mechanism to resolve conflicts that may arise from
the general application of the agreements. Nonetheless, many bilateral
RTAs clearly exclude competition provisions from the application of
the dispute settlement procedures. Examples include bilateral
agreements signed by the US and Canada.22
In contrast, EU bilateral RTAs provide for two levels of
competition-related conflict resolution. With the exception of the EU–
Chile agreement,23 all EU bilateral RTAs state that the parties may
refer to the Association Council24 regarding any dispute arising from
the application of the agreement. The Council will settle such disputes
by means of decision, in most of the agreements,25 or
recommendation, in the case of the agreements signed with Eastern
European and Central Asian countries. The Association or
Cooperation Council consists of members of the Council of the EU
and members of the European Commission on the one hand, and
members of the government of the EU’s contracting Party on the other,
so any conflict from the application of the agreement has to be solved
at a ministerial level. That said, and in cases where the Association
or Cooperation Council is not able to reach a decision, most of these
agreements also provide for an arbitration procedure.26
3.   Case studies
This section describes in more detail eight bilateral trade
agreements signed by the EU and by Canada that have specific and
quite developed competition provisions. It examines how these
competition provisions interact with trade provisions and it includes
material based on interviews carried out by the authors and their
colleagues on the operation of these particular agreements.
79
Holmes et al.
3.1 ANZCERTA
The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement (known as ANZCERTA or the CER Agreement) is the main
instrument governing economic relations between the two countries.
It entered into force in 1983.
ANZCERTA built on a series of earlier RTAs between Australia
and New Zealand, including the 1966 New Zealand and Australia
Free Trade Agreement (NZAFTA).27 Each country is a significant
investment destination for the other.28
Its central provision is the creation of a World Trade
Organization (WTO)-consistent Free Trade Area consisting of
Australia and New Zealand. The objectives of the Agreement,
according to Article 1, are ‘to strengthen the broader relationship
between Australia and New Zealand; to develop closer economic
relations between Australia and New Zealand through a mutually
beneficial expansion of free trade between the two countries; to
eliminate barriers to trade between Australia and New Zealand in a
gradual and progressive manner under an agreed timetable and with
a minimum of disruption; and to develop trade between New Zealand
and Australia under conditions of fair competition’.29
The provisions of the Agreement apply in respect of goods
traded in the Free Trade Area, which is defined in Article 2 of the
Agreement.30 The Agreement allows standard exceptions from its
provisions, for specified purposes, provided they are not used ‘as a
means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or as a disguised
restriction on trade’.31
All tariffs and quantitative import or export restrictions on
trade in goods originating in the Free Trade Area are prohibited under
the Agreement.32 The rules determining the origin of particular goods
are set out in Article 3 of the Agreement.33 Article 12(1)(a) of the
ANZCERTA requires the two countries to ‘examine the scope for
taking action to harmonize requirements relating to [...] restrictive
trade practices.’
Article 22 of the Agreement sets out the review and
consultation mechanism to ensure the Agreement’s satisfactory
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implementation. This includes an annual review of the operation of
the agreement, and further stipulates that the countries should consult
with each other to resolve contentious issues, as there is no dispute
settlement procedure under the Agreement.34
The process of business law harmonization is aimed at
identifying differences in areas that increase the transaction and
compliance costs faced by companies operating in both markets. A
Steering Committee of Officials, which was established to coordinate
the examination of the scope for harmonization, focused on the
implementation of a 1988 Protocol, according to which both countries
were to eliminate tariffs, quantitative import restrictions and tariff
quotas on goods originating in the other country.35 It was considered
that anti-dumping provisions were inappropriate in a free trade area
and that anti-competitive business practices by firms operating across
the Tasman should be subject to the appropriate competition laws of
each country.
It is argued that full trade liberalization was judged necessary
but not sufficient to eliminate the need for anti-dumping in the
ANZCERTA context.36 ‘Such elimination required active enforcement
of similar competition laws and agreement that the jurisdiction of
competition agencies extended to matters affecting trade between
New Zealand and Australia. In this connection it was agreed that
nationals of one state could be made the subject of an enquiry by the
competition authorities of the other state and be required to respond
to requests for information’(Hoekman, 1998a:21).
Competition rules in the two countries were significantly
different in 1983 when Australian antitrust laws followed a US model,
and NZ followed that of the UK.  In 1986, NZ moved to a system that
was closer to Australia’s.37
‘Australia and New Zealand eliminated the availability of anti-
dumping actions on goods originating in each other’s markets on 1
July 1990.38 In parallel, Australia and New Zealand simultaneously
extended the application of their competition law prohibitions on
the misuse of market power. The new provisions (s.46A of the
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 and s.36A of the New Zealand
Commerce Act 1986) prohibit the use of substantial market power
(Australian law) and dominant position (New Zealand law) in a
“trans-Tasman market” for certain anti-competitive purposes.’39
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‘The 1990 Steering Committee report to Governments
provided a list of recommended follow-up actions to progress
harmonization and a list of matters in respect of which future
monitoring and review activity were recommended. In July 1992, the
Steering Committee reported to Governments on a number of
substantial harmonizing outcomes that had occurred since the signing
of the MOU.’40
‘The Foreign Judgments Act 1991 in Australia and the
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1992 in New Zealand
provide for more extensive arrangements for enforcing each country’s
judgments and orders in the other country. Consultation has taken
place between Australia and New Zealand about ensuring the
compatibility of Australian and New Zealand evidence law, especially
in relation to business records and secondary evidence, in the context
of enactment of new evidence legislation by Australia and
examination of possible evidence reforms by the New Zealand Law
Commission.’41 At the 1995 meeting of the Steering Committee of
Officials, focus groups were established in five areas, including
competition policy. However, it was decided in the 1996 meeting that
‘the Committee would focus on key areas of business law rather than
defined “focus group” areas’.42
Under ANZCERTA, each country’s competition authority and
courts have a model of concurrent jurisdiction, whereby each
competition authority may control the misuse of market power in
the trans-Tasman market. The agreement provides for extensive
investigatory assistance, the exchange of information (subject to rules
of confidentiality) and coordinated enforcement.
The ANZCERTA partners did not formally eliminate the use
of CVDs however, even though disciplines on subsidies are included.
ANZCERTA includes disciplines on subsidies (Article 11) that are
stronger than those contained in the WTO.  The 1988 Protocol banned
industry-specific subsidies. Export subsidies are also prohibited
(these were eliminated by 1987). The OECD (2002) notes that no CVDs
have in fact been imposed since ANZCERTA was agreed.
In 1994, the Australian Trade Practices Commission and New
Zealand Commerce Commission concluded a bilateral Cooperation
and Coordination Agreement to reduce the possibility for
inconsistencies in the application of legislation, (Cernat and Laird,
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2003). It is worth noting that ANZCERTA does not have dispute
settlement provisions pertaining to the RTA as such.43
The ANCERTA agreement is very special because of its
elimination of anti-dumping.  It is clear that there was a direct link
between the ending of anti-dumping and the completion of a
harmonized and integrated competition regime in this case.  The use
of anti-dumping appears to have been ended de facto in 1988, but it
continued after 1983. Hoekman (1998a)  (citing Ahdar, 1991) reports
that there were numerous mutual anti-dumping initiations in the
period 1983-88 but very few findings that led to measures.  Thus the
difficulty of using the instrument may have led to a willingness to
end its use. Hoekman (1998a)  argues, however, that the key factor
was the ability of the two economies to engage in a form of deep
integration that went well beyond competition, even though it showed
far fewer obviously supranational features than the EU.  The
comparison springs to mind of the pre-1995 EFTA, where a group of
like-minded states were able to practice very free trade with each
other due to a very common economic culture. In the case of Australia
and New Zealand, the RTA perhaps provided a framework for a joint
trajectory from protectionism to openness, with the enhanced role
of competition policy in both being an important, but not the only,
element.
3.2 Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement44
Signed in Santiago, Chile, in December 1996, the Canada-Chile
Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA)45 came into force on 5 July 1997. Chile
was Canada’s first bilateral free trade partner outside NAFTA. The
CCFTA aims at the comprehensive liberalization of goods and services
trade and claims to comply with GATT Article XXIV and GATS V.46
For Chile, the main aim of the agreement was to secure market
access to Canada, while providing a boost to the Chilean government
campaign to enter NAFTA (Marsden and Whelan, 2005a:4). The
CCFTA has helped to improve trade between Canada and Chile and,
since the signing of this agreement, two-way trade has more than
doubled.
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The CCFTA’s two key liberalization features are the following:
immediate duty-free access for 85 per cent of Canadian exports and
the elimination of Chile’s 11 per cent import duty on almost all
remaining industrial and resource-based goods over five years, and
improved access for a range of agricultural goods. Both parties agreed
to seek further liberalization and in annex H-08 they set out their
commitments to liberalize quantitative restrictions, licensing
requirements, performance requirements or/and other non-
discriminatory measures (CCFTA, Article H-08).
To ensure that the benefits of the CCFTA were not undermined
by private barriers to trade, the parties included provisions on
competition policy and cooperation. The CCFTA provisions were very
general obligations relating to cooperation in the issues of competition
law enforcement policy, ‘ including mutual legal assistance,
notification, consultation and exchange of information relating to the
enforcement of competition laws and policies in the free trade area.’
(CCFTA, Article J-01(2))
The CCFTA contains obligations to adopt or maintain
measures to proscribe anti-competitive business conduct, to take
appropriate action to enforce such measures, and to consult from
time to time about the effectiveness of such action.47 Lastly, in common
with NAFTA, the CCFTA dispute settlement provisions do not apply
to competition policy.48
In 2001, the competition authorities of both countries signed
a more detailed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).49 This
provides for inter alia notification of ‘the enforcement activities that
may affect the other party’s interest in the application of its
competition law’ (Canada-Chile MOU, Article II.1), cooperation and
coordination (Canada-Chile MOU, Article III), avoidance of conflicts
procedure (Canada-Chile MOU, Article IV) and the holding of
meetings of competition officials (Canada-Chile MOU, Article V). The
MOU Article II states that:
1. Subject to Article VI, each Party will notify the other Party
with respect to its enforcement activities which may affect
the other Party’s interests in the application of its competition
law.’
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The subsequent wording is fairly general in scope and
contains special provisions with respect to mergers.50
The parties to the CCFTA may still maintain or establish state
enterprises (CCFTA, Article J-03(1)). However, both parties must
ensure that any state enterprise applies ‘non-discriminatory treatment
in sale of its goods or services to investments in the Party’s territory
of investors of the other Party.’ (CCFTA, Article J-03(3)). In fact, neither
party is prevented by the agreement from authorizing (‘designating’)
a monopoly (CCFTA, Article J-02(1)).
Articles M-01, M02 and M0-3 of the CCFTA provided that
anti-dumping measures between Canada and Chile would be
eliminated by January 2003 or earlier for goods whose tariffs were
reduced to zero before that date.51 In introducing legislation to give
effect to this, the Canadian government expressed the hope that this
might eventually create a precedent for the elimination of anti-
dumping in NAFTA.52  The elimination of anti-dumping provisions
is consistent with the Canadian trade position in Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) negotiations.
Canada’s traditional position from the time of the Canada-
United CUSFTA, has been to seek the elimination of
countervailing duty and antidumping mechanisms. It was
reported that the trade negotiators generally agreed that
antidumping might be replaced by competition law principles,
but a basis for reform of countervailing duty provisions could
not be developed. (Leach and Gastle, 2000)
The CCFTA established a Committee on Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Measures to further define subsidy disciplines and
to eliminate the need for countervailing duty measures on trade
between Canada and Chile, but both parties retain the right to use
these in the meantime (CCFTA, Article M-05(a)). This agreement
reaffirms the GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing duties in
general terms, but goes a little further than GATT in Agriculture.
From January 2003, ‘neither Party [can] introduce or maintain any
export subsidy on any agricultural goods originating in, or shipped
from, its territory that are exported directly or indirectly to the
territory of the other Party’ (CCFTA, Article C-14(2)).
Although the CCFTA requires the parties to consult on the
effectiveness of their competition laws and to cooperate in the
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enforcement of competition laws, these obligations are not subject to
the specific dispute settlement provisions of the agreement (see
OECD, 2005).
The CCFTA did not require the establishment of a competition
authority as both sides already had one. Nonetheless, each party is
obliged to designate a contact point to facilitate communication
between the parties in any matter covered by CCFTA, including
competition policy (CCFTA, Article L-01). The CCFTA does not
require either party to align their competition laws to each other.
Under the MOU, Canada has notified Chile on one occasion
and there has also been an exchange of non-confidential information
between the competition authorities (Marsden and Whelan, 2005a:30).
Despite the non-binding nature of the co-operation obligations under
the CCFTA and the MOU, Marsden and Whelan (2005a:28) conclude
that the competition chapter of the CCFTA has contributed towards
the establishment of an effective cooperation framework between the
antitrust agencies of Canada and Chile.
The authors concur with Hoekman (1998:32) that the CCFTA
is an example of an FTA that eliminates anti-dumping in the presence
of effective but not harmonized antitrust regimes. In fact, the
agreement provides for elimination of the anti-dumping mechanism
but maintains countervailing duties. The parties clearly did not regard
the antitrust provisions as irrelevant, as the FTA was followed by a
MOU, later used as a template for Canada–Costa Rica FTA. Marsden
and Whelan (2005a:34) conclude that the most important part of the
competition arrangements was the MOU, which was more detailed.
They argue that the softness of the obligations made the agencies
more willing to work with it in the informal manner they find more
congenial. They say: ‘The FTA introduces and the agency-to-agency
consolidates a working relationship between the antitrust agencies
of the parties’ and ‘Cooperation agreements promote trust and
confidence between the competition agencies of the parties.’
3.3 Canada–Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement53
The Canada–Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement (CCRFTA)54
came into effect on 1 November 2002. The agreement created a free
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trade area in goods, but unlike Canada-Chile did not cover services.
For Costa Rica the agreement was a stepping stone to the Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). For Canada the
negotiation process of the agreement was an opportunity to
‘experiment with the kind of trade law reform that would be
impossible with American participation in the negotiations’ (Leach
and Gastle, 2000).
Costa Rica eliminated tariffs on two-thirds of its imports from
Canada, with the rest being eliminated over a period of 14 years. On
the other hand, Canada immediately eliminated tariffs on 86 per cent
of its tariff lines (Customs Reporter, 2001), leaving the rest to be
removed over an eight-year period.
The chapter on competition policy does not require Costa Rica
to adopt any specific provisions of Canadian rules, but calls for
adherence to certain basic principles including the existence of an
agency with autonomy and compliance to certain due process rules
(not unlike those discussed in the WTO working Group on Trade
and Competition), in order ‘to ensure that the benefits of trade
liberalization are not undermined by anticompetitive activities and
to promote cooperation and coordination between the competition
authorities of the Parties’. (CCRFTA, Article XI.1) The cooperation
provisions are fairly broad and mainly involve notification: ‘each
Party will notify the other Party with respect to its enforcement
activities which may affect the other Party’s interests in the application
of its competition law’, including mergers, with specific wording in
this area.
The Competition provisions of the CCRTA largely replicate
those of the Canada-Chile MOU and so serve as a guide for the
cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities (Marsden and
Whelan, 2005b:9).
The CCRFTA provided for WTO rules to govern anti-dumping
or countervailing duties. However, the text recognizes the
‘desirability’ of introducing further disciplines such as lesser duty
rules and a public interest test.
According to Leach and Gastle (2000) the inclusion of anti-
dumping measures in the CCRFTA demonstrates that ‘Canada
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appears to have abandoned its traditional trade policy position that
the anti-dumping mechanism should be eliminated.’ In the Canada-
US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) signed in 1987, Canadian
negotiators sought the elimination of countervailing duty and anti-
dumping mechanisms, arguing that ‘anti-dumping might be replaced
by competition law principles, but a basis for reform of countervailing
duty provisions could not be developed’(Leach and Gastle, 2000).
Costa Rica has a widespread Free Trade Zones (FTZs) regime,
which is thought to be WTO compatible, having the effect of
subsidizing certain Costa Rican products on condition that they are
exported (International Trade Canada, 2003). The solution was
explained as follows:
The Parties to the CCRFTA do not have a general rule
regarding FTZ, but rather agreed to delay the reduction of
tariffs applied to specific tariff lines. The approach is therefore
not one of a general nature but one that is case specific.55
There have been no notifications to the WTO of countervailing
duties imposed on any of the parties.
The CCRFTA provides for a Free Trade Commission for
dispute resolution based on NAFTA Chapter 20, but the wording on
competition is obscure. The OECD report (OECD, 2005a) categorizes
the dispute settlement in the CCRFTA both as ‘competition policy
excluded’ and as ‘consultation mechanism’ in competition
provisions.56 So far, there has been no notification to the WTO of any
dispute settlement between Canada and Costa Rica in any matter.
Marsden and Whelan report that the CCRFTA has introduced
a working relationship between competition authorities, allowing
them to benefit from an increased awareness of each other’s interests
and approaches. (Marsden and Whelan, 2005b:27). Nonetheless, to
date they find that there has been little cooperation on specific cases
between these two competition agencies, with no formal notifications
made under the agreement. Marsden and Whelan (2005b) report
satisfaction by officials on both sides with the emerging relationship:
one competition official admitted that the cooperation agreement
works best when it is approached in an informal way  and the FTA
provides for a formal framework for informal contact means (Marsden
and Whelan, 2005b:28, n. 108). Additionally, a variety of trade officials
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said that ‘trust and confidence are also developed by the informal
meetings of trade officials at various multilateral fora such as the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
or the International Competition Network (ICN)’.57 The authors’ own
sources confirmed that Costa Rica is content with the CCRFTA
competition provisions and would have liked to see competition
provision in CAFTA-DR.58
This case is more evidence for Hoekman’s (1998a)  rejection
of the link between anti-dumping and competition provisions in RTAs
but it suggests that there are other positive benefits of such provisions
perceived by the developing partner here, largely through closer
interaction.
A note on CAFTA-DR
The US-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR)59 was signed in 200460 by the US, El Salvador,
Honduras and Guatemala who have ratified it and by Costa Rica,
Nicaragua and by the Dominican Republic who at the time of writing
have not yet done so.  Implementation of CAFTA-DR is therefore
pending.
CAFTA-DR is described as similar in form to the US–Jordan
FTA, but with stricter rules governing domestic environmental
standards.61 However, it does not contain a competition chapter,
apparently since the four Central American countries do not have
competition policies.62  Nevertheless, Chapter 13.4.2 of the CAFTA-
DR text on telecommunications states: ‘Each Party shall maintain
appropriate measures for the purpose of preventing suppliers who,
alone or together, are a major supplier in its territory from engaging
in or continuing anti-competitive practices.’
However, Cost Rica has been exempted from the
commitments of Chapter 13 of CAFTA-DR and has scheduled a
different set of commitments reflecting its social aims in
telecommunications policy, and including the following paragraph
on competition:
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Costa Rica shall maintain appropriate measures for the
purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a
major supplier from engaging in anti-competitive practices,
such as not making available, on a timely basis, to suppliers
of public telecommunications services, technical information
about essential facilities and commercially relevant
information that is necessary for them to provide public
telecommunications services.63
3.4 EU-Poland Europe Agreement
In 1991, Poland and the EU signed the Europe Agreement
(EA),64 which came into force in 1994. The trade and trade-related
provisions (among them competition policy rules) of this agreement
were implemented on 1 March 1992 under an Interim Agreement.65
The main aim of signing this agreement for Poland was future
accession to the European Union (EU), which eventually occurred in
2004.66  It was superseded by the Accession Treaty.
The EA facilitated trade liberalization by creating a free
trade area in industrial goods. The EA further required that Poland
adopt some form of competition policy, declaring incompatible
with the Agreement ‘practices that restrict or distort competition
such as agreements between undertakings restricting competition,
or abuse of dominant position, behaviour of state-owned
enterprises and state aid, insofar as they affect trade between the
Community and Poland’.67 The EA obliged Poland to prevent such
practices, though the EA formally left the details of how to
implement this with Poland. Anti-competitive practices were to be
assessed against the criteria arising from the application of the
rules of Articles 81, 82 and 87 of the EC Treaty.
The Commission’s oft-rehearsed position on approximation
of laws was that competition law alone was not sufficient to end all
contingent protection: the internal market acquis had to be in place
in order to create ‘a level playing field’.68
The EU thereby created an obligation for EA signatories, which
did not apply to existing members. (Holmes, 1998:101).
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After it was established in 1990, the Polish Competition
Authority (PCA),69 first received substantial help from the United
States. However, the EA led to the approximation of Polish
competition law with the acquis communautaire and assisted the PCA
in supporting liberalization.
According to Hoekman and Mavroidis (1995:125), uniquely
among Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC)s, the Polish
Anti-monopoly Office was given responsibility for carrying out anti-
dumping investigations at the beginning of the 1990s. The Anti-
monopoly Office, and later UOKIK,70 gave an opinion in cases brought
by enterprises to the Ministry of Economy related to ‘excessive
importation of goods to the Polish custom territory’ (OECD, 2003:11),
which included cases of alleged dumping. The Minister of Economy
was obliged to consult the Chairman of the UOKIK (UOKIK, 2000)
before deciding to use protectionist measures. Of course, since its
accession to the EU, Poland applies EU anti-dumping measures
against third parties and is essentially exempt from actions by other
EU states.71
Article 33 of the EC-Poland EA imposed the obligation that
the Association Council be informed of dumping cases as soon as
the authorities of the importing party have initiated an investigation;
but left parties free to impose what measures to take.  Hoekman and
Mavroidis (1995:131) argue that the EU had more scope for applying
measures. Indeed, there was an asymmetry between the initiations
of anti-dumping investigations between 1995 and 200472 – ten
initiations from the EU against Poland and none by Poland against
the EU.
The competition chapter of the agreement included regulation
of public aid which ‘distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’.73
Any practices contrary to this provision were to be assessed on the
basis of criteria arising from the application of the rules of Article 92
(later Article 87) of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(Gwiazda, 2005: 171). Each Party needed to ensure transparency in
the area of public aid, inter alia by reporting annually to the other
Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given.74 The
EA provided for the subsequent establishment of implementing rules
on state aid.  This involved the creation of a national monitoring
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authority and rules parallel to those of the EU. Cremona (2003)
comments that there was a multi-layer approach in all the Europe
Agreements. EU law did not have a direct effect and if the EU
disagreed with a decision of the national authority, the matter could
be referred to the Association Council, but the EU also had the right
to act unilaterally.75
Until the adoption of implementing rules, GATT rules with respect
to countervailing of subsidies would continue to apply. Since 1995,
there has been no notification to the WTO of initiation or use of
countervailing duties between the parties76
Ensuring transparency of state aids was a new task for the
PCA. The absence of a domestic law controlling the granting of state
aid contributed to the Commission’s less than positive opinion on
Poland’s ability to comply with and implement the EA in the field of
state aid (European Commission, 1998). The situation only changed
after January 2001, when a law regulating state aid entered into force77
and granted responsibility for monitoring state aid to the UOKIK.
Lastly, the European Commission noted that ‘with regard to state
aid, the state aid law and the secondary legislation appears to provide
a satisfactory basis for initiating effective control of state aid in
Poland’(European Commission, 2001:50). The OECD report indicates
that in 2003 the UOKIK ‘approved’ 166 cases related to state aids.78
The steel industry was one of the sensitive sectors where aid
for restructuring purposes was permitted, in line with the
requirements set out in Protocol 2 of the EA.79 Poland, however,
introduced Special Economic Zones (SEZs) where public aid was
granted, which included elements contrary to the acquis and Poland’s
immediate obligations under the EA. (European Commission,
2000:42) Agriculture and fisheries products were exempt from the
application of State aid rules under the EA.80
Matters relating to the application or interpretation of
competition provisions of the EA could be referred to the Associate
Council.81 The Council had a right to settle the dispute by means of a
decision and the parties were bound by this decision. In cases where
the Council could not settle the dispute, arbitrators could be
appointed82 and a decision was taken by majority vote. However,
Cremona (2003:284) notes that, in the case of state aids, the EU was
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not bound by the Association Council and could impose
countervailing duties. The national regimes and the Association
Council were supplemented by the right to use trade remedies,
reflecting the fact that until Poland was a full member of the EU, EU
law could not be directly effective.
The EC-Poland EA explicitly indicated that Poland committed itself
to the approximation of its legislation to that of the European Union,
particularly in the areas relevant to the internal market, though the
actual legal obligation was vague:
On the approximation of laws Article 68 simply stated:
(…) Poland shall use its best endeavours to ensure that future
legislation is compatible with Community legislation.
Obviously with the prospect of accession to the European
Union, the reference to legislation relating to competition policy was
slightly stronger: it needed to be compatible with the EU treaties in
order to ensure compliance with Article 63. More detailed goals for
the candidates were laid down in the 1995 White Paper (European
Commission, 1995:63), but it was only the political pressure of the
accession negotiations that allowed the EU to dictate precise details
of Polish law before accession.
Despite harmonization of competition law, however, there was
no formal antitrust cooperation under the EA between DG
Competition and the Polish competition authority.83 Before accession,
Poland was treated as an outsider by the Commission and there was
no exchange of information in competition cases.84 The situation
diametrically changed after entering the European Union and the
European Competition Network (ECN) at the same time. The creation
of the ECN was in some ways a logical consequence of enlargement:
the EU now had ten new members with competition authorities set
up to police anti-competitive behaviour affecting trade with other
member states. The creation of the ECN shared responsibility among
DG Competition and national agencies for cross-border cases.
The ECN has institutionalized competition policy
cooperation. Before 1 May 2004, cooperation for existing member
states was not formalized. The cooperation between UOKIK and DG
Competition is regarded as highly valuable by the former.85 The ECN
allows for a flow of information from DG Competition and other
agencies inside the ECN, exchange of confidential information and
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access to full decisions coming from European institutions. Despite
approximation of competition law in the EA, before accession only
publicly available information had been circulated.
Despite an obvious asymmetry in the adoption of rules in the
EA, the absence of cooperation in its early years and continued anti-
dumping, the Polish authorities were content with the competition
provisions of the EA as necessary step in creating a modern market
economy and facilitating integration with the EU.86
2.5 EU-Turkey Customs Union
After many years in which Turkey had an association
agreement with the EU,87 it was agreed in 1995 at the Association
Council that Turkey would create a customs union (CU) with the EU,
with industrial tariffs reduced to zero by 1999.88 Turkey is also to
start accession negotiations with the EU.89
‘Under the Customs Union, Turkey is committed to align with
part of the internal market acquis, including free circulation of
industrial goods, intellectual and industrial property rights,
competition policy (state aid control and antitrust) and to adopt the
common external tariff.  Public procurement, services and
establishment are currently not covered by the Customs Union […]’.90
The CU offers rapid liberalization of trade for industrial
commodities.91 However, there are loopholes in the process as anti-
dumping and safeguard measures remain available (Articles 38, 44,
and 63).92
CU rules also require adoption of other acquis for fully free
trade, as stated above.  The EU has consistently stated that adoption
of competition rules is not enough to ensure elimination of all
contingent protection including anti-dumping.93 Between 1995 and
2004, the EU initiated nine anti-dumping proceedings against Turkey
while Turkey used this instrument once against the EU.94 The EU
applied anti-dumping measures in two instances. Turkey has never
applied anti-dumping measures against the EU.
Nevertheless, the EU, which is an active user of countervailing
measures, has never used this tool against Turkey in the period
between 1995 and 2004. Turkey has never initiated countervailing
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proceedings, but was targeted twice, and applied countervailing
measures once.
Relations in the competition field between Turkey and the
EU are primarily governed by the agreement on the CU with the
European Community. Generally, Turkey’s antitrust legislation
appears to be largely modelled on the main principles of Community
antitrust rules, as required by the EC-Turkey Customs Union, and
Turkey has created a functionally independent body with the
administrative structures to allow for the implementation of the
rules.95
In the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement, Articles 32 to
43 clarify the obligations with regard to competition law and policy.
Article 32 deals with cartels following a similar wording to Article 81
EC. Articles 33 and 34 clarify the rules on abuse of dominance and
state aid mirroring EC rules. Article 35 states that the basis of
assessment with regard to cases will be on the basis of criteria arising
from the application of the rules of ex. Articles 85, 86 and 92 (Articles
81, 82 and 87 EC according to the new numbering) following the
Treaty of Amsterdam.
Article 36 of the Agreement deals with the limitations to
information exchange between the Parties, ‘the limitations imposed
by the requirements of professional secrecy and business secrets’.
Article 37 prescribes a two-year period with regard to adoption of
necessary rules for the implementation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 and
related parts of Article 35 by the Association Council. ‘These rules
shall be based upon those already existing in the Community and
shall inter alia specify the role of each competition authority.’ Until
these rules are adopted the authorities of the Community or Turkey
will rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted
practices and on abuse of a dominant position in accordance with
Articles 32 and 33. Besides, the provisions of the GATT Subsidies
Code shall be applied as the rules for the implementation of Article
34.96
Article 38 prescribes the procedure with regard to the issues
regarding the terms of Articles 32, 33 or 34, which are not ‘adequately
dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in Article 37, or
in the absence of such rules, and if such practice causes or threatens
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to cause serious prejudice to the interest of the other Party or material
injury to its domestic industry’. In such cases, Turkey or the EU may
take appropriate measures ‘after consultation within the Joint
Customs Union Committee or after 45 working days following referral
for such consultation. Priority will be given to such measures that
will least disturb the functioning of the Customs Union. In cases that
are incompatible with regard to Article 34, GATT rules apply’.
The CU text states that ‘Turkey shall ensure that its legislation
in the field of competition rules is made compatible with that of the
European Community, and is applied effectively’.97 Article 39(2)
further clarifies the obligations. ‘The Community and Turkey [will]
communicate to each other all amendments to their laws concerning
restrictive practices by undertakings. They shall also inform each
other of the cases when these laws have been applied.’98 In relation
to information supplied regarding state aid, the Community has the
right to raise objections against an aid granted by Turkey, which it
would have deemed unlawful under EC law, had it been granted by
a Member State. If Turkey does not agree with the Community’s
opinion, and if the case is not resolved within 30 days, the Community
and Turkey shall each have the right to refer the case to arbitration.99
In exchange, Turkey shall have the right to raise objections and seize
the Association Council against an aid granted by a Member State
which it deems to be unlawful under EC law. If the case is not resolved
by the Association Council within three months, the Association
Council may decide to refer the case to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities.100
‘The Community [will] inform Turkey as soon as possible of
the adoption of any decision under [Articles 81, 82 and 87 EC] of the
EC Treaty which might affect the interests of Turkey.’ ‘Turkey shall
be entitled to ask for information about any specific case decided by
the Community under Articles [Articles 81, 82 and 87] of the EC
Treaty’.101
Article 41 of the Agreement lays down obligations on Turkey
with regard to public undertakings to which special or exclusive rights
have been granted (Article 86 EC). Turkey is under an obligation ‘to
ensure that, by the end of the first year following the entry into force
of the Customs Union, the principles of the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, notably Article 86 EC, as well as
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the principles contained in the secondary legislation and the case-
law developed on this basis, are upheld’. Turkey is obliged to
progressively adjust any state monopolies of a commercial character
so as to ensure that there should be no discrimination regarding the
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed between
nationals of the Member States and of Turkey.102
Article 43 deals with the voluntary notification (as there is
full discretion) possibility for either Party, if either believes that ‘anti-
competitive activities carried out on the territory of the other Party are
adversely affecting its interests or the interests of its undertakings’.
The request will be made with a view to initiating appropriate
enforcement action by the relevant competition authority. ‘It will also
include an offer for such further information and other cooperation
as the notifying Party is able to provide.103 Upon the receipt of such a
notification and after discussions between the Parties, the competition
authority of the notified Party will consider whether or not to act
and to inform the other of its intentions.104 . The notifying party
remains free to use its own procedures if it wishes.105 This does not
however oblige parties to notify or act if they see an anti-competitive
action in their own territory affecting the other.
Turkey is obliged to adopt a substantive competition law that
follows the EU model as a result of the Customs Union Agreement.
The provisions in Turkish law appear in Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the
Competition Act. Article 4 deals with agreements and concerted
practices and therefore parallels Article 81(1) EC. Article 6, directed
to the abuse of dominance, is designed to follow Article 82 EC, while
Article 7 on mergers and acquisitions follows the EU merger
regulation.106
Regarding state aid control, the European Commission notes
that ‘the degree of alignment is very limited, and there is no state aid
monitoring authority. In the absence of a legal framework and
administrative capacity, no enforcement record has yet been
established’.107
‘Despite the deadline in Article 37, the required rules have
not yet been adopted, essentially because Turkey has been unable to
reach a consensus on a mechanism for aligning its aid system with
the EU’s requirements. A draft version of the Article 37 implementing
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rules has been developed that specifies the organic entities in Turkey
and the EU responsible for enforcing the competition laws and
controlling state aid. […] The provision relating to state aid lists only
a non-existent “Turkish State Aid Monitoring Authority”.108 The EU
constantly criticized the failure to resolve the issue and called for the
establishment of an operationally independent state aid monitoring
agency.109 The OECD made a similar recommendation in its 2002
Report (p.30).’ ‘One such important issue related to approval and
monitoring of state aid is the restructuring of the steel sector.’110
Another interesting issue with relevance to trade and
competition is the international aspects of enforcement. The Turkish
Competition Authority (TCA) has not established any formal
cooperation arrangements with enforcement agencies of the other
countries. It sought the assistance of the EU in enforcement matters
on two occasions in the past year. ‘In May 2004, the Authority initiated
an informal request to EU’s [DG Competition], inquiring whether
the EU’s ongoing investigation of a cartel in the electrical equipment
industry had revealed any information about the cartel’s activities in
Turkey.’ DG Competition replied that it could not provide any
information as the material collected was subject to the rules on
confidentiality.111
‘In June 2004, the TCA initiated a more formal request to DG
Competition under Article 43 of the Customs Union Agreement. […]
The TCA’s request arose from an investigation into a possible cartel
in the coal industry that involved enterprises based in the EU Member
States but whose activities affected the national market. The
[Authority] sought an investigation by DG Competition and also
requested that, if no EC enforcement action resulted, any relevant
investigative information be provided to the TCA. In its response,
DG [Competition] referred to the discretion under Article 43(3) and
noted that the Commission saw no appreciable effect in the EU arising
from the conduct in question. [Besides], the response observed that
any information obtained during an investigation would be subject
to confidentiality rules and this would prevent disclosure to the
TCA’.112
Furthermore, ‘it should be noted that the TCA has no direct
role in government proceedings that entail other competition issues
raised by international trade. The Prime Ministry’s Undersecretariat
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of Foreign Trade holds all responsibility for implementing Turkey’s
law dealing with anti-dumping and unfair import competition.113
Therefore, the Authority has had no involvement in those matters’.114
The most serious problems with competition law and policy
in Turkey involve statutory deficiencies that require parliamentary
action to remedy. Necessary legislation involves instituting a
mechanism to control state aid, as noted above, elimination or control
of state-created commercial enterprises that are vested with monopoly
concessions or anti-competitive privileges, establishment of a
mandatory role for the TCA in reviewing proposed laws and
regulations, and modification of the Competition Act to improve the
law enforcement capacity of the TCA.
The EU Turkey agreement is an interesting example of very
close harmonization but very modest rules on cooperation. GATT
rules on anti-dumping and CVDs still apply but there is hope that as
the full acquis are applied their use will eventually be  discontinued.
This has not yet happened.
2.6 EU-Croatia115
In 2001, the European Union and Croatia signed a
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).116 The agreement
came into effect on 1 February 2005, but the trade provisions of the
SAA were implemented in 2002.117 According to the EU, the SAA
provides for:
‘The four freedoms, with the creation of a free trade area by
2007 for industrial products and most agricultural products’
and creates an obligation to approximate laws:
‘Approximation of Croatian legislation to the Community
acquis, including precise rules in the fields of competition,
intellectual property rights and public procurement’.118
Croatia intended that the SAA would both liberalize trade
within an RTA and pave the way for full membership of the EU.
In common with the Europe Agreements, the SAA calls for
the adoption of the EU acquis, in particular competition policy. The
terms of the required alignment were actually slightly stronger in
the SAA than, for example, the EC–Poland Europe Agreement which
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merely stated that: ‘Poland shall use its best endeavours to ensure
that future legislation is compatible with Community legislation.’119
In reality of course, the pre-accession process drove full adoption of
the acquis for Poland.
The SAA lays down rules for competition policy that are
similar to the Europe Agreements, using the precise wording of the
Rome Treaty to declare that any anti-competitive agreements,
abuses of dominant positions (cf. Articles 81 and 82), and state aids
(cf. Article 87) whenever any of these might affect or distort trade
between Croatia and the EU,120 are incompatible with the
agreement.
Unlike the EC–Poland agreement which allowed Poland to
decide how to eliminate these distortions to trade, the SAA requires
a competition authority which has the power to authorize state aids
on the basis of the principles governing state aids in the less-
developed regions of the EU as specified in the EU Treaty Article
87(3)(a).  It further requires that all authorizations are reported to
Brussels.
The SAA does not eliminate the use of anti-dumping or
countervailing duties between the partners and, as has been
notedearlier,121 the EU position has been that ‘once satisfactory
implementation of competition and state aids policies (by the
associated countries) has been achieved, together with the application
of other parts of Community law linked to the wider market, the Union
could decide to reduce progressively the application of commercial
defence instruments for industrial products’.122  Article 70, which calls
for harmonization of competition law, reiterates that both parties ‘may
use anti-dumping or countervailing measures in accordance with the
relevant Articles of GATT’123
The SAA provides for harmonization of competition laws but
not for formal cooperation procedures between the EU and Croatia
and, from a competition policy perspective, could be regarded as a
highly asymmetric arrangement as with the EU-Turkey agreement.
However, as mentioned above, Croatia sees the SAA very much as a
stepping stone to membership of the EU in which the adoption of
EU-type laws is a way to integrate Croatia into the European economy.
According to the authors’ interviews with Croatian experts in the
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Croatian Competition Agency (CCA), the asymmetric obligation to
adopt EU norms has not been excessively burdensome.124 The
Croatian competition law of 2003 was drafted by the CCA with
technical assistance from German IRZ Stiftung125 and CARDS126 and
was indeed based on the principles required by the EU, but the
Croatian competition authorities did not feel that the harmonization
was inappropriate.127 In fact, they welcomed the advice and assistance
from DG Competition in drafting the competition law.128 There was,
for example, no concern about the provisions required by the EU on
vertical restraints, the most trade-related element of EU law.
The EU sees the SAA as requiring the CCA to regularly report
to Brussels on its activities, but there is no obligation on the part of
DG Competition to supply information about its cases to the Croatian
authority. The authors understand that the willingness of DG
Competition to supply information on a voluntary basis has not yet
been put to the test. Nonetheless, informal bilateral cooperation
between individual agencies is already reported to be good, especially
with Austria, Italy, Slovenia and Hungary. Only one request to a
Member State Authority has ever been flatly refused.129 Confidential
information cannot however be given by members to non-members
of the European Competition Network ECN. Croatia has been advised
that there is no possibility of having observer status.130 Only EU
membership will mean entry to the ECN, at which point matters
affecting trade with other member states will be governed by the
direct effect of EU law.
State aids rules have proved more problematic for Croatia.
The State Aids law was drafted by the Ministry of Finance, but the
CCA is responsible for authorizing, monitoring and if necessary
recovering illegal state aids.  The CCA has expressed some
dissatisfaction with the existing law and in January 2005 declared:
Furthermore, the practical work on authorization of state aid
has proved the inconsistency and lack of clarity relating to
some provisions of the State Aid Act which have not been
brought in compliance with the EU acquis and which result in
uncertainty with respect to the interpretation and application
of the State Aid Act.131
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Despite several high profile cases and some rejections of aids
by the CCA, total state aids in Croatia are falling and were 1.11 per
cent of GDP according to the EU definitions in 2004.132
In conclusion, the CCA acknowledges the asymmetric
character of the competition provisions of its SAA but does not see
this as problematic.133 From the competition authority perspective,
the accession process is itself expected to open and intensify
competition in the Croatian market,  and competition law
harmonization is part of this process. The main opportunity for
Croatia is being part of the wider European integration process.
2.7 EU-Mexico134
Relations between the European Union (EU) and Mexico are
based on the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and
Cooperation Agreement (the so-called Global Agreement), the Interim
Agreement and a Final Act signed in Brussels on 8 December 1997,135
which laid the basis for the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
(EUMFTA).136 The EUMFTA came into force on 1 July 2000 and was
the first agreement signed between the EU and a Latin American
country. Diplomatically the EUMFTA was seen as a way of ensuring
that Mexico did not fall totally under the US sphere of influence.
Article 1 of the EUMFTA specifies the main objectives of the
agreement:
• the creation of a free trade area in goods, including public
procurement markets,
• the establishment of a cooperation mechanism in the field
of competition,
• a consultation mechanism for intellectual property
matters,
• and a dispute settlement mechanism (Marsden and
Whelan, 2005c:8).
Both countries were to eliminate all industrial tariffs, the EU
by 1 January 2003 and Mexico by 1 January 2007. A partial removal of
agricultural and fishery tariffs is due by 2010. The EUMFTA does not
cover services but a separate agreement was concluded by the EU-
Mexico Association Council on services in 2001.137 Article 11.1 of the
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services agreement refers to the need to agree on how to manage
anti-competitive practices. The discussion here relates to the
EUMFTA, which certainly applies to goods trade, and may apply to
services.138
The competition provisions within the EUMFTA are outlined
in Annex XV to the agreement. This emphasizes mutual recognition
of each party’s existing laws. Annex XV also comprises cooperation,
including notification of enforcement activities,139 coordination of
enforcement activities, exchange of information, avoidance of
conflicts, rules on confidentiality and technical assistance. According
to Marsden and Whelan (2005c:28) the competition authorities of the
EU and Mexico confirmed that ‘the provisions of Annex XV are
practically as useful and effective as those that could be included in
an agency-to-agency agreement’ and therefore there are no plans for
the conclusion of such an agreement in the future.
The EUMFTA leaves both parties free to use WTO provisions
for anti-dumping.140  In the period 1995–2004 Mexico brought three
anti-dumping actions against the EU, and the EU brought one against
Mexico.
The EUMFTA has no provisions on state aids and leaves WTO
rules in place.  Mexico in fact started a countervailing duty
investigation against the EU in 2003 but did not impose measures.
The EUMFTA contains elaborate provisions on dispute
settlement that appear to cover competition. The EU website states
that ‘Dispute settlement mechanism: binds for the parties and covers
all aspects of the Agreements’.141
Garcia-Bercero (2005) notes that competition issues are
excluded from dispute settlement provisions of the EU-Chile
agreement, but does not suggest that this is the case for EU-Mexico.
The OECD (2005a:20) categorizes the dispute settlement provisions
for competition in the EUMFTA as ‘arbitration’ and as a ‘consultation
mechanism’.142 However, Marsden and Whelan (2005c) query whether
the EUMFTA dispute settlement system could be effectively applied
to competition.
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Anti-dumping and countervailing between the EU and Mexico
remain in the WTO dispute settlement system, not in a bilateral
regime.
The EU and Mexico have in fact had recourse to the WTO
dispute settlement procedure five times between 1995and 2005, once
since the agreement came into force in 2000. Three cases concerned
bananas, which did involve competition in services (Holmes and
Read, 2001), although they have never been treated as such.
The EUMFTA does not require the establishment of
competition authorities, since both countries have well-established
competition law jurisdictions and competition agencies. There is also
no obligation imposed on either party to harmonize its domestic
competition law with its counterpart.
Besides the explicit recognition of both parties’ competition
laws, the agreement specifies coordination and cooperation in a
variety of fields, and lays out detailed procedures on how these
provisions should be implemented. According to Marsden and
Whelan (2005c:26) the ‘EU-Mexico cooperation has become more
official, more open and more intense since the agreement has been
signed, at least on the Mexican side’. Nonetheless, regarding the
commitment of notification, the Mexicans have notified the EU of
their enforcement activity on 31 occasions; they have only been
notified of European enforcement activity on one occasion (Marsden
and Whelan, 2005c).
A possible reason for this imbalance is that the European
Commission is always very cautious to disclose any kind of sensitive
information ‘The issue of confidentiality is the chief limitation of
enforcement cooperation agreements’ (Marsden and Whelan,
2005c:26).
An alternative explanation is that the EU may be interpreting
the agreement narrowly. Article 6.1 of Annex XV creates an obligation
(albeit non-binding) on both parties to report to the other if it finds
their interests are being affected:
A competition authority which considers that an investigation
or proceeding being conducted by the competition authority
of the other Party may affect such Party’s important interests
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should transmit its views on the matter to, or request
consultation with, the other competition authority…
One can speculate that the EU interprets this to mean that
the EU should contact Mexico if its investigation is affecting Mexican
firms in the EU, rather than if it finds activity originating in the EU
affecting the Mexican economy (an export cartel, for example).
The obligation to report bilaterally is matched by a slightly
weaker right to ask for information.
The competition authority of a Party, which considers that
the interests of that Party are being substantially and adversely
affected by anticompetitive practices of whatever origin that are or
have been engaged in by one or more enterprises situated in the other
Party may request consultation with the other competition authority.
The Article calls for sympathetic consideration to be given to
such requests.
The limited use of the agreement up to now leaves open the
question whether this was ‘a missed opportunity’ or whether Mexico
is too remote from the EU for the close, if imbalanced, relationship
that exists between the EU and its neighbours. But in practice it is
too early to say whether the agreement will lead to closer ties between
Mexico and the EU.
2.8 EU- South Africa Trade, Development and Co-
operation Agreement (TDCA)143
The Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement
(TDCA) governs South Africa’s bilateral relations with the EU144and
was signed on 11 October 1999.
The Agreement was concluded after lengthy negotiations. It
covers around 90 per cent of current bilateral trade between the EU
and South Africa. The key element of the agreement is the creation
of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the EU and South Africa.145  Due
to the restructuring of the South African economy, the agreement
has an asymmetric timetable. The EU will open up its markets faster
and more extensively than South Africa. It will liberalize around 95
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per cent of its imports from South Africa within ten years, whilst the
respective figures on the South African side are around 86 per cent
in 12 years. Similarly, gradual liberalization is envisaged for industrial
products.
‘The EU, already South Africa’s largest market, source of
foreign investment and development aid, pledged to drop average
duties on South African goods from 2.7 per cent to 1.5 per cent. For
its part, South Africa agreed to cut average duties on EU goods from
10 per cent to 4.3 per cent.
An UNCTAD SMART assimilation study found that the
impact of the agreement is likely to have an uneven effect - with a
large impact on European exports to South Africa and a small effect
on South African exports to the European market.’146
The TDCA will also have an effect on the economies of South
Africa’s SACU neighbours Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and
Swaziland (BNLS),147 who may lose 15 per cent of fiscal revenue as
tariffs go, and may impose considerable adjustment costs on BNLS
countries as they enter a de facto free trade area with the EU.148
The agreement deals with competition policy in Section D,
Articles 35 to 40. It stipulates that restrictions of competition and
abuses of dominance affecting trade between the EU and South Africa
are incompatible with the agreement.149 It must be noted that the
TDCA does not specifically cover other aspects of competition policy.
Even though South Africa had competition law in place when
the EU–South Africa agreement was signed, Article 36 states that if
at the entry into force of the Agreement, the contracting Parties do
not have the necessary laws and regulations for the implementation
of the competition-related provisions of the agreement, they would
have to do so within a period of three years.150 The agreement provides
for the establishment of cooperation mechanisms between the parties
in the field of competition law and policy.151 At present cooperation
is good on some issues but the level of cooperation depends on
particular individuals. According to the authors’ interviews, only one
person in the Competition Commission (CC) had personal ties with
a colleague in Brussels. Without a formal cooperation arrangement
only that person in the CC could call their counterpart in DG
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Competition to ask for advice or information. But it was thought that
with a formal agreement in place all the CC staff would feel able to
approach colleagues in Brussels freely.152
The EU-South Africa trade agreement (TDCA) does not
explicitly mention mergers but it does provides for positive comity
in general without specifically excluding them.153 In at least one case,
the EU has vetoed a merger approved by the South African
Authorities. But the EU has not always acted without exchanging
information with the SA authorities. There has been very valuable
informal cooperation between the EU and South Africa154 (Chetty,
2005), and the South African authorities expect that the TDCA will
facilitate informal cooperation.155
‘Appropriate measures’ can be taken by either side, after
consultation with the Co-operation Council, if it considers that a
particular practice has not been adequately dealt with and is harmful
to its interests.156 Hence, the TDCA also recognizes the competency
of both competition authorities, but prescribes consultation before
any further action is undertaken.157
Where the EU or South Africa considers that anti-competitive
activity affecting its important interests is taking place in the other’s
territory, a request that the matter be investigated (‘appropriate
remedial action’) should be given serious consideration.158 The
authority receiving the request must carefully consider the views and
documents provided by its counterpart. However, this does not
prejudice the former ’s ‘functions, rights, obligations or
independence’.159
In case either competition authority decides to undertake an
action that ‘may have important implications’ for the other party,
another consultation round is provided for upon request.160 ‘Hence,
the agreement commits the competition authorities of both parties
to engage in effective communication (or consultation) on those
matters where mutual interests are concerned, without setting out
specific procedures or any mandatory course of action.’161
The agreement also provides for the granting of technical
assistance in the competition field by the EU to South Africa.162
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The typical limitation to information exchange with the EU
applies, due to the requirements of professional and business
secrecy.163
Section E of the agreement deals with ‘public aid’, Articles 41
to 43. The agreement provides that ‘public aid favouring certain firms
or the production of certain goods, which distorts or threatens to
distort competition, and which does not support a specific public
policy objective or objectives of either Party, is incompatible with
the proper functioning [of the] Agreement’.164 The parties also agreed
that granting public aid in a fair, equitable and transparent manner
is in their interests.165 The agreement sets out procedures for
consultation but essentially leaves both sides with their rights under
the WTO to use countervailing duties.166
It should be noted that both South Africa and the EU are very
active users of anti-dumping proceedings.167
Despite the somewhat asymmetrical character of the
competition obligations in the agreement, it has been welcomed by
the South African Authorities, but interestingly this has been for the
anticipated cooperation that is expected but not mandated. Since
mergers are the main area where the competition policy concerns of
the EU and SA interact, only time will tell whether this is a missed
opportunity or an opportunity to create a closer relationship.
Conclusions
The theme of this chapter is that competition provisions in
RTAs can fulfil several different functions including:
a) facilitating trade liberalization and in particular providing
an opportunity to eliminate anti-dumping or countervailing
measures.
b) facilitating cooperation on competition enforcement
c) harmonization of rules.
These have had varying weights in the different agreements
surveyed and below there is a summary of the results showing the
characteristics of the agreements analysed. Table 3.1 summarizes the
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main findings about the cases examined. The table shows the diversity
of experience. The data on the use of anti-dumping between parties
indicates how serious an issue that has been in recent years. The data
are for 2003 (the last year before Polish accession to the EU and for
the whole period 1995-2004). The data suggest that there were no
CVD measures implemented between the parties to any of these
agreements in the period 1994–2005. In cases where anti-dumping
has not been eliminated, it has in fact been used in recent times,
notably but not only by the EU.  Canada and Chile were not significant
users against each other before their RTA and it may be that the
Canadian motivation was to send a signal to NAFTA rather than to
deal with a concrete problem.  On the other hand the ANZCERTA
agreement did link the abolition of anti-dumping to competition
policy.  Meanwhile, the retention of the availability of CVDs even
where there are RTA-specific anti-subsidy rules and no anti-dumping
allowed, is slightly more surprising.
The findings are also summarized with respect to harmonization
and cooperation. The intention is to summarize the workings of the
agreements not just the formal provisions. On harmonization,
agreements are classified as
0) no provisions on harmonization (Canadian and also US
agreements)
1) very loose: EU’s looser agreements
2) firm/hard harmonization, which normally applies to the EU
and its neighbours
In general there is a dichotomy between EU agreements with
close neighbours that require adoption of rules like those governing
intra-EU trade, and other agreements that do not have such
requirements.  EU–South Africa sits uneasily in the middle.
None of the agreements have binding rules on co-operation,
although de jure the EU’s near neighbours do not have cooperation
provisions in their pre-ECN status; de facto they must report very
regularly to the EU on their activities. The classification is therefore:
1 soft but symmetrical rules on cooperation, including any
procedures for consultations, notification, or comity at all.
2 asymmetric de facto obligation of the ‘junior’ partner to cooperate,
which essentially applies to EU candidates.
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The categorization of the role of dispute settlement is very
tentative given the softness of the obligation in the competition field,
and the ambiguities of interpretation. The categories are either
whether rules are included or not. It is worth noting that ANZCERTA
has no specific DS provisions in the RTA as such.168  It is very clear
that EU agreements move furthest into DS that may affect competition
policy (see Garcia-Bercero, 2005).
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NOTES
1 Many of the agreements that the authors discuss are between non-contiguous
partners and would be better described as preferential rather than regional
agreements but we will use the latter term which is more usual.
2  For a general analysis of these agreements see Cernat and Laird (2003).
3Following the accession of the ten new Member States (Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia),
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey are currently official candidates to
joint the EU. Furthermore the EU has signed a Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
4See the communication from the European Commission (2004c).5All these
agreements include provisions dedicated to competition law and policy For
a comprehensive analysis of the competition elements of these agreements
see Holmes et al., supra n.2.
6Only the agreements with Australia, Chile and Singapore contain specific
provisions devoted to competition law and policy.
7For an analysis of the Australia–New Zealand Agreement (ANZCERTA) see
Section 2.1 of this chapter. It has to be stressed that this list of bilateral
agreements is by no means exhaustive. All the free trade agreements can be
found at the trade agreements database of the Tuck School of Business at
Dartmouth, available at http://cibresearch.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
trade_agreements_db/.
8See Holmes et al. (2005) and OECD (2005a).
9This section draws heavily on discussions with our colleague Jim Mathis. See
Mathis (2005b).
10www.unctad.org/competition
11The agreements also include provisions relating to state monopolies, public
undertakings and undertakings that have been granted exclusive rights.
12The agreements with Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.
13The remaining agreements with CEECs and CAs include a more general
provision which stipulates that contracting Parties will examine ways to
apply their respective competition laws on a concerted basis in cases where
trade between them is affected. See Holmes et al., supra n.2.
14The agreements with Egypt, Moldova and Ukraine. A similar provision is
included in the EU–Russia agreement. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that
the EU has signed further separate agreements with accession countries,
which implement the competition-related provisions of the agreements, and
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also provide for enforcement cooperation mechanisms. Similar competition
implementing agreements have been signed with Morocco and Algeria.
15See analytically, Holmes et al., supra n. 2.
16United States — Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint brought by the EC,
Dispute DS 136.
17Hindley and Messerlin (1996) refer to a ‘sanctuary market’.
18See also Estrin and Holmes (1998) and Wooton and Zanardi (2002).
19http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/peco-w/en/chap6.html citing Communication
of 13 July 1994 on the pre-accession strategy.
20See Szepesi (2004).
21See Cremona (2003) on the CEECs.
22See analytically OECD (2005a). The OECD study also includes a detailed
review of the agreements that provide for consultations as a mechanism
for resolving conflicts that arise from the application of the competition
rules found in these agreements.
23This particular agreement excludes competition provisions from the
application of dispute settlement rules (Article 180 of the agreement).
24Or the Cooperation Council in the case of the agreement signed with Central
Asian ad Eastern European countries.
25All the agreements with Candidate Countries, the Euro-Mediterranean
agreements and also the agreement with South Africa.
26Such an arbitration procedure is not applied in the agreement concluded
between the EU and its candidate countries, and the EU–Palestinian
Authority interim agreement.
27See http://www.fta.gov.au/Default.aspx?ArticleID=1183. ‘By the late 1970s,
[NZAFTA] and its predecessors had led to the removal of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on 80 per cent of trans-Tasman trade. But [NZAFTA]
was complex and lacked an automatic mechanism to move ahead. In March
1980 the concept of ‘closer economic relations’ between the two countries,
to improve living standards and international competitiveness, was
introduced in a joint communiqué issued by Prime Ministers Malcolm Fraser
and Robert Muldoon’.
28See http://www.fta.gov.au/default.aspx?FolderID=284. ‘Australia is the largest
investor in New Zealand and over half of Australia’s total investment in
New Zealand is Foreign Direct Investment, reflecting the high level of
economic integration’. New Zealand is now Australia’s third largest trading
partner and its third largest export market. Australia is New Zealand’s
largest trading partner.
113
Holmes et al.
29See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia
(1997), at point 2.
30See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia
(1997:79–81) at: ‘The 1988 CER Trade in Services Protocol provides for free
trans-Tasman trade in all services, with the exception of a number of services
which were subject to existing government regulations when the Protocol
was signed and which are inscribed in the Annex to the Protocol. Australia
currently has inscribed telecommunications, airport services, domestic air
services, international aviation (passenger and freight services), coastal
shipping, broadcasting and television (limits on foreign ownership),
broadcasting and television (short-wave and satellite broadcasting), basic
health insurance services, third party insurance, workers’ compensation
insurance and postal services. New Zealand currently has inscribed airways
services, international carriers flying, cabotage, telecommunications, postal
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1. Introduction
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have multiplied in recentyears. They have become an increasingly popular means ofcementing trade relationships bilaterally, plurilaterally and
regionally. The popularity of these agreements has taken place against
the backdrop of the perceived failure of consensus-driven
negotiations on competition issues at the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The contents of the RTAs notified to the WTO over the past
several years have been characterized by the inclusion of non-core
trade-related issues, one of which is competition.
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Competition law and policy was placed on the multilateral
agenda in 1972 at Santiago, Chile, when UNCTAD III decided to study
restrictive business practices adversely affecting trade and
development. It culminated with the negotiation of the United
Nations Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules
for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (UN Set on
Competition) under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and unanimously adopted by
the UN General Assembly in the Resolution 35/61 of 5 December 1980.
It was the first and remains the only multilateral agreement to address
anti-competitive behaviour. In the UN Set, developed States are
encouraged to make provision for the needs of less-developed
countries.   The UN Set as a whole aims at facilitating the adoption
and strengthening of laws and policies in this area at national and
regional levels. In Article E, “Principles and Rules for States at National,
Regional and Subregional Levels”, the UN Set calls upon States to
establish appropriate mechanisms at regional and subregional levels
to promote exchange of information on restrictive business practices
and on the application of national laws and policies in this area, and
to assist each other to their mutual advantage regarding control of
restrictive business practices at regional and subregional levels.  The
inclusion of competition provisions in the majority of RTAs -
including those that involve at least one less-developed partner –
can be read as a signal that developing countries have recognized
the importance of competition as a means of preventing trade
initiatives from being undermined by restrictive business practices.
This Chapter analyses competition-related provisions used by
developing countries in their RTAs. In accordance with UNCTAD’s
emphasis on capacity building, a questionnaire was designed to
gather information from competition policy professionals for the
analysis presented here. The aim of the questionnaire was to assess
the characteristics of competition provisions in RTAs from a
developing country perspective – their scope, their application and
success or otherwise in fulfilling the goals originally set for them. In
addition to the questionnaire, extensive research was undertaken into
competition provisions included in RTAs that took place among and
between developing and developed countries. RTAs signed
exclusively between developed countries were not included. The
results of both the UNCTAD Questionnaire1 and the accompanying
research have provided information from which a number of lessons
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and conclusions can be formulated. These conclusions are offered to
competition law and policy officials and experts in developing
countries in the hope that future negotiations, informed by this work,
may be increasingly fruitful.
As an indication of the popularity of RTAs, between January 2004
and February 2005 alone more than 43 RTAs were notified to the WTO
under their General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article
XXIV and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V
obligations, a fact that makes this period the most prolific period of
RTA creation to date. There are 317 RTAs currently notified to the
WTO, of which 56 involve at least one developing country.2 The WTO
estimates that there are approximately another 65 RTAs in operation
that have not yet been notified. WTO Members are obliged to notify
their agreements under Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of
the GATS, but the increasing popularity of RTAs, as well as the legal
Figure 4.1 Notified RTAs to the GATT/WTO by the date of entry into
force, 1948-2005
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Legend: The column on the right-hand side of the chart is a cumulative figure that refers
to the total number of RTAs in force and does not count inactive RTAs or accessions of
new members to existing RTAs. Source: (Cawford and Fiorentino, 2005).
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ambiguities surrounding the notification process, means that
notifications lag behind the number of active RTAs (Cawford and
Fiorentino, 2005).3
Figure 4.1 shows the number of notified RTAs to the GATT/WTO
since the 1950s. The fact that both the numbers of RTAs and also the
rate of increase of RTAs being signed are rising indicates that RTAs
are becoming the vehicle of recourse for countries that wish to settle
outstanding trade issues, as well as trade-related issues that cannot
be effectively dealt with on a multilateral level. The inclusion of
provisions pertaining to restrictive business practices in these
agreements has ensured that a certain level of familiarity and
competence in competition law and policy has been achieved in
developing and transition countries as a result of their membership
in various RTAs. Competition law, policy, enforcement and expertise
have all increased as a result of this trend towards regionalism.
Developing countries seem almost as likely to consolidate RTAs
among themselves as with developed countries. Table 4.1 shows that
developing countries have been prolific in signing agreements with
each other. This is indicative of the fact that, as per the replies to the
UNCTAD Questionnaire examined in more detail below, RTAs are
being signed between countries for cooperative reasons (the ability
to exchange information and assessment reports with counterparts
in other developing countries), as much as for developmental reasons
(in the sense of benefiting from the technical cooperation and
expertise normally offered by developed countries.)  Table 4.1 shows
this trend.
  Developing country partner with … Number Percentage
     Developed partner   28 54
     Developing partner   24 46
               Total   521 100
Table 4.1 The profile of developing country partners in regional trade
agreements
Source: Compiled from Table 4A.1 in Appendix 1.
1  Four observations are missing here because the treaty texts could not be found by the
time of publication.
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The stated aim of competition clauses, as made clear in the UN
Set on Competition, is that the benefits of trade are not undermined
by anti-competitive practices. Several other factors are also important:
firstly, the agenda-setting power of larger trading powers and
institutional donors has an influence on less-developed partners
during the negotiation of an RTA; secondly, developing countries can
grant credibility to internal reforms by including them in an RTA;
and, thirdly, competition provisions can assist in economic integration
and market access.
Firstly, larger trading partners have encouraged the inclusion of
competition provisions within RTAs. The European Union (EU), for
example, has concentrated heavily on the adoption of competition
law because of its importance to the common market. Likewise, the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) has emphasized competition
agreements in its RTAs with developing countries. The United States
also typically includes competition provisions in its RTAs. Despite
this, developing countries are still less likely to include competition
provisions in RTAs if no developed country partner is involved. Table
4.2 shows the number of RTAs containing competition provisions
signed: between developing and developed countries (the EC and
the US have been used as examples of developed country partners
because they are the most prolific initiators of trade agreements with
developing countries); and, between developing and other developing
  Source: Compiled from Table 4A.1
EC USA Developing Countries 
 
Number % Number % Number % 
No. of RTAs with 
developing countries 
containing competition 
provisions notified to the 
WTO 
8 72 3 75  24 46 
Total number of known 
RTAs with developing 
countries notified to the 
WTO 
11 100 4 100 52  100 
 
Table 4.2 Number of RTAs that contain competition clauses involving
developing countries signed with the EC or US
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countries. Institutional donors such as the World Bank or other
regional development banks have encouraged emerging economies
to adopt competition laws and have provided assistance to those
countries to help them establish such regimes.
Secondly, RTAs have been seen by developing countries in
particular as a useful means of formalizing fundamental economic
reforms such as the privatization of state monopolies. By formalizing
competition obligations within treaties, the governments of
developing countries seek to avoid interest groups from interfering
with trade liberalization. (This is particularly true of transition
economies, where entrenched monopolies constitute a small, well-
organized group with strong connections to the government. The
particular case of transition economies, however, lies outside the
scope of this chapter, and has been covered in detail by other
authors.)4
Thirdly, the adoption of competition rules prevents vertical
restrictions and cartels from forming. Both vertical restrictions and
cartels may divide markets along national lines. Competition
provisions should also help to prevent the formation of cartels, which
have a market-partitioning effect between countries. Competition
provisions therefore may have a positive effect on economic
integration between treaty partners.
The inclusion of competition clauses was rationalized by the
recognition among developing countries that ‘unilateral liberalization
does not guarantee the openness of target markets; in an economy
that is undergoing globalization and regionalization simultaneously,
countries seek strategies for positioning themselves in major import
markets in ways that will give their products greater and more reliable
access to those markets’ (Kuwayama, 2005). For developing countries,
including competition clauses in regional treaties has theoretically
opened the doors to these markets.
By highlighting developing country experiences associated with
competition provisions in RTAs, the reader will be able to assess the
most useful and the most troublesome elements of these treaties from
a developing country perspective. This section below refers to the 56
RTAs involving developing countries notified to the WTO since its
inception in 1995 (of which four treaty texts were unable to be found
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at the time of writing), plus some other agreements not yet notified
but that were mentioned by respondents to the UNCTAD
Questionnaire. Although this chapter refers to the views, opinions
and needs of developing countries, it is important to note that the
heterogeneous nature of this categorization of countries necessarily
masks important differences between individual countries. To a
certain extent, these differences will be of an ideological nature, but
disagreements are also likely to arise from the countries’ individual
features.
Occasional reference to peripheral agreements involving
competition law and policy such as agency-to-agency agreements
(ATAs) has been made throughout the text. Their inclusion is as a
result of references made to them by questionnaire respondents.
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) were also referred to
sporadically by questionnaire respondents and have likewise been
included. The growth of competition agreements outside of RTAs is
an interesting development and one that will hopefully attract further
research.
This chapter is divided into several sections. This introduction
is followed by Section 2, which outlines the motivation for this study.
Section 3 briefly examines the peripheral issues of ATAs and MLATs.
Section 4 deals with some caveats associated with the techniques
employed in gathering the data. Section 5 sets out the major themes
drawn from the UNCTAD Questionnaire, which leads to the lessons
learnt and conclusions drawn from the experiences of developing
country competition policy practitioners in Section 6. A useful table
summarizing every RTA notified to the WTO involving at least one
developing country can be found in Appendix I.
2. Motivation for this study
The authors have been guided by the assumption that policy
makers from developing countries would welcome practical advice
in addition to the theoretical arguments that have proliferated around
the subject of RTAs.
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This work is significant for two other reasons. Firstly, by
examining the lessons from several countries’ implementation of their
trade agreements, it is possible to learn about the practical realities
of engineering a response to commitments made under RTAs – what
works? What doesn’t work? What practicalities run counter to the
original intention of the treaty? Secondly, the real world examples
portrayed by the answers to the questionnaire may suggest some
proposals for making these bilateral or regional negotiations more
effective in the future. It is hoped that negotiators will be able to use
this chapter as a reference to assist them build more substantial
competition provisions.
The methodology adopted in this chapter is not new. Several
international organizations and civil society groups have undertaken
research in this area, using a similar approach. The work of the OECD
on competition provisions in RTAs is a recent example. The OECD
(2005a) surveyed existing RTAs and contrasted the breadth of
competition provisions within them. Their approach provided a
useful starting point for researchers interested in the means by which
competition has been incorporated into bilateral and plurilateral
agreements between countries, and indicated the issues of importance
to individual countries. Silva (2004) carried out a similar exercise
with countries from the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region.
The analysis presented here builds upon their work and adds to it in
several ways. It complements previous work by submitting a
questionnaire to a select group of competition policy experts and
practitioners active in the field of competition and knowledgeable
about their own country’s RTA commitments. This questionnaire has
identified aspects of competition clauses in RTAs that have been most
useful to them. Their experiences will in turn ensure that negotiators
officials and experts in developing countries can seek guidance from
the examples included in this chapter.
To make the chapter as practical as possible, competition policy
officials and experts in developing countries were surveyed and their
responses to a number of questions were recorded. The UNCTAD
Questionnaire on competition provisions in RTAs was devised by
the UNCTAD Secretariat, and carried out between May and July 2005.
The respondents came from developing countries but shared in
common the fact that they were all active researchers or practitioners
within the field of competition law and policy and were familiar with
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the various RTAs to which their own country was a party. In several
places throughout the chapter, the answers of these respondents have
been quoted. The anonymity of the questionnaire participants has
been preserved.
Of the RTAs examined in this chapter, the majority were signed
after 1995 (though several are far older) and can be said to represent
recent trends in developing country trade agreements with respect
to the scope – broader and deeper than before – of their commitments
and the partners with whom they have drawn up treaties. It is worth
noting that of the 52 developing country agreements examined in
the process of compiling this chapter (for which treaty texts were
available), 34 (or 65 per cent)5 contained some sort of competition
provision. The widespread inclusion of competition in RTAs
involving developing countries indicates the importance of this issue.
The UNCTAD Questionnaire has generated ample evidence and
useful information. For ease of reference, this information has been
extracted and discussed under several headings. Several themes
emerged from the questionnaire. Each of these themes has been
discussed and analysed with the intention of assisting negotiators
and practitioners from developing countries to understand the
problems and issues based on real-life cases described by their
counterparts while working in the field of competition law and policy.
These experiences were distilled into the following subject areas:
cooperation, technical assistance, and the interaction between
national and supranational law and dispute settlement.
Every RTA involving at least one developing country that has
been notified to the WTO since 1995 has been examined in the writing
of this chapter. In addition, the authors received feedback from a
number of competition authority officials and experts in select
developing countries. Their experiences with the application of
competition clauses in RTAs gave additional depth to the findings
discussed here. Table 4.3 lists the countries that replied to the
UNCTAD Questionnaire or in which interviews were carried out.
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Respondents 
country of 
origin 
Profile(s) of 
respondent(s) 
Agreements (including those with 
competition provisions) on which the 
respondent commented  
Argentina 
Competition 
authority; 
Competition expert 
MERCOSUR, Brazil 
Brazil Competition authority MERCOSUR, Argentina, US, Russia and Portugal 
Burkina Faso Competition expert WAEMU 
Chile Competition authority; Negotiator US, Canada, Peru, EU, EFTA, South Korea 
China Ministry of Commerce Hong Kong, Macau 
Colombia Competition authority Andean Community, US, G-31 
Costa Rica Competition authority Canada, US, CARICOM 
Jamaica Competition authority Caribbean Community, CARICOM, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia, Costa Rica. 
Jordan Competition authority Turkey, EC 
Kenya Competition authority COMESA, EAC 
South Korea Competition authority Chile, Australia, CIS, Latvia, Romania, Mexico, EC 
Mexico Competition authority NAFTA, US, Canada, G-3, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Israel, South Korea, Chile, Japan, EFTA, EC, Russian Federation 
Namibia Ministry of Trade and Industry COMESA, SACU, SADC 
Paraguay Competition expert MERCOSUR 
Peru Competition authority Andean Community, US, Chile, Singapore (APEC) 
South Africa Competition expert SACU, SADC 
Thailand Competition authority APEC 
Uruguay Competition authority MERCOSUR 
Zambia Competition authority COMESA, SADC, Zimbabwe, South Africa 
 
Table 4.3 Countries that replied to the Questionnaire or in which
interviews were carried out
   Source: UNCTAD Questionnaire results.
   1Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.
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RTAs are signed for a multitude of reasons. For small countries,
RTAs represent a means of accessing the markets of larger trading
partners, and as a means of ensuring that they are not excluded from
future trade agreements (Anderson and Blackhurst, 1993) .The
proliferation of RTAs since the 1990s, particularly on the part of large
countries such as the United States and the European Union, has
increased the pressure on smaller trading partners to create a network
of bilateral RTAs to ensure they are not excluded from further
alliances (Baldwin, 1994). For smaller countries, an RTA may create
an opportunity to gain from product areas in which they would not
have an international comparative advantage, and to act as a
signalling device of regulatory quality to potential investors (Clarke,
2004, WTO, 2003b). When the RTAs are signed among countries with
similar levels of development (less asymmetry between the partners),
especially those taking place in regional integration schemes, they
can generate knowledge leading to greater globalization through an
‘open regionalism’ strategy (ECLAC, 1994).6
The inclusion of competition clauses in RTAs has been
particularly beneficial for developing countries, because they stand
to lose the most from the anti-competitive practices of multinational
corporations. Representatives of developing countries in the
negotiations leading up to the Cancun meeting of the WTO have noted
that the majority of cross-border anti-competitive practices stemmed
from firms based in developed countries.7 Levenstein and Suslow
(2001) note that many examples of international cartels involve firms
headquartered in the developed world with substantial exports to
developing countries. Looking at a group of ‘cartelized’ products,
they note that:
Examining these sixteen products – which were cartelised at some
point during the 1990s and for which we were able to obtain
reasonably reliable trade data – the total value of such ‘cartel-affected’
imports to developing countries was $81.1 billion. This made up 6.7%
of all imports to developing countries. It is equal to 1.2% of their
combined GDP.
RTAs therefore represent a means whereby the benefits of
competition clauses can ensure that the most harmful effects of
opening their markets to developed countries will be mitigated.
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3. Other competition agreements: Agency-to-
Agency Agreements and Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties
Cooperation between competition agencies also exists outside
the framework of RTAs. Several respondents to the UNCTAD
Questionnaire reported close contact with their counterparts in other
countries even though no RTA had been signed between them.8
Developed countries seem more likely to formalize this process
through an ATA (Canada-Australia, Canada-New Zealand) than
developing countries, which rely upon informal contact with their
counterparts at foreign competition authorities.
ATAs are used by competition authorities to arrange cooperation
regarding competition when there is no regional trade agreement.
ATAs signal that the competition clauses in RTAs are not considered
to have gone far enough. Several respondents  implied that RTAs
were engineered to the satisfaction of trade negotiators, and that
ancillary issues, such as competition, were not negotiated to an extent
that satisfied competition authorities.
Marsden and Whelan (2005a) point out that the Canada–Chile
ATAs was modelled on the competition provision provided as part
of the RTA, but that it went into much greater detail. In other words,
the RTA served as a template for the design, implementation and
application of the subsequent Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on competition law and policy. The latter included a
framework for notification, cooperation and coordination of
enforcement activities, information exchange and conflict avoidance.
The Canada-Costa Rica agreement, on the other hand, contains a
comprehensive chapter on competition, and a further agreement in
the form of an ATA was not considered necessary. ATAs have
complemented the scope of cooperation, particularly in instances
when RTAs were not comprehensive.
The motivation for ATAs and MLATs, according to respondents,
stems from a lack of satisfaction among competition authority staff
members about the trade focus of the provisions on competition
included in RTAs. This motivates them to forge networks independent
of the trade agreements. One questionnaire response from Uruguay
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commented that the MERCOSUR Protocol for the Defence of
Competition (also known as the Fortaleza Protocol) was too ambitious
and not considered a genuine tool to solve issues of competition policy
as it was too trade centred. A similar response from a Latin American
respondent stated that there was a coordination problem between
the trade negotiators and the competition negotiators during the
process of creating the RTA, leaving the competition authority of the
respondent’s country dissatisfied with the end result.
MLATs differ from ATAs in the sense that the former are more
specifically focused on governing the ways in which two or more
countries may cooperate on legal matters. It provides a framework
for cooperation on information exchange, particularly in regard to
serving warrants and interviewing witnesses in criminal prosecutions,
notification of specific enforcement activities that will affect the
interests of the other party, and for avoiding disputes. An MLAT may
allow the authority of one country to request authorities in the MLAT
partner state to take a testimony on their behalf and assist in imposing
fines. A detailed MLAT may even allow extradition for competition
law issues or even technical assistance. As with ATAs, MLATs are a
recent phenomenon and are not common among developing
countries. The issue of MLATs was only briefly touched upon in the
questionnaire results and is included here as an indicator of future
trends in competition agreements.
4. Caveats concerning data
The details of many agreements have been notified to the WTO
but not yet ratified or, at least, are not yet in official operation. The
authors have included these agreements because non-ratification does
not necessarily mean that the treaty is not functioning, even if those
functions remain informal. Notification of such a treaty to the WTO
indicates the intention of ratification and the authors felt that
inclusion was more useful than exclusion in such cases.
Finally, this chapter does not claim to universally include every
bilateral, plurilateral or regional agreement involving a developing
country. Given that the only resource for all RTAs is the database
maintained by the WTO of RTAs notified by Member States under
their GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V obligations, the chapter
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focuses mainly on those agreements notified to the WTO with some
reference to other agreements mentioned by questionnaire
respondents. The authors were restricted to the RTAs, plus some
agreements mentioned by the questionnaire respondents (see Table
A.1 in Appendix 1 and Table 4.39 for a full summary of all agreements
referred to in the compilation of this Chapter). The WTO is commonly
notified after the RTA has been agreed, sometimes after it has been
ratified and occasionally not at all. Therefore, it may be possible to
uncover RTAs relevant to this chapter that have not been included
here. Thanks to a network developed by UNCTAD technical
cooperation activities and ECLAC research, several agreements that
have not yet been formally notified to the WTO are also included.
5. Major themes from questionnaire results
The inclusion of competition provisions in RTAs was felt by many
respondents to the UNCTAD Questionnaire to possibly represent a
reaction to the lack of agreement on a multilateral framework for
competition. The removal of competition from the negotiating agenda
of the Doha round at the WTO was felt to have exacerbated this
difficulty. This was emphasized by the stagnation of the Free Trade
Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which showed clearly the
diverse criteria from the LAC countries and the US and Canada, on
issues including competition law and policy.10 The efforts of other
international organizations have not been deemed sufficient (in the
eyes of many of our respondents) to compensate for this perceived
setback.
5.1 Cooperation
Cooperation between competition agencies has arisen from and
complemented RTAs. Several respondents to the above-mentioned
UNCTAD Questionnaire reported close contact with counterparts in
other countries even though no RTA had been signed between them.
The contact between competition authorities, resulting from
membership of the International Competition Network (ICN), has
facilitated this phenomenon. Developed countries and more advanced
developing countries seem more likely to formalize this process
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through an ATA (for example, US-EU, Canada-Australia, Canada-
New Zealand, and recently Argentina-Brazil)11 than developing
countries. The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaties
(MLATs) are a relatively recent development and are becoming more
widespread through the activity of the US, which has concluded
MLATs with Australia, Canada, the EC, Israel and Japan but only
recently has concluded MLATs with developing countries such as
Brazil and a number of others12 (US Department of Justice (DOJ),
2005).
Cooperation between competition authorities may take several
forms. It may be informal, in the sense that personal relationships
may play a role, or formalized via an agreement. Agreements on
competition may take the form of an ATA, an MLAT or a competition
provision embedded within an RTA. RTAs and, more recently, ATAs
have become a popular means of formalizing cooperation between
competition authorities as a result of the failure to reach consensus
on a set of binding multilateral competition rules.
Globalization has created pressure on competition agencies to
cooperate. The cross-border nature of firm behaviour in the form of
mergers and acquisitions, and anti-competitive behaviour such as
international cartels, has made it necessary for competition authorities
in different countries to rely on each other for assistance in gathering
information and conducting successful prosecutions.13 Without these
agreements, the benefits of trade liberalization may be undermined
by anti-competitive practices.
The benefits of cooperation for developing countries are
magnified when they take place with a developed partner. In this
regard, some experiences are straightforward: Brazil stated that it
benefited greatly from the bilateral cooperation it received through
its agreement with the United States. In particular, the exchange of
information between the US and Brazil assisted it to identify
conspiracies and prosecute anti-competitive behaviour.14 Both
countries share an ATA and an MLAT, according to the respondents
to the UNCTAD Questionnaire. The Brazilians also stressed that they
also benefited from their cooperation with other competition
authorities and from their participation in the ICN.
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Cooperation is not always formalized within the agreement.
Indeed, one of the benefits reported by several respondents to the
questionnaire was that the bilateral or regional treaty tended to spur
informal, as well as formal, links. Zambia and South Africa have
extended their bilateral arrangements into a type of informal judicial
recognition of the effect of anti-competitive behaviour taking place
in each other’s territory. Several cases of anti-competitive behaviour
have been prosecuted under the competition provisions of the
Zambia-South Africa agreement15 which involved exchange of
information and assessment reports. This exchange of information
and assessment reports allowed for ‘a better utilization of meagre
resources in the quest for effective and efficient enforcement of the
national competition law’, according to the Zambian respondent.
A respondent from Argentina stated that confusion arising from
cooperation provisions under the draft FTAA, to which his country
was a party, prompted an interest in seeking out a more specific
bilateral agreement. For example, the Argentina-Brazil ATA facilitates
information exchange between the two competition authorities,
implying that such exchange of information between the two
authorities was not so easy before an agreement was finalized. The
Brazilians confirmed this assessment of their relationship with
Argentina, stating that their reason for negotiating a bilateral
agreement with Argentina was that ‘not enough’ cooperation was
taking place within the framework of MERCOSUR, the Protocol de
Fortaleza. As for Argentina, it has not yet ratified the Protocol;
therefore, this agreement could not be used for exchange of
information purposes.
This informal cooperation seems to be a function of the closeness
between the two countries party to the RTA, rather than the
competition provision specifically. For example, Costa Rica has signed
several RTAs, some of which establish formal mechanisms of
cooperation and coordination for competition-related matters,
including conditions for publication and notification, such as the
agreement between Costa Rica and Canada. Other RTAs contain no
specific coverage of competition issues, but the competition agencies
of both countries nonetheless maintain close contacts. Costa Rica used
its relationship with Mexico as an example. Although the bilateral
agreement between these two countries does not specifically cover
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competition issues, the Costa Rican competition agency
(COPROCOM) maintains good relations with its Mexican counterpart
(Comisión Federal de Competencia). This suggests that an RTA
facilitates cooperation between competition agencies even if
competition is not specifically included in the treaty.16
Does cooperation depend upon the level of detail accorded to
competition provisions in RTAs? The evidence is ambiguous. A
Mexican respondent claimed that the vague competition provisions
within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) stirred
both the US and Canada to initiate separate cooperation agreements
with Mexico. In this sense, the loose competition provisions of the
RTA induced the parties to enhance the cooperation between them.
On the other hand, the competition provisions within RTAs signed
between developing countries and the EC were extremely
comprehensive, yet these also stimulated further cooperation between
the parties, according to the respondent from Chile. From this mixed
evidence, it can be inferred that competition authorities are motivated
to cooperate with each other independently of the strength of the
competition provisions in the RTA that has been signed. The evidence
from the UNCTAD Questionnaire suggests that the RTAs are a means
of opening communication channels, and that these channels are
subsequently expanded by competition authorities using the
mechanisms described above until a satisfactory level of cooperation
has been achieved.
Finally, it is important to note that the domino effect of RTAs
tends to spread competition legislation to new countries and that
this increases the opportunities for cooperation and experience
sharing among competition authorities. The popularity of competition
provisions in RTAs pressurizes signatories to new agreements to enact
competition legislation if they have not already done so. Respondents
from China, Jordan, Namibia and Singapore all claimed to have been
motivated to initiate competition legislation because of RTA
agreements that they had signed with other countries, though not all
of them have yet done so. This network effect has the general result
of spreading competition legislation. This benefits the staff of
competition agencies everywhere as it allows them to cooperate more
extensively with partner countries.
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5.2 Technical assistance
In general, developing countries rely upon technical assistance
to increase their expertise and reach their economic potential.  In the
field of competition, developing countries can benefit from technical
assistance by exchanging information and attending seminars and
workshops designed to train developing country staff members by
financially assisting such activities.  For example, UNCTAD
undertakes a variety of activities on an annual basis designed to
increase the competence of competition officials in developing
countries. These include national activities, such as publishing draft
model laws of competition, promoting a competition culture through
seminars and workshops at both national and regional levels
(UNCTAD, 2002a). Likewise, the OECD (2004) reports that, in 2004,
it held seminars in developing countries on merger analysis,
competition advocacy, the training of judges and legal professionals
and the concept of independence from the legislature. Peer reviews
by international organizations, developed countries or within the
aegis of a regional treaty are also helpful as a means of benchmarking
progress achieved by the developing country and providing a channel
through which further improvements can be suggested. Some
commentators recommend that a comprehensive plan of technical
assistance should be simultaneously undertaken with the adoption
of competition legislation, and that technical assistance needs to focus
equally on the promotion of strong civil society pressure and
engagement.17 Technical assistance can be thought of as a means of
enabling appropriate policy changes through structured interaction
between developed and developing countries.
Seminars, workshops, communication with counterparts in other
countries and financial assistance have all been useful examples of
technical assistance, according to the officials and experts contacted
for this chapter. Three themes emerged from the questionnaire
responses in regards to technical assistance. Firstly, staff expertise
was a priority for developing countries; secondly, cooperation was
itself a type of technical assistance because communication with more
developed partners increased the competence of competition
authorities; and, thirdly, international organizations had a distinct
role to play in the provision of technical assistance. For example, the
lack of expertise faced by Zambia was highlighted by a respondent
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from that country, who emphasized the importance of the staff
retraining necessary if Zambia was to successfully carry out its
obligations under its two most recent regional treaties, including
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Zambia does
not have the internal resources required to train its staff to a more
proficient level and technical assistance will be required if Zambia is
to be able to effectively shoulder its responsibilities under the new
agreements. A respondent from Brazil mentioned that his country
had profited from the experience of the US in the field of competition
policy and has drawn upon the expertise of staff members in the US
competition authority to facilitate actions undertaken domestically.
Although technical assistance was not specifically written into the
ATA between Brazil and the US, the US has nonetheless provided it.
The EC in turn actively assisted Jordan to fulfil its requirement to
enact a domestic competition law. As in the Brazilian example, this
technical assistance was not foreseen in the agreement but was
provided by the EC without question. Participation in international
fora such as the ICN, was also considered to be beneficial.
The mechanisms for providing technical assistance were
commented upon by a respondent from Jordan. Citing the technical
assistance offered to it by the EC, the respondent reported that its
adoption of competition law was actively supported by the EC
mission in Jordan. The assistance included training the staff of the
new competition authority and sponsoring awareness campaigns
helping to educate the public and legislators about competition issues
to help reduce the risk of legislative obstacles that may have arisen
to block the implementation of competition policy. Finance was
provided for a series of academic enquiries into the impact of
competition on various sectors of the economy and EC officials were
made available to answer questions from the competition authority.
5.3 National versus supranational competition legislation
The existence of competition legislation in RTAs does not
guarantee that each party to the agreement will have enacted their
own domestic competition law. The Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) contains provisions on competition (Articles 40 and 45), but
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South Africa is the only one of these countries to have its own
competition law. Similarly regarding MERCOSUR, the AC and
CARICOM, there are some countries without a competition law. The
RTA between the United States and Singapore contains competition
provisions, even though Singapore did not have a competition law
when the RTA was signed.18 Does the lack of a competition law at
domestic level undermine the competition provisions of an
international treaty? Evidence from the UNCTAD Questionnaire
indicates that it does. For example, the South African respondent
claims that the SACU competition provisions are undermined by
partner countries unwilling to enact a domestic competition law,
because of the possible negative repercussions of competition
legislation upon investment in domestic markets and upon local
entrepreneurs.
There are two important reasons to be concerned about countries
within an RTA that do not yet have their own competition legislation.
The first reason is that without legislation there is no competition
authority. Without a competition authority there is no opportunity
for cooperation between countries on competition cases because the
competition authority acts as a medium through which information
is exchanged and cooperation takes place. This has further
ramifications for the technical assistance accorded to weaker partners
to the agreement because the competition authority houses and trains
staff, allowing them to develop a proficiency in competition-related
issues. The questionnaire results indicate that the most beneficial
learning occurs when the staff of the various competition authorities
interact. South Korea nominates the consultation mechanism as the
most useful benefit of its RTAs. Those countries that fail to enact
competition legislation are limiting the amount of interaction they
may have with more developed countries. Without a competition
authority, there is no central repository for expertise or a contact point
for fellow treaty members seeking information. In this way, countries
without domestic competition legislation miss out on the benefits of
this interaction and cooperation.
The second reason is the question of which treaty should have
primacy. This issue was raised several times by respondents to the
UNCTAD Questionnaire. Parties to several treaties are faced with
the question of which treaty law on competition should apply.
Members of regional organizations are faced with the question of
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whether domestic or regional treaty law has effect. The results of our
questionnaire showed that this question has not been adequately
addressed in RTAs. A respondent from CARICOM outlined the
difficulty in applying supranational versus national law. The
supranational legislation technically only applies to cross-border
offences, which have the effect of disrupting inter-regional trade. In
reality, however, domestic concerns may take precedence.
Other RTAs are even less cohesive. For example, the SACU treaty
is openly ambiguous. Member States, when presented with conflicting
legislation on competition policy, are sometime free to choose which
treaty should prevail. A respondent gave the examples of: i) Kenya
choosing between its commitments under COMESA or East African
Community (EAC), or ii) South Africa choosing between agreements
between the SACU and the EC. In case of conflicting laws, the gap
between the obligations of different treaties creates wriggle space
that governments may exploit to the detriment of other treaty
members. It is not clear, therefore, even to Member States how
rigorous the application of competition laws will be in the different
countries. The lack of cases prosecuted under the SACU, as compared
to the active cooperation between South African and Zambia, for
example, cannot be just attributed to the fledgling nature of the SACU
agreement. It suggests confusion surrounding the applicability of each
Member State’s obligations under the agreement. On this point,
another respondent described the case of a merger of a Trinidadian
company with a company in Guyana. Here was a potential case for
both national and supranational competition authorities. However,
before the case could be examined by the appropriate competition
authorities, the government went ahead and resolved the case due to
populist and nationalist pressures, without considering it from the
perspective of competition policy. This is one example of the tension
created between national and supranational laws, and shows that
confusion between the primacy of laws may have the effect of creating
policy space that can be abused by domestic interest groups.
The situation differs in other regional agreements. The AC has a
new regional competition law (Decision 608). With the amended
legislation, Member States that do not have competition laws may
use the regional framework to speed up the process of implementing
the appropriate institutional framework in their own economies. The
AC has enacted a regional competition law that has superseded
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domestic competition laws within the member states, based on the
principle that the most recent legislation prevails. For example,
Bolivia has no competition law of its own. Therefore, the regional
law has validity by virtue of Article 3 of Decision 608, but Bolivia has
no competition authority to enforce competition legislation.
(Although, Article 49 establishes a mechanism by which they can
use the regional Decision for national problem solving, it is not clear
how this would compensate for the lack of a competition authority
to enforce it.) In the case of Ecuador, by virtue of Decision 616 it was
agreed that an interim national authority must be appointed by 1
August 2005 to deal with the new law on anti-competitive practices.
According to Article 5 of Decision 608, the AC competition law does
not apply when the origin and effect of the anti-competitive conduct
is taking place within one single Member State. Therefore, national
competition legislation is still key to tackling domestic anti-
competitive practices, and Bolivia and Ecuador will need to pass
national laws accordingly.
Another crucial issue is the relationship between regional and
domestic competition law. For example, the domestic competition
laws of Peru have come to reflect aspects of both EC and US
competition legislation through the influence of the supranational
law on domestic legislation. By virtue of the Peruvian Constitution
and the AC Treaty, community decisions are immediately
implemented and applied by the Peruvian Competition Authority at
domestic level. This means that the community law is automatically
part of the domestic legislation. The sweeping difference between
EC and AC laws is that the latter are clearly used by domestic
institutions regardless of the intra-regional effect of the matter being
judged. In EC law, the supranational law only applies to anti-
competitive behaviour having inter-regional effect, even though
domestic laws are normally so harmonized with EC law that there is
no real difference between them. In the Andean case, the law is equally
applied by national authorities with the supranational authority
becoming involved, via the actions of the AC Secretariat, only in those
cases in which the anti-competitive behaviour extends across national
borders.
According to one questionnaire respondent, the fuzzy delineation
between the domestic and regional laws in the Andean case has
become an issue in trade agreements with the United States. The
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respondent surmises that the US is particularly interested in state
monopolies and state aid practices in RTAs, because the domestic
US competition legislation is effective enough to protect themselves
from the effects of international anti-competitive practices in the
domestic US market. This may require clarification by the Peruvians
when they negotiate with the United States as they may find it difficult
to incorporate the full range of Peruvian competition law into the
RTA. In this context, it is worth noting that Peru, whose domestic
competition legislation was previously biased towards EC law, now
incorporates the US legal test of anti-competitive behaviour (i.e. that
it ‘substantially lessens competition’) in addition to the exemptions
of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
5.4 Dispute settlement mechanism
The goal of dispute settlement is to ensure compliance with the
rules laid down in the RTA. If a party to the agreement fails to comply
with the rules, dispute settlement of some type should take place
and the violating party punished (or ‘brought into compliance’)
within a certain period of time. At the multilateral level, this should
take place through the WTO, although this does not happen as
competition provisions are not yet covered. At the regional level,
separate mechanisms must be set up to adjudge cases and be
empowered to suspend concessions under the trade agreement until
the offending party is brought into line with the law.
The majority of RTAs do not contain a Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM) for competition provisions.  The reasons for this
tend to diverge, and may signal that these provisions are often
included for cooperation rather than for specific enforcement. A
respondent from Costa Rica, listing the numerous trade agreements
to which his country was a part, denied that any of them contained a
DSM. The priority of Chile in forming alliances with other competition
authorities, reported the respondent, was to enforce consumer rights
and develop a culture of competition, as much as to strengthen
existing institutions and cooperate with foreign competition
authorities. A Chilean respondent noted that in one RTA - signed
with the US - a type of dispute settlement has been included, but it is
restricted to cases of controversy between investors and
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governments.19 As per the respondent from Mexico, the advantage
of having competition-related provisions in RTAs, as opposed to
ATAs, is that the former offer the possibility of subjecting competition-
related provisions to DSM although this option is not always used.
An African respondent, commenting on the SACU, responded that
the agreement did contain a DSM but that no cases had been tried so
far, and that the expertise did not exist to try a case anyway. South
Korea was more upbeat about the possibility of a DSM, listing two
agreements that contain DSMs for competition, without commenting
on whether these had actually been used.
One point that has been raised in the context of the disparate
nature of trade agreements is that RTAs themselves could be brought
within the DSM of the WTO.20 The tone of the replies received from
the UNCTAD Questionnaire indicates that dispute settlement is not
highly sought by developing countries within the context of RTAs. It
seems unlikely, therefore, that developing countries would be in
favour of subjecting their RTAs to the binding mechanism of the WTO
DSM at this time. Unfortunately, the issue of bringing RTAs within
the framework of the WTO DSM has not been directly addressed by
any of the questionnaire respondents contacted for this chapter. The
following comments, therefore, relate to the more general subject of
dispute settlement related to competition provisions in RTAs.
There are two goals for dispute settlement in competition within
the context of an RTA. The first is that of ensuring that the partner
country maintains commitments that have been set out in the RTA.
This is the focus of most of the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures.
The second goal is that of ensuring that positive comity can be enacted
within the framework of the RTA to prosecute perpetrators of
restrictive business practices in foreign territories. It is unlikely that
the first goal of dispute settlement, that of ensuring that the other
party(ies) to the agreement conform to the rules laid down within it,
would be necessary. The questionnaire results show a refreshing
unanimity about the dangers of anti-competitive practices both at
home and abroad. The second goal, that of undertaking positive
comity, has been interpreted by the majority of respondents as being
superfluous to effective cooperation with other competition
authorities.
MLATs may represent a tentative step towards formal dispute
settlement in several of the RTAs that have been studied for this
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chapter. The positive comity provisions that are being initiated by
the US and several other countries could be perceived as a technique
to avoid disputes. This question of dispute settlement also has
potential links to the relationship between national and supranational
law (discussed above) and the issue of which law is the most effective
at uncovering and punishing anti-competitive practices.
Certainly none of the DSMs that were commented upon by the
questionnaire respondents fitted into the typical concept of DSM as
understood by the WTO. The treaties examined and from which
questionnaire responses were gathered displayed a limited scope and
a narrow vision for the potential of dispute settlement in a regional
context. This raises the question of whether dispute settlement
provisions are really necessary at a regional level, given the incentives
for both sides to benefit from cooperation. It may be that domestic
legislation, combined with comity agreements in the form of ATAs
or MLATs where necessary, is sufficient for developing countries.
6. Concluding remarks
From the results of this research, a number of lessons can be
drawn. These are, in particular, that:
i. Parties to RTAs would benefit from enacting a domestic
competition law. This will allow them to benefit from the
advantages offered by having a competition authority. These
advantages include the creation of an institutional structure to
build a domestic competition culture and to foster competencies
in the field of competition, cooperation with other competition
authorities, and the facilitation of technical assistance. It will
also allow those countries to align their laws with those
mandated by supranational agreements, where relevant.
ii. Submitting RTAs to some type of DSM is not necessary at this
point. Respondents were generally unenthusiastic about DSMs
at the RTA or multilateral level. A DSM seems to be viewed as a
mechanism for cooperation in most countries rather than as a
tool for enforcement. The results of the questionnaire led the
authors to conclude that some form of dispute settlement would
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assist countries in complying with competition agreements, and
would be an effective weapon against cross-border conspiracies,
but that it is not an immediate priority.
iii.Bilateral agreements between countries at different levels of
development generate the exchange of information. In fact, it
helps if one of the partners to the RTA is a developed country,
as cooperation can stimulate the exchange of knowledge and
experience. The ICN has greatly facilitated the exchange of
information and cooperation, according to several respondents.
iv. Cooperation agreements do not necessarily have to take the form
of an RTA, which implies government participation and
obligations. Respondents indicate that MLATs and ATAs can be
equally effective means of formal cooperation between
competition authorities, and even go beyond RTAs in some
instances. Anecdotal evidence suggests that cooperation
mechanisms such as ATAs and MLATs may be a viable
alternative for developing countries that are otherwise limited
in their ability to formalize agreements through RTAs due to
internal capacity constraints. Even informal cooperation is
positive.
v. Most developed countries are willing to provide technical
assistance that will assist the developing country meet the
obligations of the competition treaty. Evidence of this stems from
the actions of both the US and the EC in providing technical
assistance to countries even when that technical assistance is
not mandated by the treaty.
vi. In practical terms, it would be useful to enhance dialogue between
trade and competition officers in order to fully exploit all the
possible cooperation efforts in the field of competition. Perhaps
both parties need to focus on working together to incorporate
their balanced interests in the agreements.
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Although the RTAs have been criticized by several respondents
to the UNCTAD Questionnaire of falling far short of the ideal levels
of cooperation envisaged by ambitious competition authorities, the
benefits of the increased level of cooperation between countries on
competition-related matters should be recognized independently of
the complaints made about the shortcomings or limits of that
cooperation. Director-General of the WTO, Dr Supachai’s interesting
proposal that RTAs should eventually be brought within the WTO
DSM indicates the recognition that RTAs are currently responsible
for initiating a significant amount of international trade law. The
proposal to examine competition provisions indicates that a type of
jurisprudence in relation to competition is also emerging as a result
of the RTA phenomenon. The relationship between regional
agreements and domestic law may be more easily defined within the
context of a multilateral setting, as there seems to be a certain level
of confusion within competition authorities about the scope and
application of regional competition law versus domestic legislation.
The overall picture taken from the questionnaire results and from
the research conducted in the creation of this chapter indicates that
competition provisions in RTAs are beneficial for developing
countries. The lessons outlined above indicate that practical measures
and increased knowledge on the part of developing countries’
competition authorities can foster their capacity for enforcement and
strengthen cooperation with foreign counterparts. The spread of RTAs
has been responsible for propagating competition laws and
broadening of competition knowledge and expertise among
developing countries. As RTAs continue to proliferate, the positive
effects of the proliferation of competition law and policy displayed
in the questionnaire results are sure to be enhanced.
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APPENDIX I
Name of RTA 
Contains a competition 
clause? 
Yes (Y), No (N), or 
 U (Unknown) 
Location of competition 
clause in the RTA 
 
Table 4A.1
Table of all RTAs involving at least one developing
country, as notified to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) since 1995
AFTA - ASEAN Free Trade Area N    
ASEAN-China Ni  
Bangkok Agreement - Bangladesh, 
India, Laos, South Korea, Sri Lanka U
ii  
CACM - Central American Common 
Market N  
CAN - Cartagena Agreement: 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Venezuela 
Y Chapter VIII 
CARICOM – Antigua & Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Y Chapter 10.3 
Canada-Chile Y Chapter J 
Canada-Costa Rica Y Chapter 11 
CEMAC – Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Chad 
Yiii Article 13 
Chile-Costa Ricaiv Y Chapter 15 
Chile-El Salvador (idem Costa Rica) Y Chapter 15 
Chile-Mexico Y Chapter 14 
China-Hong Kong N  
China-Macao N  
COMESA – Angola, Burundi, 
Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Y Article 55 
EAC – Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania Nv  
EAEC – ASEAN 7, China, Japan, 
South Korea N  
EC-Algeria Nvi  
 .../...
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EC-Chile Y Title VII 
EC-Egypt Y Article 34 
EC-Jordan Y Article 53 
EC-Lebanon Y Article 27 
EC-Mexico Yvii Article 39 
EC-Morocco Y Article 36 
EC-Palestinian Authority Y Article 30 
EC-South Africa Y Article 35 
EC-Syria U  
EC-Tunisia N  
EFTA-Chile Y Article 72 
EFTA-Jordan Y Article 18 
EFTA-Mexico Y Chapter IV.I 
EFTA-Morocco Y Article 17 
EFTA-Palestinian Authority Y Article 16 
EFTA-Singapore Y Article 50 
GSTP N  
India-Sri Lanka N  
Japan-Singapore Y Chapter 12 
South Korea-Chile Y Chapter 14 
LAIA N  
Laos-Thailand U  
MSG - Melanesian Spearhead 
Group – Vanuatu, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji 
N  
MERCOSUR – Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay N
viii  
Mexico-Israel Y Chapter 8 
NAFTA – Canada, Mexico, United 
States Y Chapter 15 
New Zealand-Singapore Y Article 3 
PATCRA – New Guinea, Australia N  
 
Name of RTA 
Contains a competition 
clause? 
Yes (Y), No (N), or 
 U (Unknown) 
Location of competition 
clause in the RTA 
 
Table 4A.1 (continued)
.../...
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Name of RTA 
Contains a competition 
clause? 
Yes (Y), No (N), or 
 U (Unknown) 
Location of competition 
clause in the RTA 
 
Table 4A.1 (continued)
iUnder negotiation.
iiTariff concession agreement only.
iiiCompetition clause contained in CEMAC.
ivThe competition chapter is included in Chile-Central America FTA, 1999.
vThere is a reference to negotiations on competition in Article 75.
viUnder negotiation.
viiObligation to set up a competition authority.
viiiThe parties signed an agreement in 1996: the Fortaleza Protocol. In 2002, they
adopted its regulations, but two countries haven’t internalized it in their
domestic rules yet.
ixSPARTECA is a preferential trade agreement for South Pacific Island countries
wishing to access Australian or New Zealander markets and contains tariff
preferences only.
SADC – Angola, Botswana, Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Y Article 25 
SAPTA – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka N  
SPARTECA – Australia, New 
Zealand, Cook Islands, Micronesia, 
Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, 
Western Samoa 
Nix  
Singapore-Australia Y Chapter 12 
Thailand-Australia Y Chapter 12 
TRIPARTITE (Egypt, India, 
Yugoslavia – not operational) U  
US-Chile Y Chapter 16 
US-Singapore Y Chapter 12 
US-Jordan N  
WAEMU Y Article 88 
 
153
Alvarez et al.
APPENDIX II
Negotiating and enforcing competition provisions
in bilateral/regional agreements:  South-South and
North-South selected cases
UNCTAD Questionnaire on the
Impact of bilateral/regional agreements on the
development strategy of developing countries
(in collaboration with ECLAC)
UNCTAD, in collaboration with ECLAC, is carrying out research
on the specificities of competition provisions at bilateral and regional
levels: South-South and North-South arrangements.
The ultimate aim of the chapter is to provide lessons from
developing countries’ experiences, which may guide them in future
agreements and/or provide lessons for other developing countries.
This chapter will draw on the experience of practitioners and
institutions from developing countries and will make an attempt to
present their views and concerns on the agreements and their
implementation.
The attached questionnaire seeks to obtain first-hand information
from competition practitioners and representatives working in
relevant institutions of selected developing countries. The
questionnaire contains open-ended questions. You may feel free to
add your thoughts and you are kindly requested to attach any relevant
documents.
If there is a need for further clarification of your responses, you
may be contacted by phone.  Please let us know when it will be
possible to call you.
Unless required, names of respondents will not be specifically
referred to in the compilation of the results of the questionnaire and
the full anonymity of all respondents will be guaranteed.
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1b. Please list the main competition-related features of each agreement
(e.g. notification, reciprocity, etc.).
1c. In case the country has several agreements, please rank them in
terms of their frequency of application.
2. Reasons for country participation in bilateral/regional agreements
(this part draws on the phase of negotiation of the agreement,
before implementation):
Please reply to the following set of questions:
(i) What reasons prompted the country to undertake bilateral or
regional agreement(s)? For what reason(s) were CLP provisions
added to this agreement?
(ii) Was there any cooperation between the competition agencies
of your country and the other signatories to the agreement
before its signature? If so, has cooperation increased as a result
of the agreement?
(iii) Were there any obstacles to the adoption of the agreement and
particularly the competition provisions that had to be overcome
before the agreement could be reached? If so, please describe
the obstacle(s) involved.
3. Scope of agreements
(i) Please list the main CLP provisions and explain them.
(ii) What specific actions, if any, are required from CLP authorities?
(iii) What specific anti-competitive practices are covered by such
agreements?
(iv) Do the agreements contain some sort of a Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM)? Do they cover the provisions on CLP?
Please elaborate.
(v) If your country is a party to more than one agreement
containing CLP provisions, are there differences between these
provisions with respect to CLP? Please elaborate.
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(vi) If your country is a party to more than one agreement
containing CLP provisions, are there differences between these
agreements with respect to CLP? In particular, you may have
South-South and North-South agreements. Are there major
differences between the two? Please explain.
(vii) Were these agreements modelled on existing standard
provisions found in other agreements?
4.  Special conditions for less developed parties to such agreements:
Special and Differential Treatment (S&D)
(i) Do the agreements include some form of non-reciprocal
facilities in favour of less-developed parties to the agreement?
If so, please elaborate.
(ii) Does the agreement require parties to adopt/modify/implement
national CLP? If so, are the weaker parties afforded longer
deadlines to comply? Are they able to adopt a a less complete
CLP, for example without merger control?
(iii) In setting up the competition provisions, was there a perceived
need for any sectoral exemptions (i.e. industries that would be
exempted from the competition provisions?) If so, were these
exemptions included in the agreement?
(iv) Does the agreement allow a more flexible implementation of
CLP for less developed parties to the agreement?
(v) Is technical assistance in the field of CLP included in the
agreement? If yes, does it also include cooperation in case
proceedings?
(vi) To what extent is this cooperation limited by confidentiality
rules? What has the experience been so far?
5. Lessons from country’s participation in agreements (this part
refers to the phase of implementation/enforcement of the
agreements comprising CLP provisions).
Please provide general thoughts on the following issues:
(i) Once the agreement is in force, do you face difficulties enforcing
commitments? If so, which ones?
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(ii) What specific CLP provisions provided for in the agreements
have been implemented? To what extent have they been
implemented?
(iii) In case the agreement contains a DSM, please comment on
whether this has been used so far, and with what results?
(iv) Please state your thoughts on the effects of the agreement at
national level on (a) the national competition law and its
enforcement and (b) other governmental policies.
(v) What are your experiences of case handling (please give details
on each agreement).
(vi) Do your available human and financial resources allow you to
comply with this agreement satisfactorily?
(vi) Are there any new agreements in the pipeline? Please provide
details about present talks for agreements that are under way
and which may contain CLP-related provisions
6. Proposals for improving bilateral/regional agreements to make
them more effective
(i) What in your opinion are the weaknesses (if any) of the
agreements to which your country is party? Please elaborate.
(ii) Which provisions, in your opinion, provide the best results?
Please elaborate.
(iii) Would you propose further provisions? If so, why?
(iv) Other comments.
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NOTES
1A copy of the questionnaire sent by UNCTAD is attached to this document in
Appendix II.
23The ‘developing country’ category does not include CIS or Southern European
economies. It coincides with the Members of the Group of 77 at the UN and
UNCTAD.
4The number of reported RTAs varies across countries for the following reasons:
not all RTAs are reported to the WTO; RTAs involving countries that have
acceded to the EU are not always treated in the same way by researchers;
some RTAs that do not involve the creation of a free trade area on
‘substantially all trade’ are nonetheless included in some counts. In certain
cases, agreements are notified more than once, either under GATT Article
XXIV or GATS Article V. This may lead to double-counting of existing
agreements in official WTO statistics. See Chapters 2 and 5 in this volume
for further discussion.
5Interested readers may ascertain the prevalence of competition clauses in
transition economies from Table 5A.1 in Appendix I of Chapter 5 in this
volume.
6Compiled from Table 4A.1 in Appendix I.
7‘Open regionalism’ is a process of growing economic interdependence at the
regional level promoted both by preferential integration agreements and
by other policies in the context of liberalization and deregulation, geared
towards enhancing the competitiveness of the countries of the region and,
in so far as possible, constituting the building blocks for a more open and
transparent international economy (ECLAC, 1994).
8WTO (2003b).
9In Latin America, generally ATAS have complemented RTAs between parties;
they are also more detailed procedurally speaking.
10Several RTAs were perforce omitted from this study because the text of their
agreements was not available, even though the WTO had been notified of
their existence. These RTAs are marked with a U (denoting ‘unknown’) in
Table 4A.1 in Appendix I.
11The most recent Draft of the Chapter on Competition Policy, in November
2003, can be seen on the FTAA website: www.ftaa-alca.org.
12In LAC countries : Mexico, Costa Rica and Chile are active also.
13MLATs in force: The United States has bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties (MLAT) currently in force with the following developing countries:
Antigua/Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Dominica,
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Egypt, Grenada, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Korea (South), Mexico, Morocco,
Panama, Philippines, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, South Africa,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay. Source: US Dept. of State. Mutual
Legal Assistance (MLAT) and Other Agreements,http://travel.state.gov/law/
info/judicial/judicial_690.html
14 UNCTAD (2003); In Auckland Declaration, 1999, APEC Economic Leaders
endorsed the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory
Reform (The APEC Competition Principle). They also have a cooperative
program with the OECD, see: http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/
APEC-OECD.html
15Some of these experiences can be also seen in Tavares (2002).
16The respondent cited investigations into South African breweries, Illovo Sugar,
Lafarge, Coca Cola and Cadbury Schweppes.
17Costa Rica also has an agreement with Panama that has resulted in much less
cooperation but it is an old treaty, signed in 1973, and concerned mainly
with trade remedies.
18For example, Ratnakar Adhikari notes that his NGO (SAWTEE) took the
innovative step of undertaking a workshop to train economic journalists in
the concept of competition advocacy in Nepal, as a means of supporting a
draft competition act . See Consultation on Role of Media in Promoting
Competition Culture in Nepal. 23-24 July, Nagarkot, Nepal, SAWTEE and
Society of Economic Journalists.  http://www.sawtee.org/
Competition_Brt_Report.html
19Singapore was obliged to adopt a competition law by 2005 as part of the treaty
(US-Singapore FTA- Article 12.2:1).
20In strict terms a DSM doesn’t exist for: anti-competitive practices, cooperation
and consultations (US-Chile FTA-Article 16.8).
21Comments of Dr Supachai, Director-General of the WTO at Asia Leadership
Forum, as reported by Bangkok Post Business Today, 15 June 2005.
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1.   Introduction
Irrespective of progress in trade liberalization at the multilaterallevel, regional trade agreements (RTAs) have proliferated in thelast two decades or so.  The issue of special and differential (S&D)
treatment in competition law and policy has been a long-term debate,
often inconclusive, such as during the World Trade Organization
(WTO) discussions on a multilateral framework on competition,
which were subsequently dropped out of the Doha Round for
Development, along with other so-called Singapore issues such as
trade and investment.
S&D treatment for developing countries, especially least
developed countries (LDCs) on competition law and policy is duly
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acknowledged in the UN Set of 19801, in its section dealing with
‘preferential or differential treatment’.  Accordingly, it has long been
observed that S&D should be part and parcel of a possible multilateral
framework on competition. Some experts have argued that it is the
lack of attention given to the policy space needed by developing
countries in the non-discrimination and national treatment principles
discussed at the WTO that led to the rejection at Cancun of
competition law and policy from the issues to be negotiated in the
Doha Round.  Others have observed that, while competition policy
seeks to challenge industrial policy and promote free market forces,
many governments, including those of developed countries, have
recently supported national champions, whenever possible,
protecting them from free market forces.
Meanwhile, numerous RTAs, bilateral and regional (or
plurilateral) Free Trade Agreements have been negotiated after
Cancun, and an increasing number include specific competition rules.
Moreover, numerous developing countries, including LDCs, have
queued up at UNCTAD to request technical assistance and capacity
building in order to adopt domestic competition rules as a matter of
urgency.  Competition clauses within RTAs have undoubtedly played
a role in this interest in competition law and policy at the domestic
level.
RTAs examined in this chapter include bilateral as well as regional
(or plurilateral) agreements between developed countries and what
are called ‘less-developed partners’, to include both developing
countries and LDCs, but also economies in transition, because these
agreements shed light upon the issues of interest to developing
countries.
The existence of S&D treatment in competition provisions of
RTAs is one of the neglected aspects of competition law and policy.
Special provisions in favour of ‘less-developed partners’ have steadily
made their appearance in the competition clauses of RTAs over the
past several years. The types of S&D treatment extended to less-
developed partners in competition clauses are in line with the so
called ‘preferential or differential treatment’ set out in the United
Nations (UN) Set 25 years ago, and match the types of S&D treatment
that were included in specific Uruguay Round Agreements. This
chapter therefore, explores the frequency and nature of S&D
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treatment within competition clauses of RTAs and tries to shed some
light on the following questions: (i) What are the main forms of S&D
that can be envisaged in competition provisions of RTAs? (ii) To what
extent can S&D treatment be found in provisions related to
competition policy in existing RTAs? (iii) What are the principal types
of S&D provisions in competition law and policy, if any, that can be
found in RTAs? (iv) To what extent do such provisions respond to
the needs of developing countries? (v) To what extent can S&D
provisions in RTAs serve as models for the operationalization of S&D
in competition law and policy provisions in future agreements?
Accordingly, Section 2 briefly examines the history of S&D in
the WTO trade negotiations and more specifically S&D in the field of
competition law and policy in the UN Set of Principles of Rules, while
Section 3 tries to operationalize or conceptualize what typical S&D
provisions can be found in competition clauses in RTAs.  Section 4
draws attention to difficulties in identifying S&D and Section 5
provides examples of S&D provisions by types of S&D uncovered in
RTAs.  Finally, this chapter concludes by summarizing the main
findings and lessons learnt in this respect.
2.   S&D treatment in the multilateral context
S&D treatment was not a part of the original General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at its inception in 1947. Until 1955,
developing countries participated in tariff negotiations as equal
partners and were subject to the same rules of non-discrimination
and the universal and reciprocal application of commitments as the
wealthy industrialized nations. In 1955, the first provisions were
adopted to address the needs of developing countries as a group.
Initially, these provisions allowed developing countries to derogate
from their scheduled tariff commitments, use quantitative restrictions
for balance of payments purposes and certain other measures to
promote domestic industries. This process of special allowances was
formalized in the adoption of Part IV of the GATT at the Kennedy
Round of WTO negotiations. Part IV of the GATT addressed ‘Trade
and Development’ and contained various provisions that committed
WTO Members to recognize the need for positive measures to
improve market access in the developed world for the output of
developing countries by reducing obstacles to trade in these products.
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Two other measures adopted by the multilateral trade community
in favour of developing countries were equally important in this
respect. The first was the principle of non-reciprocity, which was
introduced during the Kennedy Round within Part IV of the GATT.
This principle requested developed countries to assume unilateral
concessions towards developing countries.  The second important
aspect of S&D treatment was a commitment by developed countries
to provide enhanced and preferential market access to their markets
for exports from developing countries. This was formally secured
through the Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries agreement,
introduced during the Tokyo Round in 1979. This measure has since
been abbreviated to the ‘Enabling Clause’ and has created a
permanent legal basis for the preferential tariff treatment accorded
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
An important shift in S&D treatment took place during the
Uruguay Round and led to the adoption of specific types of S&D
provisions in the various agreements that form part of the Uruguay
Round.  Less emphasis was placed on the principle of non-reciprocity
in commitments, limiting S&D treatment basically to transition
periods for developing countries, with longer periods for LDCs and
calls for technical assistance to facilitate implementation of the
agreements by developing countries.
The UN Set adopted in 1980 in the form of a recommendation to
all Member States of the UN in General Assembly Resolution 35/63
of 5 December 1980 enshrined the concept of ‘preferential or
differential treatment for developing countries’ in its Section C,
Paragraph 7. The UN Set, which has undergone review four times
since 1980 (1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000) and was found to be still valid
by unanimity, remains the only multilateral agreement on competition
in force today.
The relevant section of the UN Set states:
C. Multilaterally agreed equitable principles for the control
of restrictive business practices
(iii) Preferential or differential treatment for developing countries
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7. In order to ensure the equitable application of the Set of
Principles and Rules, States, particularly developed countries,
should take into account in their control of restrictive business
practices the development, financial and trade needs of
developing countries, in particular of the least developed
countries, for the purposes especially of developing countries
in:
(a) Promoting the establishment or development of
domestic industries and the economic development
of other sectors of the economy, and
(b) Encouraging their economic development through
regional or global arrangements among developing
countries.
Hence, the set recognizes the need for S&D treatment in the field
of competition law and policy in favour of developing countries,
particularly for LDCs, especially in promoting industrialization in
these countries and in encouraging regional agreements among
developing countries.  However, the Set does not specify which types
of S&D treatment in competition law and policy should be considered.
More recently, specific references to S&D treatment in the context
of competition arose during the discussions surrounding a possible
multilateral framework on competition policy at the WTO. During
the Fourth Ministerial Conference (Doha) at the end of 2001, the
Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) at the
WTO was charged with taking account of the ‘the needs of developing
and least developed country participants and appropriate flexibility
provided to address them.’1 The subject was also addressed in May
2002 at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), when the Joint Group on Trade and Competition Policy was
charged with examining flexibility in a future WTO multilateral
agreement on competition.2
The importance of S&D treatment for less-developed countries
was sharply illuminated by the hesitancy of developing countries to
launch negotiations on a multilateral framework on competition at
the Cancun Ministerial. The subsequent omission of trade and
competition from the present Doha round of negotiations at the WTO
is arguably the result of serious concern on the part of developing
countries about committing to an agreement in which their needs
might not be properly encompassed and which might reduce further
their policy space to implement industrial policies.
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Thus, from the past history of S&D at multilateral level, what
specific types of S&D treatment can be envisaged in the context of
competition?  (i) Technical assistance, which is a non-reciprocal
treatment in favour of the less-advanced party to an agreement, can
be considered as a form of S&D treatment.  (ii) Transition periods for
the adoption and/or implementation of competition legislation or
aspects of competition regulation constitute a second operational type
of S&D.  This may include extended time periods for adopting
implementation of clause, and/or the possibility of adopting
competition law by phases, moving from a basic regulation to a more
elaborate measure over time. (iii) Exceptions and exemptions from
competition law and policy constitute a third possible aspect of S&D.
Such provisions generally include more flexibility in favour of
developing countries. Typically, exceptions are related to sectors or
to certain anti-competitive practices. Such exemptions are regularly
applied with a ‘sunset clause’, meaning that the exemptions will
endure for a certain period of time at which time they will be either
renewed or lapse. In this way, exemptions and exceptions may
coincide with transitional periods.  (iv) Specific undertakings
designed to protect social and economic needs of developing
countries constitute a fourth type of S&D treatment.  This could also
include special undertakings by developed partners that are non-
reciprocated, such as undertakings to liberalize specific sectors
without reciprocal undertakings by the less-developed party.
3.   Typical S&D provisions in competition clauses
of RTAs
The authors have examined the RTAs notified to the WTO as
indicated in Annexes I and II.  The first conclusion was that compe-
tition clauses within RTAs were more prevalent than anecdotal evi-
dence might suggest. This shows that developed and developing
countries alike have recognized that trade cannot be liberalized with-
out being protected from anti-competitive practices. S&D treatment
within competition clauses of RTAs was also quite common. Of the
157 agreements involving at least one less-developed partner noti-
fied to the WTO since 1995,3 21 (13%) contained some type of flex-
ibility in favour of the less-developed partners. Broadly the types of
S&D treatment extended by the RTAs examined conformed to four
main categories as follows:
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1. provisions safeguarding the interests of less-developed
partners
2. exceptions and exemptions
3. transitional time periods
4. technical assistance
These types of S&D treatment appeared with different
frequencies. The most common forms of S&D treatment involved
some form of flexibility of undertakings and transitional time periods
in favour of the less-developed partner. Table 5.1 summarizes the
types of S&D treatment uncovered in the competition clauses of RTAs:
Table 5.1 Type and frequency of S&D provisions in competition
clauses in RTAs
Type of S&D 
Number of 
RTAs 
containing 
such 
provisionsi 
Manifests as… 
Safeguard interests of 
less-developed 
partners 
14 
Identical treatment for public aid as accorded to EC 
Members (EC-Bulgaria, EC-Croatia, EC-Czech 
Republic, EC-Estonia, EC-FYOM, EC-Latvia, EC-
Lithuania, EC-Jordan, EC-Morocco, EC-Romania, 
EC-Palestinian Authority, EC-Turkey, EC-Tunisia, 
Romania-Turkey) 
Exceptions and 
exemptions 6 
Protection for service industry (EC-Latvia)   
Poverty relief (EC-Jordan) 
Promote economic development (EC-Morocco, EC-
Palestinian Authority, EC-Turkey, EC-Tunisia, 
Romania-Turkey) 
Transitional time 
periods 7 
Setting up of competition authority (EC-Croatia)  
Implementation of competition law (EFTA-Bulgaria, 
EFTA-Hungary, EFTA-Poland, EFTA-Romania, 
EFTA-Slovenia) 
Protection of domestic industry (EFTA-Jordan) 
Technical assistance 1 
Exchange of experts, organization of seminars and 
training activities (EC-South Africa) 
 
                                                     
iTreaties that appeared in more than one manifestation within each category of S&D were only counted once. 
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4.   The problem of identifying S&D
It should be noted that most of the RTAs contain a clause covering
several types of exemptions that may apply equally to either party.
Generally, these RTAs also contain structural adjustment clauses
related to possible exemptions that may arise for the protection of
infant industries or related reasons. Such exemptions cannot be
labelled as S&D treatment because S&D treatment is defined as non-
reciprocal. If a clause refers to all parties to the agreement equally,
and can equally be accessed by all parties to the agreement, then in
theory it should not be labelled as S&D treatment as set out in the
introduction to this chapter. In practice, however, such a clear-cut
definition needs to be examined carefully. Several of the competition
clauses studied in this agreement legally applied to both parties, but
were basically designed for the use of the less-developed partner.
For example, the European Commission (EC) often includes generous
transition periods that relate to both parties that will evidently be
used by the less-developed partner, such as extended time periods
to formulate and implement a domestic competition law, when it is
clear that the EC has its own competition rules in force.   Also, the
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) will regularly grant
progressive implementation to all treaty members, including itself,
for provisions that EFTA already conforms to.
These provisions include clauses normally associated with S&D
such as technical assistance, structural adjustment, extended time
periods for the implementation of a competition law, and so on. Is
this a type of S&D treatment by stealth, disguised as reciprocity?
One explanation may be that the S&D treatment has been extended
in a mutual manner because the more-developed partner does not
wish to set a precedent for future S&D measures. A second hypothesis
may be that these provisions are introduced as somewhat face-saving
measures, in theory applying to both countries but in reality to be
used by the less-developed partner only.
Table 5.2 contains a list of such reciprocal measures of an S&D
nature enacted between signatories at different levels of development.
The fact that the signatories are at different levels of development
may indicate that the provisions are S&D in the sense that they will
mainly favour the less-developed partner, even though the provisions
are accorded to each partner equally.
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As shown in Table 5.2, the very basic nature of some of these
requirements (that is implementing a competition law) raise the
question of which party to the agreement will really benefit from
these provisions. None of these reciprocal provisions are likely to be
useful to the developed partner, and thus may be tentatively
characterized as a type of S&D.  If one adds these mutual provisions
to the number of non-reciprocal S&D provisions stated in Section 3,
the number of effective S&D provisions found in the RTAs increases
from 21 to 28, representing 18 per cent or almost one-fifth of all RTAs
examined in this chapter.
5.   Examples of S&D provisions uncovered in
RTAs
This section examines some examples of the non-reciprocated
S&D provisions appearing in RTAs. These provisions have been
classified under the four broad headings used in Section 3 and again
in Table 5.1.
Table 5.2 Table of mutual provisions signed between states at
different levels of development
Mutual provision Name of RTA 
Progressive implementation of basic 
competition law 
EC-Morocco, EC-Jordan, EC-Lithuania, EC-
Czech Republic, EC-South Africa, EC-Egypt, 
EC-Tunisia, Israel-Turkey 
Exemptions for national market organizations 
and domestic industry 
Czech Republic-Israel, Slovak Republic-Israel 
Reform of state monopolies; progressive reform 
of public procurement 
EC-Egypt 
Progressive cooperation between competition 
authorities 
Progressive reform of state monopolies and 
enterprises 
EC-Lebanon 
Mutual technical assistance EC-Mexico, Canada-Costa-Rica 
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5.1   Safeguarding the interests of less-developed or
developing countries
This broad category encompassed specific commitments made
in favour of the less-developed partner. The public aid provisions
provided by the EC to developing partners (and also in the Romania–
Turkey RTA) listed the interests of less-developed partners being
safeguarded.  Special aid provisions quoted below are taken from
the EC-Bulgaria and EC-Czech Republic RTAs, in which special
recognition of the less-developed party was accorded by the European
Community to the less-developed partner:
Title V, Chapter II, ‘Competition and Other Economic Provisions’
Article 64
4.a) For the purposes of applying the provision of paragraph
1, point (iii), the Parties recognize that during the first five
years after the entry into force of the Agreement, any public
aid granted by Bulgaria shall be assessed taking into account
the fact that Bulgaria shall be regarded as an area identical to
those areas of the Community described in Article 92 (3) (a)
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community.5
This special aid takes into account the economic conditions of
Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Czech Republic and includes a possibility
of the aid being extended for another five years, as shown in the
following excerpt (the wording is the same for Bulgaria, Lithuania
and the Czech Republic):
Chapter II, ‘Competition and Other Economic Provisions’ Article 64
4.a)The Association Council shall, taking into account the
economic situation of the Czech Republic [Bulgaria,
Lithuania], decide whether that period should be extended by
further periods of five years.6
Uniquely, Turkey’s agreement with Romania was inspired by the
treatment of Turkey in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community:
Article 24, ‘Rules of Competition Concerning Undertakings’
4.a) For the purpose of applying the provisions of paragraph
1, point (c), the Parties recognize that during the first five years
after the entry into force of the Agreement, any public aid
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granted by Romania shall be assessed taking into account the
fact that Romania shall be regarded as an area identical to those
areas of Turkey described in Article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community.  The Joint
Committee shall taking into account the economic situation
of Romania, decide whether that period should be extended
by further periods of five years.[italics added]
This latter excerpt is an example of a trade partner borrowing
from differential treatment provisions in another agreement when
approaching the issue of S&D treatment.  These provisions were not
always so general. The protection of Jordan’s domestic industry is
the focus of the unilateral transitional period extended from Europe
to Jordan in the EFTA-Jordan RTA:
Article 18, ‘Rules of Competition Concerning Undertakings’
3. If a Party, within five years after the date of entry
into force of this Agreement, considers that a given practice
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 causes, or threatens to cause,
serious prejudice to its interest or material injury to its
domestic industry, it may take appropriate measures under
the conditions and in accordance with the procedures laid
down in Article 25.
4. The Joint Committee shall, taking into account the
economic situation of Jordan, decide whether the period
referred to in paragraph 3 should be extended for further
periods of five years.
The interaction between these two paragraphs of the competition
clause establishes a clear transition period for Jordan in order that it
may adjust its domestic industry to fit within the framework laid out
by the new competition agreement.
5.2   Flexibility of commitments
Flexibility of commitments pertains to unilateral exceptions
granted by the more-developed partner to the less-developed partner.
These provisions manifested themselves specifically as special aid,
protection of the service industry, poverty relief and the promotion
of economic development.  For example, in the agreement signed
between the EC and Latvia, special recognition was accorded to
Latvia’s service industry.
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Chapter II, ‘Competition and Other Economic Provisions’, Article 64
6. ...if such practice causes or threatens to cause serious
prejudice to the interests of the other Party or material injury
to its domestic industry, including its services industry...
In treaties signed between the EC and the less-developed
partners, particular provision was made for the perceived poverty
of the other party. For example, in the EC-Jordan treaty, the wording
is similar to that of previous treaties, in the sense that Jordan is to be
treated the same as any Member of the EC in terms of its distribution
of state aid, but with the addition that:
Chapter 2, ‘Competition and Other Economic Matters’, Article 53
Jordan shall be regarded as an area identical to those areas of
the Community where the standard of living is abnormally low
or where there is serious underemployment, as described in Article
92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
[italics added]
The Association Council shall, taking into account the
economic situation of Jordan, decide whether that period
should be extended for further periods of five years.7
The promotion of economic development figured highly in
treaties signed between the EC and less-developed partners.
Restructuring of the domestic economy was recognized in at least
one of the treaties examined. For example, the EC-Morocco treaty, in
which the EC grants special consideration to the needs of Morocco’s
domestic economy, reads in part:
Chapter II, ‘Competition and Other Economic Provisions’, Article 36
During the same period of time, Morocco may exceptionally,
as regards ECSC steel products,  grant State aid for
restructuring purposes provided that:
- it leads to the viability of the recipient firms under
normal market conditions at the end of the restructuring
period,
- the amount and intensity of such aid are strictly
limited to what is absolutely necessary in order to restore such
viability and are progressively reduced,
- the restructuring programme is l inked to a
comprehensive plan for rationalising capacity in Morocco.8
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A similar provision occurs in the agreement between the EC and
the Palestinian Authority. The difference was that, in Palestine, the
drafters were concerned about developmental problems in general
terms. The wording of the text, therefore, does not reach the same
level of specificity as that of the EC-Morocco treaty:
Title II, ‘Payments, Capital, Competition, Intellectual Property and
Public Procurement’, Chapter 2, ‘Competition, Intellectual Property and
Public Procurement’, Article 30
As regards the implementation of paragraph 1 (iii), the Parties
recognize that the Palestinian Authority may wish to use,
during the period until 31 December 2001, public aid to
undertakings as an instrument to tackle its specific development
problems.’9"[italics added]
In the EC-Turkey agreement, this took the form of specific
measures to redress social problems such as unemployment, low
living standards or more general aid ‘of a social character’:
Section II, Competition, A. Competition Rules of the Customs Union,
Article 32
2. The following shall  be compatible with the
functioning of the Customs Union:
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual
consumers, provided that such aid is granted without
discrimination related to the origin of the products
concerned...
(d) for a period of five years from the entry into force of this
Decision, aid to promote economic development of Turkey’s
less-developed regions, provided that such aid does not
adversely affect trading conditions between the Community
and Turkey to an extent contrary to the common interest.
3. The following may be considered to be compatible
with the functioning of the Customs Union:
(a) in conformity with Article 43(2) of the Additional Protocol,
aid to promote the economic development of areas where the
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
underemployment;10
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5.3   Transitional periods
Transitional periods pertain to the progressive implementation
of certain provisions over a certain period of time. In several of the
treaties examined for this chapter, the less-developed partner was
unilaterally accorded a lengthier implementation period than that
accorded to the more-developed partner. Transition periods took
place in four areas: the setting up of a competition authority, the
implementation of a competition law, devolution of public enterprises
and, in one instance, the protection of public industry.  For example,
in the EC-Croatia treaty, Croatia was given one year to set up a
competition authority:
Title III ‘Payments, Competition and Other Economic Provisions,
Article 33 (SAA Article 59)
Croatia shall establish an operationally independent authority
which is entrusted with the powers necessary for the full
application of paragraph 1(iii) of this Article within one year
from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. This
authority shall have, inter alia, the powers to authorize state
aid schemes and individual aid grants in conformity with
paragraph 2 of this Article, as well as the powers to order the
recovery of state aid that has been unlawfully granted. 11
In many cases, the less-developed partner was required to
implement a competition law and a certain amount of time was
granted to them to do so. There were numerous examples of such
provisions occurring between EFTA and less-developed partners.
These transitional periods were alluded to in secondary sources but
the original text of the agreements was not available at the time of
publication. These secondary documents confirmed that unilateral
transition periods were extended by the EFTA to less-developed
partners in order that they would be able to set up a proper
competition law.12 Mutual provisions according all parties a lengthy
implementation period were also common. The popularity of
transition periods indicates that it is one of the most effective and
easily implemented S&D provisions.
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5.4   Technical assistance
Technical assistance within the context of competition law and
policy usually takes the form of seminars, exchanges of information
and sometimes of staff. The treaty between the EC and South Africa
sums up the type of technical assistance that usually takes place
between parties to an RTA:
 SECTION D, ‘Competition Policy’, Article 39
The Community shall provide South Africa with technical
assistance in the restructuring of its competition law and
policy, which may include among others:
(a) the exchange of experts;
(b) organisation of seminars;
(c) training activities.13
Treaty texts examined by authors seldom referred to the unilateral
extension of technical assistance. This should not lead to the
conclusion that technical assistance is rarely offered by the more-
developed to the less-developed partner. Indeed, it is in the interest
of the developed partner to ensure that the competition authority of
its partner is sufficiently competent to assist in case handling and
prosecutions. The results of a survey undertaken by UNCTAD for
another chapter of this book (see Chapter 4 by Alvarez et al.) showed
that competition authorities in developed countries were eager to
offer assistance even if it had not been mandated by the RTA.
Furthermore, two RTAs examined featured provisions for mutual
technical assistance, though the less-developed partner is more likely
to benefit from this assistance than the developed partner (see Section
3.)
6 Conclusions
S&D treatment provisions do appear in RTAs. The UN Set
recognized the need for S&D treatment in 1980 and UNCTAD has
continued to endorse special measures for developing and LDCs at
each subsequent Review Conference of the Set.  Given the difficulties
encountered by S&D at the multilateral level at the WTO, it is
somewhat surprising to find a higher than expected number of such
clauses in specific competition provisions within RTAs.  Nevertheless,
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this may be explained, of course, by the fact that not all the developed
countries in the WTO talks were signatories of RTAs containing
elements of S&D.  These RTAs were mainly passed by the EU and
EFTA, which had proposed certain elements of flexibility and
progressively at the WTO.  At the bilateral or regional level, it might
be easier for the more-advanced party to accept a certain degree of
flexibility, than they would be prepared to accept at the multilateral
level.  However, it should be highlighted that often the element of
non-reciprocity in these clauses is ignored.
The problems addressed by S&D provisions within competition
clauses are the same as those that UNCTAD has flagged many times,
particularly the need for policy space to ensure that parties at different
levels of development benefit from non-reciprocated provisions in
their favour. The appearance of S&D provisions within RTAs shows,
at minimum, that weaker partners feel that there is a necessity for
S&D treatment and that it is beneficial to them. It also supports
UNCTAD’s position at the WTO, which has been that S&D provisions
in favour of developing countries may be necessary for their social
and economic development.
There are several reasons why countries may choose to endorse
S&D treatment specifically within a competition clause, rather than,
say, in the preamble or under a general structural adjustment clause.
The first and most basic reason is that some countries do not as yet
have a competition law. Transitional periods and exemptions may be
necessary for the country to implement a competition law before it
can begin to function effectively within the regime envisaged by the
RTA. This is more often the case with less-developed partners for
whom competition legislation has not been a priority. The motivation
to implement a competition law, therefore, is normally driven by the
developed partner to the agreement such as the EC, which has shown
a strong interest in implementing competition laws within partner
states that mirror those that apply within the territory of the EC.
Secondly, competition provisions have direct implications for
domestic industries. Competition policy is perceived by many
countries, rightly or wrongly, as an infringement upon the growth
potential of protected domestic industries and some of the clauses
examined in this chapter reflect this fear.  Exemptions and exceptions
from the rules that apply to the less-developed partner are the usual
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outcome of a desire to foster the development of certain industries
within the economy of that partner, when it is felt that this would
not be possible without minimum protection from external
competition. Often, these exceptions are framed as general ‘aid’
provisions designed to remediate the effects of poverty, but equally
they are framed with a particular industry or national champion in
mind.
Thirdly, the growth of international cartels alongside the growth
of international trade has pinpointed the need for cooperation
between competition authorities in different States so that the
successful prosecution of cross-border anti-competitive practices may
be ensured. Cooperation is a sensitive area for some developing
countries because the technical competence of their competition
authority may take a while to reach the standards of the developed
partners to the agreement. To overcome this perceived imbalance in
competence, special measures such as transition periods and technical
assistance from the developed partner are included within the
competition clauses of RTAs.
The use of S&D provisions within competition provisions of RTAs
is a small reflection of a much larger issue, namely that of the conflict
between the needs and desires of developing countries. On the one
hand, developing countries desire to improve their position within
the community of nations by implementing laws that are seen to be
further integrating their economies with those of developed nations.
On the other hand, developing countries are constrained by their
particular economic and social situation which might advocate for
industrial policy and national champion policies and therefore are
placed in the position of demanding special concessions from
competition rules advocated by their more-developed partners.  The
use of S&D provisions within competition clauses of RTAs is a
reflection of this ambiguity and an attempt to equalize the economic
and power differentials between developed and developing States.
By examining one small aspect of this dilemma, this chapter hopes
to act as a reference point by which developed and developing
countries may assess their needs for balance in future agreements at
either the bilateral, plurilateral, regional or multilateral levels.
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ANNEX I
The following table lists all the RTAs including at least one less-
developed partner15 notified to the WTO since 1995. In a few cases,
the treaty text was not available at the time of publication. Such cases
were marked with a ‘U’ (unknown) in the second column. The third
column indicates the existence of S&D provisions within the
competition clause with a ‘Y’ (yes) if S&D treatment was present, or
‘N’ (no) if it was not. Those entries for which the treaty text was
unavailable at the time of writing (‘U’), or in which there was no
competition clause (‘N’) were left blank in the third column. Entries
are footnoted if additional information was relevant.
Table 5A.1 Table of RTAs involving at least one less-developed
partner,  as notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995
Name of RTA 
Location of 
competition clause 
in the RTA 
('N' = no 
competition 
clause; U = 
unknown) 
S&D 
provision in 
competition 
clause? 
(Y/N) 
Comments 
 AFTA - Asean Free Trade 
Area N  
 
ASEAN-China N1   
Albania-Bulgaria Article 25 N  
Albania- Bosnia 
Herzegovina Article 21 N 
 
Albania-Macedonia Article 27 N  
Albania-Moldova Article 21 N  
Albania-Romania U1   
Albania-Serbia 
Montenegro Article 27 N 
 
Albania – UNMIK (Kosovo) Article 25 N  
Armenia-Kazakhstan Article 8 N  
Armenia-Moldova Article 8 N  
Armenia-Russian 
Federation Article 7 N 
 
Armenia-Turkmenistan Article 7 N  
Armenia-Ukraine Article 5 N  
BAFTA* Article 15 N  
Bulgaria-Turkey Article 23 N  
Bulgaria-Israel Article 27 N  
Bangkok Agreement - 
Bangladesh, India, Laos, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka 
U1  
 
Bulgaria-Macedonia Article 27 N  
CACM - Central American 
Common Market N  
 
CAN - Cartagena 
Agreement Chapter VIII N 
 
CARICOM Chapter 8 N  
 .../...
179
Brusick and Clarke
Table 5.A.1 (continued)
Name of RTA 
Location of 
competition clause 
in the RTA 
('N' = no 
competition 
clause; U = 
unknown) 
S&D 
provision in 
competition 
clause? 
(Y/N) 
Comments 
 Canada-Chile Chapter J N  
Canada-Costa Rica Chapter 11 N Mutual technical assistance 
CEFTA Article 22 N  
CEMAC Article 88, WAEMU N  
Chile-Costa Rica Chapter 15 N  
Chile-El Salvador N N  
Chile-Mexico Chapter 14 N  
China-Hong Kong N N  
China-Macao N N  
CIS Article 17 N  
COMESA Article 55 N  
Croatia-Albania Article 27 N  
Croatia-Bosnia 
Herzegovina Article 22 N 
 
Czech Republic-Israel* Article 19 N Mutual structural adjustment 
Czech Republic-Latvia* Article 23 N Mutual structural adjustment 
Czech Republic-Lithuania* Article 22 N  
Czech Republic-Estonia* Article 24 N  
Czech Republic-Slovak 
Republic* U  
 
Czech Republic – Turkey* Article 20 N  
EAC N1 N  
EAEC N N  
EC-Algeria N1 N  
EC-Bulgaria Chapter II Y Provisions to safeguard Bulgaria’s interests 
EC-Chile Title VII N  
EC-Croatia Title III Y Provisions to safeguard Croatia’s interests, transitional periods 
EC-Cyprus Article 5.5 N  
EC-Czech Republic* Article 64 Y Provisions to safeguard the Czech Republic’s interests 
EC-Egypt Article 34 N Mutual exemptions, mutual transition periods, technical assistance 
EC-Estonia* Article 63 Y Provisions to safeguard Estonia’s interests 
EC-Hungary* Title V, Chapter II N  
EC-Latvia* Article 64 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests, exceptions and exemptions 
EC-Jordan Article 53 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests, exceptions and exemptions 
EC-Lebanon Article 27 N Mutual transition periods 
EC-Lithuania* Article 64 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests 
EC-FYOM1 Article 33 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests 
EC-Mexico Article 391 N Mutual technical assistance 
EC-Malta* U   
EC-Morocco Article 36 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests, exceptions and exemptions 
EC-Palestinian Authority Article 30 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests, exceptions and exemptions 
EC-Romania Article 64 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests 
EC-South Africa Article 35 Y Transitional periods 
EC-Syria U   
EC-Tunisia Title IV, Chapter 2 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests, exceptions and exemptions 
EC-Turkey Article 32 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests, exceptions and exemptions 
ECO N   
EFTA-Bulgaria Article 18 Y Transitional periods 
EFTA-Chile Article 72 N  
EFTA-Croatia Article 19 N  
 .../...
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Table 5.A.1 (continued)
Name of RTA 
Location of 
competition clause 
in the RTA 
('N' = no 
competition 
clause; U = 
unknown) 
S&D 
provision in 
competition 
clause? 
(Y/N) 
Comments 
 EFTA-Czech Republic* U   
EFTA-Estonia* Article 16 N  
EFTA-Hungary* Article 19 Y Transitional periods 
EFTA-Jordan Article 18 Y Transitional periods 
EFTA-Latvia* Article 16 N  
EFTA-Lithuania* Article 17 N  
EFTA-Macedonia Article 17 N  
EFTA-Mexico Chapter IV.I N  
EFTA-Morocco Article 17 N Mutual transition periods for state monopolies 
EFTA-Palestinian Authority Article 16 N Mutual transition period for state monopolies 
EFTA-Poland* Article 18 Y Transitional periods 
EFTA-Romania Article 18 Y Transitional periods 
EFTA-Singapore Article 50 N  
EFTA-Slovak Republic* U   
EFTA-Slovenia* Article 17 Y Transitional periods 
EFTA-Turkey Article 17 N  
Estonia-Faroe Islands* Article 15 N  
Estonia-Turkey* Article 24 N  
Estonia-Ukraine* Article 13 N  
GCC N   
GSTP N   
Georgia-Armenia Article 7 N  
Georgia-Azerbaijan Article 7 N  
Georgia-Kazakhstan Article 8 N  
Georgia-Russia N   
Georgia-Turkmenistan Article 6 N  
Georgia-Ukraine Article 7 N  
Hungary-Latvia* Article 22 N  
Hungary-Estonia* Article 20 N  
Hungary-Israel* Article 19 N  
Hungary-Lithuania* Article 20 N  
Hungary-Turkey* Article 24 N  
India-Sri Lanka N   
Israel-Poland* Article 20 N  
Israel-Turkey Article 25 N Mutual transition periods 
Japan-Singapore Chapter 12 N  
Korea-Chile Chapter 14 N  
Kyrgyz Republic-Armenia Article 6 N  
Kyrgyz Republic-
Kazakhstan Article 8 N 
 
Kyrgyz Republic-Moldova Article 8 N  
Kyrgyz Republic-Russian 
Federation Article 7 N 
 
Kyrgyz Republic-Ukraine Article 6 N  
Kyrgyz Republic-
Uzbekistan Article 8 N 
 
LAIA N   
Laos-Thailand U   
Latvia-Turkey* Article 25 N  
Lithuania-Turkey* Article 25 N  
MSG - Melanesian 
Spearhead Group N N 
 
Mercosur N1 N  
Mexico-Israel Chapter 8 N  
NAFTA Chapter 15 N  
New Zealand-Singapore Article 3 N  
PATCRA N N  
 .../...
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Name of RTA 
Location of 
competition clause 
in the RTA 
('N' = no 
competition 
clause; U = 
unknown) 
S&D 
provision in 
competition 
clause? 
(Y/N) 
Comments 
 PTN U   
Poland-Faroe Islands* Article 16 U1  
Poland-Latvia* Article 22 N Mutual transition period 
Poland-Lithuania* Article 22 N  
Poland-Turkey* Article 20 N Mutual transition period 
Romania-Moldova Article 16 N Mutual transition period 
Romania-Turkey Article 24 Y Provisions to safeguard its interests, exceptions and exemptions 
SADC Article 25 N  
SAPTA N N  
SPARTECA N1 N  
Singapore-Australia Chapter 12 N  
Slovak Republic-Estonia* Article 24 N Mutual transition period, mutual exceptions and exemptions 
Slovak Republic-Israel* Article 19 N Mutual transition period, mutual exceptions and exemptions 
Slovak Republic-Latvia* Article 23 N Mutual transition period  
Slovak Republic-Lithuania* Article 22 N Mutual transition period 
Slovenia-Lithuania* Article 22 N Mutual transition periods 
Slovenia-Bosnia 
Herzegovina* Article 17 N 
Mutual transition period 
Slovenia-Croatia* Article 22 N Mutual transition period 
Slovenia-Estonia* Article 24 N Mutual transition period 
Slovenia-Israel* Article 19 N  
Slovenia-Latvia* Article 16 N  
Slovenia-FYOM* Article 22 N Mutual transition period 
Thailand-Australia Chapter 12 N  
TRIPARTITE U   
Turkey-Bosnia 
Herzegovina Article 17 N 
 
Turkey-Croatia Article 25 N Mutual transition period, mutual exceptions and exemptions 
Turkey-Czech Republic* Article 20 N Mutual transition period, mutual exceptions and exemptions 
Turkey-Macedonia Article 24 N  
Turkey-Slovak Republic* Article 20 N Mutual transition period 
Turkey-Slovenia* Article 27 N Mutual transition period 
US-Chile Chapter 16 N  
US-Singapore Chapter 12 N  
US-Jordan N N  
WAEMU Article 88 N Mutual transition period 
 
Table 5.A.1 (continued)
1 As indicated at the outset in this chapter, the authors have examined all agreements involving devel-
oping countries and LDCs, but also economies in transition that, while not developing countries, are or
were, at the time of the agreement, less developed than their industrialized partners.  It was decided to
include them in the survey, because the issues dealt with were similar, and could shed light on agree-
ments involving developed and developing countries.
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ANNEX II
Methodology and Caveats
Only special and differential (S&D) provisions found within the
competition clause itself were included in this analysis. S&D
provisions commonly appear in the preamble, structural adjustment
clause, state monopolies clause and state-owned enterprise clause of
regional trade agreements (RTAs), and even though these measures
may have a preferential effect for the less-developed partner, they
were not within the scope of this study.
The RTAs used as examples in this chapter were extracted from
the database compiled by the World Trade Organization within the
ambit of its remit under Section XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Section V of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), whereby Member States should notify
the Organization of any trade agreement negotiated bilaterally or
plurilaterally between itself and another country. The search was
carried out using the (World Trade Organization) WTO intranet and
the external website offered by the WTO to the general public for
research. The list is complete for all the RTAs signalled to the WTO
to date.
The list of RTAs contained in this chapter is confined to those
notified to the WTO and that involve at least one less-developed
country, as indicated in Endnote 2. The purpose of this chapter is to
focus on RTAs signed bilaterally or plurilaterally between developing
countries or between developed countries and at least one less-
developed partner, where the treaty text was available. This excludes
agreements between developed countries, such as the Closer
Economic Relationship (CER) between Australia and New Zealand,
on the grounds that such an agreement did not involve a developing
country and could not, by definition, include S&D provisions. These
criteria likewise exclude the TRIPARTITE agreement, on the grounds
that text was not available at the time of writing.
RTAs signed between countries that have since been overtaken
by membership in a larger regional grouping were also included.
The most common example of this practice is the accession of new
Member States to the European Union in May 2005. The status of the
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RTAs signed between those countries prior to their accession to the
European Union has been highlighted in Table 5A.1, where the treaties
abrogated as a result of the accession of the new Member States of
the European Union have been marked with an asterisk. The
abrogated treaties are included here because they are operational and
because they form an excellent model of the type of S&D provisions
likely to be found in agreements signed between developed countries
and less-developed partners.
In compiling this list, several RTAs were excluded. In many cases,
this was because of difficulty in sourcing the text of the agreement.
Detailed searches were undertaken and, in at least one case, consulates
were contacted, in an effort to secure an English-language text of the
relevant treaty. In several cases, though, it was simply not possible to
obtain a copy of the treaty before this book was published (for
example, the treaty text of the bilateral free-trade agreement between
Laos and Thailand). The omissions are given in Table 5A.2.
The omission of these RTAs does not represent a significant caveat
to the conclusions drawn in the final section of this chapter, if one
bears in mind that these omissions represent approximately 5 per
cent of the entire number of RTAs involving at least one developing
or less-developed country notified to the WTO, and that several of
the agreements could be analysed from secondary texts even though
the original treaty was not available. Nor was it clear that any of the
missing texts even contained competition clauses.
Table 5A.2 List of RTAs notified to the WTO, of which treaty text was
unavailable at time of writing
Albania-Romania 
Bangkok Agreement 
Czech Republic-Slovak Republic 
EC-Hungary 
EC-Malta 
Laos-Thailand 
PTN 
TRIPARTITE 
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In many cases, the entry into force of the agreement was unclear.
The ratification and entry into force of the treaty was assumed to
have taken place if the treaty had been notified to the WTO.
It should also be pointed out that in certain cases the primary
document containing the text of the treaty could not be located, but
the contents of the treaty were available from questions and answers
sessions conducted at the WTO, or through summaries of the treaty
submitted by parties to it. The following treaties were described from
secondary sources: EFTA-Bulgaria, EFTA-Czech Republic, EFTA-
Hungary, EFTA-Poland, EFTA-Romania, EFTA-Slovak Republic,
EFTA-Slovenia, Georgia-Russia, and SPARTECA.
For example, in one case, the European Free Trade Agreement
(EFTA) secretariat lodged a single document outlining the substance
of its free trade agreements with a series of central European
countries, including Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Slovenia. This document was examined in lieu of the original
agreements. Although it may be considered a secondary source, it
was nevertheless rich in detail about each article of the trade
agreements signed between EFTA and the individual countries. In
making the trade-off between authenticity and inclusivity, the authors
believed that the abridged document served just as well as the original
trade agreements in providing the data required for this survey.
Treaties that have been superseded have been included, so long
as they remained on the WTO list of notifications. If the states were
late-joiners to the EC (that is were part of the second tranche of
Members acceding in 2005) then the list of RTAs concluded between
themselves and the EC prior to their accession was included, even
though these RTAs may have since been superseded by the EC rules.
Their inclusion was justified by the fact these treaties have been
notified to the WTO and because their contents are important for an
understanding of the issues of S&D treatment under examination in
this chapter.
States that have been scheduled to join the EU at some date in
the near future, for example, Romania and Bulgaria, also have bilateral
treaties between themselves and the EC. These bilateral treaties were
included in the database because the accession of such countries to
the EU has not yet been finalized. The bilateral treaties signed between
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themselves and the EC thus remain valid for the purposes of this
study and any references to S&D treatment within the competition
clauses of those agreements could fairly be assumed to have relevance
to the overall study.
Lack of information was also a hindrance preventing a universal
review of every RTA in existence. The list compiled here and the
conclusions drawn from it are reliant upon the goodwill and efficiency
of the WTO Members and Secretariat. Member States that have not
applied themselves to maintaining an up-to-date list of all RTAs with
the WTO will affect the thoroughness of the data compiled here.
Nonetheless, the nature of the conclusions that have been drawn from
this survey of the relevant documents is valid despite the probable
existence of RTAs involving at least one developing partner that may
have been missed in the writing of this chapter.
Finally, states that have not yet acceded to the WTO were omitted
from the list. In part, this was a practical decision because of the
difficulties of finding all the RTAs that exist outside the WTO.
Attempting to include all agreements in existence would have placed
exigencies upon the researchers that would have been difficult to
overcome if the writing was to be concluded within the deadline set
Region Country 
Europe and Central Asia 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Andorra, 
Tajikistan, Serbia, Montenegro. 
Middle East and North Africa Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Iran 
East Asia and Pacific Vietnam, Tonga, Vanuatu, Laos, Samoa 
Sub-Saharan Africa Sudan, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe 
South Asia Bhutan, Afghanistan 
Latin America and the Caribbean Bahamas 
 
Table 5A.3 List of countries currently seeking accession to WTO
Source:  Evenett and Primo-Braga,  2005
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for publication. As a result, it is impossible to list the number of RTAs
between developing countries that may have been omitted from this
study due to non-notification of the signatory parties or other reasons.
The number of RTAs in existence that have not been notified to the
WTO should be low, especially if one bears in mind two points: firstly,
that at least one of the parties to most RTAs is likely to be a WTO
Member (the ratio of WTO Member States to non-Member States being
high) and would thus have notified its participation in such an
agreement to the organization under its Article XXIV or GATS V
obligations, and secondly that countries remaining outside the WTO
may be economically isolated, and thus (arguably) less likely to sign
RTAs with partner states.  Table 5A.3 contains a list of countries
awaiting accession to the WTO. Note in support of the points made
above, that of the 31 countries in the table below, ten of them already
appear in the RTAs notified to the WTO by virtue of agreements made
with WTO Member States.25
This Chapter has not sought to address the question of the status
of a developing or transition economy once it has been brought within
the aegis of either the EFTA or the EC. Some of the countries examined
in the course of compiling this Chapter may have graduated from
developing or transition economy status, partly as a result of their
accession to the EC, or even EFTA.
NOTES
1WTO, Doha Declaration, November 2001. Available online at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#dohadeclaration
2OECD, Joint Group on Trade and Competition “The Role of Special and
Differential Treatment in Competition.” COM/DAFFE/TD (2004). Published
by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal & Enterprise Affairs, Trade
Directorate Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) June 2004
3This figure includes treaties that have since been superseded.
4Treaties that appeared in more than one manifestation within each category
of S&D were only counted once.
5WTO, Europe Agreement between the European Communities and Bulgaria,
WT/REG1/6, 2002.
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6 WTO, Europe Agreement between the European Communities and the Czech
Republic, WT/REG18/6, 10 May 1996.
7WTO, European Communities – Jordan Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, WT/
REG141/1, 2002.
8WTO, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Communities and
Morocco, WT/REG112/1, 2002.
9WTO, Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and
Cooperation between the European Community and the Palestine Liberation
Organization for the Benefit of Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, WT/REG43/1, 1997.
10WTO, Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union, WT/REG22/
1, 1996.
11WTO, European Community – Croatia Interim Agreement, WT/REG142/1,
2003.
12For details of all the above treaties, please refer to WTO, EFTA Free Trade
Agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania and Slovenia,
WT/REG14-16/2, 1996.
13WTO, Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement between the
European Community and South Africa, WT/REG113/1, 2000.
14As indicated at the outset in this chapter, the authors have examined all
agreements involving developing countries and LDCs, but also economies
in transition that, while not developing countries, are or were, at the time
of the agreement, less developed than their industrialized partners.  It was
decided to include them in the survey, because the issues dealt with were
similar, and could shed light on agreements involving developed and
developing countries.
15Currently under negotiation.
16The text of this agreement was not available at the time of publication.
17Tariff concession agreement only.
18There is a reference to negotiations on competition in Article 75.
19Under negotiation.
20Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
21Obligation to set up a competition authority.
22Under negotiation.
23Treaty text not available at time of publication.
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24SPARTECA is a preferential trade agreement for South Pacific Island nations
wishing to access Australian or New Zealander markets and contains tariff
preferences only.
25The non-acceded countries that appear on the WTO notification list by virtue
of agreements signed with WTO Member States are: Russia, Ukraine,
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1.  Introduction
Competition Law and Policy is one of the important tools forfostering development and competitiveness in developingcountries (UNCTAD, 2004a) and studies have shown that
regional economic integration provides several challenges for
developing countries aiming to make the best use of competition
policies for economic development, as there is no 'one size fits all'
adequate model. For this reason, each country has been discussing
appropriate ways of developing and implementing its own
competition policy regimes, either by adopting a competition law, or
by introducing aspects of competition policy in other areas of its legal
and political system.
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International obligations affect the competition framework within
a country, as they may impose minimum standards for competition
policies. In July 2004, following the conclusions of the Cancun
Ministerial Conference, competition was excluded from the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agenda, together with other Singapore
issues. However, other international commitments dealing with
competition law and policy exist and are either in place or being
negotiated. Those commitments assume various forms, such as
bilateral or plurilateral cooperation treaties among countries with
existing competition framework (referred by some as Agency-to-
Agency Agreements, or ATAs), a competition chapter on trade
agreement (either a regional trade agreement or a customs union
agreement) and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). As a
consequence, depending on the scope and ambition of the agreement,
as described in this chapter, a country may be required to implement
competition law and policy through the creation of a legal framework
and an enforcement institution. In other cases, when competition
agencies are already established, the main focus will probably be the
implementation of cooperation among members based on positive
and/or negative comity rules (see Chapter 4 by Alvarez et al. in this
publication).
Based on this scenario, the scope of this chapter is to evaluate,
from a developing country perspective, the benefits and burdens for
implementing competition law and policy provisions encompassed
in international agreements. These elements should be taken into
account by countries when assuming international commitments. For
this purpose, the chapter considers existing alternatives of
competition agreements and their possible breadth, comparing trade
agreements containing competition chapters with other international
competition agreements that focus mainly on cooperation.
2.  Objectives and features of international law
and policy competition provisions
Transactions with a cross-border, or even global, dimension have
been increasing mainly since the 1990s as compared to those that are
confined within national boundaries. Allied with this, companies have
been progressively defining their strategies globally and decisions
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or any anti-competitive conduct taken within a jurisdiction may have
a direct impact in another country’s jurisdiction. As a result, countries
are being pushed to adopt antitrust codes, expanding the scope of
the existing rules, and increasing resources committed to enforcement
(Pitofsky, 1998). Today, approximately 90 countries have some kind
of competition law, and 60 of those codes took effect during the past
15 years.
In this scenario, a variety of types of international agreements
that include or relate to competition law and policy issues have
become more common, serving different purposes, depending on the
objectives involved.
In order to facilitate the analysis of the advantages and burdens
arising from those agreements, international competition agreements
will be divided into two main categories: (i) bilateral or plurilateral
cooperation agreements among antitrust authorities, and (ii)
competition agreements that are part of a regional trade agreement
or custom union agreements. Some particular nuances concerning
these types of agreements also occur according to the level of
institutional development of the countries involved, as will be detailed
below.
Based on this categorization, the similarities and differences of
the purposes of each of the international agreements would be used
as a tool to evaluate not only the benefits arising from those
agreements, but also the costs and burdens that result from their
implementation, focusing mainly on the perspective of developing
countries, which have limited resources and need to allocate
accordingly.
3.  Benefits and burdens of bilateral or plurilateral
competition cooperation agreements
International cooperation between competition enforcement
agencies has become increasingly important, to the extent that they
manage to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement
by both authorities, and reduce the risk of two or more jurisdictions
reaching conflicting or incompatible decisions in individual cases.
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Generally speaking, cooperation agreements on competition
issues may achieve two main results: (i) to serve as an instrument to
foster capacity building to one of the countries, which happens when
the level of development of the parties to the agreement is uneven,
and/or (ii) to effectively implement enforcement cooperation activities
between two countries where transnational activities are involved.
In this latter case, the agreement will increase the chances that the
investigation, be it a merger or an anti-competitive conduct case, is
successfully concluded, and at the same time, the costs for the parties
and for the competition authorities in the countries involved are
reduced. To some extent, any agreement will usually aim at both
objectives, although in practice, one main feature will stand out,
depending on the institutional development of the parties involved.
The increasingly international nature of cross-border
transactions, as well as of anti-competitive behaviour that impacts
on more than one jurisdiction, have resulted in a growing number of
mergers and cooperation projects falling within the jurisdiction of
more than one competition authority. This fact has led enforcers to
examine ways to expand multilateral cooperation on competition,
aiming to achieve means of cooperation to facilitate and coordinate
their respective review, investigative and decision-making processes.
A bilateral or plurilateral cooperation agreement on competition
is usually referred as a First Generation Agreement, and its key elements
are (i) information sharing, (ii) coordination of enforcement activities,
and (iii) technical cooperation. Information sharing within First
Generation Agreements is limited to non-confidential data, and may
include all documents and records not protected by confidentiality
safeguards. Coordination of enforcement activities can be
implemented through numerous commitments, such as the possibility
that one party will request the other to consider its specific concerns
during investigations, based on traditional comity, or even to take or
not to take certain enforcement actions depending on the impact that
they will have on the requesting jurisdiction, through positive and
negative comity provisions.
However, as detailed below, evidence shows that the extent to
which parties will effectively be able to coordinate their actions, as
well as the nature of the data to be exchanged through such
instruments, will basically depend on how similar is the stage of
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development of the countries. Therefore, as will be detailed in the
following sections, bilateral cooperation agreements among countries
with competition law and authority may be divided into two subsets
of agreements.
The first subset of cooperation agreements would include the
agreements between parties with different levels of institutional
development. These agreements are usually less ambitious and tend
to concentrate on exchange of limited types of information, in most
cases achieving important capacity-building results, as the less mature
agency will end up profiting from the existing experience of the other
country by better understanding its enforcement policies and
activities. The second subset of bilateral cooperation agreements would
refer to those agreements between countries with similar stages of
institutional development. Within those agreements, authorities are
more likely to effectively coordinate enforcement activities by
frequently notifying of their enforcement activities that may affect
the other party’s market, reduce conflicts with respect to enforcement
actions, as well as have and give access to a wider variety of data,
making the antitrust enforcement more efficient and effective in
certain cross-border cases. Specific countries have even moved a step
further and signed Second Generation Agreements that, in addition to
the mechanisms included in the First Generation ones, allow the
sharing of confidential information and permit one agency to gather
information on behalf of the other (Purcell White, 2004).
It is interesting to observe that provisions included in bilateral
or plurilateral cooperation agreements are overall the same,
regardless of whether the parties are at similar levels or not. In
practice, though, for countries at different institutional stages, these
instruments have worked mostly as capacity-building tools, either
through specific technical assistance projects, such as seminars and
consultancies, or through the exchange of certain kinds of non-
confidential information such as case theories and discussions
between staff on specific substantive topics.
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3.1  Bilateral or plurilateral agreements between parties
with different levels of institutional development
Even though there is no doubt that cooperation agreements may
increase effectiveness and efficiency on competition law enforcement,
by means of technical assistance and exchange of information, any
such agreement will also entail costs and burdens for the parties
involved, such as those associated with negotiating the agreement
and with its implementation, which will be differently perceived by
each country, depending on its institutional framework and on the
resources available. Similarly, the motivations for entering into those
agreements also vary and, therefore, the evaluation of whether or
not it is worth bearing those costs will also differ.
When developed and developing countries are party to a First
Generation Agreement, the latter’s role has consisted, to a large extent,
of being a recipient of the experience of the other party (see, for
example, the case of the ATA between Canada and Costa Rica). In
any case, to put into effect the provisions of a cooperation agreement,
it will be necessary to allocate staff that could be in charge of other
areas. Therefore, regardless of the breadth of the provisions and its
main objectives, the costs for a developing country to enter into such
an agreement are undeniably high: besides communication, paper
exchange and travel expenses, the implementation of any cooperation
activity requires human resources and this is possibly the higher cost
for a developing country agency, as human resources are normally
scarce therein.
The level of human resources needed for the implementation of
a cooperation agreement will  vary according to the type of
cooperation activities, but there is no doubt that qualified people
need to be involved. If a country were to report every single
investigation that may have an impact in a counterpart’s jurisdiction,
an agency would possibly need to devote about five people at least
to deal with such activity. Notwithstanding, even though costs might
be high, if the provisions of the cooperation agreement are duly
exploited, the benefits tend to outweigh the costs. For example, if
parties effectively exchange information in a specific case, avoiding
duplication of efforts and conflicting decisions - and, therefore, an
investigation is successfully concluded - the costs of human resources,
communication, paper exchange and travel are fully justified.
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Technical assistance projects frequently produce satisfactory
results, especially if customized to the needs of the recipient, which
is likely to happen due to the cooperative relationship between parties
to competition agreements. Nonetheless, the possibility to profit from
the institutional maturity of a developed country’s agency, through
consultation channels that allow an enforcer from a developing
country to contact its counterpart abroad and learn from the another
agency’s experiences regarding specific markets and/or conducts, is
a very productive way for young competition agencies to upgrade
their analytical framework, while solving daily challenges.
From a developed country’s perspective, there are also substantial
costs involved, whether the agreement is used primarily as capacity-
building tools, or to effectively coordinate enforcement activities. For
example, for any capacity-building activity, the parties involved will
have to prepare documents, train people and bear the expenses
associated with the trips. In addition, these tasks usually entail
continuing monitoring of its implementation in the country recipient
of the program. In the second case, though, it is clear that despite
potential coordination difficulties, the possibility to have access to
information in the course of an investigation and to streamline its
proceedings as much as possible with any agency, even less developed
ones, will possibly reduce enforcement costs, and therefore is always
desirable. In agreements where its role is typically as a donor of
technical assistance, substantial human and material resources are
required to organize seminars and workshops and to respond to
consultations, which are usually well received by the developing
country. And in this case, although the return is not of the same nature
as that which the recipient will experience, or in any way similar to
those derived from coordination of enforcement activities, it is
undeniably greater, since it offers a unique opportunity to promote
the convergence of competition policy systems from the donor
country’s perspective and therefore to influence to some extent other
countries’ legislation and institutional development.
Some of the US bilateral cooperation agreements could be
included in this subset of bilateral cooperation agreements, such as
those entered with Mexico, Brazil and Israel.1 The Brazil-United States
Cooperation Agreement on Competition Enforcement, for example,
was the first formal cooperation agreement between international
competition authorities in which Brazil took part, and was signed in
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October 1999 and enacted in March 2003. The agreement specifies
certain requirements to be followed by both national antitrust
authorities2 as well as a number of possibilities regarding technical
cooperation and enforcement activities, such as:
• Prompt notification to the other party with respect to enforcement
activities that: (a) are relevant to enforcement activities of the
other party, (b) involve anti-competitive practices, other than
mergers or acquisitions, carried out in whole or in substantial
part in the territory of the other party, (c) involve mergers or
acquisitions in which one or more of the parties to the
transaction, or a company controlling one or more of the parties
to a transaction, is a company incorporated or organized under
the laws of the other party or of one of its states, (d) involve
conduct believed to have been required, encouraged, or
approved by the other party, (e) involve remedies that expressly
require or prohibit conduct in the territory of the other party or
are otherwise directed at conduct in the territory of the other
party, or (f) involve the seeking of information located in the
territory of the other party;
• Consideration of coordination of enforcement activities with regard
to related matters;
• The possibility of requesting consultations regarding any matter
related to the agreement, the option to require, after prior
consultation, the other party’s competition authorities to initiate
appropriate enforcement activities whenever a party believes
that anti-competitive practices carried out in the territory of the
other adversely affect important interests; and
• Technical cooperation activities, such as exchange of information
to the extent compatible with their respective laws and
important interests, exchange of competition agency personnel
for training purposes, and participation of competition agency
personnel as lecturers or consultants at training courses
organized or sponsored by the other authority.
Since the execution of the agreement, most of its provisions have
been implemented. Initially, the cooperation consisted mostly of
exchange of information and technical assistance projects, mainly
aimed at building capacity for the Brazilian authorities, as well as
sporadic notifications of cases with multi-jurisdictional implications.
In the past three years, though, there has been a significant increase
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in the amount of information exchange between the Brazilian agencies
and their counterparts in the United States, regarding both anti-
competitive conduct investigations and merger cases, not to mention
theoretical discussions regarding other competition issues. The
exchanges between the Brazilian authorities and the US Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff have
taken different features depending on the situation, and have
expanded from purely technical assistance initiatives, to the exchange
of non-confidential information, including investigation strategies,
views on relevant market, theories of anti-competitive harm, potential
remedies, and the like. In addition, during the recent elaboration of
the draft bill that proposes the reform of the Brazilian antitrust law,
numerous consultations were made in order to discuss specific
provisions and compare those with the United States experience and
also with international recommended practices in the area.
The evolution of the relationship between the US and Brazil in
recent years is an indication that, although the provisions regarding
positive and negative comity are still to be effectively implemented,
the countries may soon be ready to consider effective coordination
on enforcement activities, as well as systematic notification of cases
that impact both countries. These procedures will necessarily raise
the costs, but the positive effects would be undeniably greater.
From the Brazilian perspective, the value of the agreement is
already considerable, since through its numerous applications, the
agencies have been able to benefit from the expertise of a country
with a mature experience in the enforcement of antitrust law and
policy.
From the US perspective, the advantages of entering into an
agreement with a country such as Brazil are, in the short run, different,
but in the long run, quite similar to the advantages the agreement
represents for Brazil. In the short run, it seems fair to say that the
United States has been able to positively ‘influence’ the Brazilian
institutional and legislative framework and, thus, by means of soft
law, promote some convergence with its antitrust law and policy
model. As an example, Brazilian authorities have been discussing
features of its leniency program with the DOJ so as to make it more
effective. In the long run, when the parties effectively coordinate
merger and conduct investigation proceedings, the advantages will
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derive from the synergies achieved by the coordination that may
result in the reduction of investigation and enforcement costs.
Therefore, on the one hand, considering the surge in transnational
mergers and anti-competitive conduct that impacts on various
markets and, on the other, the absence of a multilateral framework
for cooperation among competition agencies, the value for developed
and developing countries alike is considerable.
In summary, although agreements between countries at different
stages of development are necessarily limited if compared with
agreements among equals, at least in the first stages of their
implementation, this is not to say that they do not serve valuable
purposes despite the costs entailed. And in the case of the Brazil-US
cooperation agreement, as was seen above, at least from a developing
country’s perspective, the net effect has certainly been positive.
3.2  Bilateral or plurilateral cooperation agreements among
parties with similar levels of institutional development
Cooperation agreements among parties with similar levels of
institutional development and legal frameworks evidently do not
result in capacity building. Whether an agreement involves both
developed or both developing countries, the costs of negotiating it
and of implementing its provisions will be worthwhile when there is
a substantive degree of multi-jurisdictional activity between the
parties involved.
For countries such as Brazil and Argentina, for example, that are
party to MERCOSUR’s customs union (thus having the same external
common tax for almost all products), and for a number of firms with
a plant in one of the two countries and exporting to the other, it is
certainly beneficial to have a cooperation agreement. As it is relatively
common that a merger in one market will impact on the other; and
that anti-competitive behaviour in one country will affect the other
market, at least to some degree, exchange of information is likely to
make enforcement more effective and efficient.
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Indeed, a cooperation agreement between Brazil and Argentina
was signed in October 2003. It is also a First Generation Agreement and
encompasses similar provisions to those included in the Brazil-US
agreement that detail technical cooperation, information exchange
and comity components. It is worth noting that the exchange of
information between Brazilian and Argentinean agencies preceded
the adoption of the agreement, but the steps specified in the bilateral
document served to institutionalize them and establish routines
among the staff. Moreover, the framework provided by the agreement
guarantees that documents from one jurisdiction may be legally used
by the other.
Although the Brazilian Government has not yet ratified the
agreement, a number of its provisions have been already put into
practice, including public information relating to notifications
regarding conduct and merger cases in both countries, in situations
where staff members identified that a certain investigation would
concern the other authority. Since the agreement was signed, for
example, there have been quite a few notifications regarding conduct
merger investigations.
The notification procedure included in the Brazil-Argentina
agreement is indeed very important, but for now and during the first
stage of its formal implementation, it is in fact quite burdensome for
both countries. And precisely for that reason, although both countries
have used it many times, it has not so far become a systematic
procedure. For developing countries with scarce human and material
resources and that have not incorporated this provision into their
routine, the obligation to notify the other country in every single case
in which an investigation possibly affects the other country’s market
may entail costs that at least upfront are not necessarily covered by
the benefits the agreement will bring when it is fully implemented.
Another aspect, however, that would deserve better attention from
agencies in both countries at this stage, refers to the possibility of
having substantive discussions related to parallel cases being carried
out by both jurisdictions. This would enable further harmonization
of the countries’ antitrust analyses, while providing better knowledge
of each other’s legal and procedural framework.
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Another example of a First Generation Agreement between parties
at similar levels of development is the cooperation between US
agencies (FTC and DOJ) and the EC Competition Directorate.
Formal cooperation between the US and EU antitrust authorities
initiated in 1991, when the ‘AGREEMENT between the Government
of the United States of America and the Commission of the European
Communities regarding the application of their competition laws’
was signed (OJ L 132, 15.06.1995). Under the principle of ‘traditional’
or ‘negative’ comity, detailed below, the agreement explicitly was
aimed to ‘promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the
possibility or impact of differences between the Parties in the
application of their competition laws’.
That framework was expanded and reinforced by a
complementary agreement signed in 1998 (OJ L 173, 18.06.1998),
aimed to introduce positive comity principles: ‘Agreement between
the European Communities and the Government of the United States
of America on the application of positive comity principles in the
enforcement of their competition laws’. Among other important
issues, according to the new understanding, a party will normally
defer or suspend its own enforcement activities to let the most suitable
authority carry out the investigation according to the specific
circumstances of the case.
Mergers were not within the scope of the 1991 and 1998
agreements due to merger legislation on both sides. To deal in a
coordinated way with mergers, the US-EU Merger Working Group
issued the ‘Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations’
in October 2002. These are intended to promote fully-informed
decision making on the part of the authorities of both sides, to
minimize the risk of divergent outcomes on both sides of the Atlantic,
to facilitate coherence and compatibility in remedies, to enhance the
efficiency of their respective investigations, to reduce burdens on
merging parties and third parties, and to increase the overall
transparency of the merger review processes.
As mentioned in the previous section, First Generation Agreements
concluded between countries at similar development stages and those
between countries with different institutional degrees of development
encompass mostly the same provisions; existing distinctions refer
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mainly to the extent to which any information exchange takes place.
As was mentioned above, First Generation Agreements allow for the
agencies to give and have access to all data and records not protected
by specific confidentiality safeguards. It is, therefore, a very broad
category, and the flexibility with which the agencies will interpret it
basically depends on the assurances that the recipient jurisdiction
will protect it as dutifully as the donor would.
As generally mentioned, positive and negative comity obligations
also play an important role. The principle of negative (traditional)
comity mean that countries would take into account the important
and clearly stated trade interests of other countries before action is
taken in particular cases. Positive comity allows antitrust enforcers
in one country to request that the other country’s antitrust agency
investigate and take appropriate law enforcement action against anti-
competitive conduct that adversely affects the interests of the country
requesting the investigation and violates the laws of the country
responding to the request, providing for more efficient application
of the two countries’ enforcement resources. Under this provision,
the requesting country will normally agree to defer initiating its own
enforcement activity and the enhanced agreement aims to reduce
the likelihood of duplicate enforcement actions in cases where
positive comity requests are made. However, the effectiveness of this
provision may be limited: this approach can be effective only when
the anti-competitive effects of the conduct affect not only the
requesting jurisdiction, but the requested country as well, which
actually may permit and encourage its procedure within its
jurisdiction (Matsushita, 2002).
Some countries with mature institutions and sufficient resources
to fully explore cooperation activities with their counterparts may
consider it appropriate to improve enforcement coordination tools
through Second Generation Agreements.3 The possibility to organize joint
investigations, as well as to exchange confidential information
through these agreements, enables the parties to expand multi-
jurisdictional enforcement and consequently to strengthen their
domestic enforcement as well.
So far, there are a limited number of such agreements in place,
which does not come as a surprise, since aside from some European
countries, Australia, the United States, and Canada, cooperation
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among competition agencies is a relatively recent phenomenon. In
April 1997, for instance, the United States and Australia signed a
Second Generation Agreement among competition agencies.4 Under the
agreement, the US and the Australian authorities5 are able to share
information obtained in the course of the agencies’ investigations, as
well as to provide each other with investigative assistance in order
to obtain information, evidence, or testimony, which should be used
exclusively for law enforcement purposes. Since then, records in
Australia that are needed to prove an antitrust case in the US, and
vice versa, have been made available to antitrust officials in the other
country, while ensuring secure treatment of confidential information.
The cooperation agreement with Australia was signed within the
realm of the US International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
of 1994, which authorizes the FTC and DOJ to negotiate assistance
agreements with foreign counterpart agencies. The Act requires that
both countries that are party to an agreement have comparable
authority to provide assistance, which corroborates the underlining
assumption that agreements among parties of the same institutional
level have different effects than those entered by heterogeneous parts.
An additional requirement consists in the other country also having
laws that adequately protect materials provided in confidence from
unauthorized public disclosure. The only exception regarding
information exchange established in the current US-Australia
agreement concerns documents and data that firms provide to the
US authorities within the scope of merger review under their pre-
merger notification programs. In those cases, however, if it is a
multinational transaction it might be also in the firms’ best interest
to grant waivers, since it would be very likely to expedite the analysis.
It is worth noting that, since 1992, the US and the Australian agencies
already had in place a First Generation Agreement for competition
matters which, though it provided an important framework for
information exchange, did not allow the parties to share non-public
information and give each other investigatory assistance.
Similarly to the US-Australia understanding, the plurilateral
Nordic Cooperation Agreement entered between Sweden, Norway,
Denmark and Iceland also authorizes the parties to exchange
confidential information regarding mergers, cartels and abuse of
dominant position cases. The agreement was initially signed between
Norway, Denmark and Iceland in 2001, and later, in 2004, Sweden
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also joined in. In addition, also in 1997, the European Commission
and the national competition agencies in Europe signed an agreement
to cooperate in handling cases falling within the scope of Articles 81
and 82 (formerly Articles 85 and 86) of the EC Treaty.6
In all the three treaties mentioned above, the parties to Second
Generation Agreements were all developed countries, with solid
institutions and mature antitrust enforcement experience. Therefore,
those countries are able to mutually assure one another that
confidential information received would be dutifully protected, and
that the assistance provided within the scope of an investigation
would be reciprocated whenever necessary. These commitments
demand significant resources and, at least at this stage, it would be
extremely burdensome for most developing country agencies to
implement with any partner. Likewise, mutuality is the most
important element in those types of agreements, and therefore,
regardless of the significant improvement regarding both institutional
framework and law enforcement promoted by a number of young
competition agencies in the past decade, it is still unlikely that mature
jurisdictions would be willing to enter into Second Generation
Agreements with countries at a different stage.
3.3  Net effects of bilateral and plurilateral cooperation
agreements
From a developing country’s perspective, formal agreements such
as the Brazil-United States and the Brazil-Argentina ones are, in effect,
valuable tools, since they foster closer work among agencies, reducing
duplication and increasing the amount of data available. More
importantly, even these agreements grant officials an adequate
framework for exchange information. However, as noted above, none
of these agreements allow for the exchange of anything other than
non-confidential information; therefore, to all intents and purposes,
at least in theory, the same exchanges could happen without an
agreement. To some extent, this is not a surprise, as in most cases
these agreements are put in place to cement a previously existing
relationship and to record procedures that usually had been tested
before by the parties. The formal instrument, nonetheless, has proved
to be important.
204
Implementation costs and burden
As previously indicated, when the parties to an agreement are
developing countries, the costs and burdens involved are of special
relevance, due to the limited resources available on both sides.
Therefore, in order for any agreement to justify these burdens, the
costs should be proportionate to the benefits, and, for that reason, it
would be desirable that the provisions are as simple as possible,
concentrating on the exchange of information and technical
cooperation, before requiring ambitious commitments such as
mandatory notification and implementation of comity provisions.
The real importance of mandatory notification requirements and
of all other cooperation provisions is that they formally validate what
is already acknowledged by the agencies, i.e. that it is in their best
interests to cooperate. Therefore, one possibility would be to consider
in the initial stages of implementation of any agreement where a
developing country is involved, any existing notification provision
as mandatory only for the undeniably relevant cases for both
jurisdictions, while postponing a broader commitment to a later stage
when the parties have been trained to implement this aspect of the
agreement and are also ready to effectively begin coordinating
enforcement activities.
4.  Competition provisions within trade
agreements
The basis for competition agreements within trade agreements
is necessarily different from the competition cooperation agreements
referred to above: the main focus of the first type is to reduce trade
barriers and to promote convergence within the region. The trade-
off between costs and benefits of the agreements in this case is
therefore different. The entire set of benefits and concessions are to
be analysed in a wider sense, and concessions, benefits and burdens
are not limited to competition issues. The introduction of competition
policy in a country has effects on its economy and social welfare,
which is in itself burdensome, even though worthwhile.
Within a trade agreement, competition law and policy provisions
aim at guaranteeing that liberalization will not be undermined by
anti-competitive business practices within the member countries. To
accomplish this, it calls for the establishment of juridical and
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institutional coverage that proscribe anti-competitive practices and
the development of competition policy and regulations among and
within the countries. In contrast to cooperation agreements - that
have as a basic assumption the existence of competition agencies to
coordinate actions - it is possible that members of a trade agreement
do not even have competition law and an enforcement agency. This
is the case, for instance, in the current impasse in the negotiations of
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in which only 16 out of
the 34 countries have already established authorities. Due to this,
the first cornerstone of a competition agreement within a trade
agreement would be to require countries to adopt a sound competition
law and policy, as well as to establish an authority to enforce it under
a national treatment principle.
In those cases, the burdens and costs of competition law and
policy provisions are not limited to issues related to the
‘implementation’ of a cooperation agreement itself: the main
transformation would be the obligation to adopt competition law and
policy within its legal, political and economic framework.
As will be seen in the following sections, competition provisions
within trade agreements are not directly concerned with the day-to-
day enforcement activities and, thus, in most cases, are more generic
than cooperation agreements that encompass operational procedures
for coordinated enforcement. The situation would be different;
however, if the trade agreement aimed at the creation of a customs
union or a common market, as the eventual ingredients of
coordination may be needed if the markets of the different countries
are to be considered as a single one. Eventually, even supranational
issues and institutions would arise. Based on this, the analysis of this
set of trade agreements will be divided into two main categories:
competition provisions in Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements; and
competition provisions in customs unions.7
4.1  Competition provisions in FTA agreements
These agreements normally include principles aimed at the
establishment of a legal and institutional competition framework and
general provisions on cooperation among the parties. As the
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agreements are quite broad, there are usually no specific burdens for
those countries that already have competition law and authority, but
for those that do not, the costs are quite significant and depend on
the country’s evaluation on whether it will effectively want to
implement a competition policy system.
As mentioned, the main scope of competition provisions within
an FTA agreement is to avoid non-tariff barriers that could arise from
the lack of competition law enforcement. Notwithstanding, there are
usually no concerns about specific provisions of day-to-day
enforcement.
Competition provisions within FTA agreements may vary, as they
will depend on the existent competition framework within member
countries, but some common features may be identified: all member
countries must have a competition agency responsible for
enforcement of antitrust laws and each of these agencies must be
subject to independent domestic judicial review. In order to further
effective competition law and policy development, there are
provisions on voluntary cooperation among members, usually
accompanied by technical assistance, as in some countries
competition agencies are to be created and capacity to deal with such
a sophisticated issue needs to be built. Some other provisions that
are sometimes considered, such as in the case of the FTAA
negotiations, currently at an impasse, include the possibility of
creating a competition policy review mechanism, through which
effective peer review of a particular country’s adherence to the
competition chapter can monitor compliance. There is no consensus
as to dispute settlement provisions.
The United States has incorporated competition provisions in
its FTA agreements with Chile, Singapore and its partners of the North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Interestingly, there are no
such provisions on the US-Central America-Dominican Republic Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The ongoing trade negotiation
between the European Union and MERCOSUR also has a general
chapter on competition.
As mentioned, the burdens of each of these agreements will be
different for countries that already have a competition policy and
for those that have still to introduce it. Besides, it is worth mentioning
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that, when calculating costs and benefits, countries should be also
aware of some provisions that are intended to be part of the
competition chapters, but that might go beyond the necessary
provisions of such chapters. MERCOSUR, for instance, evaluated that
provisions regarding public monopolies and enterprises within the
negotiation of the FTAA agreement would be outside the scope of
the provisions that should be included in a competition section, as
well as perhaps being too burdensome, given that such commitment
might conflict with other domestic policies. However, as some
countries possibly understand that these provisions are acceptable,
they accept the inclusion of such provisions in some FTA agreements,
particularly in those signed by the US, as is the case of the NAFTA
and the Chile-US Agreement.
4.2  Competition provisions within customs union
agreements
The provisions included in customs union agreements are, in
general, more specific and demand higher commitments from the
parties, as they are necessary to implement the regional integration.
Competition provisions are quite often seen as a substitute for trade
policy instruments, as often happens with predatory pricing
mechanisms as opposed to anti-dumping mechanisms. Theoretically,
at least, this should be possible, based on the assumption that
members of customs unions are at similar levels of development and
that their institutional frameworks are analogous. However, it is not
necessarily the case that ambitious competition chapters included in
agreements within customs unions achieve the desired effects.
An interesting example to assess is the MERCOSUR experience.
Since the Asuncion Treaty in 1991, the parties to MERCOSUR had
agreed to the harmonization of their competition policies as a
necessary step towards the integration process. This ambitious target
led Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay to sign, in 1996, the
Fortaleza Protocol,  through which the countries committed
themselves to a common institutional framework to address
competition issues.
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The Protocol established that each party would have a
competition law that would apply to all sectors of the economy and
an autonomous competition agency to enforce it. As in a number of
other MERCOSUR provisions, the Protocol relies on cooperation
among members regarding the application of their respective laws
in cases with extraterritorial effects. There was, nonetheless, an
expectation that the framework would evolve, and that the Committee
for the Defense of Competition (CDC), which would comprise national
authorities that would take charge of intra-regional investigations,
would be created. However, this institutionalized body is still to be
established.
In addition to these features, there are also commitments
regarding the convergence of the domestic laws, in order to ensure
that the firms would abide by an analogous set of rules and thus
compete in similar conditions; as well as a schedule for the parties to
review other governmental policies that impair competition and
distort trade among member countries. Later in 2002, the members
signed the complementary Regulation to the Protocol and specified
these goals even more.8
However, despite the elaborate structure, and the informal
information exchange among authorities, the Protocol has not yet
been effectively implemented.  The reasons for this are two-fold. First,
and most importantly, to date, only Brazil and Argentina have a
competition law for both merger and conduct analysis, as well as
fully dedicated agencies.9 Second, the Protocol’s main focus is the
trade distortion aspect in intra-regional competition cases, instead
of the enforcement of competition law and policy (see Chapter 3 of
this publication by Holmes et al., which refers to the link between
anti-dumping measures and competition provisions). Due to these
limitations, MERCOSUR members observed in 2004 that it would be
necessary to revise the Fortaleza Protocol so as to reduce its burdens
and permit its implementation. A first step to address competition
policy within the region at this stage would be by means of a
cooperation agreement, (through which the parties that already had
laws and/or institutions could be required to enforce them, but that
would also include a structure for technical assistance projects aimed
at the countries that did not have such laws and/or institutions in
place.
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An interesting aspect related to the possibility of the application
of the domestic competition laws and that does not necessarily
depend on the implementation of the Fortaleza Protocol, is that based
on another Protocol signed in Ouro Preto in 1994, by which disputes
arising in any committee may be solved through a dispute settlement
mechanism. Until the beginning of 2004, these conflicts were decided
by ad hoc arbitration chambers that were formed to deal with specific
matters. Their decisions could then be appealed to the MERCOSUR
Trade Commission. Since last July, however, a permanent tribunal
was created, that could also, at least in theory, resolve competition
disputes among the parties. In practice, however, these mechanisms,
both old and new, could only be used in Argentina or Brazil.
In 2004, the MERCOSUR Trade Commission set a mandate for
the members to revise the Fortaleza Protocol, which has been
welcomed as a valuable opportunity to streamline its normative scope
with the current state of the domestic institutions and laws. The
Brazilian proposal encompasses basically four points:
1. To eliminate the focus on the trade distortion requirement for
the enforcement of intra-regional competition cases;
2. To redefine the role of the CDC (which due to the above-
mentioned reasons was never created) as a consultative body
instead of a decisive one;
3. To strengthen cooperation among parties in extra-territorial
investigations, both in merger and in anti-competitive cases,
whenever possible; and
4. To provide for technical assistance instruments in the Protocol,
such as those included in the Cooperation Agreement.
The purpose of the proposed measures is to allow MERCOSUR
countries to proceed with the substantive application of the domestic
laws in countries where they already exist, as well as to advocate the
adoption of such laws and their effective enforcement through
technical assistance projects. In this sense, Brazil and Argentina have
a very important role to perform, both through cooperation and
enforcement of their respective domestic laws, as well by promoting
technical assistance projects for Uruguay and Paraguay.
210
Implementation costs and burden
5. Conclusion
In light of these international competition agreement models,
countries should consider their needs so as to assess the costs involved
in assuming international competition obligations, which should
always be proportionate to the benefits. If costs seem too high, it
might be that in fact the model in not appropriate in the first place.
As detailed, cooperation is increasingly relevant and its effects
should be beneficial as long as the model is adequate so to ensure
that the costs do not outweigh the benefits. Considerations on costs
and benefits of obligations assumed within trade agreements,
however, are indeed very complex. Besides, different levels of
institutional competition development within countries will also
imply that there will be different issues needing to be assessed.
At this point, one may recall that many countries have historically
resisted the inclusion of competition issues within the WTO
framework, arguing that they would loose their ability to design their
own internal markets and industrial policies if obliged to implement
competition law. Some even suggested that national markets were
seen to be too small and this raised a desire to discriminate in favour
of national producers in order to gain international competitiveness.
They have also argued the existence of a capacity problem, due to
the legislative and administrative burden of introducing competition
law. Among others, they were also concerned that failure to comply
with WTO competition laws gives rise to trade sanctions (Drexl, 2004).
Overall, those arguments may eventually be considered by
countries when negotiating regional trade agreements, as the results
of such an agreement might have similar results to those that would
arise from a WTO framework. For this reason, a number of possible
forms of special and differential treatment for developing countries
may be incorporated into agreements to achieve a proper balance
between costs and benefits.
The costs and burdens of the agreements will vary depending
on the nature of the agreement and on the objective intended.
Therefore, the main challenge for any country assuming international
commitments related to competition law and policy is to enter into
agreements where the burdens do not exceed their potential
advantages.
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NOTES
1For a list of the United States bilateral  cooperation agreements see Department
of Justice, International Agreements, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/international/int_arrangements.htm
2For Brazil, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the
Secretariat of Economic Law Enforcement (SDE) in the Ministry of Justice;
the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE) in the Ministry of Finance.
For the United States of America, the United States Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission.
3Note that the difference between First and Second Generation Agreements does
not refer to the level of development of the parties involved, but to the
categories of the information exchanged.  It is interesting to observe that
not all countries with mature competition institutions necessarily prefer
Second Generation Agreements. As previously mentioned, the agreement
in place between the US agencies and the CE Directorate is a First Generation
Agreement, which does not allow for the exchange of confidential
information.
4See press release available at  http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/04/iaeaa.htm.
5On the US side, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of
Justice (US DOJ), and on the Australian side, the Australian Consumer and
Competition Commission (ACCC).
6Commission Notice (97/C 313/03); Official Journal C 313 of 15.10.1997.
7Common market agreements, such as the European Union model, will not be
included in this analysis since the antitrust analysis will be done as if the
member countries constitute one single market. Therefore, it would not be
adequate to refer to international cooperation as this framework would be
closer to a national competition law.
8The situation is as follows: the only country that has internalized both the
Protocol and its Regulation is Paraguay. Brazil has internalized the Protocol,
but not the Regulation or the Cooperation Agreement. Argentina has only
internalized the Cooperation Agreement and Uruguay has internalized none.
9Uruguay has some provisions to enforce anti-competitive conduct and has a
department in charge of conducting the investigations within the Ministry
of Commerce. In July 2005, a Competition Law Bill was sent to Congress,
concerning anti-competitive conduct provisions, but not merger reviews.
Paraguay has its draft Competition Law Bill ready to be sent to Congress,
concerning both anti-competitive conduct investigation and merger review.
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1. Introduction
The recognition of the existence of market failures and theirimportance is a fact. Market imperfections need to be addressedthrough appropriate regulatory policies and institutions.
Particularly, trade and competition policies focus on the supply side
of the markets by regulating firms behaviour, and by playing a capital
role in protecting consumers and firms from various forms of abuses
and barriers to market access and fair competition.
This Chapter examines the case for an effective consumer
protection policy within bilateral and regional trade agreements
(RTAs). It identifies two main rationales for including consumer
protection provisions in cross-border cooperation arrangements.
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Firstly, in the need to complement competition provisions with
appropriate mechanisms to ensure that consumers are able to respond
appropriately and effectively within global markets. The second is
based on the requirements for stronger inter-governmental
cooperation agreements in dealing with the greater potential for cross-
border deceptive practices that now exists within global markets.
In the first section, the Chapter examines the argument that
consumer protection law and policy are necessary tools for addressing
market imperfections as they impact on consumers. It discusses how
the objective of consumer policy is to ensure that consumers are kept
informed about markets for goods and services in such a way that
their purchasing decisions contribute to the overall functioning of
competitive markets. And, where necessary, to protect the consumer
when their position in the market is not strong enough to allow them
to play this role.
The subsequent section expands upon the argument that whilst
protecting consumers, it is also clear that there are cases where
consumer protection regimes can protect and promote competition.
In such cases, there is therefore a positive convergence between
competition law objectives, consumer protection and economic
efficiency. The chapter then examines the argument that, as such,
consumer protection should be mainstreamed into competition policy
and other trade policies in order to ensure the best overall outcomes
for consumers while paying due regard to ensuring that these
measures are targeted appropriately, and do not become unnecessary
barriers to achieving healthy markets and economic growth.
In the third section, the chapter assesses the need for consumer
protection provisions to deal with cross-border market imperfections
and deceptive practices. It examines existing expressions of the
emergence of these requirements at the inter-governmental level, such
as the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection,1 the OECD initiatives
of the Consumer Protection Committee and the OECD 2003
Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive
Commercial Practices Across Borders,2 and, the International
Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network (ICPEN).3
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The fourth section assesses both the present and potential role
of bilateral cooperation agreements and RTAs to serve as appropriate
vehicles for enhancing both consumer protection and competition.
It identifies relevant provisions of the EU Directive on Injunctions
for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests; EU Regulation 2006/2004
on Consumer Protection Cooperation, the US-Australia Free Trade
Agreement, and the EU-ACP Cotonou Framework Agreement, with
the aim of presenting an overview of the extent to which RTAs can
offer consumer protection, either discreetly or together with
competition policy provisions.
The Chapter goes on to surmise from this examination that
bilateral and multilateral arrangements can address issues of
information sharing, mutual assistance and judgment recognition and
enforcement in cross-border trade. The authors argue that economic
development requires both the demand for and supply of competitive
markets, and this necessitates the integration of complementary
elements of consumer protection law and policy into competition
regimes. Further, stronger mechanisms of inter-governmental
cooperation are also required to address the increasing volume and
impact of cross-border deceptive practices effectively to protect both
consumers and markets.
The authors conclude that there is therefore both a strong
economic case and an existing legal model for including elements of
consumer protection either discreetly or in conjunction with the
competition provisions within RTAs. Integrating elements of
consumer protection into competition policy and other trade policies
at bilateral or regional level can help to ensure the dynamic of
empowered consumers while ensuring consumer protection measures
do not become barriers to international trade and that they are
consistent with international trade obligations. It could further be
argued that there is no overriding rationale for excluding consumer
protection within bilateral and regional agreements. Even where
problems currently exist in implementing effective consumer
protection domestically, the inclusion of consumer protection within
these agreements can add momentum to its implementation at
national level.
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2. The case for consumer protection
It is widely accepted that all markets have imperfections and
that robust regulation and independent regulators are necessary
features of healthy market economies. Imperfections emerge on both
the supply (producer) side and the demand (consumer) side of the
marketplace. Trade and competition policies focus on the supply side
and regulate the behaviour of firms. This will include identifying
and removing barriers to entry, cartels and monopolies, and other
restrictive business practices, along with investigating mergers and
acquisitions.
This form of regulation addresses market failures and can work
to protect both consumers and other firms operating in the market
to the benefit of economic growth and wealth creation. It cannot
however directly address demand-side market imperfections caused
by asymmetrical information,4 misleading advertising or deception,
for example. The main policy instruments developed to address these
imperfections fall within the remit of consumer protection policies
and law.
Consumer protection regimes are made up of both legislation
and the core institutions which make the consumer policy framework.
While differing in the degree of enforcement and consumer behaviour,
all these regimes try to address similar difficulties facing domestic
consumers. These include ensuring safety of products and services,
adequate information and redress, in addition to preventing
unconscionable, deceptive or incompetent business activities.
Consumer protection contributes to sustainable economic
development in three main ways. Firstly and most clearly, safe
products and standards not only reduce health costs to the nation,
but they contribute to the well-being and reliability of the entire
workforce and therefore economic productivity. Secondly, once firms
have made commitments to adhere to consumer protection policies,
product development or innovation will be tailored to beating the
competition through satisfying consumer needs, not lowering quality.
Thirdly, consumer protection policies can empower consumers. And
as discussed in Section 3, analysts such as Porter5 have stressed the
role that discerning consumers can play in provoking competition
between firms and innovation by them. Conversely, undemanding
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consumers provide little impetus to suppliers to improve their
products, services, delivery times, reliability, and so on.
The UK’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 2005 consumer
strategy includes wide-ranging objectives to deliver social justice,
economic and environmental progress; and addresses the linkages
between consumer protection policies and economic and sustainable
development. It focuses on consumer empowerment as an aspect of
functioning markets:
• Consumers are equipped with the skills, knowledge, information
and confidence to exercise their rights to get a good deal
• Strong consumer advocacy exists at the general policy-making level
and in special cases
• Consumers have access to appropriate and convenient sources of
advice and redress, including effective alternative dispute
resolution (ADR)
• Consumer rights are proportionate, balanced with responsibilities,
and clear and simple enough to be well understood
• Consumers are able to understand the impacts of their own
consumption decisions on our shared environmental and social
well-being
• Vulnerable consumers are protected without placing undue
restraints on markets overall
• Enforcement is fair, consistent, effective and proportionate
• Markets are regarded as fair by both consumers and business6
Whatever the scope of the strategy, all consumer protection
regimes will have a body of law underpinning transactions and
contracts within the marketplace. The variations among legal
frameworks covering consumer protection lie in three main areas.
One is the extent of their reliance on basic contract law, as in the UK,
where the Sale of Goods Acts provides parties to contracts with basic
rights when undertaking transactions. Secondly, the extent to which
consumer protection is built around broad duties or prohibitions,
such as within the US Federal Trade Commission Act (Section 5)
where ‘unfair or deceptive practices are declared unlawful’ or
alternatively is a collection of legislation.7 Thirdly, legal frameworks
will differ to the extent of, and manner in which, legislation allows
various parties to obtain redress.
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By putting consumer protection measures into national
legislation, governments are aiming for more than meeting officially
defined, legitimate needs of domestic consumers. There is also an
understanding that effective consumer protection, accessible
information and redress are essential components of a thriving market
economy and an important factor in promoting competitiveness.
This understanding became apparent at an inter-governmental
level in the 1970s, when the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) recognized that consumer protection had an important
bearing on economic and social development. And further, that an
international policy framework was needed to provide general
guidance and specific objectives on consumer protection, addressing
the particular needs of developing countries. As a result, in 1985 UN
Guidelines on Consumer Protection were adopted, and expanded
upon in 1999 to include areas of sustainable consumption, by
consensus among 150 governments.8 The Guidelines form an
internationally agreed statement of laws necessary for consumer
protection, of good practice in their implementation, and of other
action needed to promote consumer rights. The legitimate needs,
which the Guidelines are intended to meet, are the following: 
• The protection of consumers from hazards to their health and
safety
• The promotion and protection of the economic interests of
consumers
• Access of consumers to adequate information to enable them to
make informed choices according to individual wishes and
needs
• Consumer education, including education on the environmental,
social and economic impacts of consumer choice
• Availability of effective consumer redress
• Freedom to form consumer and other relevant groups or
organizations and the opportunity of such organizations to
present their views in decision-making processes affecting them
• The promotion of sustainable consumption patterns
Fully implemented within a domestic legal system, the Guidelines
provide a basic framework of protection, advice and support to enable
consumers to operate confidently and effectively in a market economy.
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In 2005, consumer protection laws and policies are commonplace
in developed countries and increasingly apparent in legislation in
developing and transitional economies. In Latin America, all countries
except Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia9 have consumer
laws. In central and eastern Europe, a wide range of consumer
legislation has been introduced, as in the more developed economies
in Asia, although less so Africa. Success in implementing robust
consumer protection regimes has been variable. Although two UN
ECOSOC monitoring surveys undertaken a decade after the adoption
of the Guidelines indicated that the Guidelines had been of some
success in influencing national policies about the management of
consumption as well as about laws to protect consumers.10
However, the monitors also reported that there had been much
less emphasis on promoting consumer awareness, through education
and information, in order to develop pressure for competitiveness
through consumer choice and preference, and on increasing the
participation of consumers in decisions which affect their interests.
These findings support the growing opinion that while trade and
competition laws and policies play an important role in promoting
economic efficiency, in order to activate competition between firms
consumers must also be able and willing to exercise their market
power. Lack of adequate consumer protection presents an obstacle
to the achievement of healthy, competitive markets as well as healthy
consumers.11 Therefore, competition provisions per se often cannot
guarantee all the benefits deriving from fair competition: an
integrated approach to competition and consumer policy is the
optimal way required for dealing with both the supply (firms) and
the demand side (consumers) of markets.
3. The case for complementary consumer and
competition regimes
Experience has shown that firms tend to avoid or minimize
competition rather than encourage it. Competition authorities are
primarily concerned with policies focusing upon rules and
procedures to prevent anti-competitive practices, dominance or abuse
of dominance, the reduction of barriers to entry and/or facilitating
optimal conditions with the aim of improving economic efficiency
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and therefore the opportunity for growth and wealth generation. It
is taken for granted within nearly all developed market economies
that competition law and policy inherently contributes to a greater
degree of ‘balance’ between the rights of producers and the protection
provided for consumers and other members of society.
This same balance is also beginning to be recognized in the
growing number of bilateral competition cooperation agreements
between countries and the many RTAs that now contain facilities for
promoting cooperation between agencies seeking to address cross-
border restrictive business practices and related antitrust issues.
However, the mainstreaming of complementary consumer policy
into competition policy provisions to ensure a healthy demand side
to markets has not, with a few notable exceptions, caught up with
these policy developments. This can cause markets to behave in a
dysfunctional manner, despite removing barriers to entry and other
restrictive business practices. As an example, Slovenia’s competition
law and policy were motivated by the prospects of EU accession.
The necessary legal framework and apparatus for the execution of
the EU antitrust regulation and regulation of state aid was introduced
in the 1990s. This was undertaken, however, without a complementary
consumer policy.
The detrimental consequences of this oversight, to both markets
and consumers, were highlighted in the Slovenian freight
transportation sector.12 Cut-throat price competition reduced
transport prices dramatically but due to an absence of a
complementary consumer policy, there was little legislation regulating
the providers’ behaviour or the quality of service and, consequently,
resulted in a deterioration in transport safety. Liberalization without
complementary consumer protection ultimately had a negative
impact on both the industry and consumer demand in both Slovenia
and the surrounding transit countries.13 This could have been
addressed by the incorporation of consumer protection provisions
within the same regional agreement that motivated Slovenia to
introduce competition policy initially.
Indeed, more recent developments in the EC 2002-2006 Consumer
Policy Strategy do indicate a decision to integrate consumer interests
more tangibly into the implementation of internal Community
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competition rules. The three stated objectives of the strategy are: (i)
a high common level of consumer protection, (ii)  effective
enforcement of consumer protection rules, and (iii) the involvement
of consumer organizations in EU policies in order to maximize the
benefits of the single market for consumers and to prepare for
enlargement.14 This regional policy focuses directly on the cross-
border demand side, seeking information and evidence about
practices that may be particularly injurious to EC consumers, but
where competitors can avoid being injured due to their capacity to
pass the costs of restrictions to the ultimate consumers. As discussed
further below, among the others, Australia, the US and the UK have
also maintained this more integrated approach.
Indeed, it is increasingly accepted that unless consumers are well
informed, able and willing to make choices including switching from
established suppliers, and to use redress and other mechanisms to
protect them from abuse, markets will not be inherently efficient,
competitive or able to serve consumers. Consumers activate
competition when they send the correct market signals via informed
and rational choices in the marketplace. How consumers search the
market, how many firms they survey before making decisions, and
how much they will spend (in time or money) to search the market
are important factors in triggering competition between firms. Allied
to this is the consideration of how they respond to products and prices
offered in the market – whether they switch firms, whether they make
formal complaints, or seek redress if necessary.
Waterson’s work (2003a, 2003b) on the role of consumers in
competition and competition policy provided propositions to
demonstrate the importance of searching and switching costs for the
outcome in a market. For example, if each consumer searches only
one firm prior to the purchase decision, the pricing outcome is at the
monopoly level regardless of the number of firms in the market. Thus,
the higher the proportion of active searchers, all other things being
equal, the greater the proportion of low-cost firms, with searchers
also imparting information to non-searchers. Waterson also argued
that in firms where no discrimination between new and old customers
is feasible, firms’ prices are generally higher with switching costs
than in their absence. This indicates the value of understanding what
can facilitate consumers in making rational and informed market
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decisions, and in doing so trigger effective competition in the
marketplace.15
The implications of the behaviour of consumers are wide ranging.
Consumers will only engage in additional searches if the expected
benefits are greater than the costs. Yet the consequence of this is that
if consumers believe it is not worthwhile searching a market, it will
not be worthwhile because firms will get signals that they do not
have to compete in order to gain customers. Conversely, if consumers
believe searching is going to be worthwhile, it will probably be so
because informed and active consumers seeking out cheaper
provisions of a standard good or service will send firms signals they
will respond to by reducing prices and/or improving quality.
The European internal market and the single European currency
are expressions of the positive complementarity of policies aimed at
enhancing both the supply and the demand for competition at the
regional level. European integration is seen as adding to transparency
and therefore competitiveness on a regional level. Within competition
policy debates, improved price transparency is typically viewed as
promoting competition if it affects the consumer side of the market.
Anderson and Renaults’ analysis of price competition when
consumers have to search for prices and product characteristics
further indicated that market prices rise with search costs, while
Bester and Petrakis concluded that increased market transparency
through advertising is also typically shown to lead to increased
competition and lower prices.16
While it cannot be assumed that consumers will be able to serve
competition well, neither can it be taken for granted that competition
will necessarily serve consumers well. Sylvan (2004), for example,
has noted that there is a mistaken perception that wide choice
automatically confers consumer benefits and consequently the
conditions for exercising choice are neglected. Markets for financial
services, second-hand goods and construction services, for example,
may present such severe information problems that consumers are
unable to exercise sound choices. Whether or not competition benefits
consumers or the economy will therefore depend on factors including
the stance and effectiveness of complementary consumer policy.17
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Research undertaken on the Indonesian competition regime
indicated that the laws had been incompletely formulated, with a
lack of clarity between the desired ends and differing means available
to achieve a specific objective. In this case, the Prohibition of
Monopoly and Unfair Business Competition Practices Law (2000) set
an arbitrarily maximum market share limit as a benchmark for fair
competition. This limit ignored issues such as the fact that large-
scale firms do not automatically have market power if the markets in
which they operate have no barriers to entry or exit, and that these
larger firms might reap the benefits of economies of scale and
increased research and development, to the betterment of both
markets and consumers. Rather than prohibiting monopolistic
enterprises, laws would have been more effective if they both focused
on ‘harmful’ monopolistic conduct and also specified the various
types of anti-competitive business practice most detrimental to the
goal of fair and open competition that enhances consumer welfare.18
Indeed, Sylvan’s work indicated that while an intervention to
prevent a hard-core cartel has both a clear consumer empowerment
and increased competition outcome, such win-win outcomes for
competition interventions are not assured. In the case of a complex
industry, the information available may simply not be enough to
translate into consumers exercising effective choices even in a highly
competitive market. Similarly, consumer protection actions may not
enhance competition because they may be inappropriately rigid and
stifle innovation.19 An area such as transparency is also inherently
complex. While price transparency lowers consumer-searching costs
and sends more indicative signals to firms about consumer choice, it
is also understood that improving market transparency can produce
anti-competitive effects on the producer side of the market, through
facilitating tacit collusion. The overall effect of improving market
transparency in an undifferentiated manner across all markets would
be of uncertain benefit to both consumers and competition.20
The crucial point that emerges from this body of work is that
without an integrated approach to effecting competitive markets, the
good intentions of both competition agencies (to prevent collusion,
for example) and the consumer protection agencies (to increase price
transparency, for example) could overall prove to be detrimental to
both markets and consumers. Within an integrated approach, any
trade-offs between consumer protection or empowerment and
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competition outcomes will be made within the context of assessing
the overall effectiveness of the outcomes of the different possible
interventions. That is, any consideration of the health of the market
will be based on both competition and consumer outcomes. Thus, in
the case of Slovenia, noted above, the strong price competition – up
to a 26 per cent drop in the cost of some cross-border freight routes –
that followed liberalization in the transport sector was accompanied
by an unacceptable deterioration in safety and quality of the market.
This could not have been taken up by the competition agency because
consumer protection regulation had not been integrated into the
competition regime or in this case within government policy.
If competition agencies are to implement a successful regime,
they need to monitor developments in both firm and consumer
behaviour which will affect the levels of competition in a given
market. A study of the performance of competition agencies
undertaken by Kovacic on behalf of the OECD (Kovacic, 2005) noted,
further, that fuller disclosure and analysis of outcomes of competition
policy will likely stimulate public discussion that, in the long run,
will improve the quality of competition policy. The social benefit of
channelling resources toward activities with the strongest
contributions to improving consumer welfare outweighs the
immediate costs of reputational discomfort to the competition
agency.21
Competition can only be ensured through sound regulation and
a vigorous regulator of both the supply of and the demand for
competition. When governments choose to implement laws which
focus on promoting rivalry, or by eliminating excessive divergence
from an industry structure, the outcomes can and should be enhanced
by increasing the impact of consumer behaviour that sends rational
signals to the market and triggers competition between firms. The
manner in which competition agencies operate is a significant factor
in determining whether competition benefits both consumers and
sustainable economic development.
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3.1  Institutional settings
While policies to ensure a healthy demand for competition are
clearly of direct relevance within the terrain of competition laws and
policies, the most direct form of demand-side competition policy is
actually that of consumer protection law; and this falls within the
remit of national consumer protection agencies. In countries such as
Australia, the US, Poland and the UK, the complementarity of
competition and consumer policy is well recognized and
institutionalized through joint agencies and laws. This establishes
consumer policy on a more equal basis with other government trade
policies. In the US and Australia, the profile of consumer policy is
higher within government and this seems to influence the allocation
of resources and the overlapping of institutions and powers
responsible for consumer policy, but particularly as it also relates to
competition and competition policy.
The US Fair Trade Commission (FTC) serves as an example of a
long-standing joint agency approach to consumer protection and
competition policy. Organized with a separate bureau for advertising
practices, enforcement, financial practices, marketing practices,
planning & information, international consumer protection and
consumer and business education, the agency is responsible for the
enforcement of the respective federal laws for consumer protection
and competition, and also for those laws which cover both areas.
From the FTC, ‘joint’ laws include the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which empowers the agency to ‘prevent unfair methods of
competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.22 Administration of the FTC is organized by regional
offices which operate for both consumer and competition areas.
Australia represents a highly integrated example where the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is
responsible for administering and enforcing the harmonized
competition and consumer protection regime established by the Trade
Practices Act (1974). This Act deals with almost all aspects of the
marketplace involving the relationships between suppliers,
wholesalers, retailers, competitors and customers. It therefore
includes elements of unfair market practices, industry codes, mergers
and acquisitions of companies, product safety, product labelling, price
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monitoring, and the regulation of specific industries such as gas,
electricity, telecommunications and airports.
Consumer protection agencies, particularly in developing
countries, are more often single agencies that tend to be under-
resourced. They are also under-represented in other areas of trade
and development policy, however complementary these may appear
to be. There is much research to indicate that consumer protection
has been poorly implemented, particularly in many developing
countries.23 Asymmetric information and an absence of legal redress
by consumers are just a few of the problems faced by consumers in
the newly liberalized markets, which will directly impact on the
development of competitive markets. And differences in the
organization of competition and consumer protection agencies within
national governments will  influence the development and
enforcement capacity of complementary policies to ensure that both
consumers and firms benefit from trade.
The ongoing challenges faced by many developing and newly
liberalizing economies in implementing effective consumer protection
policies at national level, either within competition agencies or
independently, would appear not to augur well for transposing these
frameworks to the regional or cross-border level. However, as the
following section will discuss, there is reason to believe that the
benefits of integrating consumer protection policies into other trade
and competition policies may be too important to sideline within the
proliferation of RTAs.
4. The case for regional cooperation in consumer
protection
The expansion of cross-border trade presents regulatory
challenges for any government. To support free trade, governments
prescribe that positive regulatory steps should be taken to ensure
minimum regional standards or the recognition of their trade
partners’ legal enactments. These activities necessarily require
resources and governments are advised to ensure that the benefits of
new regulations outweigh the costs of implementing them.
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When governments commit themselves to regional regulatory
initiatives, they are choosing to prioritize from among a larger group
of internal considerations, some, but not all, of which will be related
to trade and cross-border commerce. RTAs reflect policy priorities
when high political expression is used to enact a treaty in order to
realize designated common objectives. Whether between developed
or developing countries, or a mix of the two, these treaty-based
activities seem to raise the profile and credibility of the domestic
agencies responsible. And in some cases, they draw capacity-building
resources and transfer of technical know-how from one country
agency to another. Participation in an agreement can make feasible
internal reforms that are beneficial for the country and desired by its
government, but might otherwise be successfully resisted by interest
groups.24
There is no final word on why some regulatory areas are chosen
by major trading partners rather than others. It is clear that areas
supporting market access receive attention, including customs
procedures, product standards and competition law, with the
emphasis and the style of regulatory approach depending upon the
country partners involved. For competition, the absence of
multilateral rules in the trading system may be fostering the inclusion
of these provisions in RTAs.25 Competition cooperation regimes are
becoming more the norm than the exception in RTAs, perhaps
recognizing the long-understood linkage between restrictive business
practices and market access. There is some indication that regional
competition cooperation provisions also show evolution, or at least
some tailoring to the specific circumstances of the member countries.
This is itself the development of state practice, and together with the
growing number of agency-to-agency agreements, patterns of
cooperation could be discerned that may inform multilateral efforts
in the future.
These competition arrangements in RTAs are based on the general
principle that the economic welfare gains expected to materialize from
the liberalization of trade can be undermined by cross-border anti-
competitive practices. Domestic firms can collude to prohibit
competitor entry, exporting firms can combine to raise prices
following a tariff cut, or divide the regional market amongst
themselves. While free trade declarations may eliminate government
trade barriers over time, firms can and do respond to any new
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competitive pressures by seeking to maintain or re-segment the
national market through the use of private barriers to trade – or other
anti-competitive practices.
While the complementary nature of trade and competition
agreements has progressively developed, there has been far less
attention given to the complementary role that consumer policy plays
in cross-border agreements. This at a time when domestic agencies
increasingly acknowledge their inability to identify the legislative and
enforcement gaps in cross-border consumer protection, particularly
in e-commerce, but also for other cross-border deceptive practices,
scams, and spam. There is an awareness by firms and governments
that discrepancies among national consumer protection laws may
produce a lack of consumer confidence to participate in cross-border
transactions. This would tend to harm smaller and medium-sized
businesses from offering their products abroad. The harmonization
of consumer protection rules, or perhaps modes of effective cross-
border cooperation between agencies and redress by consumers,
could therefore increase transnational commerce in consumer goods.  
The need to move to the international plane by national consumer
protection agencies is expressed by organizations and bodies such
as the OECD Committee on Consumer Protection and the ICPEN
network of agencies. These bodies are working to prevent and redress
consumer problems connected with cross-border transactions in both
goods and services.26  Here there exists the same territorial and
jurisdictional issues familiar to anyone who has examined the
rationale for cross-border competition policy cooperation. Domestic
agencies may have little or no basis to act against domestic entities
causing market injury to consumers outside the country, even while
successful recourse may be obtainable by the domestic consumer for
the same practice. Likewise, agencies may have no clear authority or
capacity to take action against entities located or conducting business
from outside the domestic territory when practices are targeted or
transacted with the domestic consumers.
At a national level, there is a very limited ability to enforce
injunctions and/or cease-and-desist orders to provide consumer
protection to the public across national borders. There is also limited
ability to enforce money judgments for monetary redress for groups
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of consumers, where assets are located, or moved, across national
borders.
Technology has rapidly dictated a more global approach to
consumer protection. Consumer agencies introduced by laws to
address domestic ‘door-to-door’ consumer problems are attempting
now to respond to cross-border e-mail spam and spyware invasions.
The traditional laws protecting consumers against deceptive practices
are often broad enough to respond to this global marketplace, but an
agency’s own territorial reach is limited.27 Cooperation agreements
can help extend this reach, de jure or de facto, by providing the
frameworks to encourage or require coordination.
Just as multilateral UN and OECD Guidelines set out broader
objectives and patterns for competition cooperation, which were then
modelled for bilateral and regional approaches, one would expect to
see some similar course of development take place for consumer
protection. For cooperation, some of the broader building blocks are
already in place.
4.1  Inter-governmental sources and references for cross-
border cooperation in consumer protection
The first instrument that forms the basis for international
cooperation is the aforementioned United Nations Guidelines for
Consumer Protection.28 Besides identifying the legitimate needs of
consumers, as outlined above, the Guidelines also encourage
international cooperation, especially on a regional and sub-regional
context to develop systems for exchange of information, to cooperate
in implementation of consumer protection policies, to improve
conditions for the offering of essential goods, to develop information
links for banned or restricted products, to seek to eliminate
detrimental variations of product quality and information, to transmit
environmentally sound technologies, to promote capacity building
for sustainable consumption, and to promote consumer education.
This sets out a broad field of activities that reflects some trade
interests but with the consumer in mind. Given the time of its drafting,
there is not such an explicit reference to the modern cross-border
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deceptive practices. There is some attention given to consumer
education, but not an express linkage between consumer protection
and the functioning of competitive markets. Both of these aspects
are a more contemporary basis for international cooperation than
the Guidelines expressly recognize. However, they serve to identify
the core areas of information exchange, cooperation in
implementation, and capacity building that would be appropriate
and realizable within either a bilateral cooperation agreement or an
RTA.
A more recent and specific point of international reference is the
OECD 2003 Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent
and Deceptive Commercial Practices Across Borders.29 Resulting from
a 1999 Recommendation,30 Members are encouraged to
cooperate at the international level, as appropriate, through
information exchange, co-ordination, communication and
joint action to combat cross-border fraudulent, misleading and
unfair commercial conduct.
This should be read to be encouraging agency-to-agency
cooperation in particular cases and practices, a form of cooperation
also seen in a number of competition agreements. A second concern
in the Guidelines differs somewhat from the competition policy
pattern of practice, where ‘governments, businesses, consumers and
their representatives should devote special attention to the
development of effective cross-border redress systems’. This reflects
consumer protection law in its more ‘private international’ law
domain where single or collective action is taken under domestic
law in order to obtain a remedy by either injunctive relief (conduct
remedy) and/or by award of money damages.
As introduced above, the Guidelines were generated from the
realization that consumer protection systems are inherently domestic
and based historically on the common residence of the perpetrator
and the victim, and that this is no longer reflective of the situation of
consumers in the global marketplace.31
The more specific objectives and acts of cooperation identified
by the Guidelines include the following:
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• Establishing a domestic system for combating cross-border
fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices against
consumers
• Enhancing notification, information sharing, and investigative
assistance
• Improving the ability to protect foreign consumers from domestic
businesses engaged in fraudulent and deceptive commercial
practices
• Improving the ability to protect domestic consumers from foreign
businesses engaged in fraudulent and deceptive commercial
practices
• Considering how to ensure effective redress for victimized
consumers, and cooperating with relevant private sector entities.
Although both the areas of agency coordination and judicial/
private redress are raised, there is more detail presented on agency
aspects with emphasis on notification, information sharing and
investigation assistance. The area redress would lead to
considerations of accommodating foreign consumers pleading within
the territory of the respondent firms, but also after judgment, then
the recognition of such judgments in other territories. These activities
require treaties of recognition of foreign judgments for which now
there is little in the way of a multilateral platform for the consumer
protection area.32
These questions of cross-border collections arise even as a
number of countries have adopted consumer organization rights to
bring claims on behalf of larger groupings. These actions can go
forward in domestic courts according to certain traditional
jurisdictional principles of obtaining power over the non-resident
defendant firms. However, enforcement or collection out of country
would, if not facilitated, pose a major barrier to the viability of
developing private rights of action in cross-border cases.
4.2 Positive integration
What the above indicates is that while the members to an RTA
may take integration steps by eliminating the trade and regulatory
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barriers for commerce between the markets, the need necessarily
arises for some ‘positive’ regulatory cooperation (integration) as well.
This would allow consumers to pursue remedies across the larger
defined market, just as firms are able to operate lawfully (and
unfortunately unlawfully) across this larger market as well.
Thus, cooperation or RTAs, including reciprocal recognition of
domestic court judgments, could be viewed as facilitating the type
of cooperation suggested by the OECD Guidelines, albeit at a
somewhat advanced level.
Those elements dealing with agency-to-agency relationships are
more familiar to the template of cooperation already found in many
RTAs for competition law policy provisions. For consumer protection,
the OECD Guidelines provide a fairly sharp list of the types of
problems that an agency faces in a globalized marketplace, but
perhaps even more so in a regional trade environment, where free
trade in goods and some services trade is being established by the
elimination of governmental barriers.
For agencies, the location of wrongdoers can be extremely
difficult to determine. They can operate in concert from more than
one territory. They can use ‘corporate shells’ in various territories,
moving their operations or marketing to different territories over
time. They can use a wide variety of facilities over many jurisdictions,
including product suppliers, Internet services, banks, credit card
processors, and call and data processing centres. Increasingly,
investigations of cross-border fraudulent and deceptive commercial
practices will depend upon evidence that is transient, such as
information from computer systems and networks.
The variety of methods to avoid a distinct jurisdictional presence
for the purpose of agency control appears to be nearly endless. It
would seem that the ability to create false jurisdictional shells would
exceed the capacity of even a well-prioritized and resourced single
domestic agency. This point alone suggests a stronger cooperative or
joint response, which is what the OECD Guidelines also conclude:
D. Member countries and their consumer protection
enforcement agencies should make use of existing
international networks and enter into appropriate bilateral
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or multilateral arrangements or other initiatives to implement
these Guidelines.
Bilateral and regional agreements are examined below. For now,
it can be noted that if these corporate shells can be operated regionally,
they can also be operated ‘out of region’ as well. While a free trade
agreement (FTA) may allow for easier cross-border transmission of
goods and services, it also may raise the opportunities for cross-
border deceptive practices as well. In this environment, the ‘region’
is also not a closed system. This suggests that even while bilateral or
regional approaches move forward, that there is a strong argument
for an operative and broader international cooperation.
A primary arena for this is the International Consumer Protection
and Enforcement Network (ICPEN), established by consumer
protection agencies from 29 countries (now about 40) to facilitate
formal and informal communication and cooperation for systemic
issues as well as mutual assistance on particular cases. As an aspect
of these activities, reference is made to a 2000 study undertaken by
the International Marketing Supervision Network (IMSN) regarding
cross-border remedies.33 The territorial jurisdictional problems
confronting both agencies and systems of redress are clearly
identified:
• Some IMSN members lack authority to take action or enforce
decisions taken against domestic entities that market only to
consumers outside that member ’s country, and for some
members the existence of that authority is unclear.
• Some IMSN members lack authority to take action or enforce
decisions taken against entities located or conducting business
from outside that member ’s country, even if they target or
transact with consumers within that member’s country.
• These limitations create enforcement gaps in the abilities of IMSN
members to collectively protect consumers in IMSN countries.
The potential options also identified to address these issues also
outline in greater detail what activities would fall within a
comprehensive cooperation scheme:
• review of current limitations on the authority of IMSN members
to share information and cooperate with other enforcement
agencies; 
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• bilateral and multilateral arrangements respecting information
sharing and mutual assistance;
• bilateral and multilateral arrangements respecting judgment
recognition and enforcement;
• measures providing that IMSN members are not prevented from
enforcing laws prohibiting unfair or deceptive marketing
practices against a domestic business simply because that
business has transacted with or targeted only foreign consumers;
• measures providing that IMSN members are not prevented from
enforcing laws prohibiting unfair or deceptive marketing
practices against a business that has transacted with or targeted
domestic consumers simply because it is not a domestic
business.   
When examining developments in interstate cooperation
agreements, the list above is helpful in suggesting some benchmarks
to evaluate the facial effectiveness of the provisions examined.
5. Bilateral agency-to-agency cooperation
In spite of the clear identification of the problems generated by
cross-border trade for consumer protection agencies and consumer
complainants, the cooperation response in both agency-to-agency
agreements and RTAs is preliminary and incomplete. Only a handful
of countries have begun to develop cooperation and appear to be
active in initiating such agreements. These are the beginnings of state-
to-state practice that will likely develop over time.
Regarding agency-to-agency cooperation, this chapter has
already discussed how competition policy objectives are
complemented and the goal of competitive markets made more
complete by consumer protection law and policies. This leads to an
interesting similarity also in the mechanisms adopted by agencies to
establish cooperation. By adapting the common competition
cooperation format for consumer protection, the resulting pattern
would include:
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• definitions of consumer protection, reference to applicable
domestic laws and agencies;
• references to existing multilateral (and OECD) instruments;
• clauses permitting or requiring notification to the other agency of
investigation and case developments, changes in laws, consumer
protection activities, and so on;
• request and response provisions for information leading to the
possible investigation or enforcement of one domestic law
against the firms of the other member;
• confidentiality provisions; and
• provisions for occasional meetings, technical assistance, and
review of the agreement.
This template is so comparable to competition policy agreements,
with an additional point of reference to consumer protection, that
competition provisions and consumer protection provisions can be
drafted in the same or a similar parallel agreement.
This is evident in the few examples dealing with joint agencies
responsible for both competition and consumer protection. As noted,
Australia has a joint agency and is also active in forming agreements
for competition policy and consumer protection. This combined
approach in a single document is found in its agreements with Papua
New Guinea (PNG) (1999) and with South Korea (2002). The latter is
most explicit as it is entitled, ‘Regarding the Application of their
Competition and Consumer Protection Laws’. The agreement with
PNG states that its purpose is to promote cooperation and
coordination in the application of the countries’ competition and
consumer protection laws. In these cases, both countries are working
with joint agencies, so the inclusion of competition and consumer
protection in the single agreement would seem most advantageous,
it not rather obvious. Indeed, it would seem stranger if the joint
agencies initiated an agreement that deliberately included one of the
fields but not the other.
Although the US also has a combined agency in the Federal Trade
Commission, the Australia-US Agreement (2000) is not structured
along this pattern of a single agreement. Here, there are separate
agency-to-agency agreements for both fields of competition and
consumer protection. It may well be that the specialized legal regimes
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governing competition cooperation in the United States are a factor
in establishing a separate agreement for that subject area.34
What is more remarkable about the Australia-US Agreement is
that it does contain some decidedly strong language on notification,
and apparently without the necessity of requests being made by the
other country. Thus, ‘the parties intend to assist one another and to
cooperate on a reciprocal basis in providing or obtaining evidence
that could assist in determining whether a person has violated or is
about to violate their respective Consumer Protection Laws’ (Article
II.C). The parties also agree that their ‘staff’ shall use their best efforts
to inform each other about violations occurring in the territory of
the other party or that affect consumers or markets in the other
territory. (Article II.D). Although subject (of course) to the strict
confidentiality provisions which will necessarily limit the information
that can be communicated, these two provisions do demonstrate a
style of notification approach that is intended to be proactive (no
requesting necessary) and which may also contemplate assistance in
those cases where the informing agency’s consumers are not so
directly affected by the practice or the case at issue.35
The Australia agreements with PNG and South Korea have softer
notification provisions. They are, however, noteworthy in that they
apply identical provisions to both competition and consumer
protection. This appears to be more in the manner of a traditional
comity provision, although one might stretch the interpretation to
find some more active cross-border possibilities as well. As such,
each party agrees to notify the other when it becomes aware that an
investigation or enforcement activity may affect important interests
of the other. This is specified for those cases where one agency makes
inquiries of persons located in the other territory. The narrow reading
of this clause would be that agencies are only assuming a notification
obligation when commencing investigation into firms residing in the
other agency’s territory. While this avoids certain conflicts, it is also
not very ambitious in light of the cross-border problems identified
by the OECD 2003 Guidelines and the IMSN study on cross-border
remedies.
The PNG and South Korea bilateral cooperation agreements do,
however, demonstrate that the close parallel to competition policy
can be given effect in a single agreement and at least to the extent
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stated above, by the same or similar text. That the examples of joint
agency agreements found here happen to have softer notification
provisions may not be a function of the fact that competition and
consumer policy have been integrated in a single agreement. This
may reflect more a pattern adopted by Australia for those agreements
(the provisions in both PNG and South Korea are nearly identical),
and/or display the level of concern for cross-border practices at the
time the text was drafted (the first was in 1999).36
The next section considers how cooperation has developed within
the domain of RTAs.
6. Regional trade agreements
Unlike the consumer protection situation, the close connection
between trade liberalization and competition law has been well
exposed in multilateral contexts. As an example, consider the 1948
Havana Charter, the inclusion of competition within the WTO GATS
Agreement, and as well within the ill-fated WTO Singapore New
Issues. It has also been expressed in the regional integration context,
notably the 1957 EEC Rome Treaty. The addition of a competition
cooperation section in an RTA has become a matter of common state
practice for some territories, the European Union and Canada, for
examples. While not so clearly patterned, US trade agreements are
also tending to develop competition policy provisions. In all, there is
not only the matter of establishing a cooperation framework, which
can be accomplished by an agency agreement alone, but RTA
provisions may also reflect and communicate a political choice by
the negotiating governments to emphasize the need for the
development or the continuing viability of their respective agencies.
A newer step to take is to tangibly integrate the concept of a
complementary demand side to activate the supply of competition
with a regional market, as discussed above. Viewing consumers as
instrumental in effecting actual competitive forces is a linkage to be
drawn into regional policy and law making, in addition to
emphasizing the more diffuse methods of stimulating a competitive
market. Furthermore, since the opening of borders for greater trade
can generate that same potential for cross-border consumer abuses
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as those that occur in the competition policy field, the development
of cross-border mechanisms is also still at a rudimentary stage.
One possible explanation for this neglect is that the dominant
view of trade policy officials is that consumer protection issues are
more ‘domestic’ or localized in nature, and primarily played out
between the final seller and the final consumer. Within this outdated
framework, consumer policy areas are necessarily not intensely
affected by cross-border transactions. The OECD 2003 Guidelines
appear to be an attempt to dispel this notion.
Related to this is an influential opinion that competition law and
policy issues are more ‘governmental’ business, where choices are
being made on a case-by-case basis by an agency about which sectors
and firms should be subject to investigation and enforcement. A treaty
commitment to abide by certain principles in competition law
enforcement is well within a government’s remit, in order to signal
its efforts to function according to some mutual guidelines within
the regional trade endeavour. Although it does require a
governmental commitment, this body of opinion might suggest that
consumer protection is more ‘private’ - between buyers and sellers -
where the emphasis is upon privately initiated court remedies or other
dispute resolution activities. In these systems, the aggrieved are not
triggering an agency response, but are rather pursuing private claims
for redress upon the individual transactions. This is an over-
generalization however, for, clearly, there is no reason why parties to
an RTA could not also prescribe what they would understand to be
the minimal set of protection mechanisms to have in place for judicial
as well as administrative action. For that purpose, the UN Guidelines
on Consumer Protection are most helpful in identifying the common
elements and objectives for consumer protection, which do refer to
systems of redress.
A better explanation for the predominance of competition
provisions in current RTAs relative to consumer protection may be
found in the perception, or perhaps the negotiators’ agenda, that there
is a more direct connection between anti-competitive practices and
market access. While a domestic consumer scam may affect the
capacity to trigger competition forces in the domestic market, it may
not act so obviously to foreclose foreign competitors from market
entry or the importation of their products. Market access is the
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objective of an FTA and one can see the close connection with
regulatory cooperation that addresses this market access
commitment. An illegal or unconscionable act on the part of one or
more operators will cause competition problems if undetected.
However, detection takes place at national level by consumers and
up through to consumer organizations and consumer protection
agencies. It is only brought to the attention of trade negotiators later
on, if unsuccessfully dealt with, or stronger remedies are required.
Where developed and developing countries in RTAs are
exchanging market access commitments and some of the members
have functioning authorities, it becomes a priority for them that the
other partners also have minimum competition law standards in order
to secure the reciprocity of the market access exchange. The parallel
to consumer protection can be made in those cases where choices
and transparency of information is unavailable, or the ability to
redress these problems is present in one market and not in the other
partner’s market. However, the priority to introduce these elements
as complements to competition law cooperation is not so evident in
RTAs to date. While the objective of regional integration may well be
served by complementary supply and demand-side policies, RTAs
appear to reflect more the objective of market access as a singular
enterprise. As such, the regulatory policies supporting market access
are those that appear to receive priority.
For developing country partners, an emphasis on competition
policy may also reflect their relative lack of control over the regional
trade agenda with a developed partner. It may well be that a
developing country has a different set of regulatory priorities. As
RTAs contain more sophisticated and tailored provisions regarding
competition, it is important that the option for cooperation to deal
with cross-border consumer protection issues surface as a positive
provision that complements a developing country’s domestic
development and market objectives. This applies both for dealing
with cross-border fraudulent practices and for improving the demand
side of competition.
The question of including consumer protection provisions at
regional level can be raised where there are few cases of successful
implementation of robust national consumer protection regimes in
developing countries. At the same time, if a developing country sees
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value in promoting an agency, the inclusion of such provisions in a
regional agreement can give impetus to the internal reforms or can
provide greater resources for the betterment of both the economy
and consumers. This has occurred in several cases for competition
cooperation in RTAs where implementation of domestic competition
law and a functional agency is also called for as an aspect of the
agreement.
Regional groupings can draw on some superior institutional
arrangements and establish cooperation at levels that go beyond what
might be realizable for multilateral cooperative forums or within the
legal authority of an agency-to-agency agreement. Thus, it is
interesting to see how a developed internal regional market, the
European Union, has sought to address some of the aspects raised
by the multilateral and OECD Guidelines. Two enactments are noted
here.
First is the EU Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of
Consumers’ Interests (98/27/EC, The Injunctions Directive). This
provides that Member States shall recognize qualified consumer
groups as complainant parties within their national legal systems.
This bypasses some of the jurisdictional issues raised when consumers
seek to hold a foreign actor responsible by establishing a common
procedure for injunctions (conduct remedy) and allows qualified
consumer groups to access other Member States and commence their
actions. If a remedy is ordered, this can then be enforced in the
jurisdiction where effectiveness of redress is most likely. Two aspects
are therefore introduced in The Injunctions Directive that facilitate
redress: permitting groups to represent the more diffuse consumer
interest for injuries, and the facilitation of cross-border actions in
the respondent’s territory.
EU Regulation 2006/2004 on Consumer Protection Cooperation
also targets violators who injure consumers in another Member State.
This focuses on agency cooperation procedures and emphasizes
requirements for consumer authorities to provide information to
facilitate cross-border investigations and further, to also require, in
certain cases, that a requested agency will undertake investigations
on behalf of another. Combined, one can see how the internal market
rules are reaching to eliminate territorial issues in the consumer
protection field at an advanced level both in agency cooperation as
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well as the use of the national courts for private redress at an advanced
level.37
Aside from the EU body of consumer protection legislation, there
are few other examples within the body of RTAs. For the two largest
regionally active countries, the authors found only two treaties for
completed agreements38 – the US-Australia FTA, and the EU-ACP
Cotonou Framework Agreement. The US agreement with Australia
refers consumer protection to the chapter on ‘competition related
matters’ (Article 14(6)),  which is helpfully indicative of the
complementarity of these policy areas at the outset, and then refers
to the existing mechanisms. These include the pre-existing agency-
to-agency agreement between the two (2000, discussed above), the
2003 OECD Guidelines (as above) and the ICPEN network.
The treaty text expression is that the parties shall ‘further
strengthen’ cooperation and coordination among their agencies
especially for fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices. Areas
emphasized for attention include prompt detection of violations in
both territories, notification of investigations significantly affecting
the other territory’s consumers, exchange of information on the
administration of the laws, enforcement and investigation assistance
in appropriate cases (individual case cooperation) and consulting/
coordination on cases with significant cross-border dimensions.
Noteworthy is that cross-border notification is squarely set on the
possibility of considering injurious practices as these may affect the
other country’s consumers.
While this listing of activities is not so different from the earlier
agency-to-agency agreement between these two parties, its inclusion
within the FTA also establishes this regulatory area on an even par
with the other regulatory areas receiving attention for cooperation,
notably competition policy. It also has added momentum to the
process to continue identifying additional measures to facilitate
coordination, including the use of court procedures. As a treaty
declaration, this serves as a political expression to encourage the
respective agencies to continue the agenda, effectively seeking to give
effect to the OECD 2003 Guidelines.
242
Consumer protection, competition and RTAs
It is clear that the US-Australia FTA and its provisions provide a
model for incorporating the current international references on
consumer protection into an RTA.39
The EU external agreement with the most explicit references to
consumer protection is the Cotonou Agreement. This is a ‘framework’
that identifies the areas to be treated, as agreed, in the later
negotiations for economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between
the EU and regions of the ACP. Whether later negotiated agreements
are more or less specific is not obvious. What is authorized by the
governments to consider is a listing of cross-border consumer
protection issues that seem to draw some stronger reference to the
earlier UN Guidelines, but also pursuing some distinct considerations
as well, including an emphasis on monitoring product safety,
improving information to consumers, encouraging independent
consumer associations, notifying enforcement of legislation,
cooperation in investigation of harmful practices, and implementing
export restrictions for products that are domestically prohibited.
As a complement to competition policy considerations, there is
a single expression of the demand side of the competition equation
which might well reflect the evolution of the Community’s own
internal market approach for generating competition within the
Member States. As recited,
Cooperation shall, in particular, aim at … improving
information provided to consumers on prices, characteristics
of products and services offered…40
This may be the single clear expression of a ‘demand-side’
consideration in a regional trade or framework agreement to date,
even while not explicitly linked to a competition law provision.
For both the US and the EU, consumer protection references in
their RTAs are at best sporadic. There are no consumer protection
references in other later and contemporary US agreements, including
the US-Morocco Agreement and the US-Central America-Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The most recently
signed EU-Euro-Med association agreement, (EU-Lebanon
Agreement, 2002) does have text dealing with consumer protection,
but no particular reference to the cross-border problems identified
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in the international sources discussed above, or consideration of the
areas taken up in the Cotonou framework. Article 58 of that
Agreement41 provides in total for cooperation in order to avoid trade
barriers caused by consumer legislation, the extension of the rapid
alert system for dangerous products, for exchanging experts and
organizing training schemes.
While these aspects are also important and certainly helpful for
agency capacity, the provisions do not come close to addressing the
issues identified by the OECD 2003 Guidelines or the subject focus of
the IMSN findings on cross-border remedies. Obviously, commencing
assistance at this level provides the later opportunity to undertake
cooperation between functioning agencies.  Considering, however,
the longer-term objectives of creating a larger European economic
space and the intensity of cross-border cooperation already
committed within the EU internal market, it seems nearly disjunctive
that consumer protection cooperation has not been expressed at a
more contemporary level commensurate with what is being sought
by all the parties in the larger Euro-Med arrangements. In fact, the
ACP Cotonou framework has an arguably more advanced expression,
even while neither of these external arrangements actually reach to
give a clearly defined effect to the objects of the OECD Guidelines.
One should also make comparison to the competition provisions
of the EU-Lebanon Agreement. Here, the expression common to EU
external agreements is found, that cartels and abuses of dominant
positions are incompatible with the functioning of the agreement and
as they may affect trade between the parties. Moreover, both countries
agree to enforce their competition laws and agree to exchange
information within the confines of confidentiality. Finally, ‘the
necessary rules for cooperation … shall be adopted by the Association
Committee within five years of entry into force of this Agreement.’42
While this is also not an expression of an advanced agency
cooperation arrangement, it is a clear nod to the eventuality of
cooperation, an element that is missing in the consumer protection
section of the agreement.
What can be concluded for RTAs is the following. Few RTAs
include consumer protection provisions either to address cross-
border practices or to complement the functioning of competitive
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markets. An exception is the US-Australia FTA which places a strong
emphasis on cooperation regarding cross-border deceptive practices.
The EU internal market has moved to advance concepts that both
act to support competitive markets as well as deal with deceptive
practices by agency cooperation and consumer redress. These
examples have not yet found their way into the Community’s external
arrangements, although the Cotonou Agreement shows some
potential for these more contemporary justifications for consumer
protection provisions within an RTA.
7. Conclusions
The methods to overcome competitive market deficiencies in both
supply and demand have become highly complex within a global
marketplace. Obstacles to the supply of such markets, such as
monopolies and cartels, predatory pricing and the abuse of dominant
position, all work to the detriment of consumers as well as inhibiting
economic efficiency and sustainable growth, the very objectives of
market liberalization. Problems with the demand for competition
found in the inhibited or obstructed ability of consumers to search
and switch markets and obtain necessary redress, also work to the
detriment of both consumers and economic efficiency and growth.
This again detracts from the same objectives of market liberalization,
the enhancement of consumer welfare.
RTAs are increasingly identifying ways to use domestic regulatory
policies to support the flow of cross-border trade. While these
agreements may prioritize the policies and provisions concerned with
market access, they also acknowledge the need for competition
provisions to underpin the supply of healthy markets. Yet, finding
complementary ways of overcoming the limitations imposed on
consumers through effective consumer protection and to promote a
healthy global marketplace is only beginning to evolve.
Bilateral and multilateral arrangements can address issues of
information sharing, mutual assistance and judgment recognition and
enforcement. Agencies can develop measures to ensure that they are
not prevented from enforcing laws prohibiting unfair or deceptive
marketing practices against a domestic business simply because that
business has had a transaction with or has targeted only foreign
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consumers. It is also possible for agencies to act against a business
that has transacted with or targeted domestic consumers simply
because it is not a domestic business.
Clearly, the wide variations in the developments, as well as the
degree of integration of competition and consumer laws and policies
at national level, will be reflected in the nature and scope of the RTAs
signed up to by these jurisdictions. More integrated competition and
consumer agencies have already included elements of complementary
competition and consumer policies within their more recent RTAs,
although these examples are rare.
Yet the popularity of RTAs by members of the multilateral trading
system is also accompanied by an increasing emphasis on regulatory
treatment within these agreements. There is little doubt that
competition policy has arrived as a favoured area of regulatory
attention, along with others, including intellectual property
protection, food and product standards, and depending upon the
signatories, environment, human rights, labour rights, and so on. In
some cases these regulatory endeavours are intended to generate some
firm harmonization and may even be connected by condition to the
trade liberalization commitments. This is the new regulatory terrain
for RTAs, and particularly for those between developed and
developing countries. Some of these new areas also indicate that RTAs
are capable of adopting regimes not already covered in the WTO.
There is an inevitable lag in time between the recognition of an
area that demands international cooperation and its translation into
state-to-state agreements and treaties. The OECD guidelines that
established an instrument for competition cooperation were
generated in the mid-1980s. The bilateral competition agreements
emerged several years later, accelerating a decade later. The point of
reference for consumer protection is now placed on cross-border
deceptive practices, and this set of guidelines was adopted by the
OECD in 2003. E-commerce and communication has clearly raised
the stakes for cross-border consumer protection and the particular
instruments to address this and other issues are certainly evolving.
An agreement, such as the US-Australia FTA, promotes agency
cooperation not only regarding specific cases in particular, but also
in the development of additional techniques to feed the consumer
protection response cycle in the global market.
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It is commonplace for the advocates of any particular regulatory
policy to attempt to climb on to the RTA bandwagon and assert that
their favoured subject area should also be treated at the level of
political inter-governmental treaty making. And it is also recognized
that where negotiating parties have disparate power in market size
and development levels, the agenda for regulatory action is not
necessarily an exercise of identifying true common objectives, but
rather may reflect the reciprocity in exchanging regulatory action
for market access.
Nevertheless, and particularly for developing countries, the task
of providing comprehensive consumer protection within a global
marketplace is daunting. Given the patchy record in achieving robust
consumer protection regimes in developing countries, it is fair to ask
whether the inclusion of consumer protection provisions in an RTA
represent just one more subject area where resources must be found
and other regulatory priorities with possibly more potential foregone.
The counter-argument is that the evidence suggests that the
benefits of including complementary consumer protection provisions,
within both domestic systems and RTAs, outweigh the costs of
introducing and implementing them. This reasoning has been based
on two principal elements. The first is that economic development
requires competitive markets, which must be encouraged not only
from the supply side but from the consumer demand side as well.
The other emphasizes the growing phenomena of cross-border
deceptive practices, which unequivocally require enhanced
international cooperation in order to prevent such injurious
behaviour to consumers and for sustainable market development.
For developing countries, these considerations point to several
potential courses of action.   The first is the case where the country
happens to have a joint agency dealing with both consumer protection
and competition (integrated approach). In these cases, a bilateral
agency-to-agency agreement, or an RTA encompassing competition
provisions can also accommodate consumer protection.
To include consumer protection is to grant some equivalent
weighting to the activities of the agency itself and the role that
consumers can play in the development of the market. It suggests
that in a developed-developing country agreement where both of the
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parties have consumer protection agencies, but where only
competition policy has been included in the RTA, a better
complementary balance could be drawn by seeking consumer
protection cooperation provisions as well.
A second course arises in cases of RTAs between developing
countries. Here the balance of regulatory priorities may be more even
at the outset, and countries can determine on their own merits in
respect of their own market conditions whether or not consumer
protection should be introduced as a common area of cooperation.
The argument for its inclusion is evident where all partners have
agencies, but is not necessarily diminished when one regional member
has a functioning agency and its partner does not.
Overall, such cooperation provisions enacted in an agreement
would clearly support a domestic commitment to implement
consumer protection laws and policies, even in countries where there
is little record of implementing consumer protection laws successfully.
Given the documented trends evident in both the areas of consumer
protection and competition and in cross-border deceptive practices,
the adoption of meaningful cooperation provisions between regional
partners is a reasonable priority for any country that has already
established consumer protection laws and wishes to make them
effective in a contemporary marketplace.
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APPENDIX
United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection
(As expanded in 1999)
(…)
IV.    International cooperation 
63.    Governments should, especially in a regional or sub-regional
context: 
(a)    Develop, review, maintain or strengthen, as appropriate,
mechanisms for the exchange of     information on national policies
and measures in the field of consumer protection; 
(b)    Cooperate or encourage cooperation in the implementation
of consumer protection policies to achieve greater results within
existing resources. Examples of such cooperation could be
collaboration in the setting up or joint use of testing facilities, common
testing procedures, exchange of consumer information and education
programmes, joint training programmes and joint elaboration of
regulations; 
(c)    Cooperate to improve the conditions under which essential
goods are offered to consumers, giving due regard to both price and
quality. Such cooperation could include joint procurement of essential
goods, exchange of information on different procurement possibilities
and agreements on regional product specifications. 
64.    Governments should develop or strengthen information links
regarding products which have been banned, withdrawn or severely
restricted in order to enable other importing countries to protect
themselves adequately against the harmful effects of such products. 
65.    Governments should work to ensure that the quality of products,
and information relating to such products, does not vary from country
to country in a way that would have detrimental effects on consumers.
 
66.    To promote sustainable consumption, Governments,
international bodies and business should work together to develop,
transfer and disseminate environmentally sound technologies,
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including through appropriate financial support from developed
countries, and to devise new and innovative mechanisms for
financing their transfer among all countries, in particular to and
among developing countries and countries with economies in
transition. 
67.    Governments and international organisations, as appropriate,
should promote and facilitate capacity building in the area of
sustainable consumption, particularly in developing countries and
countries with economies in transition. In particular, Governments
should also facilitate cooperation among consumer groups and other
relevant organisations of civil society, with the aim of strengthening
capacity in this area. 
68.    Governments and international bodies, as appropriate, should
promote programmes relating to consumer education and
information. 
69.    Governments should work to ensure that policies and measures
for consumer protection are implemented with due regard to their
not becoming barriers to international trade, and that they are
consistent with international trade obligations. 
250
Consumer protection, competition and RTAs
NOTES
1United Nations Guidelines For Consumer Protection (As Expanded In 1999.)
(A/C.2/54/L.24).
2Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines for Protecting
Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial Practices Across
Borders (2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/33/2956464.pdf (no
document number).
3Except the regulation of financial services and product safety and the
procurement of specific redress for individual consumers. See http://
www.icpen.org/.
4Asymmetry of information is mentioned to indicate one of the phenomena
indicated as market failures. In this case, between two negotiating parties,
one, notably in this case the consumer, has access to an insufficient amount
of information, limiting his/her possibility to make an optimal choice.
Different arguments justify the government intervention in the economy in
the case of market failure. For more information, please refer to Stiglitz
(2002).
5Porter (1990).
6DTI Consumer Strategy. A Fair Deal For All: Extending Competitive Markets:
Empowered Consumers, Successful Business, June 2005.
7In some cases, this has been seen as less effective in leaving loopholes or
legislative gaps through which practices which would normally be seen as
unlawful can slip, until appropriate legislation is identified and introduced
in a piecemeal fashion.
8United Nations Guidelines For Consumer Protection. Op cit. See also,
UNCTAD, Competition Policy and Consumer Protection Branch, documents
and technical assistance activities, http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/
9Note that although Bolivia doesn’t have consumer protection laws for all the
sectors, sectoral regulations have included consumer protections provisions.
For more information, please see the COMPAL  (UNCTAD) Programme
website at http://compal.unctad.org.
10UN Documents: E/1995/70 &  E/1992/48. http://www.un.org/documents/
ecosoc/docs/1995/e1995-70.htm.
11See for examples, J. Vickers (2005, 2003), Asher (1998:183), Radner and
Sundararajan (2005).
12See Consumers International. Global Competition Report. 2003.
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13Ibid. The sector underwent rapid liberalization and de-regulation in 1989,
during a period of large losses in transport volume and widespread
bankruptcies. Second-hand capital goods from bankrupt industries were
sold off to the new small enterprises that now made up 72% of the market
in the decade following liberalization. The number of accidents involving
freight vehicles increasing more than 30 per cent between 1994 and 2000.
The average age of freight vehicles owned by individuals was almost double
those owned by companies, at 10 years compared with 5.4 years.
14EC Consumer policy strategy 2002-2006. COM (2002) 208 final) (2002/C 137/
02)
15Waterson (2003a, 2003b:129-150).
16See Schultz (2004:5).
17Sylvan (2004:191-206).
18Sylvan (2004)
19Sylvan (2004)
20Schultz (2004).
21Kovacic (2005:23).
2215 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, as amended, see generally, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/
stat1.htm
23See for programme examples,  Consumers International,
www.consumersinternational.org; Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS),
www.cuts-international.org/;  the UNCTAD COMPAL, http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20043_en.pdf.
24N. Birdsall and R. Lawrence (1999:136).
25For a further discussion on this issue, please refer to Chapter 2 of this
publication.
26Except areas dealing with the regulation of financial services and product
safety and the procurement of specific redress for individual consumers.
See http://www.icpen.org/.
27FTC, Chairman Majoras speech, “Protecting Consumers in a High-Tech
World”, Brussels,  04-06-05, at http://www.useu.be/Categories/
Telecommunications/Apr0605MajorasSpeech.html.
28As expanded in 1999 to address sustainable consumption. Available at http:/
/www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/consumption/cpp1225.htm
29OECD, Recommendation of the Council, cited in full, note 2, above.
30OECD, 1999 [C(99)184/FINAL].
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31As the preamble indicates, …most existing laws and enforcement systems
designed to address fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices against
consumers were developed at a time when such practices were
predominantly domestic…
32See for discussion, OECD (2005c:38-40).
33“Findings on Cross-Border Remedies”, http://www.icpen.org/imsn/
activities.htm.
34The Australia-EU agreement (2002) is not a joint agency agreement where the
EU signatory is the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate.
35The US–Australia competition notification provisions are also of a stronger
variety than what is observed in other cooperation agreements. Due to
amnesty considerations and the confidentiality requirements imposed by
Congress, it may well be that a single agreement for both competition and
consumer policy would be unfeasible.
36The (2002) Australia-EU agreement is also soft on notification, but in this case
the EU Directorate is not actually responsible for investigation or
enforcement.
37Focus on judicial action is also seen in the OAS territories where proposals
for cross-border recognition of judgements that would include consumer
redress are under consideration. See OECD Workshop presentations, note
29 above.
38The US–Australia agreement also has a separate Article on recognition of
judgments, which is not discussed here. See Article 14.7
39Cotonou Agreement, Article 51.2
40Lebanon Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, COM (2002) 170 final.
Signed 17-06-02.
41EU-Lebanon Agreement, Article 35, Paragraph 2.
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1.  Introduction
Since economics and politics are usually intertwined ininternational economic relations, regionalism has become apopular economic means for political ends - improving
interstate relations and/or enhancing security within a region. In
international relationships that have a historic record of conflict or
where no tradition of partnership exists, cooperation in economic
matters can be a core element in a process of confidence building.
Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who differ
with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has
an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and
thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities.
(Montesquieu, 1975)
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A competition policy framework at regional level has been one
of the most common features of the ongoing regionalization process.
Thus, some regions have already adopted a comprehensive regional
competition framework, while others are in various stages of such a
process. Some of them also have elaborate competition provisions in
the regional trade agreement (RTA) itself.
An important development along with the process of
globalization and regionalization of national economies is the
globalization and regionalization of civil society as well. This has
happened in two ways. Some civil society organizations (CSOs) have
grown organically and are now working in several countries, while
others are networked at global and regional levels, which has of course
been facilitated by the information and communication revolution.
This has made civil society as a whole much stronger at all levels,
enabling it to play a bigger role than ever before. Hence, it is now
widely recognized that the capacity and involvement of civil society
is crucial for good governance in terms of both policy making and its
effective implementation. It has also been observed that the
involvement of civil society, particularly consumer organizations in
the formulation and implementation has been crucial for competition
policy and law, one of the important areas of governance in a market-
oriented economy. They also play an important role in promoting
the general competition culture through their independent campaign
and advocacy activities. A weak consumer movement as well as a
low level of awareness of competition issues in civil society, however,
has proved to be a dampener in this regard.
When it comes to competition policy and law at regional level,
civil society finds itself at a crossroads. As national barriers come
down and markets are integrated, the focus of much policy-related
activities shifts from national capitals to regional headquarters. This
raises the fear that the voice of the people and civil society may not
be adequately heard in the course of policy formulation and
implementation. On the other hand, in a regionally integrated market,
dealing with anti-competitive practices goes beyond the capability
of national governments and agencies. Hence, in an era of regional
integration, the case for a regional competition framework can hardly
be overemphasized. Given this context, it would be interesting to see
how civil society has been coping with the situation and if it has
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been able to play the appropriate role at regional level as it has been
doing at national level in many countries.
Section 2 of this chapter looks at the process of regionalization
of competition rules across the world. Section 3 looks at the role of
civil society in economic policy making in general and competition
policy issues in particular, including at regional levels. The fourth
section takes a focused look at three regions, the EU, the Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to examine the
general context of civil society’s involvement in competition policy
issues as well as highlighting some experiences. Section 5 gives a
general picture of the experience of civil society involvement in
competition policy issues, while the sixth and last section concludes
the chapter, drawing some lessons from the discussions in the
previous sections.
2.   The regionalization of competition rules
As with the popularity of regionalism in recent years, the subject
of international cooperation in the field of competition law and policy1
is no longer a new one. Many developed as well as developing
countries are party to bilateral cooperation agreements on
competition law enforcement.2 Cooperation arrangements have also
featured in many RTAs. A comprehensive, regional approach to
competition policy has been adopted within the scope of some RTAs
such as, for example, the EU and CARICOM.
Some other regional groupings that have either adopted or are
in the process of adopting a regional approach to competition policy
are: MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South, also known as
Southern Cone); COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa);  SADC (Southern African Development
Community); EAC (East African Community); CEMAC (Economic
and Monetary Community of Central Africa), Andean Community,
UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union, WAEMU or
UEMOA in French), and so on. While COMESA and UEMOA have
already drafted a regional competition policy, the competition
provisions in the Andean Community agreement are quite elaborate.
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The typical agenda of regional economic cooperation blocks has
usually dealt with the issue of the harmonization of national
competition laws. In some cases, it even included the creation of a
new legal framework in certain countries, as in some Central and
Eastern European countries that have recently joined the EU.3
The provisions of these agreements can vary and set different
levels of integration and cooperation among the economic partners.
Some RTAs contain general obligations to take action against anti-
competitive conduct, others prescribe specific standards and rules,
and a few require common laws and procedures. Some RTAs provide
for the applicability, content and/or effective enforcement of
competition rules relating only to restrictive business practices (RBPs)
affecting trade among the parties, while others contain such
prescriptions with respect to all RBPs.4
In the EU, the deep nature of integration between member
countries5 allows a rather advanced cooperative mechanism on
competition issues – a supranational competition regime, which is
linked by the Treaty Establishing the European Community (1957) (Treaty
of Rome) to the fundamental objective of establishing a common
market. The EU also has associated rules, since their adoption in 1989,
regarding concentrations, which meet certain sales thresholds that
are designed to reach transactions that may affect trade between and
among EU Member States. Notably, coordination of these specific
rules is ensured by the principle of primacy of EC competition law
over national competition law.  At the same time, its Member States
have separate and distinct national competition laws, though these
are not uniform.
Some EU trade agreements have also been made with non-
member countries, although, in these, the extent of coordination
depends on the level of economic integration involved in the
agreement. A prominent example is the Agreement of the European
Economic Area (EEA), concluded by the EU with most countries of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), whereby all practices
liable to impinge on trade and competition among the EEA
participants are subject to rules that are closely related to the EC
competition law. Some of these agreements specifically state that these
practices shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising out of
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome.6
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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agreement
provides that each party shall adopt or maintain measures to
proscribe ‘anti-competitive activities’ and take appropriate
enforcement action for this purpose. Its Chapter 15, entitled
‘Competition Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises’, requires
member countries to ‘adopt or maintain measures to proscribe
anticompetitive business conduct and take appropriate action with respect
thereto’, without however prescribing specific competition standards
or rules. Under this NAFTA obligation, Mexico enacted a
comprehensive modern competition law in 1993. A similar provision
exists in both the Canada-Chile and Mexico-Chile free trade
agreements (FTAs). The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership
Agreement (JSEPA) provides that each party shall take measures that
it considers appropriate against anti-competitive activities. Similarly,
the EU-Mexico FTA focuses on ensuring the implementation and
enforcement of the parties’ respective competition laws in a manner
recalling the side agreements on environment and labour standards
embedded in NAFTA. The recently signed Canada-Costa Rica FTA
adopts a comparable approach.
Broad-based prohibitions on certain types of anti-competitive
practices have been written into subregional agreements in Africa.
For example the Treaty establishing COMESA prohibits, in Article
55, ‘any agreement between undertakings or concerted practices which has
as its objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market’.  COMESA is in the process of developing
and implementing a regional competition policy. Australia and New
Zealand have shown that harmonization is possible in competition
laws, especially in the context of predatory behaviour, with their
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
(ANZCERTA). Here, a company with a substantial degree of power
in a trans-Tasman market (one with a geographic dimension of either
within Australia, or New Zealand, or both) must not take advantage
of that power for one of three proscribed anti-competitive purposes
in any market in either Australia or New Zealand.
Most RTAs provide for consultation and cooperation mechanisms
concerning the application of measures against anti-competitive
practices, such as procedures for notification, exchange of
information and enforcement of competition rules. In this respect,
RTAs should be read in conjunction with other cooperative
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competition arrangements that the parties may have in place. It is
also an area where lessons learnt from such cooperative arrangements
have been incorporated into subsequent RTAs.  For example, the
concept of ‘positive comity’ whereby a party may request that another
party initiate enforcement action, which is seen as adversely affecting
its interests, has been incorporated into a number of RTAs, such as,
for example, CARICOM, following its initial introduction in a 1991
bilateral cooperation arrangement between the EU and the US.
3.   The role of civil society at regional level
Recently, ‘civil society’ has become no less a catchphrase than
mottos such as ‘pluralism’, ‘citizenship’, ‘representation’ and
‘inclusion’, and so on. Today, its role and influence over development
concerns is expanding. Increasingly, civil society is playing a key role
in assessing the contribution of the state and business community to
the development arena, rewarding community-friendly behaviour
and criticizing its opposite. Experience has shown that governments
cannot, by themselves, fulfil all the tasks required for sustainable
human development. This goal requires the active participation and
partnership of citizens and their organizations. CSOs, therefore, have
vital roles to play as participants, legitimizers and endorsers of
government policy and action, as watchdogs of the behaviour of
regimes and public agencies, and as collaborators in development
efforts.7
At regional level, strong participation and regular engagement
of CSOs are also key factors in achieving the goals of regional
cooperation. Successful regional cooperation schemes have all
benefited from active participation by a wide range of civil society
actors. In fact, the degree of participation by civil society can be seen
as an indicator whereby to measure the real effects of
intergovernmental regional cooperation. The UN Commission on
Global Governance used the term CSOs to describe the ‘new actors’
who should be consulted in the ‘management of global affairs’.8 For
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), it became a way in the 1980s
and 1990s to identify the broad range of social groups whose inclusion
mattered for purposes of development and governance.
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Global governance is no longer viewed as primarily an
intergovernmental concern but one that involves intergovernmental
institutions, CSOs, citizens’ movements, transnational corporations,
academia and the mass media.
The emergence of a ‘transnational’ civil society reflects a surge
in the will and capacity of people to take control of their lives, a fact
that governments and intergovernmental agencies cannot afford to
ignore. Except in places where culture or authoritarian governments
severely limit civil society, NGOs’ roles and influence have exploded
in the last half-decade.
Looking back, civil society movements across borders have been
traditionally mobilized around issues such as citizenship, rights and
democracy. Trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and competition
as well as other economic issues are relatively new concerns. In
response to the increasingly widespread disenchantment with the
way new democracies work, the struggles of CSOs have been mainly
aimed at improving representation, transparency, citizenship, human
rights and the accountability of governments and corporations.
Furthermore, the international demonstrations in Seattle (1999),
Prague and Genoa (2000) certainly marked the rising concerns of the
public over the way the global trade regime is being constructed.
Their greatest triumphs cannot be discounted. The events leading to
the Seattle debacle of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
subsequent agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) and public health at the Doha Ministerial
show that a civil society could be considered as a third global force
after the governments and business.9
The second traditional trace of CSO activities is that most civil
society movements are solidly embedded in the national arenas.
Despite a scaling-up to international level in the 1980s and 1990s, the
state remains the principal target of CSO activities. Many CSOs still
see the domestic level as the most effective way to bring about policy
change and now frequently seek to press their cases through legal
means and domestic pressure. These movements engage with
governments and seek to gain influence in concrete policy areas.
Moreover, for a range of reasons to do with resources, culture,
pragmatism and principles, CSO activities either remain focused at
national level or leap to international level, largely skipping the
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regional level. However, as regional markets are integrated, the focus
of much policy-related activities shifts from the national capital to
the regional headquarters.
Nevertheless, region-wide cooperation between civil society
movements, or representation and influence of CSOs in the regional
policy-making process is still very limited, particularly in the
developing world. Attempting to contribute to the regional agenda,
or using regionalism as a strategy, has been of comparatively recent
origin, even though there is some evidence that civil society
movements are gradually developing an independent regional
presence. Regionally, overarching networks are gradually and
tentatively coming into existence, with a view to representing and
channelling networks of civil society actors located in particular
states.
Especially in international economic policy making, more
prominent than the contributions of regional networks of CSOs have
always been those of individual organizations, who either try to
extend the outreach of their research and advocacy activities beyond
their national base, or have grown out of their initially limited
resources to expand regionally. This is a growing trend; with more
and more CSOs becoming more active, transnational, regional or
global organizations. Their presence at regional level, their inclusion
in regionalism, is an undeniable fact.
The CSO regionalization process, however, has not been entirely
self-motivated. Governments, the lead takers in regionalism,
themselves have several reasons to reserve ‘invited space’ for civil
society participation, reasons that are very much the same as those
that have driven the rush towards regionalism. For example, if RTAs
are considered an effective way to ensure regional security, then a
regional movement of civil society organizations by people bound
by common standards, values, and traditions will work in the same
way, since peace has always been, and will always be the greatest
aspiration of people. Besides, the approval of civil  society
organizations for regional decisions will help governments to
overcome any opposition from domestic constituencies against
liberalization and integration. This is being done in most regions
through developing a network of CSOs. Such networks are able to
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analyse the critical issues from both regional and national
perspectives that help the regional bodies with appropriate feedback.
One sterling example of regional CSO cooperation and alliance
building is that of the South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and
Environment10 (SAWTEE) based in Kathmandu. SAWTEE has been
promoted by CSOs from India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Pakistan in 1994 with the active support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
a German political foundation. SAWTEE has been working on regional
issues of trade and economics, including competition policy and law.
However, in the absence of an effective regional trade treaty, it has
not been able to advocate for a regional competition framework.
Nevertheless, it is visualized that once the South Asian countries
deepen their trade cooperation under the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Free Trade Arrangement a
demand for a regional competition framework will arise.11 In any
event, SAWTEE has been engaged, in cooperation with CUTS
International, in promoting competition regimes at the national level
in all SAARC countries.
This regionalization of civil society movements, such as the
experience of SAWTEE, helps to create space for information sharing,
knowledge diffusion and norms definition in areas of CSO action,
which is a space beyond the reach of states, shaped by civil society
cooperation and interaction. However, these regional networks of civil
society organizations based in different states are characteristically
not yet significant, perhaps not even to their members. Belonging is
important; but the national level remains the more significant in terms
of getting things done. Such networks also face considerable problems
of organization and strategy. The members can rarely meet face to
face and are unable to build deep bonds based on identity and
community. Many members may logically have deeper horizontal
bonds with other kinds of NGOs inside their own country.
The proliferation of transnational civil society movements in
recent years, as discussed above, can be explained briefly as an
expression of the ‘voluntary disengagement’ of the people from the
mainstream political process, and a direct response to the excesses
of globalization and corporate hegemony over the world economic
instruments and resources. Interestingly, these also serve to explain
why CSOs have quite a significant role to play vis-à-vis the various
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regional frameworks on competition, which are being developed or
negotiated and implemented across the world today.
The concerns of civil society over competition issues at regional
level have quite the same dimensions as their concerns over the same
issues at the respective national levels.  And much as governments,
national or supranational, want to win over public support,
consultation with civil society on any issue is a must, competition
policy and law being not the least of these. This process of
consultation can happen before any policy or law on competition is
formulated, so as to include CSOs as a constituency from the
beginning and during the implementation, and thus mitigate discord.
It can even be undertaken by inviting representatives of civil society
to participate in the policy impact assessment/evaluation process so
as to further evolve the policy and law in question”. Such a
mechanism was absent when the EU adopted its competition
framework originally. However, in recent changes of its competition
policy, the EU held elaborate consultations with civil society. Such a
process has also been followed in the CARICOM and COMESA to
some extent.
Anti-competitive practices, or other business undertakings that
adversely affect the public interest; and unfair trade practices that
harm consumers, therefore, can be quite rampant, nationally,
regionally, or internationally. Hence, there exists the need for CSO
involvement, which can either be in the form of consultations between
CSOs and regulators, or interventions by CSOs in competition cases
on behalf of a class of consumers. In this regard, the strength of CSOs
should be duly noted. Apparently, the clientele of Trade Negotiations
Committees (TNCs) is drawn almost entirely from all the tiny
members of these organizations and the companies’ public image
and their profits depend greatly on whether they manage to get the
endorsement of these new representatives of the public. For instance,
class actions by consumer organizations against corporates, or against
governments, government business enterprises, and private
corporations that fail to provide essential services such as gas,
electricity, water, and waste disposal at fair prices are no longer a
mere possibility.
Civil society generally has an image of being an advocate of the
common people and consumers. This will help in building confidence
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and trust amongst the people for a regional consensus, for example,
on the necessity of a regional competition framework, or the necessity
of incorporating certain competition principles into the RTAs that
their countries are parties to. CSOs are also traditionally regarded as
a useful source of technical expertise; they provide capacity building,
deliver services and, most importantly, they provide representation
and therefore articulate the voices of the people in the decision-
making processes that affect their lives. It is assumed that CSOs often
have closer contacts with local communities and can offer valuable
insights and perspectives that differ from those of donors and
government authorities.
4.   Regional experiences
To understand the dynamics of a regional competition framework
and the role of civil society in the process, it would be useful to take
a closer look at the experiences of some regions. This section, thus,
looks at the legal and institutional framework of CSO involvement in
matters of competition issues in select regions. Three regions have
been selected for this purpose: the EU, CARICOM and COMESA.
These have been selected to include regions with significant
experience in regional competition policy as well as regions that have
adopted it recently or are in the process of adoption. The selection
also covers experiences from both developed and developing regions.
In fact, these are probably also the regions that are relatively more
advanced in terms of adopting or implementing a regional
competition policy.
4.1   European Union
It is widely acknowledged that private action in the enforcement
of EC and national competition law has been extremely limited to
date.12 This is not an issue with competition policy only. The EU, in
general has been perceived by some to be distant and unfriendly to
civil society.13 In Europe, competition law is mostly enforced by
competition agencies, subject to review by the civil courts. It is much
less common that the national courts directly enforce the law on the
initiative of private parties. A study on the condition on claim for
damages was undertaken by the law firm, Ashurst, pursuant to a
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tender called for by the Commission, to identify and analyse the
obstacles to successful action for damages existing in the Member
States of the European Union. The study found that levels of private
enforcement in Europe are currently very low. The study has also
found that not only is there ‘total underdevelopment’ of actions for
damages for breach of EC competition law, but that there is also
‘astonishing diversity’ in the approaches taken by the Member States.14
The Commission is currently looking at the conditions under
which private parties can bring actions for damages before the
national courts of the Member States for breach of the Community
competition rules. The Commission is also working on a Green Paper
on Private Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules, which it plans
to adopt in 2005. The purpose of the Green Paper, which will set out
a number of possible options to facilitate private enforcement, will
be to stimulate debate and facilitate feedback from stakeholders.
Nevertheless, some consumer organizations, especially the
Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC)15 and the
Consumers Association (CA) of the UK, have proactively engaged in
competition policy development and enforcement in the EU.  As an
example, the CA got two cases of violation of EU competition rules
harming consumers in the UK resolved to its satisfaction. In one case,
the ticketing system of the 2006 Football World Cup in Germany was
discriminatory against those who did not have a MasterCard or a
German bank account (Box 8.1). This, to a great extent, was
discriminatory against non-German customers.
There are other examples. One of them, an important campaign
that BEUC and the CA jointly launched in 2001, was to find an
alternative to the Block Exemption policy in the European car
distribution market which had long been considered to be an
outmoded, inefficient and anti-competitive system of distribution.
Under this policy, the car manufacturers had been exempted from
EU competition rules and they imposed all sorts of restrictions on
their dealers, putting them as well as consumers at a disadvantage.
Through this exemption, suppliers could appoint their dealers
using a combination of both exclusive and selective distribution
systems. In an exclusive distribution system, each dealer is allocated
an exclusive sales territory but can sell new cars to all consumers
and independent resellers. In a selective distribution system, dealers
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On 1 February 2005, 812,000 tickets went on sale in the first (of five) sale
periods for the 2006 Football World Cup in Germany. MasterCard was
appointed as the official and only credit card for payment in the first sale
period. Alternatively, fans could pay via a bank transfer or direct debit. This
meant that fans could only buy tickets if they:
• had a MasterCard
• had a German bank account
• made an international bank transfer
In March 2005, the UK consumer group, the Consumers Association,
complained to the European Commission that the aforementioned
arrangements were anti-competitive. They claimed that the arrangements
discriminated against fans outside Germany as it forced them to buy tickets
initially through a single credit card operator, MasterCard, unless they held
a bank account in Germany or were prepared to incur the additional cost
involved in a cross-border bank transfer. The Consumers Association
calculated that this could amount to £20-£35 sterling depending on the bank.
They also pointed out that, in the UK, VISA credit cards are preferred to
MasterCard credit cards as there are around 42.7 million VISA credit cards
compared to around 24.1 million MasterCard credit cards in the UK.
The Commission had to investigate whether there was reasonable access to
tickets for consumers throughout the European Economic Area. On 2 May
2005, the Commission announced that FIFA (the Fédération Internationale
de Football Association 'International Football Federation') had agreed to
modify its arrangements for ticket payments for the next stages of ticket
allocation. More payment methods would be accepted in the second phase
(which began on 2 May) and fans based in non-Eurozone countries in the
EEA who do not have a MasterCard or a German bank account can pay by
making a domestic bank transfer in their local currency. FIFA and the German
Football Association will open bank accounts in the 16 non-Eurozone countries
within the EEA and will accept payments in the local currency.
The Commission observed that events such as the Olympic Games, the World
Cup or the European football championships are very popular and draw
crowds from all over the world. Non-residents need to be able to book them
in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. Commenting on the 2006 World
Cup case, Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that fans from all
over Europe want fair access to these tickets especially as it may be many
years before the World Cup will be back in Europe.
Box 8.1 Consumers Association intervention ensures access to
World Cup tickets
Source:  EU Anti-trust Legal Update, May 2005
 (www.mayerbrownrowe.com/london/broker.asp?id=2128&nid=0&fl=.pdf).
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are selected according to a set of criteria but are not allocated a sales
territory. It was not possible for dealers to sell more than one car
brand, unless he set up a separate company and maintained separate
management and separate sales premises for the sale of separate
brands. Suppliers were permitted to restrict dealers to operate in
specific geographical areas. This so-called ‘location clause’ allowed
suppliers to prohibit dealers from establishing additional sales or
delivery outlets at other locations. Dealers were also forced to provide
after-sale services whether they wanted to or not.
The campaign for an alternative to Block Exemption to ensure a
competitive car market across Europe recommended a set of rules
to:
• Allow retailers the freedom to choose the cars that they want to sell
and how to sell them
• Allow retailers to decide whether or not they want to offer repair
facilities
• Give independent repairers fair access to technical information and
spare parts, and give them the freedom to choose the cars that
they want to service and the parts that they want to use
• Allow normal market forces into the car market, by giving
consumers the power to choose the best retailers, garage services
and spare parts.
As a result of a sustained campaign, though the exemption policy
was not fully removed, a new Block Exemption Regulation with
sweeping changes was forced upon the car industry. It was adopted
and became effective from 1 October 2002.  The new Regulation
accepted most of the recommendations made by BEUC/CA.16 The
new Regulation brought a far better deal and greater choice for
consumers. Changes to the ‘Block Exemption’ rule have allowed
dealers to sell more than one make of new car and end the servicing
and repairs monopoly of garages. The rules will also make it easier
to import cheaper cars into one country from any other European
country or to buy them over the Internet.17
Another successful case of civil  society contribution to
competition policy reforms was in the context of the revision of EU
merger regulations. On 11 December 2001, the Commission adopted
a Green Paper aimed at launching a debate on the functioning of the
EU’s merger control law, and to identify possible improvements to
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the merger control regime, based on experience gathered over the
last decade. The Commission announced a proposal for a revision of
Merger Regulation during the course of 2002, based on the comments
received during the consultation.
In response to this, some consumer organizations including
BEUC and the CA made detailed submissions. Generally, they
welcomed the proposals for the new regime. They, however, had
specific suggestions to make the new regime more effective and
consumer friendly. The most noteworthy suggestion by BEUC was
related to the due process and views of consumers.18 They noted that
due process incorporates all of the procedural aspects: statements of
objections, hearings, and access to the Commission’s files. Of
particular interest is the willingness of the Commission to encourage
inputs from consumer organizations as third parties.
BEUC and the CA suggested that a number of things could be
done to ensure the involvement of consumer organizations at EU
level. Firstly, they thought, consumer organizations should be
automatically (and explicitly) invited to comment on each case and
to participate in any national committee that deals with merger
control. They highlighted a number of initiatives undertaken in the
UK by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition
Commission (CC), which enhanced the CA’s ability to intervene. For
example, the OFT and the CC were regularly contacting the CA with
specific requests for information.
However, BEUC also noted that consumer organizations often
face difficulty in their efforts to participate in the settlement process
due to a combination of lack of expertise in the relevant fields as well
as limited resources. It also urged the Commission to consider a
training programme for consumer organization representatives.
Merger review can sometimes be very technical in nature, and in
order to participate fully, consumer organizations will need to develop
specialized skills.
These observations and suggestions caught the imagination of
the Commission, particularly the then Competition Commissioner
Prof. Mario Monti. Thus, the importance of involvement of consumer
organizations was recognized not only in merger evaluation but also
in all areas of competition policy formulation and implementation.
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To ensure that the views of consumer organizations are heard during
investigations a Consumer Liaison Officer has been appointed in the
DG Competition. Prof. Monti also recognized the problem of resource
constraints among the consumer organizations and announced that
recognized consumer organizations would be resourced to the extent
possible.
4.2   CARICOM
CARICOM19 has a long tradition of consultation with members
of civil society at national and regional levels and has developed a
number of regional mechanisms that facilitate ongoing dialogue with
civil society on a range of issues, including competition policy and
consumer protection issues. CARICOM Heads of Government, in
1997, adopted the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society. The main
objectives of the charter are to enhance public confidence in
governance, to create a truly participatory political environment
within the Caribbean Community, to enter the 21st Century on the
basis of the best possible governance and to achieve and sustain that
governance by mobilizing action for change.
The Charter institutionalized a strong tradition of consultation
between CARICOM governments and stakeholders in civil society at
national and regional levels, which dates back to the early days of
the West Indian Federation, the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The Charter, one of several recommendations of the 1992 West
Indian Commission Report - Time for Action, was itself the result of
some 14 months of national consultations in individual CARICOM
Member States with a wide range of stakeholders to develop a
strategic approach to re-positioning the Caribbean in the Community
of sovereign states. In making its recommendations, the Commission
noted that ‘Integration inevitably involves inter-governmental
negotiation and decision making; but it is not the preserve of
Governments alone. People need to be drawn into the process’.
The Second Special Consultation on the CARICOM Single Market
and Economy (CSME), held in 2000, was very important for ensuring
civil society participation at the development of competition policy
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at the regional level.20 There was wide-ranging participation in this
Consultation from among the representatives of governments, the
private sector, the labour movement, media practitioners, regional
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), youth, academia, regional
organizations, and other interest groups in civil society.
The consultation identified Core Policy Areas in the CSME as
follows:21
Main Areas  -  Free Movement of Goods; Right of
Establishment; Free Movement of Services; and Free
Movement of Capital;
Sectoral Areas - Industry; Agriculture; Transport; Tourism and
other services, including Telecommunications;
Support Areas  -  Competition Policy and Consumer
Protection; Macro Economic Policies, including Monetary
and Fiscal Policies; Investment Environment; and Regime
for Disadvantaged Countries, Regions and Sectors;
Common External Economic Policy - Common External Tariff
(CET) and, Trade and Investment.
Thus, competition policy became one of the core policy areas for
CARICOM’s sustained consultation with civil  society. The
consultation also noted that the legislative arrangements in Member
States were not seen to be encouraging fair competition and did not
provide for ease of business entry and exit or provide for the
prevention of abuse of market power, inter alia. On the basis of this,
it  was recommended that appropriate national legislative
arrangements be put in place to encourage fair competition and
provide for ease of business entry and exit, with a view to preventing
the abuse of market power and providing for initiatives, regulation
and consumer protection.22
The CSME will be effected through nine major amendments to
the Treaty of Chaguaramas23 (called Protocols).  Protocol VIII
addresses issues relating to competition policy and the promotion of
consumer welfare in the CSME. Under this Protocol, a harmonized
competition policy will be established and administered. The Protocol
seeks to promote and preserve conditions for fair competition to
facilitate the participation of Community nationals in all markets and
to promote and protect the interest of consumers.
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Protocol VIII provides for the establishment of ground rules for
the conduct of enterprises to ensure healthy competition and to
promote consumer welfare in the Single Market and Economy. More
specifically it provides for:
• A ban on agreements and practices which prevent, restrict or distort
competition and the prevention of the abuse of dominant
positions in particular markets;
• Protection of consumers and an environment in which consumers
have the right of choice;
• The prevention and effective remedy of unfair trade practices such
as dumping and subsidization;
• The promotion of a business environment in which technology
development and transfer can be fostered.
Protocol VIII will apply, with few exceptions, to goods and
services and capital markets as it relates to restrictive business
practices and consumer protection, and to industrial and agricultural
procedures in respect of dumping and subsidies. The Protocol is
intended to be principally regulatory, that is containing rules and
disciplines that affect cross-border commerce and domestic business
practices. The Protocol also establishes the Competition Commission,
which will be responsible for the implementation of the Community
competition policy.
 Heads of Governments of the 15 CARICOM Member States
convened in Georgetown, Guyana in July 2002, together with
representatives of non-governmental organizations from the region
to engage in consultations aimed at strengthening the involvement
of Civil Society in the different processes in which the region is
involved, in particular the programme of regional integration in the
context of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The
initiative was termed the Civil Society ‘Forward Together Conference’.
Besides agreeing on several broad principles for strengthening
the relationships between Caribbean Heads of Government and
national governments and Civil Society, the Conference agreed to
institutionalize the Forward Together Process in the form of triennial
engagements between Civil Society and the Heads of Government,
and established a Task Force comprising a small representative group
of Civil Society, coordinated by the CARICOM Secretariat, to develop
a comprehensive regional strategic framework for carrying forward
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the main recommendations of the Forward Together Conference. One
important recommendation of the process was to establish a regional
consumer protection association in the CARICOM region.
The CARICOM Secretariat has also organized several
consultations at national level throughout the Community on the
various aspects of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
including competition policy. Business, labour and civil society
groups also participate in the regular annual meetings of the
Conference of Heads of Government and are provided an opportunity
to make statements on their priority areas.
Competition policy in the CARICOM region drew the attention
of civil society organizations and other stakeholders as it was on the
agenda of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and
the post-Cotonou negotiations. In this context, concerns about the
capacity of smaller CARICOM countries on the issue of Competition
Policy have been expressed. The Caribbean Reference Group (CRG)
on External Affairs24 strongly recommends that the FTAA process
should seek to establish a special sub-committee to examine the
current stage of development in competition policy regimes, with a
mandate to advise on measures needed to build the capacity of those
countries unable to participate in the FTAA proposed regime.25
However, looking at the current pace and status of negotiations, it is
unlikely that the FTAA would become a reality in the near future, if
at all.
4.3 COMESA
As part of the regional integration effort mandated in its treaty,
the COMESA Secretariat has developed a regional competition policy.
The aim of the policy is to ensure transparency and fairness between
economic actors in the region. It is claimed that the policy is consistent
with the provisions and intent of the COMESA Treaty26 and with
internationally accepted practices and principles of competition,
especially the principles and rules of competition elaborated by
UNCTAD under the United Nations Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices. Existing national competition policies shall be harmonized
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and brought in line with the regional policy to ensure consistency,
avoid contradictions and provide a predictable economic
environment.
The formulation of a Regional Competition Policy for COMESA
was launched through a regional conference on competition law and
policy.27 The Kampala Conference was one of a series of activities
and events organized by COMESA with the aim of contributing to
capacity building and awareness generation on competition issues.28
Prior to the Kampala Conference, COMESA had organized and
participated in a number of meetings, workshops, seminars and fora
on competition policy.29
These events provided valuable input into COMESA’s process of
formulating a regional competition policy. In all of them, there was a
strong presence of several civil society organizations, both from
within the Africa region and elsewhere. In many events organized
by COMESA, Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS) International
and Consumers International had also been invited. While Consumers
International is a global federation of consumer organizations from
across the world, CUTS International is an India-based international
consumer organization with an international presence including two
offices in the COMESA region. CUTS has been doing significant work
on competition policy in different parts of the world including in
several African countries, and promoting south-south cooperation.
The input by CUTS was considered to be valuable by COMESA and
hence CUTS was asked to share its experience of working in the region
in some of the events. This was in line with the articulation made in
the Kampala conference that there was a need for COMESA to utilize
the services of capacity building institutions, including the CSOs
existing in the region, to develop the necessary capacities both for
the private and public sector in developing national and regional
policies and laws; and the need to study experiences of other regional
groupings in the area of competition policy and law.30
Nevertheless, there was scope for broadening the extent of the
consultation process undertaken by both COMESA and government
with civil society.31 The draft Regional Competition Law and
Regulations were reviewed by the Consumers International (CI) and
some of its members. However, there are regional institutions such
as the Africa Economic Research Consortium (AERC) who deal with
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regional economic issues and have a high potential to develop
capacity on competition policy. They could possibly be engaged for
deeper involvement of civil society in the process at regional level.
There are many other CSOs with some capacity and interest in
competition issues that are working mainly at national levels but some
of them are regionally networked as well.32 Their capacity and interest
developed as they worked (or are working) on competition issues in
partnership with CI and CUTS.33
5.   Final comments on CSO involvement
In Europe, though the policy environment did not provide civil
society with much scope in engaging in regional competition issues,
civil society has created a space for itself. Despite the relative
weakness of consumer associations, Europe has a network of
consumer organizations, BEUC, and at least one consumer
organization, the Consumers Association in the UK, that has been
successful in raising competition issues at regional level drawing its
strength from the Consumers Association. In fact, though consumer
organizations have a natural interest in competition issues, it becomes
difficult for all of them to develop capacity on competition, as they
need to deal with several other issues. In such a situation, a consumer
organization having a capacity on competition issues, can share its
knowledge and understanding through networking, which can prove
to be very useful.
In the other two regions examined above, namely CARICOM and
COMESA, a few consumer organizations are reasonably strong.
Nevertheless, these CSOs are still mostly working in their national
contexts with only occasional engagement in regional issues. There
are networks of NGOs (not consumer organizations) in both regions,
but they focus more on trade and economic policy issues while giving
inadequate attention to competition policy. CI, which is a global
association of consumer organizations, has regional offices for African
as well as Latin American and Caribbean regions.
There exists a regional consumer organization, namely the
Caribbean Consumers Association (CCA) (which existed formerly as
the Caribbean Consumers League and is now trying to re-establish
itself),34 but its capacity is extremely limited and it needs to be
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significantly enhanced. However, in the COMESA region no such
body exists. There are only a few consumer organizations with
sufficient strength. It would be useful to build their capacity and
provide resources to them for the purpose of promoting an effective
competition policy in the region. CI and CUTS are both active in the
COMESA region, while CI is also active in the UEMOA region. Hence,
they can play a useful role in promoting a network of consumer
organizations as well as building up their capacity.
CI and CUTS are also active in the Asian region, particularly in
South-east Asia where a regional competition framework may emerge
at the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Once again
they can play a role in promoting effective regional competition
policy. In South Asia, CUTS is quite active in all major countries, the
networking is provided by SAWTEE, of which CUTS is one of the
founding members. Thus, civil society is already quite geared up for
a regional competition framework and waiting for the right time as
the process of regionalization itself is very slow here. In the context
of SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), though
the regional process has a mandate to evolve regional competition
policy, the progress has not been encouraging. However, the
Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU), along with its
partners, has developed a proposal for regional competition policy.35
While CI works through its member consumer organizations,
CUTS has been in the forefront of an emerging network, namely, the
International Network of Civil Society Organizations on Competition
(INCSOC). The added advantage of INCSOC is that it is a multi-
stakeholder network interested in competition issues. Its members
comprise research institutions, advocacy groups and
parliamentarians in over 53 countries, who are encouraged to take
up competition issues at national, regional and global levels.36
6. Conclusion
As deeper regional integration is taking place in many parts of
the world, there is an urgent need for adopting and implementing
an effective regional competition framework in all relevant regions.
Without a competition framework, the expected gains from deeper
trade and investment integration can be frustrated. Worse, with
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greater regional integration, the chances of cross-border competition
abuses increase substantially and the relatively weaker countries
within the region, with smaller but yet efficient firms, might lose in
the game due to absence of a level playing field.
Fortunately, this need is now well recognized and the leaders
engaged in regional integration accept that a regional competition
policy is a concomitant requirement of regional trade integration.
However, the process towards promoting regional framework or
cooperation on competition policy is quite slow. Weak consumer
movement and low appreciation of the need for a competition policy
at the regional level among civil society in general could possibly be
one of the reasons for this. Obviously, the role played by civil society
in this regard so far is far from satisfactory. Even where civil society
has been targeted for outreach by the policy makers and the
competition bodies, some feel the interaction has not been two-way.
The recent improvement in the EU has been possible due to both
an increase in openness on the part of the EC to involve civil society
as well as the increased capacity and appreciation by civil society of
the importance of competition issues at regional level.
In the CARICOM region, though there has been significant
openness on the part of the regional body as well as the national
governments, the involvement of civil society has been sub-optimal.
In the COMESA region, involvement of civil society has been
affected by both the limited encouragement given by the regional
body to civil society as well as by the limited capacity of civil society.
Often the regional bodies do not consult many CSOs because they do
not have adequate capacity on competition issues; on the other hand,
they also do not proactively take up competition issues either at
regional or national level because of their capacity constraints, though
they have significant capacity on economic and legal policy issues.
However, such organizations can develop their capacity on
competition issues as well with some external assistance and strategic
mobilization.
Improvement in this regard can be achieved if the organizations
and the networks engaged in competition policy issues intensify their
effort. CI and CUTS can play a major role in this regard. One notable
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dimension of the competition policy development in regional
framework, especially in the developing world, is the involvement
of UNCTAD. However, there is enough scope for further and deeper
involvement of UNCTAD, especially at regional level. Moreover, as
a part of its mandate, UNCTAD is engaged with CSOs and has
significant interaction with them as well.  Hence, its deeper
involvement in the regional process is likely to boost civil society
involvement in it as well.
When the EU started its journey with the regional competition
policy, there was still little understanding of the role that civil society
can play. However, over time, it became clear that the involvement
of civil society is essential.
This role is now well recognized and readily accepted in the inter-
governmental regional processes.  However, a weak consumer
movement, lack of networking and lack of awareness of the
importance of competition policy among the CSOs and their networks
have been hindering their crucial engagement in furthering the
competition agenda.
CSOs have also to maintain their preferential relationship with
the people. They can bring people-concerns in the adoption as well
as implementation of competition policy and law both at national
and regional levels. Consumer organizations have a natural interest
in competition policy but their capacity is not always sufficient.
Appropriate knowledge and experience sharing through networking
would help. In general, CSOs need to strengthen mutual cooperation
as a way to develop their own capacity as well as making their case
stronger with the policy community both at national and regional
levels. The need for developing the capacity of CSOs cannot be
overemphasized. Such an approach would go a long way towards
realizing the Millennium Development Goals through making
markets work for the poor.
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NOTES
1Competition policy, as mentioned in this chapter, will refer to all measures
through which governments seek to promote the efficient and competitive
operation of markets; whereas competition law refers to legislation that
prohibits and deals with specific anti-competitive practices of firms such
as cartels, abuses of a dominant position or monopolization and mergers
that create a dominant position or otherwise stifle competition. Competition
law, therefore, constitutes a subdivision of competition policy.
2For more details, see, for example, Mehta et al., (2005).
3One unique type of cooperation on competition issues exists among the
Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union) countries. The
thrust of their competition laws is targeted mainly at state monopolies. Thus,
they got together to develop a common approach and adopted as guidelines
an Intergovernmental Treaty on the Implementation of a Coordinated
Competition Policy, signed on 24 December 1993 in Ashkabad,
Turkmenistan.
4UNCTAD (2004b).
5The EU, indeed, is the only regional group that has reached the highest level
of economic integration – an economic union; which includes a common
market plus the adoption of a common currency and/or the harmonization
of monetary, fiscal and social policies.
6UNCTAD (2004b), op. cit.
7See the International Council for Social Welfare website at http://www.icsw.org/
for more details.
8UN Commission on Global Governance (1995).
9See Nicanor Perlas, Civil Society and the Collapse of the WTO Agenda in Seattle,
at http://www.cadi.ph/Features/Feature_Article_1.htm#_ftn7.
10www.sawtee.org
11See Mehta (2003).
12http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private_enforcement/
index_en.html
13Can EU hear me? How to get the EU’s message out (www.gallup-europe.be/
canEUhearme/Can_EU_Hear_Me-FINAL-Report.pdf).
14http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private_enforcement/
index_en.html
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15BEUC, the European Consumers
’ Organization, is the representative organization of 37 independent national
consumer organizations from countries of the EU, EEA, and elsewhere in
Europe. BEUC has a long-standing interest in the area of competition policy.
16Press Release: Consumers Association and BEUC gears up to unblock the
European car market (PR o15/2001) (http://www.beuc.org/Content/
Default.asp?PageID=330).
17Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002, Official Journal
of the European Communities, 1 August 2002 (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_203/l_20320020801en00300041.pdf)
18BEUC position on the Review of the Merger Regulation (BEUC/X/016/2002)
(http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=330).
19For a description of CARICOM regional experience and of the Treaty of
Chaguaramas, please refer to Chapter 10 of this book authored by Taimoon
Stewart.
20The Conference was held at St Philip, Barbados on 20-21 November 2000 under
the Chairmanship of the Rt Hon. Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados
and Head of Government with lead responsibility for the implementation
of the CSME.
21Report of the Second Special Consultation on the CARICOM Single Market
and Economy (CSME), St. Philip, Barbados, 20-21 November 2000
(www.caricom.org/archives/2spcsmereport.htm - 125k).
22Ibid.
24The CRG represent Caribbean NGOs and Labour unions, and is engaged in
advocacy on trade policy issues.
25www.cpdcngo.org/PDF%20Files/CRG%20Position%20Paper.PDF
26For an analysis of the COMESA Treaty, please refer to Chapter 11 co-authored
by G. Lipimile and E. Gachuiri.
27The Conference was organized by COMESA and International Law Institute.
28Report on the COMESA Regional Conference on Competition Law and Policy,
26-30 November, 2001, Kampala, Uganda.
29These have included the COMESA/UNCTAD workshop on competition of June
1999; the COMESA/SADC/UNCTAD seminar on competition of July 2000;
UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Experts Group (IGE) Meetings on
Competition; the July 2000 Competition Roundtable organized by the
Department for International Development of the UK; the July 2000
Commonwealth workshop on competition; the October 2001 Global
Competition Forum of the OECD Committee on Competition Law and
Policy; and various meetings of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy.
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30Ibid.
31CUTS-ARC (2003).
32Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) of Kenya, Namibian Economic Policy
Research Unit (NEPRU) of Namibia, Botswana Institute of Development
Policy Analysis (BIDPA) of Botswana, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)
and Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC) of South Africa and
Trades and Development Studies Centre (TRADES CENTRE) of Zimbabwe
to name a few.
33CI worked on competition issues with some CSOs under its Consumers in the
Global Market project while CUTS worked with local CSOs in four countries
under its 7Up1 and is currently working in seven countries under the
ongoing 7Up3 project in the Southern And Eastern Africa, many of which
are members of COMESA.
34Experiences and Opportunities for Capacity Sharing through Regional
Cooperation and Integration: The Case of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) (wbln0018.worldbank.org/html/smallstates.nsf/
attachmentweb/casecarribean/$FILE/casecarribean.pdf)
35Rehabeam Shilimela of NEPRU, Windhoek, Namibia in a personal
communication to the authors.
36For further details, please see www.incsoc.net
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9
Modernization of the European system of
competition law enforcement:
Lessons for other regional groupings
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, the international community has wrestledwith the question of how to advance the cause of internationalcooperation in competition law enforcement around the
world so as to avoid cross-border anti-competitive practices being
immune from investigation and prosecution. In this regard, even at
the heart of the European Union (EU), problems have been
encountered with the enforcement of the competition provisions of
the EU treaty since the EU Commission decided to focus its resources
on the most important cases having implications in several European
countries.  To facilitate enforcement of EU law by national authorities
and courts and to alleviate the burden of the Commission, a unique
system based on concurrent jurisdiction of national authorities to
enforce European law was established.  To facilitate this, procedures
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for the allocation of cases between national authorities, as well as
cooperation mechanisms and mechanisms organizing the exchange
of information between national authorities were also established.
Finally, the relationship between the EU Commission and national
authorities was meant to ensure the consistent enforcement of EU
law.
Having described the current reforms within EU competition law
regarding enforcement of community norms and taking into
consideration that the EU treaty is itself a regional trade agreement
(RTA), this chapter seeks to verify whether there are specific lessons
to be learned from the EU experience in this area and whether it is
feasible to apply some features of the EU system to other regional
agreements. In this regard, four regional agreements will be
examined: the Andean Community (AC), Mercado Común del Sur
(MERCOSUR), the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM) and Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
(UEMOA).
Given its goals, this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2
deals with the European competition system before the modernization
scheme was carried out in May 2004. Section 3 presents several
elements of the new European Competition Network and provides
available findings about its implementation during its first year of
activity (May 2004 – May 2005).  Section 4 attempts to assess to what
extent some specific elements of this EU system of information could
be implemented in four selected regional venues: two in South
America (AC & MERCOSUR) one in the Caribbean (CARICOM) and
one in Africa (UEMOA). Finally, remarks and conclusions on lessons
to be learned are offered in Section 5.
2. The European system of competition law
enforcement
The European Community (EC) was founded on the idea that
although trade liberalization and market integration are necessary
conditions to promote the economic growth and the development of
the signatories of the Rome Treaty, these policies had to be
complemented by competition law provisions.
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The Community competition rules, established in its founding
Treaty of 1957, have three goals:
• First, they are designed to prevent economic operators from
replacing dismantled public barriers by erecting new barriers
to trade; thus the prohibition of exclusionary abuses of
dominance through which dominant firms try to prevent the
emergence of competitors (or to make life particularly difficult
for them) or the strict enforcement of the provision prohibiting
inter-firm agreements on vertical distribution contracts through
which manufacturers of branded consumer goods establish
exclusive distribution networks in each European country, while
preventing their distributors from exporting the product outside
the area where they had territorial exclusivity, thereby
preventing the integration of the unique market, are also
prohibited.
• Second they are designed to ensure that operators on the enlarged
European market do not abuse their individual or collective
market power and that, through competition, the benefits
derived from the accrued intensity of competition flows to
consumers.
• Third, they are designed to ensure that Member States’
governments do not pervert the European market mechanism
by providing certain national firms with subsidies that give them
an unfair advantage over their competitors. Thus, contrary to
what happens in many other jurisdictions, EU Member States
are themselves the subject of competition law. The EU
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over state-aid cases and
national competition authorities or courts do not enforce this
part of European law.
It is important to focus on the EU provisions against anti-
competitive practices by firms. Indeed, it is in this area that the
experience of the EU with respect to cooperation among national
authorities and the ‘federal’ level is the most interesting because of
the complex and evolving relationship between the European
Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States.
284
Modernization of the European system
This section gives a brief description of the main elements of the
EU system as it was originally developed, before turning to the
‘modernization process’ in the next section.
Competition law provisions were deemed necessary at the level
of the European Community because it was considered that the
governance of the European market could not be obtained simply
through the enforcement of national competition laws of Member
States for at least three reasons:
• Most countries did not have a national competition law at the
time the European Community was founded;
• Even if a country had a competition law its competition authority
or its courts would be powerless to prevent or sanction
transnational anti-competitive practices originating outside that
country but which distorted competition on its domestic market;
• There was concern that national competition authorities, if they
existed, would be influenced by the widespread appeal of
industrial policy measures and, as a result, would be tempted
to exempt some anti-competitive practices by claiming that they
had some countervailing benefits for society.
Thus, Article 81 of the Treaty sets out the rules applicable to
restrictive agreements, decisions and concerted practices. It prohibits,
as being incompatible with the common market, all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market. According to
Paragraph 3 of Article 81, the prohibitions in Article 81(1) can be
declared inapplicable if they do not completely eliminate competition
for a substantial part of the products concerned, if they contribute to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and if they do not include restrictions that
are not indispensable for the attainment of these objectives where
certain conditions of fairness and efficiency are met. The Treaty,
however, is silent as to who should ‘declare’ inapplicability.
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Article 82 (previous Article 86), which prohibits abuses by one
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States, does not allow for exemptions.
In 1962, the Council set out the rules of procedure for the
application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty by adopting Regulation
17. Five major aspects of the European system of enforcement of EU
competition law are worth mentioning here.
First, the regulation was based on direct applicability of the
prohibition rule of Article 81(1) and prior notification of restrictive
agreements and practices for exemption under Article 81(3). As a
result the Commission, national courts and national competition
authorities could all participate in the enforcement of EU competition
law.
Second, however, the national legislation of several Member
States did not provide national competition authorities with the
procedural means of applying Articles 85(1) and 861. Where
authorities were not in a position to apply community law to cases
which fell within the scope of the European provisions and could
only apply their national law, the application of that law could ‘not
prejudice the uniform application throughout the common market
of the Community rules on cartels and of the full effect of the measures
adopted in implementation of those rules’. At the very least, a case
falling within the scope of Community law had to be compatible with
that law, Member States being forbidden, given the primacy of
Community law over national competition law and the obligation to
cooperate in good faith laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, to take
measures capable of defeating the practical effectiveness of Articles
85 and 86.
Third, the Council established a system of antitrust enforcement
that gave the Commission the monopoly of exemption under Article
81(3) EC. Thus, although national courts were competent under
Community law to enforce Article 81(1) and (2) and had an obligation
to do so under the duty of solidarity in Article 10 EC(22), they had no
power to exempt agreements. If  national courts or national
competition authorities felt that Article 81(3) EC should have been
considered, they had to adjourn the case and apply to the Commission
for information and guidance.
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Fourth, reinforcing the centralization of the enforcement of EU
competition law, Article 9(3) of the regulation allowed the
Commission to remove a case from the jurisdiction of national
competition authorities by launching its own proceedings, in effect
pre-empting national jurisdiction.
Fifth, the Council established a system of voluntary prior
notification to the Commission of agreements that could conceivably
fall under the prohibition of Article 81(1). The incentive for
notification was the possibility to obtain an exemption on the basis
of Article 81(3) and the ability for the parties to avoid sanctions if
their notified agreement was found to violate Article 81(1). Two ideas
underlie this notification procedure. First, the desire to raise the level
of legal certainty of operators who did not know whether their vertical
distribution agreements violated EU law, given that competition law
enforcement was a novelty in Europe. Second, the desire to provide
the Commission with as extensive information as possible on
potentially restrictive agreements.
Over the years, competition law enforcement has become one of
the most important European policies. Some of the most important
aspects of the early system of competition enforcement are the
following.
The existence of competition law provisions in the EU Treaty
undoubtedly contributed to raising the awareness of the Member
States that did not have a competition law and encouraged them to
adopt a competition law consistent with EU law or to adapt their
domestic competition law to align it more closely with that of the
EU.2 This process was helped by the principle of supremacy of
European law over national law and over national constitutions,
which was affirmed by the European Court of Justice in 19643 and in
1970,4 by the principle of direct effect and by the fact that, in the
European Community, EC law depends on national procedural laws.
Under these circumstances, the existence of a supranational
competition law at regional level has contributed to the dissemination
of a competition culture in Member States and to soft harmonization
of national laws between Member States. As the importance of
European competition law enforcement has become increasingly
great, national competition regimes have also become more active.
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However, it should also be noted that development of competition
law at the level of the Member States has also occurred in the area of
merger control. This is interesting because unlike the case of anti-
competitive practices for which there is concurrent jurisdiction of
national authorities and the Commission, the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction over the control of mergers having a community
dimension. Thus, Member States do not directly enforce EU merger
control law and are under no obligation to control mergers that fall
below the thresholds for European control.5 Nevertheless, all Member
States have adopted merger control. One of the reasons for the
widespread adoption of merger control at national level in EU
Member States may be the fact that Article 9 of the merger regulation
provides that a Member State may inform the Commission that a
notified concentration threatens to significantly affect competition
in a market within that Member State, which presents all the
characteristics of a distinct market, and that in such a case the
Commission may decide to refer, in whole or in part, the case of the
merger to the competent authority of the Member State. This
provision provides a major incentive to Member States to adopt a
merger control law and to establish a credible domestic authority to
review mergers.
In the original European competition law framework,
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EU Treaty by the authorities
of the Member States remained fairly rare. One explanation for the
lack of engagement of national authorities and courts is that the
monopoly of the Commission on the granting of exemptions acted
as a deterrent for national competition authorities or courts to
adjudicate cases on the basis of EU law since they could not apply it
fully. It also discouraged parties from bringing their case to a national
enforcer. An added consideration was the fact that national authorities
examining the compatibility of agreements with European law knew
that they were at risk of having a stay put on their proceedings if the
Commission decided to open an investigation on the same
agreement.6
At first, the fact that national authorities and courts did not
participate very actively in the enforcement of EU law was not
considered problematic as it allowed the European Commission to
develop the case law (under the control of the European Court of
Justice) in a more systematic and consistent manner than would have
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been the case had the inexperienced national authorities been more
actively involved. However, over time, as the interpretation of
European competition law became clearer and more widely known,
this benefit became less important.
Because there was little enforcement of EU law by national
competition authorities, there were relatively few problems of
allocation of cases among competent national competition authorities.
The few cases that did arise concerned situations in which the same
practice had been referred to the Commission and to a national
competition authority. In those cases, there was informal consultation
between the European Commission and the national competition
authority and if the Commission was confident that the national
authority was likely to decide the case in a manner consistent with
the thinking of the Commission, it was happy to let the national
competition authority go ahead with the case.
Some limited cooperation took place between individual national
competition agencies and the European Commission. For example,
the German and the Italian competition authorities regularly
consulted the Commission when dealing with Article 81 or 82
infringements. However, cooperation between the Commission and
national authorities on the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the
EU Treaty was limited by the ruling given by the European Court of
Justice in the ‘Spanish Bank’ case.7 National competition authorities
were not entitled to use as evidence, for the purpose of applying either
national rules or the EU competition rules, unpublished information
contained in replies to requests for information sent to firms by the
Commission or obtained through an investigation carried out by the
Commission.
There was also very little formal cooperation among national
competition agencies and there were very few formal cooperation
agreements between Member State competition authorities. France
and Germany had a cooperation agreement and, together with the
United Kingdom, they entered into an agreement on simplified
merger notifications. But neither of these agreements gave rise to
significant real cooperation or exchange of information between
competition authorities. An exception is the Nordic agreement, which
gave the competition authorities in Norway, Denmark, Iceland and
Sweden the possibility to cooperate and exchange confidential
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information regarding enforcement of national competition rules in
these four countries. The four competition authorities met annually.
Whether any informal cooperation was taking place between national
competition authorities is difficult to assess, among other reasons
because there is a question as to what constitutes informal
cooperation. Certainly national competition authorities met in various
fora, such as the EU consultative committees, the annual meeting of
the director generals of competition of the EU, the OECD competition
committee and at numerous international conferences on competition
issues; but it appears that when it came to cooperating on case specific
issues, there was little action.
Given the fact that national laws were relatively similar because
they were at least consistent with EU law, and that cases were often
similar from one country to another, it is surprising to observe that
there was so little cooperation on enforcement among European
national competition authorities. This suggests that even in countries
that are important trading partners and that are geographically close
to one another and have similar levels of economic development,
cooperation between national competition authorities on enforcement
issues - even informal cooperation - does not necessarily occur
spontaneously. However, as shall be seen further on, when there is
an organized framework for the cooperation between competition
authorities, then both formal and informal cooperation seem to
develop more easily.
The possibility offered to parties to notify agreements in order
to benefit from an exemption did have a few benefits. First, it allowed
the Commission to promote the unification of the European market.
The vast majority of notifications concerned distribution agreements
and the Commission was in a position to refuse to exempt vertical
agreements which unduly restricted trade between Member States,
for example when they offered absolute territorial protection to their
distributors. Second, it allowed the Commission to elaborate relatively
precise rules, embodied, for example, in block exemptions, which
offered legal certainty, or at least reduced legal uncertainty, to business
firms.
But the voluntary notification procedure also had disadvantages
that, over time, became serious obstacles to the efficient enforcement
of EU law. The major disadvantage of the system was the fact that
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the Commission found itself flooded with tens of thousands of
notifications of vertical agreements that it was unable to process
individually. In order to deal with this problem, the Commission
resorted to the granting of block exemptions for certain types of
vertical agreements. It also led to the widespread practice of issuing
‘comfort letters’ stating, variously, that the Commission believes the
agreement to be in accordance with Article 81(1) EC, that it merits
exemption, or simply that the Commission is closing its file. Such
letters led to the closing of 90 per cent of Regulation 17 notifications
informally. However, they are neither a decision granting negative
clearance nor an exemption applying Article 81(3) EC.
The irony of this method of treating the problem was that to grant
block exemptions to vertical agreements of a certain kind, the
Commission had to first declare the concerned agreements anti-
competitive. Indeed an exemption could only be granted to an anti-
competitive agreement. In this process, many agreements that were
not in fact anti-competitive were declared to be violations of Article
81 and the conditions under which they were granted the exemption
had little to do with the conditions laid out in Article 81(3).
Because it spent so much time dealing with notified agreements,
which in most cases did not raise significant competition issues, the
Commission had very few resources available to deal with horizontal
concerted practices which were far more likely to be seriously anti-
competitive and which were, in most cases, not notified since their
authors (or their lawyers) knew that an exemption for such practices
was extremely unlikely.
Thus the effectiveness of centralized EU competition law
enforcement, which undoubtedly had contributed in the early years
to the rapid development of a consistent case law, to providing firms
with a substantial level of legal security, and to a soft harmonization
of national laws came to be questioned on at least two grounds: first,
the notification procedure had backfired and contributed to creating
a gap between sound economic analysis and the practice of the
Commission, which was wasting much of its precious time and
resources barking up the wrong tree; second, the system did not give
much incentive to national competition authorities and courts to share
in the burden of enforcement weighing on the overworked
Commission.
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3. The modernization process in the EU
In 1999, the Commission launched its White Paper on the
modernization of the enforcement of EC competition rules. Its
objective was to launch a discussion with the European academic,
legal and business communities and with the other institutions of
the European Union on how to improve the effectiveness of the
enforcement of EC competition rules in the context of the enlargement
of the EU.
The means considered by the Commission were the abolition of
the notification system, an elimination of the monopoly of the
Commission on the interpretation of Article 81(3), an effort to increase
the level of enforcement of EU law by Member State competition
authorities and courts, and the development of a cooperation
framework between European national competition authorities and
the Commission itself.
After a lively debate, the Council adopted Regulation 1/2003,
which establishes a new European competition enforcement regime,
based on the joint enforcement of the EC competition rules by the
Commission and national authorities and which came into effect on
1 May 2004.
The abolition of the notification system should allow the
Commission to re-focus its enforcement work on hard-core cartels
and abuse of dominance. Article 81 becomes directly applicable in
its entirety, including Article 81(3). It is hoped that the direct
applicability of Article 81(3) will facilitate the application of EC
competition rules by Member State courts and competition
authorities. Proceedings by national competition authorities and
national courts on Article 81 cases can no longer be blocked or delayed
by notifications to the Commission. Henceforth, when a case falls
inside the scope of application of Articles 81 and 82, Member State
courts and competition authorities will not be able to leave aside EC
competition rules and base their decisions solely on national law.
Under Article 3 of Council Regulation 1/2003, they have an obligation
to apply EC competition rules, at least alongside national law. Finally,
Council Regulation 1/2003 provides for mechanisms of coordination
and cooperation between the Commission and national authorities
to achieve a coherent enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
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With the adoption of Council Regulation 1/2003, the Commission
published the Modernization Package, which is a set of six notices
on various aspects of the new system of enforcement of EU
competition law.8
Through the decentralization of EC competition law enforcement,
the Commission sought to entrust decision making to national courts
and authorities, while maintaining its overall control over EC
competition law and policy. To achieve this aim, the Modernization
Package seeks to solve the problem of allocating cases among
European competition authorities, to facilitate the exchange of
information between competition authorities, and to define the links
between national authorities and courts and the Commission itself.
Together, the national competition authorities and the
Commission form a network of public authorities, which is a forum
for discussion and cooperation for the application and enforcement
of EC competition policy. The network called the ‘European
Competition Network’ (ECN) provides a framework for the
cooperation of European competition authorities.
Five main elements of the Council regulation regarding the
relationship between the European Commission and the national
authorities and national courts are worth describing:
1) Allocation of cases
According to Article 11(3) of Council Regulation 1/2003, the
competition authorities of the Member States shall, when acting under
Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty, inform the Commission in writing
before, or without delay, after commencing the first formal
investigative measure. This information may also be made available
to the competition authorities of the other Member States via the
competition network. This allows the network to detect multiple
proceedings and address possible case re-allocation issues as soon
as an authority starts investigating a case.
Where case re-allocation issues arise, they should be resolved
swiftly, normally within a period of two months. In most instances,
the authority that receives a complaint or begins an ex-officio
proceeding will remain in charge of the case. Where re-allocation is
293
Jenny and Horna
found to be necessary, network members will endeavour to re-allocate
cases to a single well-placed competition authority. An authority can
be considered to be well placed to deal with a case when three
cumulative conditions are met: 1) the agreement or practice has
substantial direct actual or foreseeable effects on competition within
its territory and is implemented within or originates from its territory;
2) the authority is able to effectively bring to an end the entire
infringement; 3) it can gather, possibly with the assistance of other
authorities, the evidence required to prove the infringement. If
parallel action by two or three national competition authorities
(NCAs) is appropriate because an agreement or practice has
substantial effects on competition, mainly in their respective
territories and the action of only one national competition authority
would not be sufficient to bring the entire infringement to an end
and/or to sanction it adequately, the authorities dealing with a case
in parallel action will endeavour to coordinate their action to the
extent possible. They will seek to designate one of them as a lead
authority and to delegate tasks to the lead authority such as, for
example, the coordination of investigative measures and the
information of the parties involved.
The Commission will deal with agreement(s) or practice(s) 1) that
have effects on competition in more than three Member States, 2)
with cases closely linked to other Community provisions that may
be exclusively or are more effectively applied by the Commission,
and 3) with cases raising new competition issues. It will also deal
with cases whenever it is necessary to ensure effective enforcement.
2) Exchange of information among national competition
authorities
Article 12 of Council Regulation 1/2003 provides that ‘for the
purpose of applying Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty the Commission
and the competition authorities of the Member States shall have the
power to provide one another with and use in evidence any matter
of fact or of law, including confidential information. Information
exchanged shall only be used in evidence for the purpose of applying
Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty and in respect of the subject
matter for which it was collected by the transmitting authority.
However, where national competition law is applied in the same case
and in parallel to Community competition law and does not lead to
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a different outcome, information exchanged under this Article may
also be used for the application of national competition law (…)’.
This article of the Council Regulation takes precedence over any
contrary law of a Member State.
3) Assistance on investigations by competition authorities of
Member States
According to Article 22 of Council Regulation 1/2003: ‘The
competition authority of a Member State may in its own territory
carry out any inspection or other fact-finding measure under its
national law on behalf and for the account of the Competition
authority of another Member State in order to establish whether there
has been an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. (…)
At the request of the Commission, the competition authorities of the
Member States shall undertake the inspections which the Commission
considers to be necessary under Article 20(1) or which it has ordered
by decision pursuant to Article 20(4). (…)’.
4) Control of the Commission over enforcement of EU law by
national competition authorities
Article 16 of Council Regulation 1/2003 provides that: ‘ When
competition authorities of the Member States rule on agreements,
decisions or practices under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty
which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot
take decisions which would run counter to the decision adopted by
the Commission’.
Article 11 of the same regulation provides that: ‘No later than 30
days before the adoption of a decision requiring that an infringement
be brought to an end, accepting commitments or withdrawing the
benefit of a block exemption Regulation, the Competition authorities
of the Member States shall inform the Commission. To that effect,
they shall provide the Commission with a summary of the case, the
envisaged decision or, in the absence thereof, any other document
indicating the proposed course of action. This information may also
be made available to the Competition authorities of the other Member
States (…)’.
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Furthermore, Article 11-6 allows the Commission to supersede
national competition authorities by providing that ‘The initiation by
the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision under
Chapter III shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member
States of their competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. If
a competition authority of a Member State is already acting on a case,
the Commission shall only initiate proceedings after consulting with
that national competition authority’. This article could be applied if
one of the following situations arises: 1) Network members envisage
conflicting decisions in the same case; 2) Network members envisage
a decision that is obviously in conflict with established case law; 3)
Network member(s) is (are) unduly drawing out proceedings in the
case; 4) There is a need to adopt a Commission decision to develop
Community competition policy, in particular when a similar
competition issue arises in several Member States or to ensure
effective enforcement; 5)The NCA(s) concerned do not object.
5) Relationship between the Commission and national courts
Article 11 of Council Regulation 1/2003 provides that when
applying EC competition rules, national courts are bound by the case
law of the Community courts as well as by Commission regulations
applying Article 81(3) EC to certain categories of agreements,
decisions or concerted practices. Furthermore, the application of
Articles 81 and 82 EC by the Commission in a specific case binds the
national courts when they apply EC competition rules in the same
case in parallel with or subsequent to the Commission.
Furthermore, national courts must also avoid giving decisions
that would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission
in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the national court may
assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings.
If a national court wants to take a decision that runs counter to
that of the Commission, it must refer the question to the Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling (Article 234 EC). The latter will then
decide on the compatibility of the Commission’s decision with
Community law.
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Article 15(3) of Council Regulation 1/2003 allows national
competition authorities and the Commission, acting on their own
initiative, to submit written observations to national courts of their
Member State on issues relating to the application of Article 81 or
Article 82 of the Treaty. With the permission of the court in question,
they may also submit oral observations to the national courts of their
Member State
3.1  Provisional assessment of the system of decentralized
enforcement of EU competition law
This new system of decentralized enforcement of the EU law has
been in effect for just over a year at the time of writing and it is
therefore quite early to draw definitive conclusions as to whether it
has increased the effectiveness of the enforcement of EU law.
However, several preliminary conclusions can be offered, based on
interviews with and speeches by competition officials in Europe.
First, it is clear that the Modernization Package, and, in particular,
the abandoning of the notification system, has allowed a general
refocusing of European law enforcement on the most egregious anti-
competitive practices. As Philip Lowe, the EU Director General of
Competition stated in March 2005:9 ‘There is a clear focus on the
most serious infringements: almost half of the ECN enforcement
decisions concerned cartels and one third concerned abuses of a
dominant position on the European market, in particular by national
incumbent operators in the newly liberalised sectors’.
Second, the compulsory reporting of cases of practices that could
violate EU law to the network has permitted each national authority
to gain access to information as to the kind of EU cases with which
other national competition agencies were dealing. This has
contributed to encourage each national authority to more carefully
assess whether the cases it dealt with under its national laws could
also be violations of EU law. As a result, national competition
authorities have reported several hundred cases to the ECN during
its first year of operations; many of these were cases of alleged
horizontal anti-competitive practices or of abuses of dominance, a
striking fact given the very limited number of non-vertical EU cases
dealt with each year prior to the reform.
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Third, the process of allocating cases among competition
authorities seems to have worked smoothly. In the vast majority of
cases, the first competition authority to which a case was referred
was also the best placed. In a few instances, discussions between the
EU Commission and a national authority revealed that the
Commission was the best placed to deal with the cases considered.
For example, following discussions between the European
Commission and the French Conseil de la concurrence, which had
received a referral concerning Wanadoo, whereby a
telecommunication operator alleged that Wanadoo had violated
Article 82 by practising predatory pricing for internet access through
ADSL, it was decided that the European Commission, which had
previously dealt with a similar case concerning Wanadoo, was the
best placed competition authority to deal with the case.  In a speech
in March 2005,10 Ms Kroes, the EU Commissioner, made this
comment: ‘Identifying which authority is well placed to handle a case
is only one part of the picture. Proactive work sharing also offers
new opportunities in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The action
of the Commission and that of a Member State competition authority
can often complement each other. One concrete example is the
handling of the simultaneous complaints against Deutsche Post
received by both the Commission and the German Bundeskartellamt.
Deutsche Post’s actions were based on a provision of the German
postal legislation, which was already the subject of a Commission
procedure under Article 86 EC. In this case, it was agreed that the
most effective and efficient way forward would be for the Commission
to continue its Article 86 procedure and for the Bundeskartellamt to
continue the antitrust complaint. The combined efforts enabled both
the Commission and the Bundeskartellamt to take their respective
decisions within a very short timeframe’.
Fourth, the creation of the network has led to heretofore
unknown, sometimes informal, levels of exchange of information
among national competition authorities and the European
Commission, leading to a higher level of enforcement of EU law. Ms
Kroes gave a vivid illustration in the above-mentioned speech:
‘Recently several Member States’ competition authorities received
complaints from customers suggesting that a cartel was operating in
the flat glass sector. The authorities sat down and put the individual
pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together. On seeing the full picture emerge,
they concluded that the scope of the case might call for Commission
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action. As a result, the Commission carried out inspections last
month’. In a survey on the effect of the Modernization Package
published in 2005,11 it was reported that there have been several cases
where the French authorities have launched investigations on the
basis of information received from the Commission. Similarly, in
Germany it was reported that as a result of the traditionally high
level of communication with the Commission, and now with other
national authorities, there have been several cases in which
proceedings were initiated by the Federal Competition Office on the
basis of information received from other authorities. The Portuguese
Competition authority also confirmed to the authors of the survey
that it had already started investigation proceedings as a result of
information transmitted by another national competition authority.
Fifth, a number of competition authorities have been able to
request the cooperation of other national authorities either to
investigate on their behalf or to undertake a joint investigation. In
the above-mentioned survey, it was, for example, reported that in a
recent case the Danish Competition Authority carried out a dawn
raid following a request from the Swedish Competition Authority
regarding an alleged anti-competitive agreement between a Danish
company and a Swedish company.  It was also reported that, in
Germany, inspections (dawn raids) are now frequently carried out in
close cooperation with simultaneous inspections being conducted by
other national authorities. It was also reported that the Italian
Antitrust Authority has recently opened an Article 81 investigation
into alleged restrictive practices adopted by certain baby milk
suppliers active in Italy, in the course of which it has successfully
coordinated dawn raids in France, Germany and Spain. The Swedish
Competition Authority has, in cooperation with the Danish
Competition Authority, carried out cross-border, on-the-spot
investigations at the premises of undertakings active within the
natural gas market in Sweden and Denmark in an investigation
regarding possible market sharing and abuse of dominant position.
In a recent speech, the Chairman of the French Conseil de la
concurrence has alluded to the fact that it had requested that British
authorities conduct an investigation in the United Kingdom to
complement the elements in possession of the Conseil and to allow it
to establish the proof of a violation of EU law.
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Sixth, besides formal or informal cooperation on specific cases,
national competition authorities are now getting together in both
formal working groups and informal meetings where they discuss
antitrust law and economics, as well as problems encountered in
specific sectors. In the first half of 2005, there were 14 sectoral working
groups dealing with energy, railway transportation, automobile, and
so on,…and four horizontal working groups.
Overall, it seems that the reform has indeed been quite successful
and that it has raised both the awareness and the level of enforcement
of EU competition law.
It is particularly worth noting that the establishment of a formal
network of competition authorities and the organization of a
systematic exchange of information on transnational cases among
national competition authorities has acted as a catalyst to promote
the development of deeper formal cooperation among them.  The
development of formal cooperation between national competition
authorities has also led to the development of informal cooperation
and exchange of views on general topics, sectoral study groups, and
so on. This phenomenon of generalized cooperation is all the more
interesting because cooperation and exchange of information between
national competition authorities before the adoption of Council
Regulation 1/2003 were very limited. The increase in formal and
informal cooperation between national competition agencies seems
to have increased, to a considerable degree, the enforcement of EU
law at national level. According to Philip Lowe, this, in turn, has also
changed the way the Commission enforces EC competition rules, by
transforming it from a mode of reactive enforcement to a pro-active
one.  Sectoral inquiries into energy and financial services, which the
European Commission has undertaken since the adoption of the
Council Regulation, may provide the clearest example of this.
Four general lessons can be learned from the European experience
described above:
1) Regional trade agreements are powerful, natural instruments for
promoting competition law enforcement because the benefits
of trade liberalization are realized only to the extent that firms
do not engage in anti-competitive measures which will restrain
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trade between the countries that are parties to the regional
agreement, thereby defeating its purpose.
2) The existence of a supranational competition law in a regional
grouping, which is not exclusive of the fact that Members States
can have their own national law to resolve competition issues
that do not involve transnational anti-competitive practices
having an effect on trade, can be a useful tool, both to promote
a level playing field and to promote the soft harmonization of
national laws over time.
3) When there is a body in charge of enforcing the supranational
law, the relationship this body and the national competition
authorities of the members of the regional grouping share is
bound to evolve over time. Strong input and control by the
‘federal’ body at the beginning of the process (for example via a
notification process) is useful to the extent that members of the
grouping may not initially have the required resources or
understanding of competition law enforcement. However, there
is a need to involve the national competition authorities of the
members of the regional grouping more closely over time and
to shift from an a priori to an ex post system of enforcement as
the case law develops, in order to limit the cost of enforcement
and make it more effective.
4)  Cooperation between competition authorities on transnational
issues does not come spontaneously but requires a framework,
including procedures to share information on cases of mutual
interest, on the kind of information that national competition
authorities need and a mechanism of case allocation. The
development of such a framework does not require the existence
of a supranational competition law.  Once this framework exists
both formal and informal cooperation between competition
authorities can develop.
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4. Examining four regional competition
agreements in the light of EU experience
This section evaluates the experience of four regional groupings
in dealing with cross-border anti-competitive practices. This
assessment has been organized around the main elements of the EU
Modernization scheme presented in Section 3: (i) the decentralization
of enforcement; (ii) the avoidance of multi-jurisdictional conflicts and
excessive costs; (iii) more effective regional law enforcement; and
(iv) fostering cooperation amongst regional and national authorities.
Prior to presenting this assessment, it appears useful to indicate
context in which the four regional groupings have developed their
competition policy enforcement regimes.
4.1. Brief description of the four selected regional groupings
The Andean Community (AC)12
In the Andean Group Free Trade Community, regional tariff and
non-tariff barriers were progressively reduced. Policy harmonization
on rules of origin, transportation, export subsidies, anti-dumping and
countervailing duties, intellectual property rights, and standards and
investment, among others, supplemented the trade liberalization
efforts of each country.
The Cartagena Agreement of 1969 does not contain any
competition rules similar to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome.
It does, however, include a mandate to adopt regulations for dealing
with restrictive business practices. Decision 285, enacted in 1991 by
the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, established common
rules ‘to prevent or correct distortions in competition resulting from
practices aimed at restricting free competition’. Its substantive
provisions and enforcement mechanisms are modelled after European
Union competition rules. The system is therefore based on
supranational rules enforced by community bodies.
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Decision 285 prohibits restrictive practices resulting either from
collusive agreements (such as price fixing, restraints on output,
distribution, technical development and investment, market
allocation, discrimination, and tying arrangements) or from abuses
of dominant position (such as refusals to deal, withholding of input
to competing firms and discrimination) as long as they affect
competition in more than one country of the subregion. If the practice
does not have extraterritorial implications, then national law applies.
The enforcement of Decision 285 was the responsibility of the
Board of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement (hereafter
referred to as the Board), a supranational institution, which conducted
investigations and proceedings at the request of countries or affected
firms. The General Secretariat prepared and carried out the
investigation jointly with the relevant national competition authority
If the Board determines that the practice is restrictive to
competition, it may issue an order for it to be ceased. It may also
authorize the affected country to impose corrective measures, that
is, to lower tariffs on the products exported by means of restrictive
practices.
A number of institutional limitations have contributed to the
failure of Decision 285. A first limitation was that the Board could
not initiate investigations on its own. Its actions had to be requested
either by the countries or by firms having a legitimate interest. This
left the Board with little power to oversee the Andean market.
A second limitation was that the Board had neither punitive nor
coercive powers to force firms to implement its decisions. It simply
issued a finding with an explanation setting forth its conclusions and
a recommendation to cease the practice.
A third limitation was that political will to enforce competition
policy was at best inconsistent (there was virtually no regard for
competition in Bolivia and Ecuador and the interest for competition
in Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela was inconsistent).
According to Ana Julia Atar and Luis Tineo, at the end of the
1990s13
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‘Four important points can be concluded from the Andean
countries’ experience. First, competition policy still depends
heavily on individuals rather than on institutions. The
president plays a determining role in policy shaping, which
cannot easily be set apart by the supposedly independent
agencies. The heads of the agencies are to some extent subject
to signals hinging upon the government’s will. The green light
has been fully given in Peru where INDECOPI still enjoys the
government’s confidence. The green light has selectively been
given in Colombia and Venezuela, but a red light has been
given where frequent shifts in government policies have forced
the competition agencies to change priorities in their agendas.
Second, a lack of government conviction in competition policy
has increased rent-seeking activities by the traditional
business groups. Governments have given in to competition
pressures. Accordingly, sectoral exemptions have been
bestowed, new restrictions to trade and investment have begun
to appear, sanitary and phytosanitary measures have halted
imports, and threats of antidumping and countervailing duty
actions have intensified, as have domestic industry lobbying
for tariff protection. The economic turmoil of Colombia and
Venezuela are clear examples of the protectionist answers that
governments can provide against increases in competition
coming from abroad.
Third, the laws have been applied very differently to similar
situations. Although there are common grounds regarding
collusive agreements, such agreements have been more
effectively prosecuted in Peru and Venezuela than in
Colombia, and they are freely employed in Bolivia and
Ecuador. None of the countries has developed sound criteria
toward vertical restraints. Finally, each country has tailored
its own merger policy, which ranges from full freedom to
merge in Peru, to an outdated system in Colombia where
mergers are overlooked, to a forceful system in Venezuela
where mergers matter. As a result, each country, with different
priorities, has yielded different outcomes and therefore,
provided firms with different signals.
Fourth, the Andean countries and existing agencies have
missed the regional role that competition policy may play in
the integration project. The Andean institutions have lost their
leadership in this area to the extent that competition policy is
left to each country. Extraterritorial problems originated by
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cartels and restraints at the distribution channels are
increasing in the region(…). Despite the fact that the increase
of competition in the region is largely due to the Andean trade
liberalization framework, the absence of a regional
competition policy not only has not promoted the expected
regional integration of firms, but, for the most part, its
inhibition.’
In spite of these weaknesses, a few cases have been dealt with,
and in the first semester of 2005, one investigation was launched.14
On 29 March 2005, Decision 608 on ‘Regulations for the Protection
and Promotion of Competition in the AC’15 was adopted. This
Decision, amending Decision 285, meets some of the concerns raised
by Ms Atar and L. Tineo. In addition, this Decision was partly
conceived as a result of the Cooperation Agreement between the EU
and the Andean Community, which had the following three main
objectives: (i) to amend the former community competition law; (ii)
to adopt national competition laws for Bolivia and Ecuador; and (iii)
to adapt the domestic laws of Colombia, Peru and Venezuela to the
new community competition law.16.
One of the most important aspects of the Decision 608 - a major
difference with the former Decision 285 - is that it empowers the AC
General Secretariat to tackle cross-border anti-competitive practices
more effectively by imposing sanctions.17. According to Article 18 of
Decision 608, the General Secretariat can run its own investigations
and gather all the evidence that it deems necessary.  In addition, the
national authority in charge of the investigation and the General
Secretariat will coordinate during the investigation period.
Decision 608 creates an advisory Committee (the Andean
Committee for the Protection of  Competition) ,  composed of
representatives of national competition authorities and designed to
facilitate better handling of competition cases and guarantee the flow
of information between the regional body and national competition
authorities.18
Article 37 of Decision 608 also provides for the development of
exchanges of information and experience as well as technical training
and the compilation of jurisprudence on competition law and policy.
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CARICOM19
The Member States of The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St
Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago.
Chapter VIII of the Treaty of Chaguaramas (hereafter referred to
as the Revised Treaty)20 provides for the development of a Community
Competition Policy.
The basic objective of the CARICOM competition policy regime
is to ensure that anti-competitive conduct does not prevent the
benefits expected to accrue from the establishment of the CARICOM
Single Market and Economy (CSME).
The Protocol prohibits agreements, decisions and concerted
practices by firms that have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition and abuses of a dominant
position in the market.
The Protocol provides for various legal and economic
exemptions.
Activities undertaken by employees for self-protection or
collective bargaining by employees or employers do not fall within
the scope of competition rules and the activities of professional
associations whose standards are approved by the Competition
Commission would not be subject to competition rules.
The competition rules do not apply to anti-competitive business
conduct of a firm having minimal effect on trade in the CSME or to
agreements, decisions and concerted practices by firms that have the
effect of improving production or the distribution of goods and
services or promoting technical or economic progress if the
competition restrictions are indispensable to the firm’s attainment
of the aforementioned objectives and competition is not eliminated
in a substantial part of the relevant market for the good or service.
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The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) has
the power to exempt sectors or enterprises or groups of enterprises
in the public interest and to develop special rules for special sectors.
The CARICOM Model Law is intended to guide the Members in
developing their legislation.
Member States are required to enact rules of competition as
outlined in Chapter VIII of the Treaty, and to establish national
competition authorities to implement and enforce these rules.
Member States are also required to take effective measures to ensure
access by nationals of other Member State to enforcement authorities,
including courts, on an equitable, transparent and non-discriminatory
basis.
Jamaica and Barbados are the only countries that have
competition regimes in place. Jamaica has had a competition law
(the Fair Trading Act) and an authority (The Fair Trading
Commission) since 1993. Currently that law is being amended to take
into consideration, among other factors, the provisions of Chapter
VIII of the Revised Treaty. Barbados enacted its law in January 2003,
and has set up a Fair Trading Commission that brings under one
umbrella the supervision of regulated industries, competition and
consumer affairs. While St Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) passed
a competition law in 1998, no authority has been set up to enforce
the law. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a
subregional grouping of smaller states within CARICOM, and
Trinidad and Tobago both have draft laws and other Member States
are in the process of drafting their laws.
The Protocol provides that all legislation, agreements and
administrative practices inconsistent with the rules of competition
must be notified to the COTED within 24 months. The Member States
were required, within 36 months of the Protocol’s coming into effect,
to establish a programme providing for the termination of proscribed
legislation, agreements and administrative practices.
The Protocol calls for the creation of a regional competition
commission composed of seven members with skills in commerce,
finance, economic law, competition policy and international trade
and to be appointed by the Regional Judicial Legal Service
Commission (RJLSC).
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The CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC) is responsible
for enforcing the rules of competition, coordinating the
implementation of CARICOM Competition Policy, promoting
competition in the CSME, and performing any other function
designated by any competent body of the Community.
The CARICOM Competition Commission is severely hampered
by restrictions that are due to the reluctance on the part of Member
States to relinquish sovereignty. The lack of supranational legal
authority for the CARICOM Competition Commission is a major
shortcoming of the Revised Treaty. For example, in CARICOM, the
initiation of an investigation is complex. Upon formal request of the
Commission, the relevant national competition authority must first
undertake a preliminary examination. If the results of this preliminary
investigation suggest that further investigation of the matter is
justified, then the CARICOM Competition Commission and the
relevant national authority shall hold consultations to determine and
agree on who should have jurisdiction to investigate. If there is a
difference of opinion regarding who should conduct the investigation,
the CARICOM Competition Commission is required to cease any
further examination of the matter and refer it to the CARICOM
Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) for decision.
As Taimoon Stewart has argued, this ‘arrangement is very worrisome,
since it virtually “ties the hands” of the Community Commission, and vests
power in COTED, a political body’.
Finally, at national level, each Member State is responsible for
the enforcement of its domestic competition law rules and for enacting
legislation that:
• Ensures consistency and compliance with the rules of competition
for CARICOM;
• Ensures that the determinations of the CARICOM Competition
Commission are enforceable in its jurisdiction;
• Establishes a national competition authority and facilitates the
development of administrative procedures to enforce the rules
of competition; and
• Provides penalties for anti-competitive business conduct.
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MERCOSUR22
Although the creation of the Common Market took place in 1991
with the signing of the Asunción Treaty by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay, it was not until December 1996 that an ambitious set of
guidelines towards a common competition policy in the region was
adopted. One important goal of the protocol was to pave the way for
abolishing anti-dumping measures among MERCOSUR countries.
Indeed, anti-dumping measures have been widely used in the region
and they impair trade. For example, between 1991 and 2001, Argentina
had initiated 38 anti-dumping actions against Brazil, two against
Paraguay and one against Uruguay, while Brazil has opened two
investigations against Argentina and two against Uruguay.
According to Article 4 of the Protocol, ’individual or concerted
acts, of whatever kind, the purpose or final effect of which is to
restrict, limit, falsify or distort competition or access to the market
or which constitute an abuse of a dominant position in the relevant
goods or services market in the framework of the MERCOSUR, and
which affect trade between the States Parties’ constitute an
infringement of the Protocol.
The Member States commit themselves to adopt, within two
years, common rules for the control of acts and contracts, of any kind,
which may limit or in any way cause prejudice to free trade, or result
in the domination of the relevant regional market of goods and
services, including those which result in economic concentration,
with a view to preventing their possible anti-competitive effects in
the framework of the MERCOSUR.
The protocol is to be enforced by the MERCOSUR Trade
Commission (TC) and the Committee for the Defence of Competition
(CDC). Both bodies are composed of representatives from each
member country. However, in the case of the CDC, each country’s
representatives must come from its respective competition agency.
The TC performs adjudicative functions, whereas the CDC is
responsible for the investigation and evaluation of cases, which are
handled in three stages. Proceedings are initiated before the
competition authority of each country at the request of an interested
party. After a preliminary determination of whether the practice has
MERCOSUR implications, the competition agency may submit the
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case to the CDC for a second determination. Both evaluations must
follow a rule of reason analysis in which a definition of the relevant
market is made and evidence of the conduct and the economic effects
must be provided. Then, the CDC must decide whether the practice
violates the Protocol and recommend that sanctions and/or other
measures be imposed. The CDC ruling is submitted to the TC for
final adjudication by means of a directive.
As part of these procedures, the protocol establishes provisions
for preventive measures and undertakings of cessation. This
mechanism allows the defendant to cease the investigated practice
under certain obligations agreed upon with the CDC.
The monitoring of these measures and the enforcement of the
sanctions are the responsibility of the national competition
authorities.
Article 32 of the Fortaleza Protocol mandated: ’The States Parties
undertake, within a two year period following entry into force of the
present Protocol, and for purpose of their incorporation in this
instrument, to draft joint standards and mechanisms which shall
govern State aid which is susceptible to limit, restrict, falsify or distort
competition and to affect trade between the State Parties.’
Like any other international treaty in compliance with Public
International Law rules, the Protocol must be ratified by all national
parliaments of the Member countries to enter into effect. However,
the ratification process was not completed and currently the Protocol
is being reviewed in order to introduce amendments.
Two main reasons seem to explain why the Protocol was not
ratified.
1. The first reason was strong resistance to the provisions of the
Protocol providing for the elimination of anti-dumping duties
and for the regulation of state aids, as was stipulated by the
Protocol. This resistance is partly due to trade asymmetries
among the MERCOSUR Member States and the domination of
the Brazilian economy.
2. The second reason is the lack of experience in antitrust law
enforcement, particularly in the case of Paraguay and Uruguay.
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A cooperation agreement among the antitrust agencies of
MERCOSUR was recently adopted (July 2004) and has been put into
effect, after being incorporated into the national laws of each member
state. A special provision was made to allow Paraguay to join the
Agreement once it adopts a competition law and establishes a
competition authority. The aim of this agreement called
‘Understanding on Cooperation between Competition Defence
Authorities of Member States of MERCOSUR for the Enforcement of
National Competition Laws’ (the ’Understanding’) is to promote
cooperation in the execution of national competition laws and
technical cooperation between national competition authorities.
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)22
The West African Economic and Monetary Union - (hereafter
referred as its French original acronym UEMOA - Union Économique
et Monétaire Ouest Africaine) includes eight countries (Benin, Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea- Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo).
UEMOA Member States have embarked on a series of reforms since
May 1996. As a result of these efforts, by 1999, all tariff barriers were
eliminated on intra-community trade. This has led to a certain level
of market integration, strengthened by a customs union and common
trade policy.
In May 2002, the UEMOA Council of Ministers adopted the
Community Competition Law, which is comprised of five elements:
1. Control of anti-competitive behaviour within the UEMOA;
2. Rules and procedure related to the control of cartels and abuse
of dominant position within the UEMOA;
3. The control of State aids within the UEMOA;
4. Transparency of the financial relationship between Members
States and public enterprises on the one hand, and between
public enterprises and international or foreign organizations on
the other; and
5. Cooperation between UEMOA’s Commission and national
authorities in the enforcement of the law.
To promote clarity and legal predictability with regard to
competition, it was deemed necessary that the competition law should
include a non-exhaustive list of banned practices. The content of the
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list was based partly on the practices most frequently encountered
in any market economy, and partly on the distinctive features of
UEMOA, particularly as regards vertical agreements.
The law also applies to practices ’comparable’ to an abuse of
dominance and to mergers. Individual or sectoral exemptions can
be granted.
As in the case of the AC, the UEMOA Competition Law applies
to practices that have an intra-regional effect. Similarly, countries
that do not have national competition laws may apply regional
competition law within their national boundaries. This is the case,
for instance, of Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Togo. These countries
have been asked to adopt a competition law in conformity with
Community Competition Regulations. Meanwhile, these countries
take part in the implementation of the Community Competition
Regulations through their involvement in the deliberations of the
Regional Advisory Committee on competition (the supranational
administrative body in charge of the enforcement of this regulation.),
which is composed of two representatives from each member state.
Its role is to provide advice on the Commission’s draft decisions.
Following a ruling by the UEMOA Court of Justice (opinion 003/
2000/CJ/UEMOA) the UEMOA Commission has exclusive authority
to implement Treaty provisions concerning competition. National
competition authorities enforce national competition laws when they
exist, but national laws are inoperative in areas covered by community
rules. However, formal and informal cooperation between the
Commission and the competition authority of each country occur
whenever there is an investigation. This cooperation is simplified by
the fact that the Commission is composed of two representative of
each member state.23 A network linking the Commission and national
competition authorities is in the process of being set up to promote
this cooperation.
Recently two decisions were taken concerning the construction
of a gas pipeline across Benin and Togo.  In the first decision, in
application of UEMOA ‘s Community Competition Regulations on
state aids, the Commission granted Benin and Togo a special fiscal
and legal regime so these countries would to be able to provide fiscal
incentives to enterprises involved in the construction of the gas
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pipeline. The second decision was an exemption granted by the
Commission to a joint venture between the enterprises, which will
have the responsibility to run the pipeline after its construction.24,25
4.2 The EU experience and the four regional agreements:
similarities and differences
The various provisions of the four groupings described above
will be examined below, in light of EU experience in competition law
and policy. Clearly, not all of the EU characteristics are adaptable to
the other regional realities. Some features are directly related to the
concurrent jurisdiction of the European Commission and the national
competition authorities to enforce EU law- Therefore, they are not
relevant to the four regional agreements since none of them enforces
the regional law concurrently with the national authority. Other
elements discussed in the review of the EU modernization system
concerning the way the regional authority promotes the development
of national competition law, the cooperation between national
authorities and the regional authorities in the enforcement of the
regional laws and the cooperation between national authorities, are
relevant to the case of the regional agreements.
4.2.1 Relationship between trade and competition
It is clear that in the case of the EU the establishment of
competition rules was deemed to be a necessary complement to trade
liberalization. As in the case of the EU, in the four regional agreements
under review, competition law provisions are considered to be a
necessary addition to or an integral part of regional trade
liberalization measures. The provisions of regional competition laws,
when they exist, apply to practices that have an effect on trade. The
complementary nature of international trade policy and competition
policy, which has been much discussed at multilateral level in the
context of the negotiations of the Doha Round at the WTO, is clearly
illustrated in those agreements.
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4.2.2 Centralization of regional law enforcement
 Much of the rationale for the decentralization of EU competition
law enforcement comes from the fact that the European market is
deeply integrated; therefore, a considerable number of anti-
competitive practices may have an effect on intra-community trade.
As a consequence, national competition authorities need to assist the
European Commission in dealing with routine cases so as to avoid
an excessive burden to the Commission.  The authors have shown
that to achieve this result, in Europe, national competition authorities
are competent, together with the European Commission, to enforce
EU law, at least as far anti-competitive practices are concerned. They
also enforce their own domestic competition laws. It was also seen
that the enforcement of EU law by national competition authorities
had necessitated the creation of a network of European competition
authorities and measures designed to bring better comprehension of
competition issues at national level and a more efficient decentralized
enforcement of EU law.  Overall, to ensure consistent enforcement,
the decentralization of the enforcement of the regional law has
required building a rather complex system of relationships between
the Commission and the national authorities.
In the four regional groupings chosen, although market
integration is a goal, the level of market integration actually achieved
is not yet as significant as in Europe. As a result many public restraints
to international trade remain and private anti-competitive practices
may be perceived to be a less important obstacle (in relative terms)
to market integration than in Europe. Additionally, Member States
belonging to the regional groupings are, in some cases (particularly
in the case of CARICOM and UEMOA) small developing countries
with limited resources to devote to fighting anti-competitive practices
and little experience of antitrust enforcement. Therefore, the pressure
to decentralize the enforcement of regional competition law may be
less than in Europe.
In three out of four cases, the model used is that of a grouping
with a supranational law enforced by a supranational body, although,
as shall be seen later, there can be significant differences in the
enforcement powers of supranational bodies.
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This is, for example, the case of the AC, where Decision 285
establishes common rules: ‘to prevent or correct distortions in
competition resulting from practices aimed at restricting free
competition’ and creates a supranational institution, which conducts
investigations and proceedings at the request of countries or affected
firms. It is also true of the CARICOM Model Law, which is intended
to guide its Members in developing their own national legislation.26
The CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC) shares the
responsibility for enforcement of the regional law with the national
competition authorities Finally, it is the also the model followed by
UEMOA, which has a model regional law and where the Commission
has exclusive authority to implement Treaty provisions concerning
competition.
In two of the three agreements, UEMOA and the AC, the regional
bodies in charge of enforcing the supranational law have acquired
significant powers.
The case of the AC is particularly interesting because, as already
indicated, significant institutional changes in 2005 have given teeth
to the regional institution, provided for more cooperation between
the regional and national authorities and increased pressure to adopt
national competition law consistent with the regional law. For
example, as mentioned earlier,  Decision 608 of the Andean
Community now the General Secretariat of the Community of Andean
countries to impose sanctions in case of transnational anti-competitive
practices.  These changes remedied two previously identified
weaknesses of the grouping: the lack of an appropriate competition
culture and the lack of sanctioning power for the regional competition
authority. The grouping had not been successful in developing a
culture of competition at the national levels of its Member States and
in some there was little or no interest in competition. In the discussion
concerning the European Union, an increased level of awareness of
competition issues at national level in most Member States has, to a
large extent, been due to the increase in cooperation with the
Commission and with other national competition authorities; the
regional competition authority was very weak because it did not have
sanctioning powers and had only limited means of investigation.
In the case of UEMOA, inspiration for its institutional design
clearly came from the EU model. The RTA has a strong central body
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in charge of enforcing a regional law that applies to practices that
have an effect on trade between Member States. Member States are
required to adopt national laws consistent with the regional law and,
in case of conflict, the principle of primacy of the regional law applies.
The centralized enforcement by a supranational body of a
regional law necessarily entails some relinquishment of national
sovereignty; this has already happened,  as in the case of the EU, in
the UEMOA agreement and also in the AC agreement since its recent
changes. Attempts to promote a centralized system of enforcement
without relinquishment of national sovereignty to the regional body
in terms of powers of investigation or sanctioning of illegal practices
results in paralysis.  This is partly what is happening in CARICOM,
which is the least successful of the three regional agreements
providing for the centralization of a regional law. Indeed, the
CARICOM Competition Commission is severely hampered by
restrictions that directly result from the reluctance on the part of
Member States to relinquish sovereignty. It is possible that one of the
reasons for the failure of CARICOM members to provide the
CARICOM Competition Commission with sufficient investigatory
power to effectively enforce the regional law is the disproportion of
economic power among the countries that compose the grouping.
The economies and trade capacity of Jamaica and, in particular, of
Trinidad and Tobago are considerably more developed than that of
the smaller islands (such as, for example, St Vincent and the
Grenadines) or that of the least developed members states (such as
Haiti). At the same time, a number of these small island economies
are in direct competition when it comes to tourism, for example. It is
thus possible that the fear exists that, if they are not strictly controlled
by the Member States, the regional institutions might represent the
interests of the more powerful countries to the detriment of the other
Member States.
4.2.3 The harmonization of national competition laws with the
regional law
In the case of the European Union, as has already been
mentioned, Member States have, over time, adopted national
competition laws with provisions similar to the provisions of Articles
81 and 82 of the EU Treaty. This soft harmonization is a consequence
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of the EU institutional architecture and the principle of primacy of
Community law.  This system ensures a level playing field in Europe;
similar practices are treated in the same way from the standpoint of
competition whether or not they affect intra-European trade. In
addition, cooperation between the Commission and national
authorities is facilitated by the fact that national competition
authorities enforce, at domestic level, prohibitions similar to those
of the EU Treaty.
In the three regional agreements examined that establish a
regional law (that is all of the agreements reviewed except for
MERCOSUR), national competition authorities do not enforce the
regional law.  However, it is still important for the consistency of the
system that, to the fullest possible extent, the Member States have a
national competition law and that those national competition laws
be consistent with the regional law. Furthermore, national competition
authorities may be called in to assist the regional competition
authority in the enforcement of the regional law and it is thus useful,
for the cooperation to be effective, that national authorities have some
experience enforcing a law similar to the regional law.
In all three of these groupings, Member States are required to
adopt national competition laws in line with the regional law. For
example, in the case of CARICOM, Member States must create a
national competition authority and enact competition legislation
consistent with CARICOM competition rules. Decision 608 on
‘Regulations for the Protection and Promotion of Competition in the
Andean Community’27 requires Bolivia and Ecuador to adopt national
competition laws and the other Member States to adapt their national
laws to make them consistent with the new community competition
law. In UEMOA, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Togo have been
asked to adopt a competition law in conformity with the Community
Competition Regulations.
Those Member States of UEMOA that have not so far been able
to adopt a domestic competition law may, within their boundaries,
apply regional competition law to practices that do not have a trade
effect. Similarly, the Andean Community Law is applicable in Bolivia
and Ecuador and could be used to challenge domestic anti-
competitive practices.
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4.2.4 Cooperation among national competition authorities
without supranational law enforcement system: the case of
MERCOSUR
 The MERCOSUR agreement is quite different from the other
three agreements reviewed, in the sense that it does not include a
supranational law or a supranational enforcement agency.
Enforcement powers in the area of competition rest with the national
competition authorities; the agreement merely provides for a
mechanism of cooperation and exchange of information between
national competition authorities on transnational issues. As already
mentioned, the agreement has not yet been ratified, and all
MERCOSUR countries do not yet have a national competition law.
Overall, it seems that the MERCOSUR cooperation agreement has
been largely ineffective.
Several considerations can be put forward to explain this relative
failure.
First, it is not easy to promote cooperation or exchange of
information among national competition authorities in the absence
of compulsory mechanisms. Before the EU modernization process
there was little cooperation among Member State authorities.
However, once the network was established and once national
competition authorities were required to provide information to the
network on transnational cases they were dealing with, cooperation
between them went far further and extended to the establishment of
working groups and much informal cooperation.
Furthermore, EU Member States, which are not only
geographically close but are also major trading partners, have
relatively similar levels of development. As a result, cooperation on
competition issues or exchange of information among national
competition authorities can be relatively balanced, in the sense that
the potential violators and the potential victims of transnational anti-
competitive practices are fairly evenly distributed among countries.
This is not the case in MERCOSUR, where the economic might of
Brazil very much dominates the region and the other members. This
imbalance is likely to make voluntary cooperation among national
authorities more difficult by exacerbating trade friction.
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4.2.5 Fostering formal and informal cooperation between
national competition authorities and regional bodies enforcing
‘regional law’
An interesting aspect of the Andean Community, and of the
UEMOA system, is the relationship between national and regional
authorities.
As previously explained, the adoption of an EU style relationship
between the regional and national competition authorities would
probably have been too complex to implement in the Andean
Community and in UEMOA. This is evident from the relatively
limited number of transnational cases and the limited resources of
national competition authorities within these two regional groupings,
and the fact that, in both groupings, there are countries that have
very little experience with competition law.
As a result, in both groupings the regional law is enforced by the
regional competition authority, yet both groupings have, in relatively
similar ways, ensured that national competition authorities would
nonetheless be involved in the enforcement of the regional
competition law.  In the Andean Community, the Andean Committee
for the Protection of Competition, an advisory committee composed of
representatives of national competition authorities, was created by
Decision 608 in March 2005.  Article 37 of the same decision provides
for exchange of information and experiences between competition
authorities as well as for technical training and the diffusion of
jurisprudence on competition law and policy.
Similarly, in UEMOA, the Regional Advisory Committee on
competition is composed of two representatives from each Member
State.
Finally, an ‘Understanding on Cooperation between Competition
Defence Authorities of Member States of MERCOSUR for the
Enforcement of National Competition Laws’ has recently been
adopted by MERCOSUR and is designed to promote cooperation
between the national competition authorities of Member States.
In order to develop cooperative links between the countries, the
competition authorities of the four groupings should act to
disseminate a culture of competition, to facilitate benchmarking and
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the establishment of best practices and ultimately to increase the level
of enforcement at national level, both in terms of quality and quantity.
The EU experience shows that the establishment of a more formal
network enabling competition authorities to engage in regular contact,
particularly when there is an obligation to provide information on
possible cases of violation of the regional law, leads to an
improvement in the awareness of regional laws, promotes a more
consistent enforcement of national and regional laws and helps the
spread of a competition culture in the Member States via the
development of informal cooperation between national authorities.
From the available information analysed, it seems that there is
still room to create more systematic links and interaction among the
national competition authorities in the four regional groupings.
5. Conclusions
Each of the regional agreements in Latin America and Africa
examined in this chapter faces difficult challenges and it is fair to
say that so far they have achieved modest results.
As already noted, in each of the regional agreement groupings
some Member States do not have a domestic competition law and a
domestic competition authority and, even in Member States that have
a competition law, awareness of the possible benefits of competition
is often lower than at regional level. As a result, there has been little
enthusiasm on the part of Member States to allow the regional
competition authorities sufficient powers and means to fulfil their
tasks (CARICOM, notably).
The situation is slowly changing. As an example, in the four
groupings examined, Member States that do not have a competition
law are required to adopt one. Nevertheless, adopting a national
competition law in these cases, particularly when this is principally
done to meet an obligation, is not sufficient to make Member States
appreciate the benefits of competition either at national level or at
the level of the regional grouping.
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Furthermore, many Member States involved in these regional
agreements are small economies with insufficient resources to fund
a national competition agency (this is particularly relevant for some
members of CARICOM and UEMOA). As a result, in Member States
having a national competition law, the law is not always enforced
vigorously nor is it even well understood.
Finally, when it comes to specific cases, regional competition is
not always welcomed by governments that may be more sensitive to
its short-term costs than to its long-term benefits (hence, for example,
the large number of anti-dumping measures in the MERCOSUR area).
This situation is very different from that which prevails in the
European Union. The level of awareness of competition is much more
widespread in Europe. This fact should not be surprising, in view of
the fact that the European Commission has pushed the agenda of
trade liberalization and competition for more than 50 years.
Furthermore, the economies of European Union Member States
are sufficiently prosperous that adequately financing their national
competition authorities does not constitute a major effort.
But, even though the conditions for the development of
competition law at regional level are very favourable in the EU
context, the recently adopted competition Modernization Package
represent an additional effort made to raise the level of awareness of
competition law in Member States and to decrease the costs of
enforcement
One of the lessons of the EU experience in this area is that, even
in the context of well-established trade and competition agreements,
further efforts to promote a competition culture in Member States
and to rationalize the enforcement of regional competition law are
always necessary.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the four regional authorities
should focus more on the development of a competition culture. This
advocacy function is crucial. Indeed, it would be a mistake to believe
that the existence of a regional competition agreement and/or
authority is in itself proof that the case for international competition
has been made. In fact, it is, at best, an opportunity to make this
case.
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One of the relatively inexpensive ways for a regional authority
to push forward the case for competition in Member States is through
a coordinated effort involving the various national competition
agencies.
As already indicated, the EU Modernization Package provides
for the establishment of a network of competition authorities meeting
regularly, informing one other of their respective activities, creating
working groups, developing personal relationships and cooperating
formally and informally on specific cases. The level of interaction
between the regional and national competition agencies seems to be
much more advanced in the EU than in the four groupings examined,
even though in some cases (MERCOSUR in particular), there have
been attempts to develop a network of competition authorities and
to promote cooperation.
Beyond what has already been said, the ability of a regional
competition authority to push the competition agenda is also
dependent on its enforcement capacity. The EU Commission has
actively used this power to investigate blatant anti-competitive
practices by firms or by governments (in the area of state aids). Such
cases have often been the subject of intense controversies in Member
States (particularly in the area of merger control).
In several of the agreements reviewed, the regional competition
authority has only limited means to initiate cases and is dependent
either on complaints from victims or from Member States. While
limitation of the powers of the regional body may be considered
legitimate to protect the national interests of the Member States, it
comes at a cost:  the weakening of regional competition law
enforcement.
Another lesson that can be drawn from EU experience is that it
is always worthwhile to seek ways to make competition law
enforcement less costly, particularly at regional level. This lesson
would seem to be particularly relevant for regional agreements among
developing countries whose Member States have limited resources.
But it is not only relevant for such agreements, as it was already noted
that a major motivation of the EU Commission in pushing the
Modernization Package was precisely the desire to reduce the cost of
enforcing EU competition law.
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From this standpoint, it would seem that for some of the four
agreements examined in this chapter there is room for improvement.
Indeed, the cooperation between national competition authorities and
the regional body in charge of competition (when such a body exists)
appears in some cases designed not so much to minimize the cost of
enforcement for the signatories of the agreement as to protect the
national sovereignty of each Member State. The most striking case is
that of CARICOM.  Some of the CARICOM Members States are micro-
states where the creation and the funding of a domestic competition
authority are not economically justified. In these circumstances,
concentrating the investigatory powers at regional level could have
contributed to minimizing the cost of enforcement for Member States.
Yet, on the one hand, Member States, when requested by the
CARICOM Commission, are expected to conduct preliminary
investigations on its behalf and, on the other, they have the power to
prevent the CARICOM Commission from further investigating a case
in which the Commission had reasons to believe that a violation of
CARICOM law had taken place. It may be that the issue of the proper
balance between the protection of national sovereignty of Member
States and the effectiveness of the regional competition policy will
have to be reconsidered.
A final remark is in order.
Before judging that the small number of cases examined under
these agreements is evidence of their ineffectiveness, one should
remember that in the EU there was practically no enforcement of the
regional competition law during the first decade after the Treaty was
signed (it was only very gradually that competition law enforcement
took centre stage) and that the four regional competition agreements
in Latin America and Africa considered here were all signed less than
ten years ago.  As is evident from the case of the EU, a regional
competition agreement can evolve (and usually become more
effective) over time. It has been shown that this process has already
taken place for some of the agreements examined.  In particular, it
was noted that the MERCOSUR Agreement is being reconsidered and
that Decision 608 on ‘Regulations for the Protection and Promotion
of Competition in the Andean Community’ was adopted and modified
Decision 285, thereby solving some problems. There is thus every
reason to believe that over time all four regional agreements will be
modified and that they will become more effective.
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The previous remarks on the lessons to be drawn from the EU
experience should not be understood to imply that the solutions
adopted in the EU Modernization Package are necessarily adequate
for other regional groupings.  What they do seek to suggest is that
some of the issues that are relevant in the case of the EU might also
be worth considering in the context of other regional agreements.
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1.  Introduction
This Chapter looks at the experiences of small economies in thespecific area of cooperation in the enforcement of competitionlaw and policy. It examines cooperation to deal with the cross-
border effects of anti-competitive conduct and the technical assistance
required for building capacity to implement and enforce the law. The
economies chosen for examination are the small economies of the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).1 These economies are deemed
to be small because of several characteristics which, when combined
together, create conditions of small size not seen in larger economies
that claim the status of small economies in the literature2 and the
international fora (such as, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada,
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Israel). It is argued here that the claim of these larger economies to
the status of small size is not only erroneous, but is damaging to the
needs of ‘real’ small economies, in that it erodes the very real claims
of such economies for consideration for special and differential
treatment. CARICOM countries are put forward as representatives
of the type of economies that qualify for designation as being of small
size.
CARICOM consists largely of the former British West Indian
colonies, which were granted independence over a period covering
a decade and a half from 1963 onwards. The first effort at integrating
all these economies under one governing body was in 1959 when
Britain attempted to bring them together in a West Indian Federation
with dominion status within the British Commonwealth. The
reasoning was that the island colonies were too small to be viable as
independent states. Indeed, the idea of independence was not even
entertained, given the small size of these economies. However,
Jamaica withdrew from the proposed West Indian Federation and
the whole idea collapsed. Thereafter, Britain granted independence
to the colonies, starting with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in
1963 and then the other islands during the rest of the 1960s and into
the mid-1970s. However, several islands in the Caribbean are still
colonies of Britain, such as the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman
Islands and Montserrat.
The governments of the newly independent countries soon
recognized that the small size and limited resources and capabilities
of these economies limited their developmental potential. As a result,
the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) was formed in 1968 by
which a process of integration was initiated. Inspired by the formation
of the European Community, the level of integration was deepened
in 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing a
Common Market in CARICOM. In recognition of the even greater
challenges faced by the smaller island states of the region, a
subregional grouping, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS),3 was formed in 1981 and has progressed to a much deeper
level of integration than the larger grouping, CARICOM.  Suriname
(formerly a Dutch colony) and Haiti (formerly a French colony) joined
CARICOM in 1995 and 2002, respectively. A loose arrangement
between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic, the Caribbean
Forum (CARIFORUM), exists for the specific purpose of coordinating
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their relations and particularly negotiations with Europe. Finally, in
the last decade of the 20th century, CARICOM began negotiations to
create the deepest level of integration, the CARICOM Single Market
and Economy (CSME). The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas was
signed in 2001, and all signatories are in the process of putting the
legal and institutional arrangements in place to meet the obligations
undertaken and thereby establish the CSME.
The Treaty of Chaguaramas has a special designation of Less-
(not least)Developed Countries (LDCs) within CARICOM to
differentiate between the smaller economies within the Community
and those that are more complex and viable, the More-Developed
Countries (MDCs). The countries included in this designation are
the OECS countries and Belize, and special and differential (S&D)
treatment is accorded to them. This designation is totally separate
from the UN list of Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) in the global
community or any other designation of LDCs at the global level. It
refers only to smaller economies within CARICOM and under the
specific terms of The Treaty of Chaguaramas.
The issue of small size and viability in the international economy
and system has become more pressing now with the changes in the
global economy, the stringent rules of international trade and the
absence of socio-economic considerations in the rulings of the World
Trade Organization. In the last decade and a half, these countries
have been on a roller coaster of economic ups and downs, but
primarily downs. It is precisely because of the small size and
vulnerability of these economies and their limited human and
financial resources that it is very difficult for them to break out of
this dire economic circumstance. These characteristics are explored
in the following section.
1.1   Characteristics of small size: the specific case of
CARICOM
Designation of small size status to a country has become a
contentious issue in international relations. There is ambiguity in
terms of its definition, primarily because the meaning has been
diffused by claims to the status of small size by countries such as
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Canada, Israel, Singapore, Australia and others. Those economies are
fairly complex with a reasonable level of integrated production
systems, innovation capability and control over cutting-edge
technologies that give them the capability to compete in the global
economy, even if in a limited specialized area, as is the case of
Singapore. Moreover, we note here the geo-politics of the post-World
War Two era, which resulted in massive aid such as the technical
assistance granted to East Asian countries to stimulate the
metamorphosis into the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries. We
argue here that it is contradictory to designate complex economies
as ‘small’. The term ‘Small Economies’ was introduced by CARICOM
economies into the language of international negotiations in the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) and other negotiating fora, and studies on small size
(Commonwealth Secretariat studies, for instance) have focused on
the Caribbean and Pacific small economies. Our central argument
here is that the meaning of the term ‘small size’ extends beyond static
indicators of size of land mass, population and gross domestic
product (GDP) to a dynamic notion of the interaction of a
configuration of characteristics linked to size and historical
experience that serve to limit development potential and options and,
thus, economic growth and societal development. The idea of ‘small
size’ is organically linked to underdevelopment and to both economic
and socio-political constraints to achieving development, not just to
static characteristics.
While most CARICOM countries are island states with a small
land mass, particularly the seven OECS countries, which are less than
800 sq. km, there are three that are continental states with a relatively
large land mass, such as Belize with 22,995 sq. km. Yet, the annual
GDP of Belize is under US$1 billion, similar to the small island states
in the OECS.  Singapore, with a land mass of 682.7 sq. km has an
annual GDP of US$106 billion approximately.4
Population size is significant because it impacts on market size
and therefore on opportunities for scale economies. The OECS and
Belize have populations of fewer than 300,000. Jamaica’s population
is 2.6 million (the largest next to Haiti) and Trinidad and Tobago’s is
1.3 million.5 Yet, Haiti’s population is 7 million and Singapore’s is 4.4
million, but there is a wide difference in the performance of those
two populations and their impact on economic performance.
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Different factors limit the capacity of these small countries to position
themselves in the global economy in a way that would result in inward
flows and retention of capital. Some factors are influenced by history
and culture. The Caribbean was the first non-European area to be
colonized.  Some of the history of slave trading may explain the
human resource constraints faced by these countries. There is a
shortage of technical human resources.
Also, the island status of most of these economies increases the
transportation cost of goods that negatively affect the economies.
Shipping routes and trading partners have been shaped by its colonial
heritage to look to other English-speaking territories. Belize and
Guyana have limited channels of communication/transportation with
their continental neighbours, though that is now changing,
particularly for Belize, with increasing economic linkages with Mexico
and Guatemala.
Few people and limited resources obviously also have led to a
limited demand for goods and services and, therefore, limited
economic activities service the domestic sector. Local firms are
generally small family firms that are technologically backward and
operating in the import and retail sectors or offering domestic
services. The local business sector is risk adverse and invests little or
nothing in Research and Development (R&D). Further, the
descendants of the colonial elite class dominate large sectors of the
domestic economy, such as the import and retail sectors. This
concentration in the hands of a few has resulted in limiting
entrepreneurial activities in the traditional domestic sectors.
The low savings rate in these economies partly stems from a lack
of confidence in the financial system. There is some evidence of
financial and human capital flight.
For OECS countries, the shortage of technical human resources
is so critical that the number of staff allocated to deal with external
trade negotiations (WTO, FTAA, ACP-EU and bilateral negotiations)
in most countries ranges from three to five officers. The workload is
so great that it is impossible to do research or to specialize in any
particular subject area. These countries are currently searching for
ways to minimize the effects of this deficit.
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The CARICOM Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM6) was
created in 1998 to address the problems of the Caribbean countries
at regional level, by facilitating trade negotiations through adequate
personnel conducting specialized research in areas of interests for
the region (to the extent possible given very limited staff). Consultants
have also studied the region to assist in policy formulation. However,
interests differ in the region between the MDCs and the LDCs, and
the OECS countries are not confident that they could abdicate policy
formulation and development of negotiating positions to the CRNM.
Therefore, the OECS Trade Negotiation Group (TNG) was formed in
2003 to coordinate policy and negotiating positions within the OECS
for submission to the CRNM. The TNG shows promise, in that
discussions within this group have been fruitful and more coherent
positions are being developed. However, much more needs to be done
to develop institutional structures and portfolio allocation to
maximize the potential of this group.7
Besides these problems, there are other serious structural
rigidities. All the economies are characterized by single commodity
export that is the major springboard for other economic activities,
thus rendering the economies very vulnerable to changes in the global
marketplace. Natural resource exploitation is dominated by foreign
direct investment (FDI): for example, tourism, oil, bauxite, and agro-
processing. Moreover, the leading sector generally remains at the
primary processing level, with the lucrative components of the
product chain remaining in the hands of firms in the industrialized
countries. While this is clearly evident in the commodity production
industries, it is also true of the tourism industry, which is increasingly
dominated by the International Tour Operators who, through vertical
linkages, dictate the terms of trade and cream off the profits from
the industry. Because of the colonial inheritance of producing
commodities for export and importing consumption needs, these
economies still retain structural rigidities that are difficult to
transform. Thus, there are few linkages between the leading sectors
and the rest of the economy. Most inputs to cater for the tourism
industry are imported, for instance.
The dependence on imports rather than on local production and
the dominance of a limited export sector at primary levels of
production have led to dependence by the government on a narrow
tax base, particularly tariffs on imports. There is a conflict, therefore,
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between the thrust towards lowering tariffs and the need to defend
government revenue. The narrow base of export markets makes these
economies vulnerable to sudden changes because of lack of flexibility
to switch. Such is the case of tourism where heavy dependence on
the US market, for instance, can lead to sudden stemming of tourist
inflows if there is an economic downturn or security problems or if
advice is given to citizens against travelling to a particular destination
either because of security risks in the host country or for geo-political
reasons.
Economic fragility is compounded by vulnerability to natural
disaster, with Montserrat destroyed by volcanic eruptions, and
repeated destruction across the region caused by hurricanes. This
leads to uncertainty as to the sustainability of several sectors in the
economy as, for example, agriculture and tourism, which could
sustain product and infrastructural damage resulting in disruption
in economic activities, increases in insurance rates and interest rates
on bank loans, or even inaccessibility to loans, and general disruption
in the whole economy. It is the immediate and pervasive impact on
the whole society and economy of a single blow – a decline in
commodity price or loss of market, a hurricane, excessive competition
from imports and the inability to recoup, leading to serious socio-
economic problems – that is a defining feature of small, vulnerable
economies.
1.2   Competition law in small economies of CARICOM
The findings of a recent study on competition issues undertaken
in CARICOM countries8 confirm that, even in micro-economies that
are open to imports and foreign direct investment, anti-competitive
conduct can be found in the non-tradable sector.
Moreover, the study shows that the persistent concentration of
wealth in the hands of the descendants of the plantocracy, leads in
many cases to dominance in product markets and to related abuses
of dominant position. It was also found that in the non-tradable
sectors, mergers leading to excessive concentration or monopolies
could be harmful.
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Also, price-fixing by Trade Associations persists openly, mainly
because of unawareness of the illegality of the act. Such trade
associations (e.g. Bakers’ Associations, Shipping Agents) should be
alerted to the potential illegality of their conduct, and monitored for
continued collusion. Disciplining other associations, such as taxi
associations in tourist economies, could be problematic in many of
the territories because of the political and socio-economic fall-out
that could result.
Cooperation amongst small firms exists and it is meant to achieve
economies of scale in importation and the retail of products. In the
study, this business conduct was found amongst newly migrant ethnic
groups (Chinese, Taiwanese and Indians).  These groups are
challenging the incumbents, usually from the plantocracy class,
providing more competition and, thus, benefits are flowing to
consumers. They are likely to be exempt from the law under the de
minimus clause.
Very high concentrations in product markets were found in these
economies, both as a result of efforts to achieve minimum efficient
scale and because of the unequal distribution of wealth derived from
historical circumstances. Moreover, the lines of division amongst
importers, distributors and retailers are much diffused. Abuse of a
dominant market position is more likely to occur, particularly in the
import/distribution/retail trades and downstream tourism services,
in which Destination Management Companies could squeeze smaller
players out of the market through exercise of market power.
Interlocking directorates are prevalent in these economies and
seemingly are used to ensure the continued control of the economy
by the dominant elite.
Collusion was found to be unlikely in the micro-economies, given
an aversion to cooperation and a reluctance to disclose information
found amongst family firms. This may not be as pronounced in
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, where the economies are larger
and more complex. Moreover, it could be extremely difficult to prove
collusion, barring written evidence, given the culture of small
societies, with close personal relations amongst business rivals.
The research showed that, despite the validity of smallness and
economies of scale arguments against Merger Control Regulation
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(MCR), evidence of the need for MCR in the non-tradable sector was
found. For instance, in Belize, one bus company, through allegedly
predatory behaviour, succeeded in effecting a hostile takeover of the
other five companies on the country-wide route and once the
monopoly was achieved, raised fares, leading to riots.
Competition law in small economies should:
• Include provisions proscribing anti-competitive agreements, abuse of a
dominant market position, and merger control regulation
• Introduce competition law initially focusing on advocacy in order to
develop a culture of competition and understanding of the law by the
business sector
• Have a soft merger control regulation that would not impose heavy
burdens on the Commission, but would allow the authorities to deal
with mergers in the non-tradable sector in particular that would be
harmful to consumers
• Introduce merger control regulation some years after the introduction
of the competition regime, so that skills could be developed to apply
the regime
• Have a threshold for MCR low enough to catch the dominant local firms
but introducing in the evaluation sensitive criteria tailored to the need
to achieve minimum efficient scale
• With excessive concentrations caused by inherited wealth, there may
need to be targeting for abuse of a dominant position as the most
important aspect of competition law enforcement and in the corporate
public interest
• Have a lower threshold for determining dominance than what exists in
developed markets
• Allow for exemption of small- and medium-sized enterprises
• Recognize the difficulty of proving collusion in small societies where
personal relationships amongst business persons are deep and
intimate
• Recognize that the leniency programme may not work and may even be
dangerous to whistle-blowers in these small economies, saddled as
they are with businesses that are conduits for drug money laundering
• Target trade associations but also be sensitive to the socio-economic
fall-outs, such as dealing with taxi associations in tourist economies
Box 10.1 Recommendations and observations on domestic compe-
tition laws in small economies
Source:  Stewart, 2004
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Having a strong competition regime in each CARICOM country
could lead to changes in the structure of ownership in the economies.
At present, bank rates are so high, with margins between the lending
and borrowing rates so wide that the cost of money to the business
sector is extremely high. Banks operate in a cartel-like fashion, though
they claim to be engaging in a ‘follow the leader tactic’. Moreover,
banks discriminate in their lending policies against the small
entrepreneurs by having stringent collateral rules. Access to capital
is therefore a barrier to entry into the market for small entrepreneurs.
A strong competition regime may serve as a disincentive to this
cooperation amongst banks and stimulate competition, leading to
consumer benefits and providing opportunities to new entrepreneurs
In the next section, the underlying reasons for cooperation and
forms of cooperation are examined as a basis from which to evaluate
the needs of the small economies of CARICOM.
1.3   Cooperation on cross-border effects of anti-
competitive practices
Competition law is designed to deal with anti-competitive
practices that take place within a national jurisdiction, and which
adversely affect domestic consumers. Most competition laws
explicitly exclude from their scope those anti-competitive practices
that have no effect on the domestic market. For example, export
cartels are excluded from coverage by the law in most competition
regimes (an exception, among others, being Brazil) because domestic
consumers are not affected; rather, foreign consumers are the ones
who are adversely affected. Competition authorities would take no
action in cases where domestic consumers are not affected. Some
laws include provisions that allow authorities to investigate cases in
which perpetrators of anti-competitive practices are outside the
national jurisdiction, but their practices affect national consumers.
However, enforcing this provision is tantamount to extraterritoriality,
which is not sanctioned under international law, and which can only
be engaged in by the powerful countries.
The problem with investigating and applying sanctions to firms
outside one’s jurisdiction which are engaging in misconduct affecting
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one’s consumers is that there is no legal access to the firms involved,
and no legal basis upon which to conduct investigations in another
country’s jurisdiction, without the explicit consent and, preferably,
cooperation of that country. It is in this context that bilateral
cooperation agreements were developed. For instance, the practice
of notification began initially because the United States was exercising
extraterritoriality in OECD countries in order to get information
related to anti-competitive conduct affecting its domestic market. As
such, the first agreements signed in the 1980s were defensive in
nature.9 Over the last decade and a half, cooperation agreements have
deepened considerably, but only amongst OECD countries, with the
deep levels of cooperation still limited to a few of them. These include:
consultations, exchange of non-confidential and/or confidential
information allowed by the domestic laws, notifications of
enforcement activities affecting the other party’s interests,
commitments to take into account the other party’s significant
interests when investigating or applying remedies, requests for
assistance in investigations into anti-competitive conduct, requests
for enforcement of an order by one party in the territory of another
party, joint investigations, mutual legal assistance, and positive
comities.10
Such deeper levels of cooperation are relatively recent
phenomena, though, in that as late as the early 1990s, there was some
reluctance on the part of OECD countries to cooperate with one
another. The work being done in the OECD Secretariat on hard-core
cartels was a major trigger to deepening cooperation modalities
amongst these countries. Even now, sharing of confidential
information is done very sparingly, and most countries have laws
that prohibit the sharing of information that is not in the public
domain, or that was acquired in the process of an investigation. The
experience of OECD countries has been one of gradual deepening of
cooperation as they gain credibility with one another’s competition
authorities, and a level of personal relationships and trust developed
amongst staff. Such cooperation has been voluntary, and has occurred
amongst countries where there is convergence of the law and
enforcement procedures and mutual confidence.  It is not surprising,
therefore, that deep cooperation is largely limited to those developed
countries that are culturally compatible, that is, Europe and its
diaspora.
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It should be pointed out here that most anti-competitive conduct
with serious cross-border effects comprises hard-core cartel
agreements between multinational corporations (MNCs) from the US,
Europe and Japan. Since the early 1990s, the US, followed by other
OECD countries, has increased its vigilance on international cartel
activity, and some 40 cartels have been investigated and sanctioned
in that time. It is estimated that US$80.1 billion of exports to
developing countries have been affected by cartel pricing, resulting
in tremendous welfare losses for consumers in those countries and
inhibiting development efforts (Evenett et al., 2001). Further, these
cartels are increasingly targeting developing countries because of the
increased stringent enforcement activities in OECD countries on the
one hand, and the lack of competition laws and institutions or weak
enforcement in developing countries on the other. For instance, the
published records of the International Electrical Association revealed
that the International Heavy Electrical Equipment Cartel agreement
covered mainly developing countries, and Jamaica was named as one
of the countries affected. The territories excluded or exempted from
the agreements are usually the home territories of the member
companies (the EU and Japan,11 where there is antitrust legislation
prohibiting such activities), plus those regions in their traditional
sphere of influence (Jenny, 2003:10).
The activities of international cartels have had serious dampening
effects on development in these countries, given the high dependence
on imports, not only of consumer goods, but also of producer goods.
For instance, the Trinidad and Tobago economy is heavily dependent
on the oil and natural gas revenues, and heavy industries that rely
on a competitive price for energy through the piping of natural gas
directly to the industrial site. The major economic activities centre
around the petroleum and petro-chemical industries, involving
drilling and piping oil and natural gas, and a mini steel mill is one of
the successful heavy industries, together with production of
methanol, urea and ammonia. The Seamless Steel Tubes Cartel12,
which operated from 1990 to 1995, would have impacted on profit
margins in the oil and natural gas sector. The Graphite Electrodes
Cartel increased prices paid by the mini steel mill for graphite
electrodes13 by 50 per cent more than the market price. The activities
of the Vitamin Cartel were worldwide, according to the US Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), and therefore all vitamin imports into the
CARICOM region that were included under the cartel arrangement
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would have been overpriced. It is clear, then, that for developing
countries, there is urgent need for deeper levels of cooperation not
just amongst themselves, but, more importantly, between themselves
and industrialized countries.
1.4   Special provisions needed for small economies
Given both the high level of maturity required for participating
in deeper cooperation levels and the obligations involved in such
agreements, what special cooperation provisions would enhance the
ability of CARICOM small economies to comply with obligations on
competition policy included in trade agreements?
The level of special provisions that are required is related to the
following factors:
• The relative level of maturity of the competition authorities as
between the contracting parties
• The capacity of the competition authority in terms of technical
resources
• The extent of the obligations undertaken in the trade/cooperation
agreement
• The level of openness of the economy and hence, exposure to anti-
competitive conduct originating outside of the domestic market
• The dependence on imports and FDI increases the vulnerability of
these small economies to the pernicious activities of international
cartels.
• The ability of the government/competition authority to successfully
investigate and enforce laws in the case of multinational firms
located in the domestic market and international cartels.
• Factors that would impact on the ability of the country to negotiate
cooperation provisions are the maturity of its institutions, the
extent of the convergence of the laws of the parties and the track
record of enforcement of the law.
The small open economies of CARICOM need a high level of
cooperation with their major trading partners, such as the United
States, Canada and Europe, because they are very vulnerable to the
actions of international cartels involving firms from these countries.
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However, the legislative and institutional framework is still too new
to deal with anti-competitive conduct or has still to be put in place
in most CARICOM countries and technical officers need to be trained
to conduct investigations. Further, OECD countries may have little
to gain from such cooperation, and may be uncomfortable sharing
sensitive or confidential information with authorities that do not have
a proven track record of enforcement and demonstrated respect for
confidentiality of information. While the Barbadian and Jamaican
FTCs are gradually developing such a track record and maintain a
high standard of enforcement, they are as yet very young. This is not
to detract from the high level of cooperation in technical assistance
provided by OECD countries, including training workshops and
seminars/conferences, such as the Latin American Forum held in
Madrid in July 2005.
1.5   Cooperation with developed countries varies
substantially
The Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement (FTA) includes
fairly substantial cooperation provisions, and this is a welcomed
development. This may have resulted from Costa Rica’s demonstrated
commitment to enforcement of competition law and the progress
made in developing its competition regime. Nevertheless, the
provisions of the agreement have not as yet been incorporated into
domestic law through legislation, and are therefore not fully
implemented or enforced. This demonstrates that even when more
substantial provisions are agreed upon, it is the implementation that
proves the usefulness of the agreement.  Bilateral negotiations of an
FTA between Canada and CARICOM is scheduled to begin in late
2005, and no doubt, there will be a competition provision in the
agreement because Canada has in the past been a major proponent
of a strong competition chapter in the FTAA. However, one does not
expect a replication of the Canada-Costa Rica provisions in the
forthcoming Canada-CARICOM FTA because of the undeveloped
state of competition policy in CARICOM countries.
There are many constraints to strong cooperation even amongst
homogenous competition regimes in the OECD countries (to the
extent that there is compatibility in terms of core competition
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principles, prohibitions, and enforcement of the law). Stronger
cooperation provisions may be found in bilateral cooperation
agreements between competition authorities that are at equivalent
levels of maturity and with homogenous laws. However, there is some
evidence that mature competition authorities are reluctant to enter
cooperation agreements with weak, new authorities, and particularly
deep commitments in cooperation agreements on enforcement. This
was evident in discussions in the WTO Working Group on Trade and
Competition Policy (WGTCP) in which OECD countries were insisting
on limiting cooperation to sharing of public information.  It may be
that a consideration would be the level of trade with the country and
the extent to which its domestic firms are capable of engaging in
anti-competitive conduct that could block market access or affect
the domestic market of the industrialized country. In the case of
CARICOM countries, no domestic firm is capable of affecting markets
in the industrialized countries in any significant way.
Hence, while the theory would suggest that small open economies
may have trouble securing cooperation provisions in enforcement of
the law amongst OECD competition authorities, they should
nevertheless argue for deeper cooperation/ assistance in investigating
MNCs. There is a power asymmetry that renders governments in
small economies powerless to discipline these corporations that may
be influential in such economies. Despite the unlikelihood of success,
trade-offs in negotiations may arise that may allow some leeway
directed specifically at small economies, or CARICOM economies.
For instance, small economies may ask for assistance in
investigating and prosecuting firms that participate in international
cartels whose activities harm their economies, and which have been
investigated and punished by the industrialized countries, for
instance, the Vitamin Cartel. In many instances, the US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)/Department of Justice (DOJ) or the European
Commission Directorate General (DG) Competition have information
and evidence of cartel activity affecting developing economies, but
cannot share them because of domestic laws restricting the disclosure
of information. Such is the case with the Vitamin Cartel and the
Shipping Cartel investigated by the EC DG Competition. Indeed,
Brazil tried for years to sanction members of the Vitamin Cartel for
operating within their borders, but was unable to get any information
from the US FTC because of confidentiality rules.
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Even so, sharing the information and evidence may not be
sufficient for small economies to proceed with enforcement of the
law against MNCs because of power asymmetry. The clout of the US
FTC/DOJ or DG Competition is needed and if they act as a protector
of these economies against international cartels, which are already
under investigation, by incorporating them under the umbrella of
prohibitions for the cartels, they would be contributing considerably
to the development of these small economies, given the extent to
which cartel activities adversely affect developing economies.14
Moreover, a special provision may be that reciprocity may not be a
requirement, since small economies hardly have the human resource
capacity to respond to even simple information exchange. Small
economies need deeper cooperation with the more mature
competition authorities to pursue investigation and sanctioning of
international cartels, but at times this may be unlikely if the interests
of the developed countries and the rules of competition enforcement
in those countries diverge from the small economy’s interests.
What small economies can receive in cooperation agreements
and which they also need very much is technical assistance in various
forms. Examples can be activities such as internships or posting of
staff from more mature agencies in new agencies in small economies
to provide guidance and assistance in investigations. At present, there
are no trained personnel to staff competition agencies or even the
Community Competition Commission, which is due to be constituted
by June 2006. Training of the human resources to implement and
enforce the competition regime is absolutely essential at this point.
The expertise of the experienced staff could make a substantial
contribution to the maturing of the competition commissions in these
countries.
Education of consumers, the business sector, the regulators,
judges, lawyers, the press, non-governmental organizations and other
stakeholders is sorely needed.  At present, there is a total lack of a
competition culture in CARICOM countries, with the exception of
Jamaica where they have had 12 years to build a sense of competition
discipline in the private sector. Interviews carried out by the author
in 2003 in six CARICOM countries15 showed that, apart from Jamaica,
there was a lack of understanding on the part of the private sector of
even the basics of competition law and what is anti-competitive
conduct. Indeed, trade associations fix prices with impunity, because
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there is no sense of wrongdoing. And, since there is no legislation,
then there is no illegality; so fixed prices are published in the
newspapers (for example, the price fixing of the Baker’s Association
in 2003). Therefore, the most critical task needed in CARICOM
countries is education in the benefits to be derived by consumers
and producers of abiding by the rules of competition.
The University of the West Indies does not at this point offer a
course in Competition Law and Policy. This is one area of urgent
need so that long-term training and training of trainers can be offered
within the region on a sustainable basis.
 In the next section, cooperation provisions found in FTAs entered
into by CARICOM are examined for special treatment based on the
constraints faced by small economies.
2.   Competition cooperation provisions in
CARICOM signed agreements
In the case of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the
Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy, the level of cooperation on competition is deep. This is not
the case with the other trade agreements signed by CARICOM,
however. The CARICOM-Venezuela and CARICOM-Colombia Trade
Agreements16 were the first ones to be signed in July 1991 and July
1994, respectively. At that time, competition policy was not on the
international trade agenda. It became part of the WTO agenda in
1996 at the Singapore Ministerial.  Neither was the CARICOM’s
competition regime developed until later in the decade. It is therefore
understandable that there is no mention of anti-competitive business
conduct in these two FTAs.
The CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA17 was signed in August
1998, and by then CARICOM countries were negotiating the Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas by which the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy was to be created. Protocol Eight of the Draft Revised Treaty
provided for the Community Competition Regime, its object being
to ensure that the benefits to be derived from governmental removal
of barriers to market entry are not compromised because of anti-
competitive conduct by the private sector. This Treaty was signed by
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Heads of Governments in 2001, and Protocol Eight became Chapter
8 of the Revised Treaty. Another development which sensitized
CARICOM governments and other governments in Latin America to
the need to proscribe anti-competitive conduct as part of FTAs was
the fact that the hemispheric Working Group on Competition Policy
had been meeting for several years, and had done considerable work
in preparation for the start of negotiations of the FTAA Agreement.
Negotiation of this agreement started in September 1998. Therefore,
the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed from 1998 onwards all
contain provisions on competition policy. These are CARICOM-
Dominican Republic, CARICOM-Cuba18 and CARICOM-Costa Rica.19
Provisions in these agreements related to competition are very
brief and little is said about cooperation. The Draft Chapter on
Competition Policy in the FTAA offers far greater depth than any
other trade agreement. However, negotiations are at an impasse and
there are no positive indications that they will resume soon, or even
at all. At the time that negotiations halted, most of the text was still
bracketed. Given the current impasse and the change of heart of many
countries in terms of the level of commitment they are willing to
adopt, it is doubtful whether the more advanced and challenging
provisions will be adopted, at least generally. If there is a plurilateral
agreement alongside a multilateral one, then there are possibilities
that there would be deeper obligations undertaken by a few countries.
Yet, it is important to examine the draft text if only because it
reflects the ambitions of the various parties to the negotiations. It
represents five years of negotiations, and is reflective of the views
held by countries in this hemisphere. It provides insights into the
kinds of provisions that the smaller and weaker economies wanted
in the cooperation section of the chapter.
2.1   Cooperation provisions in the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas (2001)
Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishes a
competition regime for CARICOM, providing detailed guidance on
the provisions to be adopted, the institutional framework that must
be set up and the modalities for implementation. The regime is
designed to deal with domestic and cross-border anti-competitive
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conduct within the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).20
It provides for the establishment of a Community Competition
Commission to oversee the enforcement of the competition regime
at Community level (similar to the EC DG Competition’s role in the
European Union), and requires each Member State of the CSME to
legislate and implement competition law at domestic level, to set up
a national competition authority, and to cooperate with each other
and with the Community Competition Commission in implementing
the Community Competition Policy. The Caribbean Court of Justice
is the Court of Appeal against decisions made by the Community
Competition Commission.
Provisions on cooperation in Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty
include the following. Article 170(3) outlines the obligations of
Member States:
Every Member State shall require its national competition
authority to:
(a) cooperate with the Commission in achieving compliance
with the rules of competition;
(b) investigate any allegations of anticompetitive business
conduct referred to the authority by the Commission or
another Member State;
(c) cooperate with other national competition authorities in
the detection and prevention of anticompetitive business
conduct, and the exchange of information relating to such
conduct.
Article 173(2) outlines the functions of the Community
Competition Commission, which include:
(e) co-operation with competent authorities in the Member
States;
(f) providing support to the Member States in promoting and
protecting consumer welfare;
(g) facilitating the exchange of relevant information and
expertise;
(h) developing and disseminating information about
competition policy, and consumer protection policy.
Obligations on the level of cooperation within CARICOM,
mandated by the Revised Treaty, are very high. A National Authority
must assume responsibility for investigating anti-competitive
behaviour in its territory which affects another Member’s territory
within the CSME, this being the highest possible level of cooperation
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on cross-border effects of anti-competitive behaviour. The National
Competition Authorities must also cooperate with the Community
Competition Commission in its investigation of cross-border anti-
competitive conducts. At this point (August 2005), there are only two
countries in the Community that have competition legislation, have
established Fair Trading Commissions, and are enforcing the law.
These are Jamaica (1993) and Barbados (2002). All other countries in
CARICOM are in the process of establishing the required regime.
While there are no special provisions in Chapter 8 directly linking
cooperation mechanisms to small size, there are provisions in the
Revised Treaty which grant special and differential treatment for
disadvantaged economies, sectors and industries and for the LDCs
within CARICOM (note once again, LDCs refer to the Less-Developed
Countries within the regional grouping, not Least-Developed
Countries as designated by the UN).
Article 157(1) provides for disadvantaged countries, regions and
sectors to be provided with technical and financial assistance as may
be required to allow them to participate effectively in the CSME and
to administer international trade agreements. The Council on Trade
and Economic Development (COTED) of CARICOM is mandated to
evaluate the need for technical and financial assistance to
disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors (Paragraph 2).
According to Paragraph 3 of Article 51, such technical and
financial assistance may include
(c) professional assistance in meeting obligations under trade-
related agreements
(d) assistance to establish institutions or centres for the
training or retraining of employees as the case may require;
(e) provision of relevant expertise to formulate a legal policy
framework conducive to fair trading and fair competition
One can therefore surmise from this that there would be special
consideration in the form of technical assistance given to CARICOM’s
LDCs as they proceed with establishing and enforcing their
competition regime.  Such considerations could include assistance
in developing the law and setting up the institutional framework for
implementation and enforcement of competition law. Such technical
assistance would more likely come from the Jamaican Fair Trading
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Commission and, to a lesser extent, the Barbados Fair Trading
Commission since, apart from those Commissions, there is no other
source of knowledge in the region. Given the depth of cooperation
envisaged within the CSME, the existing framework may be sufficient.
However, there is little capacity within the OECS countries to
enforce competition law. There has been some discussion on the
possibility of establishing a subregional competition commission to
service the OECS countries, with links to each country through a
competition desk in the ministry responsible for trade. Even so, the
problem of jurisdiction will need to be addressed by giving the
Subregional Commission legal authority to investigate the markets
of the OECS.
Another question that has not been dealt with by the Treaty is
the response to requests for information from another competition
authority in a Member State. Given the short supply of technical
persons in the relevant ministries, the lack of skills in the area of
competition policy and the sense of overwhelm experienced by most
technical officers while they try to cope with portfolios that should
be handled by a team of people rather than by one individual, one
can anticipate that there could be long delays in responses to requests
for information. This could prove to be not only frustrating, but could
reduce the credibility of the system when issues and cases are not
dealt with expeditiously. Cooperation between competition
authorities could therefore be hindered by limitations in the LDCs to
respond to requests, and measures need to be adopted to address
the problems that could be encountered.
2.2 Competition provisions in FTAs
Competition provisions in the FTAs in which CARICOM
participates are limited to commitments to develop and enforce
competition law. Little is said about cooperation.
2.2.1 CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA (August 1998)
Article XI deals with anti-competitive business practices.
The Parties will seek to discourage anticompetitive business
practices in the Free Trade Area and work towards the
adoption of common provisions to prevent such practices.
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(2)The Parties will undertake to establish mechanisms aimed
at facilitating and promoting competition policy provisions
and ensuring their application among and within the Parties.
There is provision in Article XIV for Standing Committees to be
set up, operating under the guidance of the Council. Art. XIV (viii)
provides for a Committee on Anti-competitive Business Practices.
The Committee’s functions include
Art. XIV (2)
(iii) consult on issues of mutual concern relating to its subject
area which arise in international fora;
(iv) facilitate information exchange among the Parties;
(v) create working groups or convene expert panels on topics
of mutual interest relating to its subject area;
These provisions apply to all  the committees, not just
competition.
Further, Article VI says that
Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Party to provide
confidential information, the disclosure of which would
impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public
interest, or which would prejudice legitimate commercial
interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
Interestingly, at the time this Agreement was signed, the
Dominican Republic did not have competition legislation and only
Jamaica in CARICOM had a law and an authority. Seven years later,
the same situation exists, except that Barbados passed its law in
January 2003, having established its authority earlier.
No significant progress has been achieved in moving forward
the implementation of the agreement during the last four years and,
with the exception of the Joint Council, the only committee that has
been established to date has been the Committee on Rules of Origin.
No other Standing Committees have been constituted. However, at
the recently concluded (August 2005) 3rd meeting of the Joint Council,
it was agreed that the other Standing Committees will be constituted
and a meeting is scheduled for late October. The parties re-affirmed
that they are committed to the process.
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2.2.2 CARICOM-Cuba FTA (2000)
The FTA aims to strengthen commercial and economic relations
between the parties through free market access for goods, services
and investment, and elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. The
scope of the coverage of the FTA Agreement is substantial, including,
among others, provisions on rules of origin, technical standards,
business facilitation, trade financing, tourism, investment, intellectual
property rights, transportation and unfair trade practices (subsidies
and dumping. It contains, as part of its objective
(ix)  the discouragement of anticompetitive business practices
between the parties
Article 23 states that
a. The Parties will discourage anticompetitive business
practices and work towards the adoption of common
provisions to prevent such practices.
b. The Parties will undertake to establish measures and
mechanisms to facilitate and promote competition policy and
ensure their application between the Parties.
It contains no specific provisions on cooperation modalities. Cuba
is at the early stages of liberalizing its economy, and much of its trade
was controlled by the State at the time this Agreement was negotiated.
Progress in implementation of the Agreement has been very slow,
and CARICOM manufacturers, particularly those in Trinidad and
Tobago, have had problems accessing the Cuban market. A decision
has been made to establish a Trade Facilitation Company in Cuba to
iron out the problems faced by those trying to access the market.
2.2.3 CARICOM-Costa Rica FTA (2004)
The CARICOM-Costa Rica FTA includes soft provisions on
competition policy. Interestingly, despite the fact that the Canada-
Costa Rica cooperation provisions in their FTA are touted as a model
for future agreements, this was not replicated in the FTA with
CARICOM, which was negotiated after the Canada-Costa Rica FTA
was signed.
Article XIV.01 requires that
1. The Parties shall seek to make progress towards the
adoption of common provisions to prevent the benefits under
this Agreement from being undermined by anticompetitive
activities.
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2. Likewise, the Parties shall make an effort to establish
mechanisms to facilitate and promote the development of
competition policy and to guarantee the application of
regulations on free competition in and between the parties in
the free trade area.
There are no specific provisions regarding cooperation.
Article XIV states that within a period of two (2) years of the
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall analyse
the developments regarding paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIV.01
and shall consider adopting disciplines in this Chapter.
As stated earlier, the competition regime in CARICOM is too
undeveloped to expect more than provisions encouraging its
implementation.
The CARICOM-Costa Rica agreement is still not implemented.
The Agreement requires simultaneous passage of legislation so when
the two countries exchange instruments, the Agreement will be fully
implemented. Trinidad and Tobago’s bill has been processed to the
stage of requiring only the signature of the President. However, Costa
Rica has been slower, and the bill is still to be presented to Parliament,
though it is supposed to be the first item on the agenda when
Parliament resumes work (August 2005).
2.3 FTAA cooperation provisions
Although there has been an impasse in the negotiation of the
FTAA Agreement, partially linked to WTO negotiations, there is still
merit to examining the provisions on cooperation in the draft chapter
on Competition Policy (FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev 3 Nov. 21, 2003). Even
if negotiations never resume, they represent the interests, positions
and aspirations of the countries in the hemisphere with respect to
the cooperation on competition law enforcement. While most of the
text was still bracketed at the time of the cessation of negotiations,
the debate and reflection that took place in that group to forge the
chapter to this point reflect a remarkable level of cooperation amongst
technical staff of competition authorities and trade ministries in the
hemisphere.
353
Stewart
It should be noted that at the Miami Ministerial in November
2003, there was agreement that different levels of ambitions would
be accommodated by having two-tiered negotiations, one for those
countries willing to undertake deeper obligations, and another for
those that want a minimum of obligations. Therefore, should
negotiations resume, one could expect two different Agreements
resulting from the negotiations.
The draft chapter provides for technical assistance and this article
is not bracketed, thus reflecting consensus in the group that such
assistance should be provided:
Article 16. Technical Assistance
16.1. The Parties agree that it is in their interest to work
together on technical assistance activities related to the
development, adoption, implementation, and enforcement of
competition laws and policies, including by sharing expertise
and information, training officials, sending experts to
participate in events related to competition issues, and
exchanging personnel, when appropriate.
Consensus was arrived at that there should be cooperation in
investigating and taking appropriate action where there is evidence
to indicate that anti-competitive business conduct is occurring.
Bracketed text contains provisions on notification, exchange of
information, consultation, positive and negative comity, and joint
investigations.
Article 8.  Mechanisms for [Cooperation] [Collaboration] and
for Exchange of Information among [Competition] Authorities
8.1. Parties recognize the importance of cooperation and
coordination among their authorities to further effective
competition law enforcement and development of competition
policies in the FTAA.
8.2. If there is evidence to indicate that anticompetitive
[business] conduct [of economic agents] with cross-border
impact is being carried out, the Parties will [endeavour to
cooperate] [cooperate] [and promote the exchange of
information,] in investigating and taking appropriate action.
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[8.3. The Parties may conduct joint investigations.]
[8.4.  For effective implementation of cooperative
relationships, the Parties recognize the value of entering into
cooperation agreements or arrangements. When developing
their cooperation agreements or arrangements, the Parties
agree to consider providing for notification, exchange of
information, consultation, positive and negative comity and
coordination in related matters.]
[8.5. Each Party shall notify the affected Parties when a
competition law enforcement action may affect another Party’s
interests.]
[8.6.   When a Party notifies another Party about a competition
law enforcement action that may affect its interests, the
notified Party shall provide detailed information about the
action in question.]
[8.7.  A Party may request another Party to take appropriate
action when there are indications that anticompetitive
[business] conduct [of economic agents] is being carried out
contrary to the competition law in the territory of the
requested Party and that such conduct negatively affects the
interests of the requesting Party. Nothing in this article limits
the discretion of the requested Party’s competition authority
under its competition laws and enforcement policies as to
whether to undertake enforcement activities with respect to
the anticompetitive activities identified in a request.]
There are very deep levels of cooperation proposed, but most
are bracketed. Given that there may be two-tiered negotiations if there
is a resumption of negotiations, then it is possible that those countries
that would opt for the higher level of commitment in a plurilateral
agreement would also arrive at consensus on those provisions that
offer deeper levels of cooperation.
The draft text also includes provisions for the establishment of a
Committee on Competition with powers to, amongst other functions
outlined in Article 12.1.1,
• Promote cooperation among the Parties and subregional entities
on [competition] issues arising under this chapter. (Article
12.1.1(b))
355
Stewart
• Assist in coordinating technical assistance (Article 12.1.1(c)
• [Establish procedures for making and distributing to the Parties
any notifications made in accordance with this Chapter.] (Article
12.1.1(d).
Therefore, not only is there consensus to provide technical
assistance, but also for developing institutional mechanisms for
ensuring that such technical assistance is coordinated and therefore
delivered.
It should be noted that the very process of negotiation of the
chapter led to the technical staff of competition authorities getting
to know each other and a phenomenal increase in informal
cooperation amongst competition authorities within the hemisphere.
That is a very positive development in cooperation on competition
that has been achieved, irrespective of the impasse in the negotiations.
2.4   Informal cooperation: the Barbados and Jamaica
experience
 2.4.1 The Barbados Fair Trading Commission
Barbados has no formal cooperation agreements with other
competition agencies. All assistance has been given on the basis of
informal arrangements. Barbados received technical assistance from
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in
the form of an attachment of one of their officer ’s to the Fair
Competition (FC) Division for a period of 3 months. The ACCC officer
assisted in the development of systems and procedures to be used
by the FC Division. This attachment was found to be very useful and
instructive as it formed an important component of the training and
development of the necessary competencies of officers in the FC
Division.
There was a view that informal cooperation agreements are most
useful when there might be a matter of urgency regarding which
advice may be sought to assist in the execution of an investigation or
just a quick query on how to obtain information to assist in an
investigation. An informal contact can provide unofficial advice
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quickly, which may not be the case when the request has to go through
formal channels. Getting a formal response may sometimes be time
consuming.
However, it was felt that there is an advantage to formalizing
these arrangements because the informal link to a contact person
used most frequently may not always be available and one would
wish urgent matters to be given some priority. In an informal setting,
priority requests may not always be treated with the urgency that is
necessary.
It was suggested that formal agreements should enshrine some
given time frame to respond to an information request from new
competition agencies based on a request’s assigned level of priority
which had been previously mutually agreed. For example, a Priority
1 request could be answered in 1-3 working days, Priority 2 in 4-7
working days, and Priority 3 in 7-14 working days.21
2.4.2 The Jamaican Fair Trade Commission
The Jamaican FTC has no formal cooperation agreement with
any other competition agency.  However, there is ‘networking’ with
individuals in more mature authorities, such as the US FTC, some of
whom are extremely helpful and accommodating of their queries.
The FTC staff has had help with case law on a number of issues -
largely consumer related.
The FTC received a request from the US DOJ in late 2004 to assist
with information in respect of the remittance sector, and they made
a considerable effort to comply with the request.  The DOJ was
investigating Western Union. They forwarded a substantial amount
of information about the local remittance sector.  By all indications it
was considered to be very useful.
It was felt by staff of the Jamaican FTC that the most important
form of cooperation that they need from more mature authorities at
this stage of their development is the sharing of expertise with staff,
such as establishing some internship or exchange programme
whereby experts from mature agencies could spend some time with
them, dealing with specific cases and issues. This kind of sharing
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will necessarily import sharing of information, generally - about
approaches to dealing with similar cases, on how firms operate in
different regulatory environments.  Of course confidentiality issues
would have to be critically evaluated and appropriate provisions put
in place to address the relevant issues. There was also the view that
an agency such as theirs could also benefit greatly from assistance
with drafting procedural rules and regulations.
Cooperation between Barbados and Jamaica is developing, and
the Barbadian FTC said that the most informal cooperation and
assistance they have received have been from the Jamaican FTC. There
is potential for future cooperation on, for instance, how to proceed
with investigating anti-competitive conduct, where the perpetrator
operates in both jurisdictions.   The Jamaican competition law does
not address mergers and acquisitions and so the Jamaican FTC is
observing with keen interest what is happening with mergers
regulation in Barbados so that they could be made aware of market
concentration in the various sectors.22
3.  Conclusions
This Chapter argues that while CARICOM countries may need
high levels of cooperation, particularly with competition authorities
in the United States and Europe, from whence most of their imports
come, the reality is that it is unlikely that such cooperation would be
available, given that their competition regimes are not sufficiently
developed to meet the prerequisites for deeper levels of cooperation.
However, this does not preclude the possibility of developing new
modalities of cooperation designed specifically for small economies
to address the problem of their ability to investigate and discipline
international cartels, which adversely affect their domestic markets
and further limit their development potential.
The findings of the research showed that CARICOM has no
cooperation agreement of substance with third parties, and this is
because, until CARICOM countries legislate prohibiting anti-
competitive practices and develop institutions to enforce the law,
there is no basis for cooperation on competition issues. While
Barbados and Jamaica have laws that are enforced, these agencies
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are as yet too young to qualify for deeper levels of cooperation.
However, they have been beneficiaries of very useful informal
cooperation with mature agencies. The process of negotiating the
draft chapter on competition policy in the FTAA in itself generated
high levels of informal cooperation amongst competition authorities
within the Western Hemisphere, and shows that a regional or
international committee on competition policy, as proposed in the
WTO WGTCP, has great potential for generating informal cooperation
and providing technical assistance in the form of substantive
discussions on competition enforcement issues that would benefit
young competition authorities.
For CARICOM countries, the most important type of cooperation
at this stage, being realistic as to what is possible, is for very deep
levels of technical assistance to train staff in investigating cases
through internships and placing staff from more mature authorities
for several months with a young authority to guide the staff in
investigation and institution building.
More specifically, the following are needed:
1. Training of lawyers in drafting skills.
2. Scrutiny of draft competition law by competent experts with
experience in implementation of competition law in mature
regimes, to identify loopholes in the law and possible
implementation problems.
3. Short-term and long-term training of technical/professional
staff to serve in Competition Commissions and to service the
private sector:
a. Seminars and workshops of varying levels of complexity
targeting government technocrats, the business sector, the
policy, journalists and consumers
b. More detailed and intensive training sessions for potential
staff of competition authorities, judges, and lawyers
c. Scholarships for legal training in competition law from
recognized universities
d. Developed internal capacity to offer training on a
sustainable basis by enhancing the capacity of the University
of the West Indies to offer training programs in competition
law and policy. This would require assistance from
international experts since the expertise just is not present in
the region. Apart from the lack of faculty involved in research
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on competition policy, there is no faculty with experience in
enforcement of competition law, and few in the region
(Jamaica and Barbados) with such experience. Most of the
cases dealt with by the Jamaican and Barbadian FTCs are
consumer protection cases, rather than antitrust.
4. Technical and financial assistance in institution building.
Urgent attention to technical assistance in CARICOM is needed,
since these countries are attempting to set up competition regimes
now, but are doing so with a dearth of human and financial resources.
NOTES
1CARICOM consists of Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (still a colony of
the UK), St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. (While Haiti is part of CARICOM, it is not
active within the regional grouping because of its chronic instability and
problems. After Aristide was deposed in 2004, CARICOM Heads of States
refused to recognize the new government and diplomatic relations were
severed.)
2For example, Gal (2003).
3The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) consists of seven states:
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
4Central Intelligence Agency (2000).
5While Haiti’s population is much larger than the rest of CARICOM, it is not
considered significant here because there is little purchasing power in the
country and limited economic activity.
6The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) was created by the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Governments to develop, coordinate
and execute an overall negotiating strategy for various external trade
negotiations in which the Region is involved. The RNM is responsible for
developing and maintaining a cohesive and effective framework for the
coordination and management of the Caribbean Region’s negotiating
resources and expertise.
7Interviews conducted by the author in June 2005 with trade technocrats in OECS
countries.
8Stewart (2004).
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9Discussion in the FTAA Negotiating Group on Competition Policies (NGCP)
August 2003.
10For an exhaustive analysis of these forms of cooperation, please refer to
Chapter 6 of this publication co-authored by Rosenberg and Tavares de
Araujo.  Also see UNCTAD (2002b).
11The US FTC charged the US participants early in the cartel’s life and forced
their withdrawal from the cartel.
12Tubes, pipes and casings (Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) used in the
transmission of oil and gas from wells.
13Used in mini steel mills to generate the enormous heat necessary to melt scrap
metal and convert it back to marketable steel product. There is no substitute
input.
14See the work of Evenett et al. (2001).
15Belize, The Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and
Trinidad and Tobago. The findings of this empirical study are published in
Stewart (2004).
16Agreement between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the
Government of the Republic of Venezuela on Trade and Investment, July
1991. Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation between
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Government of the Republic
of Colombia, July 1994.
17Agreement Establishing the Free Trade Area between the Caribbean
Community and the Dominican Republic, August 1998.
18Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) and the Government of the Republic of Cuba, July
2000.
19Agreement between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) acting on behalf
of the Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of
the Republic of Costa Rica (Establishment of a Free Trade Area), April 2004.
The Bahamas, Haiti and Montserrat are not signatories because they are
not part of the CSME.
20The CSME represents a deepening of the CARICOM integration process into
a single market and eventually, a single economy. All members of CARICOM
except the Bahamas and Haiti are members of the CSME
21Interview with Mr Barry Headley, Chief Economist in the Barbados Fair
Trading Commission.
22Interview with Ms Barbara Lee, CEO of the Jamaican Fair Trading
Commission.
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1.  Introduction
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)launched a Free Trade Area (FTA) on 31 October 2000 and plansto become a customs union in the near future.  The absence of
tariff and non-tariff barriers in the FTA has enhanced and made
competition stiffer.  However, in order to ensure fair competition
As the regional economy integrates more deeply, the necessity for
appropriate policy instruments and tools is becoming increasingly urgent
and, in this regard, a competition policy is important to ensure observance
of good corporate governance and promoting equitable and harmonious
economic development.
Erastus Mwencha, Secretary General, COMESA:
Ministerial Roundtable, Cairo Egypt, 2004
Framing the Issue
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and transparency among economic operators in the region, COMESA
has formulated regional competition regulations.  The regulations
are consistent with internationally accepted practices and principles
of competition, especially the United Nations Set of Principles and
Rules on Competition developed by UNCTAD in 1980.  Alongside
these regional regulations, national competition laws continue to be
developed or improved and brought in line with the global trends
and developments as COMESA deepens its regional integration.  They
are also being improved to ensure consistency in regional policies,
to avoid contradictions and to provide a regionally predictable
environment.
While enhancing fair business practices, the regional competition
regulations, are aimed at achieving the following:
i) to promote fair competition aimed at boosting regional trade
and investment; and
ii) to ensure the maximization of consumer welfare in the
COMESA region through an effective regional competition
framework.
The competition regulations are intended to enhance COMESA’s
rules-based trading system by promoting economic efficiency,
predictability of the trading regime, good corporate governance and
fairness among economic operators and consumers.
National economic developments arising partly from
privatization, dismantling of public sector monopolies and
liberalization of foreign investment and trade economic liberalization
programmes in general, have led to a concentration of economic
power among a few business operators.  This continues to cause
concern both at national and regional levels, and the need for a
regional framework to address possible anti-competitive trends,
including abuse of dominance and cartel behaviour, is becoming
increasingly urgent. And so, the regional competition regulations
should contribute to adoption, improvement and effective
implementation of competition policies by Member States as an
integral part of their economic reforms at national and regional levels.
For COMESA to achieve the aforementioned benefits of
competition, there should not only be a law with attendant
regulations, but there should be established (pursuant to specified
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provisions of that law) a commensurate adjudicative entity to enforce
it.  For reasons, which this chapter hopes to make clear, the law and
regulations should be drafted with some degree of specificity in order
to give guidance to those who would be its ultimate arbiters.
This approach departs from the historical norm, namely, the use
of broad, sweeping language within a text of short duration.  The
recommended deviation in this area is promoted by an inarguable
reality; competition/antitrust philosophy is a relatively new
phenomenon in this and other development regions.  Therefore, in
setting up a competition regime, COMESA should not only draw on
a home-grown pool of expertise but also on comparative experience.
The regulations will  also specifically address consumer
protection.  This marks a departure from regional competition
arrangements including the European Union.  Consumer protection
should not be thought of as simply providing safeguards to
consumers.  Good consumer protection also provides benefits to all
traders through encouraging consumer transactions and more
particularly to ethical traders who, in the absence of effective
regulation, unfairly lose business to unscrupulous traders in situations
where consumers cannot distinguish between the two until after the
transaction.
It is submitted that the proposed legislation will certainly keep
faith with established precepts of competition jurisprudence.
However, the particular needs and history of the economics of the
Member States have been taken into account to ensure that this new
law is appropriately relevant to the present and future demands of
the Region.
1.1 Allocation of competences
In regional trade agreements all over the world, whether the
European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the
Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA/WEMU),
the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) or the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the
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issue of the division of competences between the members and the
umbrella body is always central. As Ulrike Guèrot1 points out, the
loss of power of the governments of the European Union Member
States  to the European body is an issue that the Member States would
have to deal with. He further argues that due to the extended
membership of the European Union, the sovereignty of states and
the competences being exercised from various levels of the Union
will become even more controversial. COMESA would have to deal
with such complexities not only in the area of competition, but in
other areas of trade too. Some members may feel that their needs are
not being fully taken care of by the regional body. Others may want
to argue for exemptions from the application of competition
regulations, especially where such exemptions are granted under
national laws. Vilenas Vadapalas2 further puts forward the point that
accession to the EU for Lithuania would ‘inevitably mean a transfer
of sovereign powers (competences) of the state to the communities
and the Union’. COMESA will also have to deal with the need to
protect Member States autonomy and their identity while at the same
time upholding the common goals and aspirations under the common
market treaty in general and competition regulations in particular.
Since COMESA is now a customs union and is preparing to become
a common market by 2008, at the latest,  with the advent of
competition regulations, Member States without a competition law
in the region would have to enact one in the context of the regional
law and in a situation where free movement of goods, services and
persons may have made it vulnerable to anti-competitive practices.
Undoubtedly, the transfer of sovereignty to COMESA also implies
that Member States do exercise sovereign powers together in common
market matters. This will largely depend on the industrial structures
of each Member State and the current economic status.
COMESA is dealing with a situation where Member States have
undergone structural adjustment programs of liberalization and
privatization without having competition laws. This is a big challenge
for COMESA as a common market and for Member States at national
level. One of the challenges for example being faced by the newly
established Malawi Competition Commission is how it will relate to
specific sector regulators, which have been in existence for some time
now. Uganda had to delay its competition bill finalization to study
the East African Community (EAC) and COMESA regulations for
coherence.
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On the allocation of competences, COMESA Member States
would have to deal with more than one set of regional grouping
competition rules in the future. The EAC, the SADC and the Southern
Africa Customs Union (SACU) have articles on restrictive business
practices, and efforts to operationalize these articles are under way.
The EAC has a draft competition law, which is at an advanced stage
of discussion.  This will pose a challenge to Member States that belong
to two of these regional bodies as far as the allocation of competences
is concerned. Examples of such states are Kenya and Uganda, EAC
and COMESA, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi,
Seychelles, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, COMESA and SADC.   This
overlap would have to be addressed by COMESA as well as the other
regional bodies with cross-cutting members.
Though COMESA regulations are largely based on the EU
Competition Law; it is important to note that for a period of 40 years,
the EU has developed a body of law through case law. This EU law
has been implemented by Member States’ courts and has been
progressively adopted by national governments in their national law.
It can be argued that the EC has succeeded in bringing about
convergence in national antitrust policies while at the same time
European competition policies still provide for the co-existence of
national and European Competition Law subject to European law
supremacy.3
The COMESA and UEMOA (WAEMU)4 West African Economic
and Monetary Union, which also adopted competition rules in May
2002, have provided the supremacy of competition rules over national
laws. However, the exercise of the supremacy can only be meaningful
through a process of enforcement and coordination of the rules, and
creation of trust by the national government of the regional body.
1.2  General policies underlying the COMESA competition
regulations
On 17 December 2004, the COMESA Council of Ministers
approved and gave effect to the COMESA Competition Regulations5
and Rules in their Member States. This has resulted in an
unprecedented process of discussions, research, consultations and
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negotiations that will put into place the implementation of the
competition regulations. The approval of the Regulations is seen to
be consistent with the provisions of Article 55 of the COMESA Treaty,
which provides for the establishment of regional competition
regulations. The Competition Regulations and Rules shall seek to
promote fair competition in order to boost regional trade and
investment; and to ensure the maximization of consumer welfare in
the COMESA region through an effective regional competition
framework. It is further envisaged that the regional competition
regulations shall contribute to the adoption, improvement and
effective implementation of competition policies as an integral part
of Member States’ economic reforms at national and regional levels.
Above all, the Competition Regulations and Rules are intended
to enhance COMESA’s rule-based trading system by promoting
economic efficiency, the predictability of the trading regime, and good
corporate governance and fairness among economic operators and
consumers. The competition regulations, when in force, shall
represent the most effective means available to businesses, both large
and small, of ensuring that the common market operates effectively
and fairly. Further, it is envisaged that as COMESA moves to complete
the customs union, it shall be necessary to ensure that anti-
competitive practices do not engender new forms of protectionism
at national level, which would only lead to diminishing the potential
value of the common market. The legal framework for regional
competition policy is also intended to provide a mechanism for
technical cooperation among national competition authorities of
Member States. This would include strengthening the exchange of
information, undertaking consultations and joint operations in the
enforcement of competitive laws and thwarting anti-competitive
practices at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.
1.3  Regional institutions for competition policy and law
1.3.1 COMESA
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
is a regional integration grouping currently with nineteen African
sovereign states.6 By virtue of the COMESA Treaty, these countries
have agreed to promote regional integration through trade
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development and to develop their human and natural resources for
the mutual benefit of the all their peoples.
1.3.2 SADC
The other regional body that contains provisions in its Treaty
that favour and promote competition is the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), an economic grouping of fourteen
countries.7   The primary objective of the SADC alliance is to promote
economic growth and development, to alleviate poverty, to enhance
the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa,
and to support the socially disadvantaged through regional
integration. The competition provision under the SADC Treaty reads:
‘Member States shall implement measures within the community that
prohibit unfair business practices and promote competition’.
1.3.3 SACU
The third regional body of great economic importance is the
Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU).8 Its treaty contains two very
important provisions that address competition in the customs union.
Article 40 states: ‘1. Member States agree that there shall be
competition policies in each Member State. 2. Member States shall
cooperate with each other with respect to the enforcement of
competition laws and regulations’.  The treaty goes further to provide
for remedies relating to unfair trading practices. Article 41 provides
for unfair trading practices:
The council shall, on the advise of the commission, develop
policies and instruments to address unfair trade practices between
Member States.
1.3.4 CARICOM
It is also useful to mention that the ideal of having a regional
competition regime has been mooted in the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM).9  The members of the Caribbean Community, with the
exception of the Bahamas, have agreed to move to a deeper level of
integration by forming a CARICOM Single Market and Economy
(CSME) that it is hoped will be like the European Community.
Protocol VIII of the CARICOM Treaty identifies the types of anti-
competitive business conduct that are prohibited as follows: (i)
agreements, decisions and concerted practices by firms that have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
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competition, and  (ii) abuse of a dominant position in the market.
The Merger Control Regulation is not provided for in protocol VIII
because it was felt that it would be inappropriate given the small
size of CARICOM firms, and the intension of the integration of
production processes of goods and services.
The CARICOM countries have yet to develop the legal and
institutional framework for complying with the protocol and
enforcement of the law.
1.3.5 EAC
Another regional body that has a direct impact on COMESA
competition regulations, is the East African Community (EAC).10
Article 75 of the EAC on the establishment of a customs union Section
1(i) specifies competition as one of the areas in which Member States
needs to develop a joint protocol. The EAC has developed a draft
competition law to operationalize Article 75 1(i) on competition. The
draft regional competition law for the EAC Member States is at an
advanced stage of enactment and has been discussed by the Council
of Ministers. Two Member States of EAC are members of COMESA
and the other member belongs to SADC.
2.  Formation of COMESA
The history of COMESA goes back as far as 1965 when the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) convened a
ministerial meeting of the then politically independent states of
Eastern and Southern Africa to consider proposals for the
establishment of a mechanism for the promotion of subregional
economic integration. The meeting, which was held in Lusaka,
Zambia, recommended the creation of an Economic Community for
Eastern and Southern African states.
Consequently, an Interim Council of Ministers, assisted by an
Interim Economic Committee of officials, was subsequently set up to
negotiate the treaty and initiate programmes on economic
cooperation, pending the completion of negotiations on the treaty.
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In 1978, at a meeting of Ministers of Trade, Finance and Planning
held in Lusaka, the creation of a subregional economic community
was recommended, beginning with a subregional trade area that
would be gradually upgraded over a ten-year period to a common
market until the community had been established. To this end, the
meeting adopted the ‘Lusaka Declaration of Intent and Commitment
to the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and
Southern Africa’ and created an Inter-governmental Negotiating Team
on the Treaty for the establishment of the Preferential Trade Area
(PTA). It was agreed at this meeting to put in place a schedule for the
work of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Team.
After the preparatory work was completed, a meeting of Heads
of State and Government was convened in Lusaka on 21 December
1981 at which the Treaty establishing the PTA was signed. The Treaty
came into force on 30 September 1982, after it had been ratified by
more than seven signatory states as provided for in Article 50 of the
Treaty.
The PTA Treaty envisaged its transformation into a common
market and, in conformity with this, the Treaty establishing COMESA
was signed on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda, and was ratified
a year later in Lilongwe, Malawi, on 8 December 1994. Hence,
COMESA was established in 1994 to replace the PTA, which was
established in Lusaka, Zambia in 1981, within the framework of the
OAU’s Lagos Plan of Action and the final Act of Lagos. The PTA at
the time was established to take advantage of a larger market size, to
share the region’s common heritage and destiny and to allow greater
social and economic cooperation, with the ultimate objective being
to create an economic community. To date, COMESA remains one of
the most successful regional economic cooperation and integration
groups in Africa.
It is envisaged that closer economic integration of COMESA
Member States shall further enlarge the market of the member
countries. This enlarged market, governed by a stable, transparent
and predictable framework for trade, will allow for economies of scale,
will improve the level of specialization, will reduce production and
transaction costs,  and will,  altogether, help to increase the
competitiveness of the common market. This, in turn, will lead to an
increase in trade flows and investment in the region, and between
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the region and the rest of the world, thereby promoting their
sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in
the COMESA Member States.
2.1  The need for a regional competition policy11
Even before the current regional process began, it was clear that
national competition authorities need to cooperate on their
competition law enforcement work in order to deal effectively with
restrictions on competition that have cross-border effects. Increased
globalization has meant that a higher percentage of competition cases
now have significant regional and international components. As trade
and investment liberalization reduces entry barriers, firms may have
greater incentives to engage in anti-competitive practices and
mergers, which would limit market access by firms. Therefore, the
need for increased regional cooperation can be achieved at different
levels and under different forms. The regional competition law and
policy is one such initiative.
It has become imperative for business, politicians and economic
policy makers to focus on the necessary adjustments to accommodate
the changing economic environments in the region. These are
considerable but by no means insurmountable. The task of COMESA
Member States is to provide the right environment for economic
integration. This requires a range of activities from the creation of a
common legislative framework to the mutual recognition of standards
and qualifications. The common market competition regulations shall
firmly establish one of the foundation stones of the economic
integration of the region.
National economic developments arising partly from
privatization, dismantling of public sector monopolies and the
liberalization of foreign investment and trade, and economic
liberalization programmes, in general, have, at national and regional
levels, led to a concentration of economic power among a few business
operators. Most COMESA Member States have continued to witness
the transformation of what used to be the public sector into a hard-
core private sector. This has raised concern both at national and
regional levels, and the need for a regional framework to address
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possible anti-competitive trends including abuse of dominance and
cartel behaviour, has become increasingly urgent. The region, for
example, has witnessed single dominance of foreign firms in two or
more Member States. The Ilovo Sugar Company, an international
conglomerate, has a single dominance presence in Swaziland,
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda. The likelihood of abuse by such a
company is very high. It is able, through its holding company, to
engage in various anti-competitive practices if not effectively
monitored. And such monitoring can only be effective at regional
level.
The COMESA Member States fully recognize that the benefits of
market integration would be achieved only in a dynamic competitive
economic environment where new market barriers are not erected in
place of those that have been dismantled. Concentrations of economic
power, which lead to market dominance and reduce or eliminate
competition, must be dealt with at regional level. At the same time,
and more importantly, legal certainty must be provided if enterprises
are to be alive to the possibilities and to respond to the challenges of
regional economic integration. The regulations establish conditions
for free and effective competition in the common market to ensure
that anti-competitive practices do not create new barriers to trade or
other forms of protectionism. The competition regulations set down
minimum standards and allow enterprises to penetrate the common
market and to establish themselves without barriers or restrictions,
thereby facilitating intra-COMESA trade and cooperation.
Creating legislation for the regional competition regulations was
inevitable. The few Member States with national competition laws
were quick to realize that such laws were not effective enough to
deal with the anti-competitive practices, which were manifested most
at regional level. This dilemma in enforcement has been fully
acknowledged by all the national competition authorities in the
region, namely, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
It is incontestable that globalization of business activities has led
to a large increase in competition cases with a regional or international
dimension.  The national competition authorities have already had
to deal with cases involving regional anti-competitive activity, with
the participating firms being located in two or three countries in the
common market. This has been very common in the enforcement of
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cases involving mergers and takeovers. A large proportion of merger/
takeover investigations involve a foreign party or assets or
information located abroad.  Regional competition cases raise difficult
challenges for competition law enforcement, which can only be
effectively solved through enhanced regional cooperation.
Cooperation and transparency in procedures is also essential for
business, which otherwise would be subject to excessive costs arising
from parallel and poorly coordinated investigations. To address the
problems being encountered by the national competition authorities,
the solution lies in the regional approach to the competition cases
with regional coverage.
The Commission has handled a number of cross-border cases involving
players in the subregion of Southern Africa and Zimbabwe. The mergers
and takeovers were in the Agro-Processing sub-sector, poultry industry,
sugar refining, agrochemicals, beverages and construction and building
products industries, among other sectors. International mergers and
takeovers have continued to be the greatest challenge of the Zambia
Competition Commission due to a lack of information on the competitive
behaviour of these regional firms and the absence of cooperative
arrangement within the region. Positive comity as an instrument of
cooperation among competition officials is at a very informal level. The
current practice of informal positive comity is not sufficient to effectively
regulate the behaviour of transnational corporations in the region. There
is a need for a regional framework for the regulation of the behaviour of
regional firms. This framework may take the form of a Regional
Cooperation protocol or a forum where matters of anti-competitive
conduct and/or cross-border mergers and takeovers that are likely to be
anti-competitive would be resolved. The absence of such a mechanism
has made it possible for transnational corporations to enter weaker
economies of regional states and wipe out competition and abuse their
dominance without any action from the competition authorities. The
weakness currently is that the jurisdictions of the competition authorities
are domestic without any extra-territorial applications.
Box 11.1 Extract from the Zambia Competition Commission
Source:  An extract from the speech presented by Mr Ngenda Sipalo, Vice Chairman of the
Zambia Competition Commission at the SADC Cooperation Forum, 21-22 November 2001,
South Africa
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2.2 Case examples
The need for a regional competition regulation can be exemplified
by the case examples presented in this chapter. These cases have one
thing in common: they are of a cross-border nature and they affect at
least two COMESA Member States. It can be argued that well-enforced
regional competition regulations could resolve such cases in future
to the benefit of all affected parties and that they would be more
comprehensively tackled and resolved.
Merger control regulations for COMESA form part of Articles 16
and 18, which impose a cross-border condition. The rule applies only
when the merger affects trade between Members States. The case
examples presented in this chapter from the carbonated soft drinks,
tobacco and cement sectors were of a cross-border nature and
therefore affected one or more Member States of COMESA. This
shows that the COMESA competition regulations are timely and, if
effectively enforced, will be of great economic significance for the
common market.
In the COMESA regional context,  the problem, and its
consequences, of multiple merger notification would make it
imperative that merger control provisions should be incorporated
into the regional competition law. The region has a number of
practical examples supporting this view. For instance, the global Coca
Cola/Cadbury Schweppes merger was reviewed in the COMESA region
by the competition authorities of Zambia and Zimbabwe. The merger
was notified to, and reviewed by, the two competition authorities
separately, even though its effect was regional in view of the almost
free trade between COMESA Member States. In the case of Zimbabwe,
the merger was approved with certain conditions, which included
partial divestiture and undertakings on the part of the merging parties
to develop local beverage brands. In Zambia, as reported in the
Annual Report 1999 of the Zambia Competition Commission, the
merger was also conditionally approved but with different
undertakings ‘aimed at enhancing competition, including the
obligation on TCCC (The Coca Cola Company) to notify its exclusive
dealing arrangements, restrictive territorial allocation agreements and
stop price fixing arrangements’ (Box 11.2).
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Introduction and relevant background
The Coca-Cola Company  (TCCC) and Cadbury Schweppes (CS) Plc signed an
agreement for the purchase by TCCC of the CS commercial beverages brands
and trademarks outside the United States, continental Western Europe and a
few other countries.  In Zambia, TCCC lodged a notification under Section 8 of
the Act to acquire Cadbury Schweppes Zambia (CSZ) Limited.  TCCC produces
carbonated soft drinks in Zambia, while Cadbury Schweppes produced both
carbonated and non-carbonated drinks, as well as clear beer (whisky black)
Major findings
TCCC had a 92 per cent market share in carbonated soft drinks in Zambia,
while CSZ had 8 per cent.  Their products are almost perfect substitutes.  Imports
of competing products are negligible and are mainly done by Kazuma Enterprises
on a niche market basis, including Pesis products from Namibia.  The takeover
of Cadbury Schweppes brands in Zambia by TCCC was effectively eliminating
competition and any possible entry into the carbonated soft drinks market in
Zambia, especially since ownership and or authorized use of patents and know-
how are key to substantial investments in Zambia and the Zambian operation
had only been awarded a franchise to use the TCCC trademark and beverage
brands.
The Zambia operation needed re-capitalization.  The parties submitted that
TCCC would infuse its expertises in the beverage sector and assist CSZ achieve
efficiencies.  Third-party concerns were raised regarding the concentration of
economic power in TCCC in Zambia as well as the future of Goldsport in Ndola,
which is an SME with TCCC franchise for secondary brands.
Commission decision
There existed entry barriers in the carbonated soft drinks market in Zambia,
even before the notification of this transaction.  In Zambia, the transaction
entailed elimination of a vigorous competitor by TCCC and consolidation of
TCCC market and power and likely abuse of the same in relation to distributors
and retailers.  However, CSZ required re-capitalization . CSZ had already sold
the brands to TCCC, and CSZ did not have the franchise to produce the brands.
Closure of CSZ would have had worse effects on both the social and economic
spheres in the country.
The transaction was authorized with conditions, which included the following:
• TCCC was to cease operation of any exclusive dealings and territorial
restraint arrangements in Zambia.
• TCCC shall not fix prices or excessively advertise the recommended
price;
• TCCC  and cooperating bottlers in Zambia would continue to comply
with the provisions of the Competition and Fair Trading Act.
Box 11.2 Takeover of Cadbury Schweppes by Zambia Bottles Ltd.
Source:  Zambia Competition Commission
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It should however also be noted that while the merger affected
other COMESA countries, such as Uganda, the absence of merger
control provisions in those countries prevented it from being notified
and reviewed by the affected countries. As such, the countries could
not obtain countervailing concessions on the merger’s consummation
as Zambia and Zimbabwe did.
It should however also be noted that while the merger affected
other COMESA countries, such as Uganda, the absence of merger
control provisions in those countries prevented it from being notified
and reviewed by the affected countries. As such, the countries could
not obtain countervailing concessions on the merger’s consummation
as Zambia and Zimbabwe did (Box 11.3).
The competition authorities of Zambia and Zimbabwe also
separately reviewed the global Rothmans of Pall Mall/British
American Tobacco merger. The Zimbabwean authority approved the
transaction with conditions of both a structural (partial divestiture
aimed at promoting new entry into the cigarette-making industry)
and a behavioural nature (undertakings not to increase cigarette
prices for a specific period of time). The Zambian authority
unconditionally approved the merger since it was found that ‘the
concentration was likely to enhance competition as market offerings
were likely to be enlarged in terms of brands’ (Box 11.4).
Other notable examples include the acquisitions by Pretoria
Portland Cement of South Africa and Lafarge of France of major
cement companies in various COMESA Member States in Southern
Africa. Even though the acquisitions had the effect of drastically
changing the structure of the whole regional cement market,
individual countries reviewed them separately on national rather than
on regional considerations (Box 11.5).
 A regional approach to the above transnational mergers could
not only have avoided dissimilar outcomes on the same transactions
but could have eliminated the threats and likelihood of plant
relocations from one COMESA Member State to another by the
merging parties. A regional competition law with merger control
provisions would also ensure that the beneficial effects of merger
control provisions will accrue to all COMESA countries, and not only
to those few countries with such legislation. It would further assist
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The Coca-Cola Company  (TCCC) and Cadbury Schweppes (CS) Plc signed an
In December 1998 Cadbury Schweppes Plc of the United Kingdom sold to the
Coca Cola Company (TCCC) of the United States of America its commercial
beverage brands outside the United States, Continental Western Europe and
certain other territories worldwide. In December 2000, TCCC submitted to the
CC in terms of Section 35 of the Competition Act a merger application for
authorization of its proposed acquisition in Zimbabwe of beverage brands owned
by Cadbury Schweppes Plc.
The brands acquisition transaction was evaluated as a horizontal merger as
defined in Section 2 of the Competition Act. Consultations were made with the
parties and other competition authorities that had also considered the transaction
in terms of their countries' competition legislation, i.e. the Australian Competition
& Consumer Commission, the Zambia Competition Commission and the
Competition Commission of South Africa.
The Commission identified from a consumer survey undertaken that the relevant
product market was 'ready to drink' soft drinks of a carbonated and non-
carbonated nature (TCCC had submitted that the relevant product was all
beverages, including tea and coffee, and even bottled water). In that market,
the merging parties' pre-merger market shares were 76.9 per cent (Coca Cola
brands) and 12.5 per cent (Cadbury Schweppes brands) resulting in a combined
post-merger market share of 89.4 per cent. It was, however, found that the
proposed merger will not create a monopoly situation in the relevant markets,
which is highly contestable, nor will it lessen actual competition in the soft
drinks bottling and distribution industry. It was also found that the proposed
merger had considerable public interest benefits in the form of generation of
foreign currency from the continued export of local beverage brands such as
the Mazoe brands, the creation of employment, the more efficient use of
resources and the continued availability of Schweppes brands on the market.
The Commission therefore authorized the transaction subject to conditions,
which included that TCCC undertake to purchase Schweppes Zimbabwe Limited
as a going concern and to establish an appropriate shareholding structure (to
include indigenous shareholders) to oversee the operations of the new company
to be formed; that TCCC undertake to maintain the local Mazoe and Calypso
brands on the Zimbabwean market and to develop them into regional brands
with wider circulation; and that TCCC undertake to promote and develop
Zimbabwean suppliers and supplies with respect to the raw materials necessary
to produce the finished product brands.
An undertaking to the above effect was signed between the Competition
Commission and TCCC on 30 May 2001.
Box 11.3 Coca-Cola Company/Cadbury-Schweppes merger
Source:  Zambia Competition Commission
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In January 1999, British American Tobacco (BAT) Plc of the United Kingdom
announced that it had reached an agreement with the shareholders of Rothmans
International, Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG of Switzerland and the
Rembrandt Group Limited of South Africa to merge their international tobacco
businesses. Subsequent to the completion of the international merger between
BAT and Rothmans International, Rothmans of Pall Mall (Zimbabwe) Limited
in September 1999 applied to the Competition Commission under Section 35 of
the Competition Act, 1996 for authorization to acquire the entire issued share
capital of BAT Zimbabwe Limited.
The merging parties gave as one of the reasons to merge the declining market
for cigarettes in Zimbabwe. It was presented that the Zimbabwean manufactured
cigarette market had declined to such an extent that it was no longer big enough
for the continued viability of two manufacturers as evidenced by the poor
performance of BAT Zimbabwe Limited in its financial year ended 31 December
1998.
The case was evaluated as a horizontal merger as defined in Section 2 of the
Competition Act. Through its investigations, the Commission noted that
although the merger would result in the creation of a monopoly situation in the
relevant market (i.e. the manufactured cigarette market), it had other public
interest benefits. Section 32(5) of the Competition Act includes as such benefits
the creation of greater economies of scale resulting in more efficient use of
resources, the generation of foreign currency through exports, and the
stabilization of product prices on the local market. The failing firm defence put
forward by the merging parties was also considered a strong point in this
connection.
The Commission therefore authorized the merger with certain conditions aimed
at alleviating the adverse effects of the monopoly situation created. The
conditions related to the disposal of surplus cigarette-making equipment to third
parties interested in entering the Zimbabwean cigarette-making industry and
constant surveillance by the Competition Commission of future cigarette price
increases, with price rises needing the Commission's authorization, while the
monopoly situation created remains in existence.
Box 11.4 Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American Tobacco merger
Source:  Zambia Competition Commission
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This is the matter in which the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)
subsidiary, Pan African Cement Group (PAC) notified of its intention to takeover
the CDC interests in Chilanga Cement PLC (Zambia), Portland Cement Company
(Malawi), and Mbeya Cement Company (Tanzania). Further, an agreement was
already signed by PAC/CDC to allow Lafarge of France takeover the three PAC
cement companies as the majority shareholder.
Lafarge was a relatively new comer to the sub-Saharan region i.e. Eastern and
Southern Africa. As of 1997, the firm had five plants in Africa located in Kenya
and Cameroon. In 1998, Lafarge bought a plant in South Africa from Murray
Roberts and the recent acquisition of Blue Circle Industries (BCI) in 2001
entrenched its market position. The takeover when concluded shall enhance
Lafarge's position in the region as follows:
The acquired BCI regional cement plants include:
                                                        Capacity (MT)                       Market share
  1. South Africa                         2.3 million                           30 per cent
  2. Kenya                                   250,000
  3. Uganda                                 120,000
  4. Zimbabwe                             350,000
Additional to the proposed acquisition of PAC/CDC's cement plants in the
region:
                                                        Capacity (MT)                       Market share
  1. Zambia                                 400,000                                80 per cent
  2. Malawi                                150,000                                 70 per cent
  3. Tanzania                              250,000                                22 per cent
Lafarge has a cement plant in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) with a capacity
of 2.3 million tons and it has an excess capacity of about 600,000 tons. Lafarge
has had joint venture cement operations in Kenya, Nairobi and Mombasa.
Lafarge does not export any cement to the Chilanga Cement markets. This
scenario changes the market position of Lafarge when one takes into account
the announcement that Lafarge has taken over the British BCI. This effectively
means that Lafarge is present in Zimbabwe, Kenya and Uganda. Despite this,
Lafarge's facility in Zimbabwe cannot export into Zambia because its current
production is all taken up by local demand. Its Uganda and Kenya plants are
logistically unable to export into Zambia due to the prohibitive land-based
transport costs. Its Indian ocean trading company, Cementia could sell into
Zambia through a Tanzanian port. This trading wing has eight ships and eight
terminals to facilitate its operations. Lafarge is well positioned to take on Zambia
from the north, south and east. This is fine it if goes to enhance competition
and not to eliminate it by buying off the potential competitor, Chilanga Cement.
Box 11.5 The takeover of cement plants in Malawi, Tanzania and
Zambia by Lafarge of France
Source:  Submissions by third party to the Zambia Competition Commission during the
assessment of the Lafarge takeover
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those countries with limited resources to embark on full and effective
merger control at regional level.
The COMESA region is ripe for active involvement in merger
control given the advanced stage it has reached in integrating the
economic activities of its Member States, particularly in the area of
trade cooperation. Cross-border business transactions, including
investment and business concentrations and alliances, are now
becoming the norm in the region, thereby justifying merger control
at regional level. There is therefore a great need for merger control
provisions in any competition law that COMESA will adopt. The EU’s
‘one-stop shop’ merger notification approach has a lot of merit and
justifiably suitable if adapted correctly to the COMESA region’s
particular needs and requirements.
Mergers that raise possible competitive issues in more than one
country have become commonplace in the region, as is review of a
single transaction by multiple competition authorities. These
transactions move independently through the various procedural
stages at the national competition authorities, and the timing and
processes often vary among different national competition authorities.
This has raised the cost of doing business in the common market
and, therefore, requires firms to understand the procedures and
analysis that each competition authority will employ in its review of
any anti-competitive matter.    Coordination of procedures is not,
however, sufficient if national laws are not designed to address market
access issues that foreign firms may face.  These problems can only
be resolved if COMESA Member States in the region enact sound
competition principles and enforce them effectively.
‘Although multilateral trade liberalization and regional
integration may provide significant welfare gains, there is still need
for complementary regulatory and competition policies to ensure that
the predicted benefits are not impaired by private anti-competitive
practices’12. As national governments’ restrictions to trade are
progressively reduced, there is increased concern that the benefits
of trade liberalization could be denied through anti-competitive
business practices with market foreclosure effects.  Anti-competitive
practices are not only detrimental to the welfare of the country where
they take place, but are a matter of legitimate concern to other trading
partners too.  For example, national players can organize themselves
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into import or market-sharing cartels in order to keep new
competitors from abroad out of their market.  Further, exclusive
distribution practices can sometimes be formidable obstacle to
companies trying to gain a foothold in foreign markets.  In such
circumstances, the only appropriate and effective remedy lies in a
policy of active competition law enforcement at regional level.
Attempts to address such ‘market access’ cases through
extraterritorial competition law enforcement can antagonize other
countries.  They can also prove ineffective because vital evidence is
often located abroad. The regional competition regime offers the
option to deal with cases of an extraterritorial nature.
The Member States of COMESA have in recent years witnessed a
change of attitude towards the role of governments in a globalized
economy. In line with the liberalization of trade and investment
restrictions and regulatory reforms, competition laws have been
introduced or reinforced in countries at different levels of
development.  More than five countries in COMESA have already
enacted a competition law and at least 15 others are in the process of
preparing competition legislation.  Most of these competition laws
came into effect in the last ten years.  These figures suggest growing
regional consensus on the need for competition law as an integral
part of the domestic reforms necessary for integration in the regional
economy.  Most developing countries have stressed this point in the
UNCTAD working group.  These figures also show that competition
law and policy is an issue of genuine interest by countries at all levels
of development.  Cooperation in the competition field should not
therefore be limited to COMESA members.  Indeed, competition
authorities in the subregion have stressed the importance of
enhancing regional coordination, including technical assistance,
exchange of information and co-operation in enforcement. The
regional competition framework offers an institutional framework
for such cooperation.
The majority of developing countries in the absence of an effective
regional competition policy will find it difficult, especially where there
are no national competition laws, to stop anti-competitive behaviour
by the local subsidiaries of merging multinationals in developed
countries. These multinational corporations may behave
competitively in Europe because of the effective competition rules
but may indulge in anti-competitive practices in developing countries.
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It is evident that firms can engage, and tend to engage, in cross-border
anti-competitive behaviour with impunity, especially in countries that
do not have domestic competition laws, and most of the Member
States in the common market are particularly vulnerable to the
practices. The COMESA Regional Competition Regulations offer
Member States without national competition laws an opportunity to
assess any anti-competitive conduct through the COMESA route.
3.  The COMESA competition regulations
As stated earlier, COMESA launched a Free Trade Area (FTA) on
31 October 2000 and plans to become a customs union by 2008. The
absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the FTA has enhanced
competition in the common market. In response to these market
changes, and in order to ensure fair competition and transparency
among economic operators in the region, COMESA formulated
regional competition regulations. These regulations are expected to
be consistent with internationally accepted practices and principles
of competition especially the United Nations Set of Principles and
Rules on Competition developed by UNCTAD in 1980.
The COMESA Competition Regulations and Rules are directly
derived from Article 55 of the Treaty. This provision bestows upon
Member States the responsibility of embracing the market economy
principles and the requirement for Member States to prohibit any
agreement between undertakings or concerted practice, which has
as its objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition in the common market. The other provisions in the Treaty
which promote and preserve the state of competition in the common
market include Article 52 which contains a prohibition of any subsidy
granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form,
which distorts or threaten to distort competition, insofar as it affects
trade between Member States; Article 51 contains provisions on
dumping; and Article 49 provides for the elimination of quantitative
and other restrictions between Member States.
Article 55: Competition
1. The Members States agree that any practice, which negates
the objective of free and liberalized trade, shall be prohibited.
To this end, the Member States agree to prohibit any agreement
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between undertakings or concerted practice, which has as its
objective, or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market.
2. The Council may declare the provisions of paragraph 1 of
this Article inapplicable in the case of:
a) any agreement or category thereof between undertakings;
b) any decision by association of undertakings;
c) any concerted practice or category thereof;
which improves production or distribution of goods or
promotes technical or economic progress and has the
effect of enabling consumers a fair share of the benefits:
provided that the agreement, decision or practice does not
impose on the undertaking restrictions inconsistent with
the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty or has the
effect of eliminating competition.
3. The Council shall make regulations to regulate competition
within the Member States.
It is paramount to appreciate that the COMESA Competition
Regulations and Rules are intended to operationalize Article 55 of
the Treaty. This is in accordance with Article 55(3) of the Treaty, which
empowers the Council to make regulations to regulate competition
within the Member States. Consequently, the COMESA Competition
Regulations and Rules are an independent set of legal rules, which
form part of the web of laws and policies designed to achieve the
objectives of the common market. The competition regulations, after
being approved by the Council, have become an independent
mechanism designed to meet the aims and objectives of the common
market and not merely an instrument for the achievement of a unified
common market. All businesses, whether trading as companies,
partnerships, state corporations, trade associations or sole traders
and whether for profit or not, must have regard to the competition
regulations.
The main competition regulations governing undertakings in the
public and private sectors are set out in parts three and four of the
regulations. Article 16 prohibits arrangements between two or more
undertakings, which may affect interstate trade and which have an
anti-competitive object or effect. Specifically prohibited are all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.
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The consequence of infringing Article 16(1) is set out in Article 16(3),
which makes such an agreement or decision automatically void.
Article 16: Restrictive Business Practices
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
Common Market: all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which:
a) may affect trade between Member States; and
b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition with the Common Market.
2. Paragraph 1 applies only if the agreement, decision or
concerted practice is, or is intended to be, implemented within
the Common Market.
3. Any agreement or decision, which is prohibited by
paragraph 1, is void.
Article 16(4) provides that the rigour of the prohibition in Article
16(1) may be lifted in specified circumstances: Article 16(1) may be
declared inapplicable in respect of cartel-type arrangements which
meet four tests, two positive and two negative. The two positive
requirements are that the agreement, decision or concerted practice
must contribute to improving production or distribution of goods or
promoting technical or economic progress and; that it must also allow
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. The two negative
requirements are that the agreement does not impose restrictions
unnecessary to the attainment of the positive objectives stated and
that it must not afford the undertakings concerned the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the market
in question. It is important to stress that all four of these requirements
must be satisfied if an agreement is to satisfy Article 16(4).  This
exemption is also qualified by Article 55 (2) of the Treaty.
The second important provision is found in Article 18 of the
regulations. Article 18 is concerned with abuses of a dominant
position, whether by one or more undertakings. The abuse must occur
within the common market and it is prohibited insofar as it may affect
trade between Member States. Under Article 18 of the Regulations,
certain conduct is expressly deemed as abuse of a dominant position
and therefore prohibited. Such conduct shall include restrictions of
entry into a market, prevention of competition in a market,
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elimination of any undertaking into the market, limitation of
production of goods or services, and so on.
Article 18: Abuse of a Dominant Position
1. Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the Common Market or in a substantial part
of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common
Market in so far as it affect trade between Member States, if
it:
a) restricts, or is likely to restrict, the entry of any undertaking
into a market;
b) prevents or deters, or is likely to prevent or deter, any
undertaking from engaging in competition in a market;
c) eliminates or removes, or is likely to eliminate or remove,
any undertaking from a market;
d) directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling
prices or other restrictive practices;
e) limits the production of goods or services for a market to
the prejudice of consumers;
f) as a party to any agreement makes the conclusion of such
agreement subject to acceptance by another party of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with
subject of the agreement; or
g) engages in any business activity that results in the
exploitation of its customers or suppliers, so as to frustrate
the benefits expected from the establishment of the
Common Market.
2. In determining whether an undertaking is in a dominant
position, consideration shall be given to the:
a) Relevant market defined in terms of the product and the
geographic context;
b) Level of actual or potential competition in terms of number
of competitors, production capacity and product demand;
c) Barriers to entry of competitors; and
d) History of competition and rivalry between competitors
in the sector of activity.
The provision for abuse of dominant position in turn requires
the Commission to assess vertical restraints. The assessment of
vertical restraints is controversial because most of the examples of
vertical restraints entail claims of efficiency gains. The Commission
shall have to analyse vertical restraints from a ‘rule of reason’
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perspective. Consequently, the Commission may in certain
circumstances grant exemptions. It is now stated law that: ‘finding
that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a
recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for
which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned
has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine
undistorted competition on the Common Market’.13 The Commission
as seen from the wording of Article 18 shall adopt this approach.
Article 19 of the regulations specifically addresses the prohibition
of cartel arrangements. The horizontal agreements, especially those
which fix prices, collusive tendering, quota allocation, collective
refusal to supply are expressly prohibited. These arrangements are
widely condemned by most competition laws of Member States as
they serve no purpose other than to shift benefits from consumers to
producers, the upshot being organizational inefficiencies and the
making of excess profits. Article 19 expressly incorporates the notion
that horizontal agreements are illegal per se.
Article 19: Prohibited Practices
1. It shall be an office for undertakings engaged in the market
in rival or potentially rival activities to engage in the practices
appearing in paragraph 3:
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply where
undertakings are dealing with each other in the context
of a common entity wherein they are under common
control or where they are otherwise not able to act
independently of each other.
2.This Article applies to formal, informal, written and
unwritten agreements, arrangements and understandings.
3. For the purpose of paragraph 1, the following are
prohibited:
a) agreements fixing prices, which agreements hinder or
prevent the sale or supply or purchase of goods or services
between persons, or limit or restrict the terms and
conditions of sale or supply or purchase between persons
engaged in the sale of purchased goods or services;
b) collusive tendering and bid-rigging;
c) market or customer allocation agreements;
d) allocation by quota as to sales and production;
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e) collective action to enforce arrangements;
f) concerted refusals to supply goods or services to a potential
purchaser, or to purchase goods or services from a
potential supplier; or
g) collective denials of access to an arrangement or
association, which is crucial to competition.
Article 24 of the regulations provides for a pre-merger notification
system which requires participants to a merger to inform the
Commission of any merger likely to substantially prevent or lessen
competition, or likely to be contrary to the public interest. A notifiable
merger requires a regional dimension. For the purpose of the
regulations, a merger has a regional dimension where both the
acquiring firm and target firm or either the acquiring firm or target
firm operate in two or more Member States and the threshold of
combined annual turnover or assets in the region, either in general
or in relation to specific industries.14 Consequently, the Commission
shall handle larger mergers above certain turnover thresholds.
National competition authorities shall apply national merger laws
below the thresholds. Where the companies are required to notify a
merger in two or more national jurisdictions, it shall be possible for
them to ask the Commission to take over the case if the Member
States concerned agree.15
Article 24: Notification of a Proposed Merger
1. A party to a notifiable merger shall notify the Commission
in writing of the proposed merger as soon as it is practicable
but in no event later than 30 days of the parties' decision to
merge:
Any notifiable merger carried out in contravention of this
part shall have no legal effect and no rights or obligations
imposed on the participating parties by any agreement in
respect of the merger shall be legally enforceable in the
Common Market.
Part 5 of the regulations, comprising Articles 27 to 38, deals with
consumer protection and welfare. These are not discussed in this
chapter due to space limitations.16
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3.1  Need for cross-border impact
As stated above, Article 55(1) of the Treaty is identical to Article
81(1) of the European Community’s Treaty of Rome. It should be
pointed out, however, that Article 55(1) which prohibits ‘any
agreement between undertaking or concerted practice which has, as
its objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market’, does not specifically state
that the offensive agreement must ‘affect trade between Member
States’, as is the case with Article 81(1).
Notwithstanding that omission, it is submitted that the impact
of cross-border trade is an implicit prerequisite in light of the wording
of Article 16(1) of the Regulations. Consequently, the Commission
essentially can only intervene when there is an effect on trade between
Member States. The Regulations, more especially Articles 16 and 18,
and to some extent the Merger Control Regulation, do not apply
unless the agreement or conduct ‘may affect trade between Member
States’ and has as its object or effect the restriction or distortion of
‘competition within the Common Market’. The concept of an
agreement, which may affect trade between Member States, provides
a jurisdictional limit to the prohibition laid down in Articles 16 and
18. The criterion confines the scope of the application of Articles 16
and 18 to agreements having a minimum level of cross-border effect
within the common market; hence the practices must appreciably
affect trade between Member States.
COMESA comprises 20 Member States. Obviously, via a treaty,
these states have voluntarily decided to take on certain obligations
vis-à-vis each other. They have not given up their rights as sovereign
nations. In order for COMESA to assert jurisdiction, therefore, the
conduct in question must cross borders.
The above contention is buttressed by the Preamble to the Treaty
itself which, after listing the 20 Member States that are party to it,
states:
Conscious of the overriding need to establish a Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa...
Having regard  to the principles of international law
governing relations between sovereign states, and the
principles of liberty, fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law, ... (emphasis added)
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Additionally, Article 55(1) prohibits anti-competitive practices
‘‘within the Common Market’. The ‘Common Market’ is defined in
Article 1 of the Treaty, and Article 1(2) states that the common market
is only open to the 20 listed Member States. In other words, the Treaty
is concerned with activity between these Member States, not with
conduct solely within the borders of any one state.
That having been said, it must nonetheless be made clear that a
broad interpretation be given to the concept of ‘conduct which affects
trade between Member States’. It is an expression that is given a broad
meaning and any conduct that will trigger the intervention of the
European Commission is that which ‘may have an influence, direct
or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between
Member States, such as might prejudice the aim of a single market in
all the Member States’. The European Commission has always tended
to apply the provision in a liberal manner.
The fact that the Court’s definition encompasses ‘potential’
impact as well as ‘actual’ and also considers what ‘might’ prejudice
the aim of a single market shows the breadth of the Court’s reach.
For COMESA to adopt a comparable approach, support may be
found in Article 4 of its Treaty, specifically, Section 6(d) where it is
stated that:
in the field of economic and social development: ...
(d) adopt a regional policy that will look into all possible
economic problems that Member States may face during the
implementation of this Treaty and propose ways and means
of redressing such problems in a manner that will satisfy
the conditions of equitable and balanced development
within the Common Market;...
Additionally Article 6(c),  which lists the ‘Fundamental
Principles’, states that:
The Member States, in pursuit of the aims and objectives stated
in Article 3 of this Treaty, and in conformity with the Treaty
for the Establishment of the African Economic Community
signed at Abuja, Nigeria on 3rd June 1991, agree to adhere to
the following principles:...
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(c) inter-State cooperation, harmonization of policies and
integration of programs among the Member States;...
The creation of a cohesive Single Market is obviously an
important objective of the Member States. Regional integration is not
only a ‘specific undertaking’ but also a ‘fundamental principle’.
Conduct that affects trade between Member States, is therefore a
concept to be broadly defined in order to ensure the attainment of a
true common market.
3.2 Relevant European Community experience
It is readily acknowledged that to infringe Article 81(1), three
conditions must be satisfied. There must be:
1) some form of collusion between undertakings
2) which may affect trade between Member States, and
3) which has the object or effect of restricting competition within
the common market.
The European Court of Justice has articulated, in several cases,17
the test as to whether it will be found that there has been an impact
on trade between Member States. One notable case held:
..... it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of
probability in the basis of a set of objective factors of law or
fact that it may have an influence direct or indirect, actual or
potential on the pattern of trade between Member States, such
as might prejudice the aim of a single market in all the Member
States.
The Court’s view can be summed up thus: if one can reasonably
say that trade between Member States is being, or will probably be,
affected such that the notion of a common market may be (or has
been) impacted, there is an effect across state lines.
3.2.1 ‘Appreciable’ effect
However the fact that there is an impact on trade between
Member States is not enough. That impact must be ‘appreciable’.
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Indeed, courts have come up with an actual number, 5 per cent,
but that does not mean that analysis is foregone. The facts of each
case have to be carefully considered. As early as 1969, the European
Court determined that ‘... an agreement falls outside the prohibition
in Article 85 when it has only an insignificant effect on the market,
taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned
have on the market of the product in question’.
In essence, therefore, courts and others who are called upon to
adjudicate look to the market share of the companies involved in
relation to the product(s) in question.
3.2.2 ‘Trade’ defined
As to what constitutes ‘trade’, the term is also given a wide scope.
The courts have found that the word ‘trade’ ‘covers all economic
activity, including not only the supply of goods but also the supply
of services... It seems that the flow of profits from one Member State
to another in itself constitutes “trade” between Member States.’18
In summary, to trigger the jurisdiction of a regional competition
authority, the conduct in question must have, or be likely to have, an
appreciable negative competitive impact on trade between Member
States. ‘Trade’ encompasses all activity that results in a profit, and
also covers goods as well as services.
As to whether or not the conduct at issue requires regulation is a
question to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, there is
certain economic activity so inherently inimical to the interests of
the common market that it may be deemed to be per se illegal and, as
such, warrants a truncated analysis.
3.3  Supremacy of the COMESA competition regulations
There are provisions for cooperation between the Commission
and Member States in the application and enforcement of the
Regulations and Rules. These relate to both the application of the
law and practical cooperation. The concurrent jurisdiction of the
Commission and national courts to apply the Regulations means that
consistent application is required. Any inconsistency would offend
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against the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the
fundamental principles of the Treaty.
Within the common market there are at least two legal orders:
national legal orders comprising the respective bodies of legal rules
within each of the COMESA Member States and the regional legal
order comprising the body of legal rules created at COMESA level.
The latter includes the COMESA Treaty and the secondary legislation
of the common market, principally Regulations and Directives, all of
which are of equal application within all Member States. Under
Article 5 of the Treaty, Members States have made an undertaking
that they shall make every effort to plan and direct their development
policies with a view to creating conditions favourable for the
achievement of the aims of the common market and the
implementation of the provisions of this treaty and shall abstain from
any measures likely to jeopardize the achievement of the aims of the
common market or the implementation of the provisions of this
Treaty.
Article 5: General Undertakings
1. The Member States shall make every effort to plan and direct
their development policies with a view to creating conditions
favourable for the achievement of the aims of the Common
Market and the implementation of the provisions of this
Treaty and shall abstain from any measures likely to
jeopardize the achievement of the aims of the Common Market
or the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.
Member States found to be in breach of the Regulations in
combination with their duties under Article 5 of the Treaty are
required to cooperate with the COMESA institutions in achieving
the objectives of the Treaty, which include the institution of a system
ensuring that competition is not distorted. Member States could be
in breach of these duties where they enact legislation requiring or
encouraging undertakings to act contrary to the COMESA
competition regulations or reinforcing the effects of such conduct.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the COMESA competition
regulations constitute a new legal order of international law, under
which the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within limited fields, with the subject of the new order comprising
not only Member States but also their nationals.
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Independent of the legislation of Member States, the competition
regulations shall not only impose obligations on individuals but shall
also be intended to confer upon them rights which become part of
their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are
expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of the obligation
which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals
as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of
COMESA.
The common market legal order may be characterized as being
autonomous and inherently supreme by virtue of the undertaking
under Article 5 of the Treaty. The common market law is said to enjoy
primacy over national law. This is stated under Article 5(2) of the
Treaty which requires Member States to take steps to make the
provisions of the Treaty an integral part of their legal systems and
which their courts shall be bound to apply.
The common market legal system shall have precedence over
national law and a Member State may not unilaterally nullify a
provision of the Regulation by its own subsequent domestic legislative
measure. The decisions of the COMESA Court of Justice on the
interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty shall have precedence
over decisions of national courts. For example, it may be that a
particular agreement is permitted under domestic competition law
but is forbidden under Parts 3 and 4 of the Regulations; in that case,
the principle that the Treaty and COMESA Regulations have
supremacy over domestic law means that Parts 3 and 4 will prevail
over the domestic law and that the agreement will be forbidden.
Conversely, an agreement that is permitted under Parts 3 and 4 of
the Regulations cannot be prohibited under domestic competition
laws.
Moreover, the regulations upon publication in the official gazette
of the common market shall be directly effective within national legal
orders, independent of any measure of reception or enactment into
national law. This direct effect is full and uniform in all Member States
from the date of entry into force of the regulations and for so long as
they continue in force. In accordance with Article 10(2) of the Treaty,
the regulations shall be binding on all the Member States in their
entirety. Consequently, national courts are expected to apply the
regulations in their entirety and protect those rights that the Treaty
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confers as well as to enforce obligations on the part of individuals
and firms.
The question as to whether the Regulations form part of national
legal orders is established under Article 5(2)(b) of the Treaty, which
confers upon the regulations of the Council, the force of law and the
necessary legal effect within all Member States.
3.4  Enforcement institutions and their respective
jurisdiction
The COMESA Treaty establishes various organs of the common
market. This chapter examines the role of each of those institutions
in relation to the creation, application and enforcement of competition
law and policy.
3.4.1 Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers of the common market established by
Article 7 of the Treaty (Council) is the supreme legislative body of
COMESA and takes the major economic and political decisions
pertaining to the common market. It consists of such ministers as
may be designated by each Member State. The Treaty under Article
11 places a duty on the Council to adopt appropriate regulations and
directives to give effect to the principles set out in the Competition
Regulations.
3.5  COMESA Competition Commission
The COMESA Competition Commission (Commission) is the
executive arm established under Article 6 of the Regulations. It has
broad responsibilities which include the implementing of the
decisions of the Council and the putting forward of opinions or
recommendations on matters dealt with under the Regulations. The
Commission has a central role in relation to competition; it is
responsible for both the development of policy in relation to
competition law and for the application and enforcement of the
Regulations. It also has powers and duties to enforce the consumer
394
Allocation of competences - COMESA
protection provisions of the Regulations. Decisions and other public
statements made by the Commission shall be important in setting
out general principles about the way in which it proposes to act.
Box 11.6 “Three-tier” decision making process: COMESA competi-
tion policy institutional arrangements
  FULL BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
(minus the 3 full-time Commissioners who made 
initial determination)
Appeal 
Disputed 
Initial Determination Accepted Case Closed 
Hearing 
Committee of 3 full-time 
Commissioners 
Recommendations 
Breach 
Investigations 
Complaint 
COMPETITION COMMISSION 
No breach Case Closed 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Level 1 
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The Commission as established under Article 6 shall enjoy an
international legal personality. It shall have, in the territory of each
Member State, the legal capacity required for the performance of its
functions under the Treaty and the power to acquire or dispose of
movable and immovable property in accordance with the laws of
each Member State.
The Commission under Article 7 has been bestowed with the
functions of applying the provisions of the Regulations with regard
to trade between Member States and is responsible for promoting
competition within the common market. In carrying out its functions,
the Commission may:
• monitor and investigate anti-competitive practices of
undertakings within the common market;
• mediate disputes between Member States concerning anti-
competitive conduct;
• help Member States promote national competition law and
institution;
• harmonize national laws with the regional Regulations;
• cooperate with national competition authorities in Member States;
• cooperate with and assist Member States in the implementation
of its decisions;
• provide support to Member States in promoting and protecting
consumer welfare.
Irrespective of whether an agreement or arrangement has been
notified to the Commission or a complaint made, it is open to the
Commission to launch its own investigation in relation to any
agreement, practice or other activity that it may suspect infringes
the competition rules. This general supervisory function of the
Commission in competition matters, demonstrates further why the
competition rules are all-embracing and cannot be circumvented or
ignored by Member States.
Consequently, the Commission’s powers of investigation, have,
due to its international character, taken into account the need for
observing the principles of natural justice. The provisions of the
Regulations must be applied in accordance with the general principles
common to the Member States. These shall include principles of
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proportionality, equality and non-discrimination, legitimate
expectation, legal certainty and the right to a fair hearing.
Fundamental human rights as derived from the constitutional
traditions of the Member States, and as set out in the African Union
Charter for the Protection of Human Rights and Peoples Rights, shall
be taken into account when implementing the Regulations. The
Regulations further provide for remedies and penalties for persons
who contravene or fail to comply with any provisions of the
Competition Regulations and Rules.
The third important enforcement institution is the Board of
Commissioners (the Board) established under Article 12 of the
Regulations. The composition and appointment of the Board reflects
the regional character of COMESA. The members of the Board are
drawn from the Member States of COMESA. The Council on the
recommendation of the Secretary General appoints them. The
functions of the Board include the determination on any conduct,
and adjudicating on any matter provided under the Regulations. The
Board shall also hear appeals, or review any decision of the
Commission that may, in terms of the Regulations, be referred to it.
It may also delegate any of its functions to another COMESA Agency
established to coordinate and regulate a specific sector.
3.6  The COMESA Court of Justice
The COMESA Court of Justice (Court) is created under Article
19 of the Treaty. Its major function is to ensure the adherence to law
in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Treaty.
This includes the conduct of judicial review of acts of COMESA
institutions, which shall include any disputes arising out of the
application of the Regulations by the Commission. Member States,
legal persons and natural persons shall have locus standi before the
court. Referrals to the court may be made by the Secretary General
of COMESA, any person who is resident in a Member State, and the
Member States themselves, to the effect that the act, regulation,
directive or decision is ultra vires or unlawful or an infringement of
the provisions of the Treaty.
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The COMESA Court of Justice shall receive appeals against the
decisions of the Board. The judgement of the Court is binding in
matters of law in all Member States. The Court has seven judges and
jurisdiction to hear all cases brought by individuals and undertakings
against measures of the Commission. Actions against the Commission
in competition cases shall generally be taken to the Court. It has
unlimited jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Commission
imposing penalties for infringements.
The Court hears appeals from the Board on points of law in
relation to competition cases. It shall also hear positions on points of
law from the national courts of the Member States, actions brought
by Member States or undertakings against the Commission and
actions brought by the Commission against states (infraction
proceedings).
3.7  Remedies before Member States’ domestic courts
Since the regulations apply directly in Member States, private
parties may file complaints to initiate infringement procedures under
the regulations. This is more so, given the fact that the regulations
create rights and obligations between individuals as well as between
individuals and Member State governments.
Private persons and firms can invoke Articles 18 and 19 of the
regulations in two procedural situations before national courts:
• As a defence in a civil action involving a prohibited agreement
or as part of an action for an injunction; or
• Damages incurred as a result of an infringement of the
competition regulations.
In private actions, national courts have jurisdiction to determine
whether the regulations have been violated. They are able to assess a
case involving the regulations, although they must consider legally
binding acts by the Commission, for example exemptions under
Article 16(4) of the regulations. In this context, the consistency of the
COMESA competition regulations throughout the common market
is guaranteed by Article 30 of the Treaty, which empowers and, in
certain circumstances, requires national courts to refer a case to the
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COMESA Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on questions of
interpretation on the legality of the act or a decision made under the
regulations.
It is important to note that the system allows national courts to
concurrently apply the regulations and the national law. Article 29
of the Treaty provides that, except where the jurisdiction is conferred
on the Court by or under this Treaty, disputes to which the common
market is a party shall not on that ground alone, be excluded from
the jurisdiction of national courts. For example, although it is only
the Commission that can grant an exemption pursuant to Article
16(4), the national courts may be empowered to enjoin any party from
infringing Article 16. It shall be therefore necessary for the national
courts to decide whether, in any particular case, the agreement does
so clearly infringe Article 16 that an exemption is very unlikely to be
granted by the Commission, even if it has been notified to the
Commission, or whether there is no infringement of Article 16 and
therefore the question of an exemption under Article 16(4) does not
come into play.
Invariably an agreement that is the subject of legal proceedings
under the regulations before the national court, will also be the subject
of consideration before the Commission. In this situation, national
courts have the option either to adjudicate upon the dispute or
suspend the proceedings pending determination by the Commission.
Similarly, where it is clear that the regulations apply, and there is no
possibility that the Commission will grant an exemption under Article
16(4), the national court may proceed to rule on the matter. However,
where the situation is unclear, the national court would most probably
not take a final decision, but would stay proceedings or adopt interim
measures and seek assistance from the Commission or the COMESA
Court of Justice.
Member States are further employed in the execution of a
judgement which imposes a pecuniary obligation. In such a case, the
rules of civil procedure in force in the Member State in which
execution is to take place shall govern the process.
It is envisaged that the Commission shall actively encourage
private parties to seek remedies before national courts and the
Commission shall have a duty to give advisory opinions regarding
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questions of law arising from the provisions of this treaty affecting
the common market.
3.8 Mechanism for cooperation in the application and
enforcement of competition regulations
The Regulations provide a mechanism for cooperation for the
operation of regional and national competition laws. It is important
to note that the COMESA Competition Authority is not yet operational
and there are still very few Member States with operational national
competition authorities. Consequently, we shall base our analysis on
the existing provisions of the regulations and the rules, knowing very
well that once the Commission becomes operational, it will develop
further rules or directives necessary for the efficient performance
and implementation of the Regulations.
As stated earlier under Article 16 of the Treaty, there is a general
undertaking by the Member States to make every effort to implement
the provisions of the Treaty and to abstain from taking any measure
likely to jeopardize the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.
One such provision is Article 55 of the Treaty, which calls for the
implementation of competition law and policy. The Treaty
requirement is enhanced in the Competition Regulations by Article
5, which confers upon the Member States an obligation to take all
appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising
out of the Regulations, and requires Member States to abstain from
taking any measure that could jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives of the Regulations.
Further, the Member States have made specific undertakings
under Article 4 of the Treaty in the fields of industry and energy to
eliminate rigidities in the structures of production and manufacturing
so as to provide goods and services that are of high quality and are
competitive in the common market.
The mechanism for cooperation deals with the application and
enforcement of the competition regulations under Parts 3, 4 and 5 of
the Regulations. As stated above, these operate against the legal
background of the supremacy of the Treaty or the Regulations over
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national competition laws, the direct application of the Treaty and
the duty of sincere cooperation contained in Article 5 of the Treaty.
The Commission, pursuant to Article 7, has the power to issue
notices and guidelines to provide guidance for business and indicate
the Commission’s view on certain matters relating to the application
of the regulations. For example, the Commission can exempt certain
categories of agreements under Article 16(4) of the regulations. It
will be necessary for the Commission to issue guidelines for the
application of Article 16(4), setting out the way in which the
Regulations will apply to such agreements, and also a more general
guide for businesses and for the national authorities on the application
of the exemption provision.
In a regional competition regime, it is important that there are
practical mechanisms to ensure the appropriate enforcement of the
Regulations at national level and that the operation of national law
does not conflict with the operation of the Regulations in cases where
jurisdiction may be overlapping.
The Regulations and the Rules contain various provisions to
ensure cooperation at national level with the Commission’s
investigation and enforcement powers. Under Rules 43 and 44, before
the Commission undertakes an on-site investigation, it must inform
the competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the
investigation is to be carried out. Officials from the competent
authority may assist the Commission with investigations, and, where
the investigation is opposed by the parties concerned, the Member
State must give the necessary assistance to the Commission officials
to enable them to carry out their investigations. The officials from
the competent national competition authority shall be expected to
accompany the Commission officials to an on-site investigation.
Further, decisions of the Commission that impose penalties for
infringement of the Competition Regulations are enforceable in
accordance with the COMESA Treaty. Enforcement shall be governed
by the rules of civil procedure in the Member State where the
enforcement is carried out. In the case of Member States with common
law systems, this may require the Commission to cause a decision to
be registered with the High Court as a result of which it will have the
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same effect as if it were a judgement or order given or made by that
Court on the date of registration.
To this end, national competition laws may be required to revise,
amend or enact appropriate provisions with the aim of realigning
their law with the requirement of the Regulations.
For the implementation of certain provisions of the Regulations,
the Commission may require the cooperation of the national
competition authority. For instance, under the merger control
regulation, a Member State, having attained knowledge of a merger
notification submitted to the Commission, may request the
Commission to refer the merger for consideration under the Member
State’s national competition law if the Member State is satisfied that
the merger, if carried out, is likely to disproportionately reduce
competition to a material extent in the Member State or any part of
the Member State.
Further, for all merger enquiries, all relevant Member States are
required to be notified and to submit written representations to the
Commission. Member States may not apply their own national
competition laws to concentrations with a regional dimension, except
in certain limited circumstances. Conversely, the Commission may
not use the Merger Regulations to investigate concentrations without
a regional dimension except in certain limited circumstances.
The Commission may refer mergers with a regional dimension
back to a Member State to take action under national legislation where
there is a competition problem in a distinct market within the Member
State. Member States may take action in relation to a merger that
falls to the exclusive competence of the Commission in order to
protect ‘legitimate interests’. The merger Regulation may recognize
the exclusions under Article 4 of the Regulations as such legitimate
interests. The Commission may further use the Merger Regulation to
investigate concentrations without a regional dimension at the request
of a Member State. However, the general rule is that if a merger meets
the tests for assessment by the Commission, the national competition
authority will not investigate. As noted above, in such cases the
Commission has exclusive competence, subject to certain limited
exceptions.
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It is important to note that the approval of the Competition
Regulations by the Council makes them, in accordance with Article
10 of the Treaty, binding upon each Member State to which it is
addressed as to the result to be achieved but not as to the means of
achieving it. The entry into force of Regulations is provided for under
Article 12 of the Treaty, which stipulates that Regulations shall be
published in the official Gazette of the common market and shall
enter into force on the date of their publication or on such later date
as may be specified in the Regulations.
4.  Towards the implementation
The entry into force of the regional competition regime shall bring
about several challenges to the COMESA Member States, the most
important of which is to ensure a correct system of allocation of cases
(between the Commission and national competition authorities) and
a constant application of the regulations and rules by all players.
The implementation of the regulations shall require a phased
approach in which the focus should first be on advocacy in order to
‘build a competition culture’ at both national and regional levels,
secondly on enforcement and particularly on anti-competitive (or
cartel) enforcement, and thirdly on merger regulation.
The Commission shall require modern and efficient tools that
shall be acceptable as a business regulator. It must be a Commission
that allows more freedom for business to take the commercial
decisions they want, while safeguarding competition. It is important
to mention that alongside these regional regulations, national
competition laws shall continue to be developed, reviewed and
realigned with the global trends and developments as COMESA
deepens its regional integration. This shall also ensure consistency
in regional policies, avoid contradictions and provide, as mentioned
earlier, a regionally predictable economic environment.
The challenges for the new commission and for the national
competition authorities shall be enormous, especially in the early
stages of implementation. The first such challenge shall be the
prospect of harmonizing national competition laws and regional
competition. Efforts at harmonization shall be seriously constrained
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by the different capacities of the individual national competition
authorities. Already, one can witness a marked difference in
experience and resource endowment among the national competition
authorities. This shall indeed be a significant limiting factor because
no matter how useful the regional law is intended to be, if the national
competition authorities command neither national political support
nor technical competence, then the intervention of the COMESA
Competition Commission shall be met with constraints, thereby
inhibiting the progress of regional trade and investment.
In order to effectively implement the regulations, it is essential
for Member States to mobilize a strong technical capacity to support
the conceptualization of the system. Where these skills are not
available at national level, they will need to be imported. When they
are imported, it is important to ensure that local capacity is built at
the same time. There shall be considerable need to ensure that
opportunities to develop local, more permanent skills are attended
to, especially by the competition authorities. This is so, because for
the regional regime to work effectively, it shall require effective
competition authorities at national level.
In the context of the critical manpower and technical resource
shortages in Member States, the successful implementation of the
regulations shall be reliant on the participation of a strong and willing
domestic and regional private business sector.
The implementation of the block exemption rules and guidelines
will be another challenge to be faced by the Commission. There is
need for a complete departure from the old legalistic block with
exemption regulations as is happening in the EU competition system,
by adopting a more economics-based approach. Instead of imposing
on companies a limited list of what they can and ought to do, the
new approach shall define a limited list of what is specifically
prohibited, that is those matters related to practices prohibited under
Regulation 19.
The other challenge shall deal with the Commission’s intervention
against anti-competitive mergers. There shall be a need to continue
reviewing the procedure for merger assessment to create a more level
playing field in the common market. The Commission shall be
required to enact more streamlined rules or systems for merger
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referrals, which shall smooth the process of referrals to and from the
Commission. There may be a need to also consider at this early stage
the introduction, with greater caution, of the EU concept of the ‘one-
stop shop’ principle and of introducing more flexibility into the review
timetable.
As COMESA establishes the Commission to implement the
Regulations, it will be found that there are gaps in the Regulations
and Rules that need to be filled. There is a need to give the Regulations
the ‘teeth to bite’. The Commission, once operational, may require
the enaction of more rules to create the conditions for a greater
involvement of national competition authorities and courts by
empowering them to apply Regulations 16 and 18 in their entirely
and for national courts to apply the regional law whenever applicable,
that is whenever the agreement or practice at stake may affect trade
• New antitrust regulation (Reg (EC) No 1/2003): eliminates notifications;
empowers national competition authorities and courts to apply Article
81 in full; increases the Commission's inspection powers
• New merger control regulation (Reg (EC) No 139/2004): enables the
Commission to intervene against all anti-competitive mergers; reinforces
the 'one-stop shop' principle;  introduces some flexibility into the review
timetable
• Block exemption regulation on technology transfers between firms:
creates a safe harbour for agreements licensing new technological
breakthroughs between competing companies with a market share below
20 per cent (30 per cent for agreements between non-competing firms);
no presumption of illegality for agreements between companies with
higher market shares
• Regulation on air transport between EU and non-EU airports: gives
the Commission clear and effective powers to review the impact on
European consumers of alliances between EU and non-EU airlines
Box 11.7 Main competition reforms in EU Competition Law
Source:  European Commission Competition Policy Newsletter - Special Edition ISSN 1025-
2266
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between Member States. This will allow not only the Commission
but also the national competition authorities to be responsible for
enforcing regional competition rules. There may be a need to draw
clear rules on the power of the Commission and national competition
authorities to intervene as amicus curiae before courts applying
Regulations 16 and 18 of the Competition Regulations.
Given the similarities between the Regulations and the EC Treaty
on competition, it will be helpful to borrow with greater caution from
the ‘modernization’ principles of the EC Competition Law. Among
the modernization principles to be considered by the Commission
shall include:
• Accommodating the principle of subsidiarity by allowing the
most appropriate competition authority to act in any particular
case.
• Introducing a level playing field for competition scrutiny of
commercial agreements across the common market.
• Putting in place a mechanism to ensure cooperation and
consistency in the operation of the new regime.
• Issuing a Notice on cooperation between the Commission and
national competition authorities and national courts.
The Commission, upon entry into force of the Competition
Regulations, shall find itself, at its establishment, with the formidable
task of creating a ‘competition culture’ within the COMESA Member
States. Competition enforcement at common market level will be more
effective if there are Member States that understand and support the
concept of competition policy.
It is expected that the introduction of a regional competition
regime will be met with some resistance, especially in those Member
States that are still pursuing economic policies of protectionism. In
such Member States, it may be difficult to demonstrate the benefits
of competition and how greater competition in the economy will in
fact bring about economic efficiency. The Commission shall be
required to put in place a vigorous competition awareness campaign.
The general attitude of the people towards the liberalization
process that was embarked on by most COMESA Member States has
also created a barrier to competition advocacy. The privatization
programme by most Member States witnessed the entry of
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multinational companies and the exit of local firms from the domestic
market. The demise of local firms has always been attributed to the
stiff competition brought about by multinational companies. In the
eyes of many, rightly or wrongly, competition in domestic markets is
seen as a destroyer of local firms.
The fostering of the development of competition expertise outside
the government institutions has been minimal in COMESA Member
States. The concept of competition is not only new to the business
stakeholders but also within the government institutions. The national
competition authorities in the few countries with national competition
laws are still weak and their capacities are not fully developed. This
has made most national competition authorities unable to carry out
meaningful advocacy work on competition. The legal system or the
judiciary, lawyers, public servants, businesses have yet to embrace
and understand the concept of competition. There will be a need for
the Commission’s involvement in the training programmes of the
said stakeholders, and for these stakeholders to give proper guidance
to governments in the allocation of competences at national and
regional levels.
As for most governments of these countries, competing needs
and priorities have always tilted their efforts towards areas other than
the promotion of competition. The political aspirations and policy
pronouncements had a tendency to overshadow competition.
Limitations of the available financial and human resources have
continued to undermine the role of competition in national economic
development.
The COMESA Competition Commission would also have to deal
with other challenges facing developing countries in Africa. The issue
of developing local entrepreneurship and protection of small and
medium enterprises as a tool of poverty alleviation is important to
policy makers in the developing world in general and to COMESA
Member States. This may affect the process of implementation of the
competition regulations and a common ground on the core policy
options, which could go contrary to competition principles, should
be addressed at an early stage.
It should be appreciated that competition law and policy is only
one among many instruments available to government required to
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bring about economic growth. The introduction of competition laws
in most of these countries has not been matched by the review of
other legislation, which inhibits the proper functioning of competitive
markets. Whereas most of these countries have liberalized the
economic process, the enactment of accompanying new laws to
regulate the market economy process and the repeal or amendment
of the existing laws, which operate against the competition process,
has been demonstrably slow. There still exist many laws or regulations
in these countries that make it impossible for the competitive process.
For example, there are still laws in some COMESA Member States
that control prices and some that discriminate against foreign firms.
5.  Conclusion
In reality, the Regulations and Rules are still very new, and it is
too early to gauge the long-term impacts on socio-economic
development. However, the indications from the three Member States
with operational national competitions laws demonstrate some very
positive development impacts. However, there are potential areas of
weakness associated with implementation and enforcement. These
areas of weakness are expected to be remedied through deliberate
focused interventions.
The effective regional competition enforcement is by and large
going to rest on the orientation and capacity of national competition
authorities. It shall require the raising of enforcement standards in
the national competition institutions, establishing competition
authorities in all Member States, harmonization of national laws in
line with COMESA competition law and, above all, learning from
the best practices and experiences of the developed countries.
As for the application of COMESA competition regulations, in a
situation where many members do not have competition laws, it
would be interesting to follow the development of the implementation
process in this regard. One important consideration would be to
stipulate as part of the implementation guidelines the provision that
Member States with no competition law may take anti-competitive
cases to the regional body. The regional body may take the liberty of
handling cases regardless of the cross-border impact, which would
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otherwise be handled at national level and use this as an interim
measure while Member States prepare to enact competition laws. This
would form a good base for COMESA to start off the implementation
of the regulations. The Andean Community Law (Decision 608) also
allows Member States to apply the regional law in place of national
laws. Ecuador is one country, within the Andean Community, which
is preparing to utilize this option. However, countries choosing this
method should be aware of the fact that anti-competitive practices
are most likely to thrive where there is no national law; and, hence,
information about their rights and obligations under the regional law
is limited. To overcome such a challenge, the affected Member State
should set aside resources to create national institutions to support
the implementation of the regulations.
On merger control, the examples given in this chapter shows
that there is a great potential for COMESA regional regulations to
deal with cross-border mergers and acquisitions. As mentioned
elsewhere in this chapter, the COMESA Competition Commission
may wish to consider as one of the deliverables, the establishment of
the Commission as a ‘one stop shop’ for merger analysis. At a time
when all COMESA countries will have competition laws, it would be
more cost effective to handle the mergers at regional level rather than
having different countries dealing with the same merger.
Further, in order for the COMESA Competition Commission and
national courts to apply the regulations effectively and to enhance
the allocation of competences, there is a need to develop capacity-
building programs at national level. This includes human resource
and institutional capacity building for both enforcement officers and
the judiciary. The UNCTAD training programme in this area has been
effective in sensitizing the judiciary and enforcement officers on the
legal and economics aspects of competition cases and would be a
good model to consider.
It is also important to note that it is one thing to have rules and
regulations, but another for the regulations to have the desired effect
of spurring regional trade and curtailing cross-border anti-
competitive practices. An effective way to assess the effectiveness of
the applications of the COMESA rules and regulations would be by
examining the number and the nature of the cases brought before
the Commission. There is therefore a need for COMESA to develop
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within its enforcement activities an advocacy programme for sensitive
Member States on the rules and regulations at two levels:
(a) For countries with competition laws, their responsibilities under
the new regulations and their role in the enforcement process.
(b) For members with no competition laws, what they need to do to
benefit from the rules - enact national legislation.
Member States with competition laws should be made aware that
the common market legal systems shall have precedence over national
law and therefore should enact competition laws that are in line with
COMESA regulations and those with existing laws may be required
to amend them to conform with regional law.
NOTES
1Dr Urrike Guèerot is head of the EU Unit at the DGAP in Berlin. In his
commentary on the debate on the European Constitution Treaty Convention
for the Centre for European Reform entitled ‘A “competence catalogue” is
code for protection’ in June 2002. Also see http://ww.euractive.com/articles
2See Delimitation of Competences between the European Union and the Member
States: a look from a candidate country by Prof. Dr Vilenas Vadapalas,
Director General of the European Law Department under the Government
of Lithuania; Chair of International and EU Law of the Faculty of Law,
Vilnius University. See also http//
www.ecln.net|elements|constitution_debate/perspective2004/part1/
1_02.html
3See http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/tradepolicy/papers/
woolcock.htm
4OECD Global Forum on Competition: Contribution by WAEMU/UEMOA; 14-
15 Feb. 2002. The Member States of WAEMU are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
5The term ‘Regulations’ is equivalent to a competition law, and is used to reflect
the Treaty terminology.
6The Member States of COMESA are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia
and Zimbabwe.
410
Allocation of competences - COMESA
7The Member States of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8SACU comprises South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia
9CARICOM comprises , Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis,
St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.
10Member States of the EAC are Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Rwanda and
Burundi have also requested to join the EAC
11The author who was one of the consultants in the formulation of the COMESA
Regional Competition Law has drawn some conclusions from the various
working documents that the consultants prepared.
12Cernat Lucian: “Competition Audit of the Economic Policy-Making Process”
paper presented at the Project Interim Meeting, 16-17 August 2005, Hanoi,
Vietnam.
13Michelin vs Commission, Case 322/81, 1983, ECR 3401.
14Regulation 23.
15Regulation 24(7).
16It is worth noting that the treaty establishing the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) includes a section on Consumer Protection (Part VI). However,
this regional arrangement is yet to be implemented.
17In Common Market Law of Competition (citation, supra) it was stated on pg.
110 that the test was first stated in Case 56/65 Societé Technique Minière
[1966] ECR 235, 249, 251 and is repeated in Consten and Grundig [1966]
ECR 299, 341 [1966] CMLR 418, and later in Case 27/87 Erauw-Jacquery
[1988] ECR 1919 [1988] 4 CMLR 576.
18Common Market, citation, supra on pages 108-109.
12
Suggestions for enhancing the
effectiveness of cooperation on
competition law and policy at the regional
level from the experience of the Republic
of Korea
DEUK-SOO CHANG
1. Introduction
With trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization,economies around the world are being dramaticallyintegrated into a single market. To further develop the world
economy along this trend of globalization, cooperation in competition
law and policy is needed among developed countries (North-North),
developing countries (South-South), between developed and
developing countries (North-South) and between developed and
transition economies.  This is elucidated by the fact that competition
issues are included in various forms of bilateral, multilateral, regional
and subregional agreements.
Director of International Organization Division, Korea Fair Trade Commission. The editorial
team thanks Hyung-Bae Kim for his comments on this Chapter. The views expressed in this
Chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNCTAD
Secretariat.
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Although developing and the least developed countries take an
interest in adopting or implementing competition laws, they face
obstacles in the process of adopting the laws and encounter
difficulties in implementing them due to a lack of experience or public
awareness. Mostly, developed countries provided technical assistance
in this area.  But, complementing developed country assistance, in
recent years there is also a growing recognition that cooperation
among neighbouring countries with a similar political, economic, and
institutional structure can be effective for formulating and
implementing competition laws.  In this regard, the Republic of Korea
has been strengthening cooperation with its neighbouring countries
in East Asia and members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
This Chapter will first take a look at the regional cooperation
experiences of the Republic of Korea regarding competition law and
policy as regards creating and participating in FTAs, the sharing of
information on international cartel cases and the provision of
technical assistance to developing countries and transition economies.
This Chapter will then suggest ideas for enhancing the effectiveness
of regional cooperation through assessing the merits of the
cooperative activities.
2. Regional economic cooperation in East Asia
2.1 Current economic situation in the East Asian region
With the rapid development of information and communication
technologies and transportation, international transaction costs have
been significantly lowered and government regulations and trade
barriers are steadily being abolished and reduced. As a result, the
world economy is being integrated into a single global market. At
the same time, economic interests at regional level are encouraging
countries to integrate into regional blocks at a rapid pace. Countries
in Asia have established regional economic blocs such as the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which includes countries
bordering the Pacific Ocean though not in Asia, and the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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The East Asian economy encompassing the Republic of Korea,
Japan and China had achieved annual economic growth rates
averaging around 7 per cent throughout the 1990s. Today it plays an
important role as a major engine of the global economy after
overcoming the financial crisis that hit the region in 1997-98. Among
the countries in East Asia, China shows the most remarkable
economic growth. One of the critical forces behind the fast growth
in this region is market competition promoted by the efforts for trade
liberalization such as elimination of barriers to trade and investment.
With lowering investment barriers, direct investment in the region is
increasing to a level that exceeds the average of world direct
investment. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are also
increasing in the region.
As one of the efforts to strengthen a market economy, China and
other Asian countries have been striving to adopt or improve
competition law and policy.
2.2 Growing economic alliance between the Republic of
Korea and East Asian countries
Amid the accelerating intra-regional economic alliance in East
Asia, there is a need for the Republic of Korea to strengthen its
economic partnership with countries in the region, as its revitalization
is highly dependent on the region’s economic growth. To that end,
the Republic of Korea mostly relies on the World Trade Organization
(WTO) multilateral framework while pursuing various
complementary agreements including FTAs and economic
cooperation agreements.
Although not concluded with an East Asian country, the Republic
of Korea-Chile FTA signed in April 2004 is an outcome of such efforts.
This FTA will not only achieve trade and investment liberalization,
but also consolidate economic alliances in many sectors such as
finance, information and communication technology and science. It
will also become the template for strengthening economic alliance
with East Asia. Currently, the Republic of Korea is also pursuing FTAs
with Singapore and Mexico. Meanwhile, with regard to the Republic
of Korea-Japan FTA, a Joint Study Group of economic and political
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leaders from both countries was launched in July 2002 to assess
possible effects of the agreement. Reviews are also in progress to
find various means of cooperation in the region, including the
possibility of the East Asian Free Trade Area covering ASEAN plus
the Republic of Korea, Japan and China.
2.3  The characteristics of competition provisions in East
Asia
Japan was the first Asian country to adopt and implement
competition law, followed by the Republic of Korea and Taiwan
Province of China. Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore also joined
the ranks recently. China undertook to legislate antitrust law after its
WTO accession.
Since Asia has not had sufficient experience in the field of
competition law implementation, related studies have been mostly
focused on importing and adapting to the specific needs of the Asian
countries the provisions of some experienced countries such as the
US and the EU member states. Also, countries in the region are
becoming increasingly interested in competition laws of their
neighbours, such as the Republic of Korea and Japan, in order to
legislate or enforce competition laws successfully while adapting to
their unique needs and situation. Even the Republic of Korea and
Japan, countries with considerable experience in competition law
enforcement, are also examining how to enhance the effectiveness of
their competition laws.
Compared with the US and Europe, where market economies
evolved gradually, Asian countries depended heavily on government
intervention or assistance in developing their economies. Therefore,
competition laws in these countries are designed to cure negative
effects rather than to prevent the causes, and they focus on
administrative regulation rather than judicial regulation. Because the
government directly allocates resources, it cannot help but establish
various institutional barriers, such as authorization/permission
systems and high tariffs, to manage limited resources. These barriers
promoted monopolistic structures. In addition, regulations were
initiated mostly ex officio of regulatory agencies rather than by filed
complaints.
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As economic power in these countries is normally concentrated
in a few families or business groups, competition laws include
measures to curb concentration of economic power in addition to
regulations for protecting free and fair competition. For example, in
order to respond to this specific need, the Korea Fair Trade
Commission (KFTC) established measures such as prohibition on
cross-shareholding, restriction on the total amount of shareholding
of other companies and restriction in the exercise of voting rights in
finance and insurance companies.
3. The Republic of Korea’s experience of regional
cooperation in competition law and policy
3.1 Cooperation through FTAs
Heavily dependent on external trade for its economic growth
and development, the Republic of Korea has been one of the biggest
beneficiaries of trade liberalization within the multilateral frameworks
of the GATT and the WTO. Recently, regionalism led by FTAs has
been rapidly expanding. The Republic of Korea also began to actively
pursue FTAs with other countries.1
3.1.1  Republic of Korea-Chile FTA
The Republic of Korea-Chile FTA, which came into effect on 1
April 2004, consists of 21 chapters divided into seven parts.2
Competition-related issues are included in nine Articles of Chapter
14. In that chapter, competition authorities of both countries agreed
to apply their respective competition laws in order to ensure that the
benefits of liberalization in goods and services would not be
diminished or cancelled by anti-competitive business conduct. To
this end, both parties agreed to cooperate and coordinate between
their competition authorities. In addition, with a view to preventing
distortions or restrictions on competition which may affect trade in
goods or services between them, the parties agreed to give particular
attention to anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices and
abusive behaviour resulting from dominant positions. The parties
also agreed to cooperate and coordinate for the implementation of
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competition laws. The main provisions included notifications,
consultations, exchange of information and technical assistance as
follows.
Notifications
Each competition authority shall notify the competition
authority of the other Party of an enforcement activity if it:
•  is likely to substantially affect the other Party’s important
interests;
•  is related to restrictions on competition which are liable to
have a direct and substantial effect in the territory of the
other Party; or
•  concerns anti-competitive acts taking place principally in
the territory of the other Party.
Coordination of Enforcement Activities
The competition authority of a Party may notify the other
competition authority its intention to coordinate enforcement
activities with respect to a specific case. This coordination
shall not prevent the Parties from taking autonomous
decisions.
Consultations when the Important Interests of a Party are Adversely
Affected in the Territory of the Other Party
The competition authority of a Party may transmit its views
on the matter to, or request consultation with, the other
competition authority
•  if it considers that an investigation or proceeding being
conducted by the competition authority of the other Party
may adversely affect such a Party’s important interests,
•  if it considers that its interests are being substantially and
adversely affected by any sort of anti-competitive practice
conducted by one or more enterprises located in the other
Party.
Exchange of Information and Technical Assistance
With a view to facilitating the effective application of their
respective competition laws, the competition authorities may
exchange non-confidential information. The Parties may also
provide each other technical assistance in order to take
advantage of their respective experiences and to strengthen
the implementation of their competition law and policies.
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3.1.2  Republic of Korea-Singapore FTA currently being pursued
Competition-related provisions are also included the Republic
of Korea-Singapore FTA, which was recently signed and is expected
to be effective soon. Its purpose is to promote free competition and
curtail anti-competitive practices, such as anti-competitive horizontal
arrangements between competitors, abuse of market dominance, anti-
competitive vertical arrangements between businesses and anti-
competitive mergers and acquisitions. Matters related to cooperation
in competition law and policy under the FTA can be summarized as
follows:
Promotion of Competition
Each Party shall promote competition by addressing anti-
competitive practices in its territory, adopting and enforcing
such means or measures as it deems appropriate and effective
to counter such practices.
Competitive Neutrality
Each Party shall take reasonable measures to ensure that its
government does not provide any competitive advantage to
any government-owned businesses.
Consultations
• At the request of a Party, the Parties shall enter into
consultations regarding matters that may arise under this
Chapter, including the elimination of particular anti-
competitive practices that affect trade or investment
between the Parties.
• During the consultations, each Party shall endeavour to
provide relevant information to the other Party.
• Any information or documents exchanged between the
Parties in relation to any mutual consultations shall be kept
confidential.
Cooperation
The Parties recognize the importance of cooperation and
coordination between their competition authorities for
effective competition law enforcement.
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3.2 Cooperation through bilateral arrangements and
consultation meetings
3.2.1  Republic of Korea-Australia Cooperation Arrangement
After working-level consultations for about two years, the KFTC
signed the Cooperation Arrangement with the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)3 in September 2002.
The arrangement is the first of its kind that the KFTC concluded. Its
purpose is to promote the effective enforcement of the competition
and consumer protection laws in both countries through the
development of cooperative relationships between the two national
agencies. In accordance with the provisions of the arrangement, the
agencies will share information, cooperate with and provide
assistance to each other to the extent compatible with their essential
interests. The main content of the arrangement will be examined as
follows:
Exchange of information
Both Agencies recognize that it is in the common interests to
share information that will:
• facilitate effective application of the competition and
consumer protection laws administered by the respective
Agency;
• facilitate coordinated investigations, research and education;
• promote a better understanding by each of the Agencies of
the economic and legal conditions and theories relevant
to their respective competition and consumer protection
law enforcement and related activities.
Based on the recognition, the Agencies will, on a regular basis,
exchange and provide information in relation to:
• investigations and research conducted;
• speeches, research papers, journal articles, and other
materials;
• compliance education programs;
• amendments to relevant legislation; and
• human resources development and management.
Notification of enforcement and related activities
In respect of investigations by the Agencies, each Agency will
notify the other whenever an investigation, enforcement or a
related activity may affect the essential interests of the other.
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Each Agency will, in particular, notify the other when it makes
inquiries of persons located in the other’s jurisdiction.
Assistance in enforcement and related activities
The assistance available under this Arrangement includes
coordination of enforcement activities when the Agencies
agree that it would be beneficial in a particular case, and
providing access to information of the Requested Agency.
However, the Requested Agency is not required to provide
information to the Requesting Agency if disclosure of that
information to the Requesting Party is prohibited by relevant
laws, or is incompatible with the essential interests of the
Requested Agency.
In addition, the Agencies will arrange visits and/or the
exchange of staff as appropriate and develop cooperative
arrangements in relation to staff development and training,
mutual assistance in legislation and so on.
Since the signing of the Arrangement, the KFTC has sent its staff
to the ACCC almost every year to exchange information on the
Compliance Programme, consumer protection policies and case
proceedings. It is also noted that bilateral cooperation in other
enforcement-related activities has been going smoothly.
 3.2.2  Republic of Korea-Mexico Cooperation Arrangement
Following the Cooperation Arrangement with Australia, the
Republic of Korea signed a cooperation arrangement regarding the
application of competition laws with the Federal Competition
Commission of Mexico in April 2004. In accordance with the
provisions of the arrangement, each Agency will notify the other
Agency with respect to its enforcement activities that may affect
important interests of the other Agency and cooperate in the detection
of anti-competitive practices and the enforcement of their competition
laws. There are provisions relating to confidentiality of information
and coordination of enforcement activities. In addition, it is stipulated
that for technical cooperation in competition law enforcement and
policy, both Agencies will carry out activities such as exchanges of
information, exchanges of personnel for training purposes and
participation of personnel as lecturers or consultants at training
courses on competition law and policy organized or sponsored by
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each Agency. The Arrangement includes provisions for law
enforcement cooperation one level higher than that prescribed in the
Republic of Korea-Australia arrangement. In accordance with
Paragraph V ‘Cooperation regarding anticompetitive practices in the
territory of one country that adversely affect the interests of the other
Agency’, if an Agency believes that anti-competitive practices carried
out in the territory of the other country adversely affect its important
interests, the first Agency may request the other to initiate appropriate
enforcement activities, and the requested Agency will carefully
Table 12.1 Bilateral consultation meetings
Meeting Date Topics discussed 
9th Republic of Korea-
Russia consultation 
meeting 
June 2005 
• Discussed recent trends in agency activities in the field of 
competition policy and regulatory reform 
• Noted the progress in bilateral cooperation between their 
competition authorities 
7th Republic of Korea-
US consultation 
meeting 
November 
2003 
• Discussed issues of common interest, including 
cooperation in international cartel investigations, 
harmonization of intellectual property rights and 
competition policies, and protection of consumers  
• Officially agreed to sign a bilateral agreement between 
the competition authorities 
13th Republic of 
Korea–Japan bilateral 
consultation meeting 
March 
2004 
• Exchanged their opinions on the content of the revision of 
competition laws and on ways to coordinate technical 
assistance in competition policy for countries in East 
Asia 
• Consulted on the establishment of a Joint Study Group 
consisting of leaders from the government, academia 
and industry in order to eliminate anti-competitive 
practices existing in the markets of the two countries 
9th Republic of Korea–
France consultation 
meeting  
April 2004 
• Exchanged their views on important cases handled by 
the two authorities as well as recent trends in 
competition policies in the Republic Korea and France 
• The French delegation expressed a deep interest in the 
Three-Year Market Reform Roadmap and the revision of 
the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (the 
competition law in the Republic of Korea) 
• At the suggestion of the French delegation, both 
countries basically agreed on signing a bilateral 
cooperation agreement 
4th Republic of Korea-
EU consultation 
meeting 
June 2005 
• Discussed recent revisions of the competition laws of 
each party 
• Exchanged opinions on investigations into the Microsoft 
Corporation, which had been charged with abuse of 
market dominance (bundling) 
• Agreed to strengthen the cooperative relationship by 
sharing related information 
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consider enforcement activities with respect to the practices identified
in the request.
3.2.3  Holding bilateral consultation meetings
Currently, the KFTC maintains cooperation channels with 11
countries for consultation meetings on competition policy.4 Recent
consultation meetings have been held with Russia, the US, Japan,
France and the EU. See table 12.1.
3.3 Cooperation through Memorandums of Understanding
(MOUs) with CIS members and transition countries in
Eastern Europe
Transition countries, which are undergoing transition from
government-controlled economies to market economies, have not yet
adopted competition law or, if they have, are at the early stage of
competition law enforcement. Worse still, they are experiencing a
lack of social and political awareness of and support for competition
laws. Therefore, it is necessary to provide assistance in institution
building so that competition policies can be established firmly in
transition economies. Strengthening technical assistance is also
needed as a way to help them improve their law-enforcement
capabilities. In this regard, the KFTC has been reinforcing cooperative
relationships with CIS members and transition countries in Eastern
Europe by holding consultation meetings with Russia since 1997 and
with Romania since 2001. The KFTC signed a Memorandum
Regarding Cooperation in Competition Policy with a total of 13
competition authorities (11 competition authorities of CIS countries,
including the Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support to
Entrepreneurship5 of Russia, the Competition Council of Latvia and
the Competition Council of Romania) in September 2003. Comprising
a preamble and 13 provisions, the Memorandum prescribes exchange
of information and the provision of technical assistance with regard
to anti-monopoly or fair trade policy enforcement in order to create
favourable conditions for market competition between the parties.
Provisions 2 and 3 are related to cooperation.
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Basic directions of cooperation
• exchanging legal acts and other binding instruments, on the
basis of which the activities of the Parties in the field of
competition law and policy are carried out;
• improving legal framework on restrictive business practices,
unfair competition and merger control, in consideration
of the experience of the Parties;
• exchanging experience in the field of investigation,
concerning the infringement of competition laws;
• working on development of scientific and methodological
basis for research in the field of competition law and
policy.
Main forms of interaction
• promoting and strengthening cooperation in exchanging
non-confidential information, such as the developments
of competition law and policy and cases;
• organizing training for the staff of the other parties in the
KFTC;
• sending the experts of the KFTC for providing personnel
training and consultation on law enforcement and policy
making;
• participating in the conferences, symposiums, seminars and
other events held in the territories of the Parties;
• organizing visits of the high-level officials of the Parties for
discussing questions of further multilateral and/or
bilateral cooperation.
In collaboration with the Korean International Cooperation
Agency (KOICA),6 the KFTC undertook a technical assistance
programme for public officials from competition authorities in eight
transition countries7 in April 2005 to strengthen market function in
the countries. The programme included presentations and discussions
by participants and lectures on nine themes that are substantially
helpful to transition economies, such as the relationship between
competition policy and economic development, national monopoly
and competition policy, cartel regulations and merger reviews.
3.4 Cooperation on international cartel cases
Developed countries including the US and EU Member States
are strengthening the extra-territorial application of competition law
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to the conduct of foreign companies which results in restriction of
competition in their markets. Such business conduct includes
international cartels and mergers. International cartels, in particular,
are being dealt with as top priority in the US and the EU. With this
trend, the Republic of Korea began to apply its competition law in
the 2000s to competition-restrictive practices of foreign companies
that damage domestic companies and consumers.
In March 2002, the KFTC imposed administrative fines of 11.2
billion won (approximately US$ 8.5 million) in total, along with
corrective orders, against six graphite electrode manufacturers from
the US, Germany and Japan for having participated in the
international cartel of graphite electrodes. This is the first case of the
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) being applied to
anti-competitive conduct committed by foreign companies located
outside the Republic of Korea. And in April 2003, the KFTC issued
corrective orders and imposed administrative fines of 3.9 billion won
(approximately US$ 3 million) in total against six vitamin producers
from Switzerland, Germany, France, Japan and the Netherlands,
which had participated in an international cartel. Below are examples
of the Republic of Korea’s experience in handling international cartel
cases, which reveal the importance of international cooperation in
combating international cartels.
3.4.1  Effects of international graphite electrodes cartel on the
Korean market
Estimated as dominating over 80 per cent of the world’s market
share, six graphite electrode8 producers, Showa Denko K.K. (Japan),
Nippon Carbon Co., Ltd (Japan), Tokai Carbon Co., Ltd (Japan), SEC
Corporation (Japan), SGL Carbon Aktiengesellschaft (Germany) and
UCAR International Inc. (United States), had meetings from 1992 until
1998, and collaborated on and implemented price fixing. They agreed
that, if a producer in a ‘home market’ raised its price, the other
producers in the market would also raise their prices (so-called
respect for the ‘home market’). In ‘non-home markets’, which consist
mainly of the Asian region excluding Japan, the cartel participants
agreed on a specific market price. The cartel conspirators also agreed
on a ‘No Rebate, No Discount’ rule, regional allocation of sales volume
concentrating on the Asian region, limits on the volume of graphite
electrode exports, and an agreement not to export electrodes to
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countries where cartel members were located. What is more, with an
aim to impede the entry of new firms into the market, they agreed
that there was to be no transfer of production technology outside the
circle of producers participating in the cartel.
The Republic of Korea does not have any graphite electrode
producers, so it had to rely entirely on imports of graphite electrodes.
Moreover, since over 90 per cent of the Republic of Korea’s graphite
electrode demand depends on imports from those cartel participants,
the Republic of Korea was found to have undergone substantial
damage. Korean companies imported graphite electrodes worth US$
553 million from these cartel participants during the cartel period.
The import price rose from US$ 2,255 per ton in 1992 to US$ 3,356
per ton in 1997.
3.4.2 Effects of an international vitamin cartel on the Korean
market
The world’s bulk vitamin market is dominated by F. Hoffmann
La-Roche Ltd (Switzerland), BASF A.G. (Germany) and Aventis S.A.
(France, formerly Rhone-Poulenc S.A.). Led by these three companies,
six vitamin producers including Eisai Co., Ltd ( Japan), Daiichi
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd (Japan) and Solvay Pharmaceuticals B.V. (the
Netherlands) agreed to allocate sales volumes and coordinate the
price of bulk vitamins in the global market. Take vitamin A and E as
an example. After the first meeting in Zurich in 1989, four vitamin
companies, including La-Roche, BASF and Aventis, met every year
to agree on fixing the market share of each company in regional and
global markets to the 1998 level. They also included in their agreement
that the market share quotas would increase in proportion to the
expanded market size. To check the implementation, these cartel
participants exchanged related information and coordinated, on a
regular basis, allocated sales volume and real sales volume in each
national and regional market. As to sales prices, the cartel members
accepted the ‘price-before-volume’ principle as being the underlying
principle of the cartel. Once one cartel member announced a price
increase, the others would follow suit. In this way, they raised prices
each quarter or each year. Similar international cartels were also
formed in the vitamin B5, D3 and beta carotene markets.
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Among the many types of bulk vitamins, only vitamin H is
produced in the Republic of Korea. For other vitamins, such as
vitamins A, E, B5, D3 and beta carotene, the Republic of Korea relies
entirely on imports. During the cartel period, the Republic of Korea
imported bulk vitamins worth US$ 185 million from the six
companies. The import price increased during the period, but
plunged after the termination of the cartel. This led to enormous harm
being done to the Korean companies that had imported bulk vitamins
from the cartel members and, ultimately, to consumers.
3.4.3 Examples of cooperation on investigation of international
cartel cases
Upon launching investigations into the graphite electrode cartel,
the KFTC notified competition authorities in related countries (the
US, Germany and Japan) of its investigations in accordance with the
‘1995 OECD Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between
Countries on Anti-competitive Practices Affecting International
Trade’. The KFTC requested these authorities to provide necessary
information on where the cartel conspirators met, what they
discussed, and internal reports of the relevant authorities from which
they might gather the information requested. As shown in Table 12.2,
the requested parties provided only publicly available data.
 Information provided 
US Department of Justice 
• sent a letter stating that it was difficult to disclose cartel-
related information and evidence since these are 
considered confidential information, but that the 
Department could provide the information presented at 
the court after the conclusion of the US v Mitsubishi 
Corp case. 
• provided information on financial status of UCAR 
International, a US company, before the KFTC made a 
ruling. 
Fair Trade Commission of 
Japan 
• stated that the provision of information related to a case 
under investigation was prohibited by law, but that its 
officials who investigated the cartel case were willing to 
provide explanations for the KFTC investigators.  
EU DG Competition • provided a non-confidential version of its decision. 
 
Table 12.2 Information provided by foreign competition authorities
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Meanwhile, the Chairman of the KFTC had individual meetings
with the US, German and Japanese Ambassadors to the Republic of
Korea and explained the cartel case before the KFTC ruling was laid
down. Also, before a press release on its ruling, the KFTC notified
competition authorities and embassies of the related countries of its
decision.
In the international vitamin case also, the KFTC notified the
competition authorities in Switzerland, Germany, France, Japan and
the Netherlands of its initiation of investigations and the results.
3.5 Cooperation through technical assistance
In the early days of competition law enforcement, the Republic
of Korea received technical assistance from advanced countries or
international organizations in order to overcome problems arising
from its lack of experience and to improve its know-how. Many KFTC
officials received training at competition agencies in developed
countries through field trips and visits,  and participated in
competition policy seminars and workshops hosted by international
organizations such as the OECD and the IBRD. All of these fora of
technical assistance were very helpful for reviewing and formulating
Korean competition law, as well as for introducing new competition
policies and improving case proceedings.
Because of sustained economic growth, the Republic of Korea
became the 29th member of the OECD on 29 December 1996. With its
success in economic development and competition law enforcement
at the same time, the Republic of Korea has begun to act as a bridge
between developed and developing countries in competition law and
policy. Developed countries want the Republic of Korea to play a
more active role in spreading competition culture throughout the
world, while developing countries desire to learn from its experiences,
a country with similar historical and economic conditions. Since it
initiated technical assistance activities in the late 1990s, the KFTC
has been undertaking a variety of technical assistance programmes
for developing countries based on experiences as a recipient and
donor country with regard to competition law enforcement. These
programmes include the International Workshop on Competition
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Policy, KOICA’s training programme on competition policy, and
educational programmes through the OECD-KOREA Regional Centre
for Competition.
International Workshop on Competition Policy
The International Workshop on Competition Policy, which has
been held every year since 1996, has become a useful channel for
sharing and understanding experiences of both developed and
developing countries in competition law enforcement. Having been
co-hosted by international organizations such as the OECD, the
Workshop has dealt with not only traditional issues of competition
law such as cartels and mergers, but also with topics specifically
focused on the development dimension, including ‘the role of
competition policy in developing countries’ and ‘competition law
appropriate to developing countries’. The Workshop is usually held
for three to four days, and lecturers are mostly high-ranking officials
of the KFTC and instructors from the OECD Secretariat or Member
States. At the 9th International Workshop on Competition Policy last
year, law enforcement experiences relating to cartels were shared with
Asian countries including China and Indonesia, and transition
economies such as Ukraine.
KOICA’s training programme on competition policy
In cooperation with KOICA, the KFTC has undertaken
programmes for sharing the Republic of Korea’s experience in
competition law enforcement with developing countries since 2002.
Senior-level KFTC officials or professors provide lectures on the
‘relationship between competition policy and economic
development’, ‘M&A review system’, ‘proceedings of investigation
and sanctions against concerted behaviour’, and ‘cases of regulatory
reform’ for working-level officials from participating countries. The
KFTC operated two programmes in 2002, three in 2003 and one in
2004 for China, developing countries in Asia and transition countries.
This year, the KFTC also held a course entitled ‘Strengthening Market
Function for Transition Countries’ for public officials from
competition authorities in CIS countries in April, and plans to start a
course on developing competition law and policy for 20 countries in
Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle East in November.
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Educational programmes of the OECD-KOREA Regional Centre for
Competition
In April last year, the Republic of Korea established the OECD-
KOREA Regional Centre for Competition, which provides
programmes for strengthening capabilities of Asia’s developing
countries in competition law.9 As one of the first competition-related
regional offices in the world, the centre engages in educational
activities on competition policy management for relevant public
officials and experts in Asia as well as counselling and research
activities on competition policy and legal institutions. The centre
organized two educational programmes for Indonesia and four
Central Asian countries last year, and plans to run a total of seven
programmes this year, including the educational programme on
mergers for 21 competition officials from Indonesia, Singapore and
Taiwan Province of China, which was held in April this year. In
particular, the centre was designated as the provider of education in
accordance with the MOU signed between the OECD and the ADB to
provide about US$ 600,000 for a technical assistance programme for
China. Table 12.3 clarifies the different types of technical assistance
provided.
 International Workshop on Competition Policy 
KOICA 
programmes RCC programmes 
Period 3~4 days 14 days 5 days 
Participants Countries from around the world 
Developing and 
transition countries 
Non-OECD member 
countries in Asia 
Selection of 
trainees KFTC KOICA 
Consultation between 
OECD and KFTC 
Lecturers KFTC and OECD officials 
KFTC officials and 
professors OECD experts 
Financing KFTC KOICA KFTC, OECD 
 
Table 12.3 Comparison of technical assistance programmes
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Top Level Official Meeting on Competition Policy
During the First Top Level Official Meeting on Competition Policy
held in Bogor, Indonesia, in May this year, participating countries
had in-depth discussions on the challenges they are facing in
enforcing competition law and policy, and their efforts to overcome
these challenges and difficulties. The session titled ‘Towards Effective
Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Activities’, in particular,
discussed the current situation regarding technical assistance and
ways of effective technical assistance for countries that have recently
adopted, or have yet to adopt, competition law and policy. Various
opinions on the current situation and problems of technical assistance
were exchanged between donor (Republic of Korea, Japan and Taiwan
Province of China) and recipient countries (Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet Nam and Singapore).
Competition authorities in both donor and recipient countries may
need to pay more attention to, and make more efforts for, providing
effective technical assistance. Also, more active discussions on
technical assistance were needed at the regional APEC level where
competition issues are sometimes thought to be overlooked.
4. Evaluation of cooperative activities
4.1 FTAs, bilateral arrangements and MOUs
Multi-level approaches are required for cooperation in
international cases between competition authorities, technical
assistance and capacity-building activities. To make these cooperative
activities more effective, binding agreements should be adopted
between countries. Most such cooperation agreements on competition
law and policy have a common content: notification, negative comity,
positive comity, coordination, and joint investigation.
Table 12.4 summarizes the different kind of provisions included
in the various agreements concluded between the Republic of Korea
and other countries.
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As shown in Table 12.4, the three RTAs include most of the
general forms of cooperation. However, due to the vagueness of these
provisions, it  is often difficult to implement these forms of
cooperation. In terms of positive comity, there are differences among
the three agreements: while the Republic of Korea-Australia
Arrangement has no such provisions, and the Republic of Korea-
Chile FTA prescribes only consultation requests, the Republic of
Korea-Mexico Arrangement has full provisions on positive comity.
Legend: ○: has provisions,  ×: has no provisions,    : has limited provisions  
Table 12.4
Comparison of Republ ic of Korea-Austral ia
Arrangement, Republic of Korea-Chile FTA (Chapter
14) and Republic of Korea-Mexico Arrangement
 
Republic of Korea-
Australia 
Arrangement 
(September 2002) 
Republic of  Korea-
Chile FTA (came 
into effect in   
March 2004) 
Republic of  Korea-
Mexico 
Arrangement 
(March 2004) 
Type agency-to-agency arrangement 
government-to-
government 
agreement 
agency-to-agency 
arrangement 
Structure 
Preamble, 
11 Paragraphs 
(29 provisions) 
9 Articles 
(21 provisions) 
Preamble, 
13 Paragraphs 
(42 provisions) 
 by type of cooperation  
Positive comity × ○ consultation request 
○ 
law enforcement 
request 
Negative comity ○ ○ ○ 
Enforcement 
cooperation 
○ 
includes 
investigation 
assistance 
 
only prescribes 
exchange of 
information 
○ 
includes 
investigation 
assistance 
Enforcement 
coordination ○ ○ ○ 
Notification ○ ○ ○ 
Technical 
assistance ○ ○ ○ 
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In the area of enforcement coordination, the three agreements
do not include explicit provisions on a deep level of coordination,
such as a joint investigation into international cases. Moreover, as
these agreements were signed only recently, there have not been many
specific cases of bilateral cooperation, other than the cooperation with
the Australian competition agency in personnel training.
The MOU with 13 transition countries mainly covers the exchange
of information and the provision of technical assistance with regard
to anti-monopoly and competition policy implementation, and does
not include various forms of cooperation that most cooperation
arrangements have. Therefore, the MOU needs to be rearranged in
order to guarantee a deeper level of cooperation. A bilateral
consultation meeting on competition policy could serve as a channel
for enhancing mutual understanding and seeking specific ways of
cooperation through discussions on pending issues. More efforts
should be made to establish cooperation channels with more countries
and to develop existing consultation meetings into bilateral
agreements.
4.2 International cartel cases
Cross-border anti-competitive cases require cooperation and
coordination between different jurisdictions. During the course of
enforcement activities, disputes with foreign companies and,
furthermore, diplomatic rows between countries could occur. It takes
considerable time, effort and personnel to handle an international
case related to different foreign firms or countries. Worse still, some
companies that participated in anti-competitive practices do not have
local branches or offices in developing and least developed countries,
and thus many difficulties may arise during the investigations.
During the investigations of the aforementioned international
cartel cases, the Republic of Korea was hoping for more forthcoming
responses from the requested parties. For a more effective cooperation
in law enforcement, information needs to be exchanged between
competition authorities. However, in many countries important
information is often classified as confidential, which limits substantial
cooperation in law enforcement.
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4.3 Technical assistance
Technical assistance has contributed greatly to advancing the
competition laws of the recipients to the global level and establishing
cooperative relationships between donor and recipient countries.
From the perspective of the Republic of Korea’s experience, technical
assistance programmes have not only been a useful means whereby
to understand and share experiences in competition law and
enforcement in each country, but have also helped developing
countries to adopt competition law and policy and establish a tailored
enforcement system.
Despite some positive experiences, such as, for example, the
International Workshop on Competition Policy and the OECD-Korea
regional centre for competition technical assistance programmes, the
current scale of technical assistance in competition lags behind the
official development assistance provided in the economic and social
sectors. Sometimes, technical assistance initiatives only provide
general ideas regarding competition laws and policies and are not
meeting the needs of recipient countries. It is also noted that when
the programmes are carried out alone by individual countries without
coordination and cooperation, they may risk running in an
overlapping and unsystematic way.
5. Conclusions: suggestions for enhancing
effectiveness of cooperation at regional level
5.1  Including competition issues in the economic alliance
agreements
Agreements for economic partnership such as an FTA will bring
about promotion of competition through trade and investment
liberalization. To achieve this expected outcome, participating
countries should respond appropriately to anti-competitive practices.
Therefore, competition policies focusing on regulating anti-
competitive practices need to be given careful consideration as an
important element of the framework for economic alliance.
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Many ASEAN countries are actively moving toward trade and
investment liberalization with their initiatives for the ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement (AFTA) and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA).
With the Bogor Declaration of 1994, APEC member countries
announced their commitment to complete the achievement of their
goal of free and open trade and investment by 2020 (for developed
economies, by 2010).  With the ‘APEC Principles to Enhance
Competition and Regulatory Reform’, APEC members also committed
themselves to addressing anti-competitive behaviour by
implementing competition policy. To put these commitments into
action, economic agreements should be signed and competition-
related issues need to be included.
In order to be effective, an appropriate competition cooperative
system should have some characteristics reflecting the diversity in
development stages and in approaches to competition regimes in East
Asian countries. This competition framework should be
‘comprehensive’, ‘flexible’ and ‘gradual’. The cooperative structure
needs to be a comprehensive framework encompassing not only
prevention of disputes over competition law enforcement and
cooperation among countries concerned, but also technical assistance.
Furthermore, it would be desirable to set the scope of cooperation
flexibly, in order to respond to the different approaches of competition
laws in other countries. Finally, when the competition regime in a
country differs from that in others, gradual strengthening of
cooperation should be considered. For example, the initial scope of
cooperation is limited to notification, exchange of information,
technical assistance and consultation. Then, the scope of cooperation
can be broadened into cooperation at the enforcement level, such as
enforcement coordination, in the long term.
Provisions to be included in the economic alliance agreement
are correlated to the commitment to regulate anti-competitive
behaviour. In order to face anti-competitive practices, such as cartels
in the East Asian market, it is essential to maximize the benefits of
free and open trade and investment. Therefore, the individual
commitment of each country to regulate anti-competitive activities
in its domestic market is important for establishing a single economic
community in East Asia. That’s why an effort should be put into
creating an environment for preventing and punishing anti-
competitive practices.
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5.2  Strengthening technical assistance for institution and
capacity building
Substantial cooperation in competition law and policy between
countries in the region would be possible when each country has in
place provisions and authorities effectively preventing anti-
competitive behaviour in its market. Still, many developing, transition
and least developed countries have not introduced competition law
or, if they have, do not have a comprehensive and systematic
competition law adapting to the international standards. They do
not have independent competition authorities in charge of
competition law implementation either. Under these circumstances,
it is too soon to hope for substantial cooperation in competition law
and policy immediately. To begin with, technical assistance should
be provided for institution building, as a way to ensure that
competition policies become well established in these countries and
for capacity building in law enforcement. A set of actions should then
be undertaken by these countries.
First, good practices need to be found so that technical assistance
activities can be carried out effectively. Given that the increase in
technical assistance has not always guaranteed effective solutions,
efforts should be made to provide assistance more tailored to the
specific needs of developing countries within the budget.
Second, technical assistance programmes should reflect the
economic structure and development stage of recipient countries.
Countries preparing to introduce or in the early stage of implementing
competition law may often face difficulties from a lack of experience.
What they need is the capacity to implement competition policies. In
addition, donor countries together with the recipient countries should
try to understand and find solutions to challenges facing the recipient
countries, such as concentration of economic power by large
companies and monopolies, privatization of public corporations and
integration of geographically segmented markets.
Third, technical assistance activities being carried out alone by
individual countries should be managed and coordinated
systematically. Of course, it is not easy to integrate a variety of
technical assistance activities. However, countries can coordinate
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them voluntarily by sharing information on the current activities
concerning technical assistance in each country.
Fourth, competition authorities in donor countries should try to
broaden the support base for technical assistance. Technical assistance
programmes are usually financed not by economic agencies, but by
other agencies. In this regard, efforts are needed to enhance
understanding of competition policies among these financing
agencies.
To expand technical assistance at the global level, consideration
should be given to more active discussions in international
organizations such as UNCTAD, WTO, OECD, APEC and ICN. Also
important is the greater interest and commitment of competition
authorities in both donor and recipient countries. At the same time,
recipient countries must know what they need to formulate and
enforce the laws, and what’s to be done. For their part, donor countries
have to develop and operate various programmes tailored to the
unique needs of recipient countries. To transform donor-oriented and
introductory programmes into recipient-oriented and problem-
solving programmes, in particular, the current one-year programmes
need to be changed into multiple-year programmes. Various kinds
of content by sector such as law, policy, cases and so on or by level
such as rudimentary, intermediate and advanced need to be
developed. In addition, international cooperation between
competition authorities is important. It would be desirable to develop
programmes connecting diverse technical assistance activities of
countries, exchange programme content or lecturers, establish
communication channels to evaluate and discuss the effectiveness of
the programmes, and systematically coordinate bilateral, multilateral
and regional technical assistance activities.
5.3 Expanding comparative studies for harmonization of
competition law
Although an increasing number of Asian countries legislate and
enforce competition law with the enlargement of the market economy
in the region, few countries, other than the Republic of Korea and
Japan, have accumulated sufficient experience to evaluate the
consequences.
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In order to further develop competition laws in Asia, there should
be studies that compare provisions adapted by the Republic of Korea
and Japan with those in the US and Europe in order to develop the
laws to meet global standards. By sharing their know-how and
experiences with other countries, the Republic of Korea and Japan
can help these countries develop tailored competition law. The results
of these comparative studies can also be used as valuable information
by countries trying to develop a competition framework, such as
China, let alone countries lacking competition law enforcement
experience such as Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia.
In the short term, the studies on competition laws in Asia will
contribute to developing the competition laws of each country and
establishing competition order in the region. In the long term, the
countries are expected to converge or harmonize the laws and, thus,
to lay the legal foundation for incorporating Asian economies into
an economic community.
Despite the competition regime being established in each country,
substantial cooperation in enforcement would be difficult to expect
if there are differences in competition laws and regulations.
Harmonization of different laws of different countries is a prerequisite
for substantial cooperation in this field. To that end, there should be
many international academic events where specialized scholars, legal
experts and public officials gather and exchange their opinions. Such
events will present participating countries with opportunities to reach
a consensus on the goals and the content of competition laws and
policies and, ultimately, to harmonize their competition laws and
policies.
Endeavours to transfer specialized knowledge and technologies
to competition law enforcers of other countries are equally important.
For example, sponsored by the KOICA, the KFTC held a two-week
programme for sharing the Republic of Korea’s experience in
competition law implementation with 15 officials from the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) of the People’s
Republic of China10 in 2002. The KFTC also hosted an international
seminar where the US, EU and Japanese experts, dispatched as
lecturers for the program, as well as public officials from the Korean
and Chinese competition authorities, had in-depth discussions on
the competition laws of each country.
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5.4  Establishing consultation channels
In order to guarantee regular consultations between competition
authorities, countries in the region should strive to develop a regional
consultation body while maintaining bilateral consultation channels.
The launch of a formal regional conference could represent an
effective option. East Asian countries including the Republic of Korea
hold the East Asia Conference on Competition Law and Policy and
the Top-Level Officials’ Meeting on Competition Policy. These
meetings will definitely serve as a channel for cooperation in
competition law and policy in the East Asian region.
Moreover, in order to spread competition law throughout the
region, equally important is to build a working-level channel for the
discussion of technical issues. In this regard, the Republic of Korea,
Japan and Taiwan Province of China have recently had close
consultations, and tangible results of this effort are expected soon.
Consistent support and interest of not only East Asian countries but
also related countries are required to bring such efforts in line with
those of international organizations.
NOTES
1The Republic of Korea-Chile FTA is the first FTA Korea signed. The Republic
of Korea temporarily signed the Republic of Korea-Singapore FTA after
reviewing the final draft, and is pursuing FTAs with Japan, Mexico and
ASEAN countries.
2 The objectives of the Republic of Korea-Chile FTA are to encourage expansion
of bilateral trade, eliminate barriers to trade, facilitate cross-border
movement of goods and services, promote conditions of fair competition,
increase investment opportunities, protect intellectual property rights and
create effective procedures for the resolution of disputes.
3 The ACCC is a national agency in charge of both competition and consumer
protection policies and is evaluated as an exemplary competition authority
whose purpose is to increase consumer welfare.
4 As of June 2005, the 11 countries are Japan, the United States, France, Russia,
the European Union, Romania, Mexico, China, Germany, Australia and Italy.
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5 Through the government reorganization in March 2004, the Federal Anti-
Monopoly Service (FAS) was newly created under the office of the Prime
Minister after its predecessor, the Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy and
Support to Entrepreneurship, was abolished. The FAS is in charge of anti-
monopoly and competition policies. Policies relating to entrepreneurship
support came under the charge of the Ministry of Economic Development
and Trade.
6 KOICA was established in 1991 to strengthen cooperative relationships and
mutual exchange with developing countries and promote socio-economic
advancement of these countries. It implements and administrates the grant
aid and technical programmes of the Korean government.
7 The eight transition countries include Latvia, Tajikistan, Russia, Moldova,
Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
8 Graphite electrodes are large columns used in electric arc furnaces in steel-
making mills to generate the intense heat (about 3000°) necessary to melt
and further refine steel. There are no substitute goods.
9In May 2003, the OECD proposed to establish a regional competition centre
which will provide training and education on competition law and policy
for non-member countries in Asia, and signed the MOU with the KFTC for
the establishment of the OECD-KOREA Regional Centre for Competition
in December 2003.
10 China’s competition law is composed the Countering Unfair Competition Law
and other individual laws such as the Law on the Protection of Consumer
Rights and Interests and the Price Law. The Countering Unfair Competition
Law provides for 11 types of unfair competition practices. However, the
Law has no provisions on monopoly, cartel and M&A. Currently, China is
working at legislating the Anti-Monopoly Law, a universal and
comprehensive competition law.
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Exemptions from competition law in
regional trade agreements:
A study based on experiences in the
agriculture and energy sectors
1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the issue of exemptions from competitionlaw in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) with a view toanswering the question of whether there are any sectoral
differences in the scope of application of competition policy. The term
‘exemption’ is used here in a broad sense to mean not only the total
exclusion of competition law provisions from a particular sector but
also to cover cases where the general rules of competition law are
subjected to modifications and adaptations with a view to making
them more lenient and accommodative in favour of private actors
engaged in a particular sector or activity or meeting certain general
conditions in common. Based on a closer examination of national
and regional experiences in the application of competition law in
two key sectors, agriculture and energy, which have been chosen only
MELAKU GEBOYE DESTA
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for explanatory purposes, the chapter attempts to draw the lessons
that could be helpful particularly to developing countries in their
effort to introduce competition law and institutions at both national
and regional levels. Two main lessons are particularly apparent.
Firstly, knowledge of the experiences of other countries and regions
in the development of their competition law systems, including any
sectoral differences and exemptions, provides useful lessons for those
that are in the process of making one so that they would avoid or
minimize mistakes made by others while strengthening their
achievements. And, secondly, the extent to which a sector is subject
to standard competition rules in a market of export interest to a
developing country is an important factor in designing the latter’s
export policy and strategy.
With these objectives in view, the chapter is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides a general background about the nature of
competition law and policy and its major features in terms of both
substantive rules and principles and the exceptions with the help of
examples from different national systems. Section 3 provides an
overview of competition law in RTAs based on examples of RTAs
from the north, the south and those with north-south membership.
Section 4 then looks at exemptions from regional competition law
based on experiences from national and regional competition law
systems using the agriculture and energy industries as explanatory
case studies. Finally, Section 5 concludes by drawing the lessons that
could be learnt for the future of competition law/policy in
international/multilateral economic cooperation.
2. Competition law: general remarks
Competition law1 is a key element of virtually all advanced
national legal systems based on free market principles. Competition
law is concerned with the structure and behaviour of enterprises on
the market. It aims to create a market in which producers and traders
would compete freely on the quality of products and services they
offer and the prices they charge rather than through the improper
exercise of market power, whether acquired unilaterally or in concert
with others. More broadly, competition policy is designed to address
‘industry structures and practices that give excessive market power
to sellers – power to raise prices above, or reduce quantities below,
the levels that would prevail in competitive markets.’2
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The competition laws of almost all countries target two forms of
practices by private-sector operators – concerted practices, such as
price fixing and market-segmentation cartels (hereafter anti-
competitive agreements), and abuse of dominant positions such as
monopolies (hereafter disciplines on dominant market positions).3 A
chief feature of all these laws is that they discourage the formation of
anti-competitive agreements as well as the abuse of dominant market
positions. To take an example, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890 in the US provides, in part: ‘Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.’4 Likewise, Section 2 of the same Act on
monopolies provides as follows: ‘Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony….’5 Sanctions for violation of competition law range
from administrative behavioural or structural orders to, in some cases
such as in the US and, since 2002, in the UK,6 criminal penalties
against officers acting on behalf of those operators.
Competition law applies only to the conduct of private
enterprises acting out of their own free will. It does not apply to cases
where companies take anti-competitive measures pursuant to
requirements set by the state. Under such circumstances, private
enterprises often have the defence of ‘foreign government
compulsion’, which is normally available in cases where anti-
competitive private conduct is compelled by a government. In a US
case, a group of crude oil suppliers participated in a concerted boycott
designed to deny an oil refining company (Interamerican Refining
Corporation) crude oil from Venezuela. In the antitrust proceedings,
the defendants argued that they could not supply the required grade
and type of oil to the refiner because the Venezuelan government
had forbidden sales which, directly or indirectly, reached
Interamerican. The US District Court for the District of Delaware held
that ‘the undisputed facts demonstrate that defendants were
compelled by regulatory authorities in Venezuela to boycott plaintiff.
It also holds that such compulsion is a complete defense to an action
under the antitrust laws based on that boycott.’7
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Moreover, competition law does not apply to inter-governmental
anti-competitive practices such as the various international
commodity agreements made by producing and consuming countries
aimed at regulating prices and supplies through production quotas,8
or those established only by producing countries such as the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).9 Such
practices could however be covered by the rules of the WTO system,
due to the direct governmental act involved, unless justified by any
of its exceptions.10
3. Competition law and regional trade agreements
3.1 The backdrop of trade liberalization
Although national competition law had its historical origins
independently of international trade, the current discussions about
regional and international competition law and policy are taking place
against the backdrop of broader international trade liberalization
through bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral means. With
the proliferation of RTAs aimed at closer economic integration
through the dismantling of barriers against the free movement of
goods and services, and in many cases also of capital and persons,
the need for competition law at regional level has become ever more
apparent, and regional competition laws and policies are increasingly
commonplace.
The reasons behind this development are fairly well known.
Firstly, although multilateral and regional trade liberalization have
succeeded in the reduction/elimination of most governmental barriers
to trade, the lack of similar arrangements to deal with ‘private trade
barriers’11 to international trade has created doubts about the
effectiveness of the multilateral trading system. Competition law is
thus perceived as a necessary anti-circumvention supplement to RTAs
designed to protect the fruits of trade liberalization from being
undermined by private sector barriers.12
Secondly and related to the first, closer integration between
markets means that the likelihood of private measures in one country
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adversely affecting another country’s interests is much higher. More
specifically, the creation of RTAs, if not supplemented by appropriate
arrangements about enforcement of competition law, has the potential
to exacerbate this problem since RTAs by definition make it easier
for companies to cause damage in partner countries. In the absence
of inter-state cooperation on competition issues, the standard reaction
in such circumstances by any government would be to apply its
competition law to practices that took place outside its territorial
jurisdiction, as is often the case with US antitrust law, thereby causing
serious international frictions.13 Regional competition law is thus as
much an instrument of minimizing trade distortions as of building
confidence and amicable international relations at regional level.
Indeed, the recent growth in the number of countries with
competition law in many parts of the developing world is directly
linked to the unprecedented growth in the number of regional trade
agreements with competition provisions over the past decade or so.14
At the global level as well, the WTO system already contains some
competition provisions, such as the 1996 Reference Paper on
Telecommunication services.15 Moreover, intense effort has been
taking place on this topic, particularly since the 1996 Singapore
Ministerial Conference, with the object of introducing a generic
competition agreement that would apply to every sector in the same
way as the agreements on subsidies and countervailing measures or
on anti-dumping measures. This effort has not been successful yet16
and the competition policy instruments in existence today at
international level are limited to the soft-law provisions of the 1976
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (revised in 2000)17
and the 1980 United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Restrictive
Business Practices.18
3.2. A brief survey of competition law in RTAs
Almost every modern RTA devotes a chapter or so to competition
law issues.19 While the ideal goal in every case might be harmonization
of competition law standards across the membership of RTAs, in
reality significant divergence exists in the form and substantive
content of the competition law obligations created by different RTAs.
On the least advanced end of the spectrum fall such agreements as
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the New Zealand-Singapore bilateral agreement, which limit
themselves to broad and non-binding language without any realistic
intent to discipline anti-competitive behaviour.20 On the most
advanced end, fall such region-wide common competition regimes
as that of the EC, which not only imposes common substantive
obligations directly on the private operators in member countries
but also creates a supranational authority with power to enforce the
law throughout the Community. It is difficult to find any other RTAs
with this level of harmonization and the closest the author has been
able to find thus far is the Caribbean Community. Most RTAs fall
somewhere between these two extreme cases. A good example of this
middle tier would be Chapter 15 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),21 which requires each signatory government
to ‘adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business
conduct and take appropriate action with respect thereto….’22 While
Canada and the US already had long-established competition law
systems, Mexico adopted a competition law and created the Federal
Competition Commission to enforce it in 1993.23
The following section will look more closely at the competition
laws of three RTAs – the EC, CARICOM, and a category of RTAs
concluded between the EC and different developing countries. The
purpose of this discussion is to illustrate the different levels of
ambition in competition law reflected in such arrangements and to
lay the contextual background for the subsequent discussion on the
exemptions from these systems.
3.2.1 The European Community (EC)
Given the depth and complexity of EC competition law, it is
impossible to provide any detailed description of the system here.
The following brief introduction is intended mainly to outline the
general principles contained in the Treaty of Rome and a few of the
key secondary legislations so as to lay the background for the
subsequent discussion of the exemptions from regional competition
law, for which EC law is almost the only source.
The EC boasts the most advanced and near-uniform system of
regional competition law with a powerful Competition Directorate
General that has the competence to enforce its rules directly on private
enterprises throughout the Community. Indeed, ‘the competition
445
Desta
sector is the only one in which the commission is entrusted with the
application of community rules to individual undertakings’.24
The basic substantive rules of EC competition law are contained
in Articles 81 and 82 EC on anti-competitive agreements and abuse
of dominant market position, respectively. Article 81(1) prohibits ‘all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.’
This general principle is supplemented by a list of specific practices
such as price fixing, supply restriction, and market sharing
agreements which ‘shall be automatically void’. Article 81(3) provides
a list of conditions under which anti-competitive agreements,
otherwise falling under Paragraph 1, would be exempted, which will
be discussed in the next section.
Article 82 EC also provides that ‘Any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States’. Once again, this general principle is also supplemented by a
list of specific practices that may qualify as such an abuse of a
dominant position. These practices include the imposition of unfair
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions, and
limitation of production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers.
Article 86 EC then singles out public undertakings and
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights
and declares that they, too, are subject in principle to the rules of
competition law contained in the Treaty. However, Paragraph 2 goes
further and provides:
 ‘Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in
this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as
the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in
law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent
as would be contrary to the interests of the Community’
(emphasis added).
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The relevance of this provision particularly to the energy industry
will be discussed in the next section.
The power to issue regulations and directives necessary for the
enforcement of EC competition law was initially given to the
European Council. Interestingly for the purpose of this discussion,
the Council also had the power ‘to define, if need be, in the various
branches of the economy, the scope of the provisions of Articles 81
and 82’.25 It will be seen later on, with the help of examples from the
agriculture and energy sectors, how the Council exercised its power
under this provision in adapting the scope of competition law to the
various branches of the economy.
3.2.2 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
As early as 1973, the Chaguaramas Treaty establishing
CARICOM26 provided a set of principles governing restrictive
business practices. In a language that clearly bears the influence of
the EC system described above, Article 30 of the Annex to the
Chaguaramas Treaty considered incompatible a category of private
sector practices that would nullify the benefits expected from the
agreement to liberalize intra-regional trade. These practices include
the following: (a) agreements between enterprises, decisions by
associations of enterprises and concerted practices between
enterprises which have as their object or result the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market,
and (b) actions by which one or more enterprises takes unfair
advantage of a dominant position, within the Common Market or a
substantial part of it. Furthermore, Article 30(4) also committed
Member States to introduce ‘as soon as practicable’ uniform
legislation for the control of restrictive business practices.
The sketchy provisions of Article 30 were later amended and
replaced by a new and more detailed protocol in 2000.27 The protocol
establishes a regional competition commission invested with powers
necessary for the enforcement of the rules, including powers to secure
the attendance of any person before it to give evidence, order
termination of anti-competitive conduct and impose fines and/or
order payment of compensation to affected parties.28 The protocol
also imposes on Member States the obligation to take all necessary
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legislative measures to ensure compliance with the rules of
competition and provide penalties for anti-competitive business
conduct and establish national competition authorities to that end.29
The national competition authorities are required to cooperate with
the Community Competition Commission (Article 30(b)(3)).
At the substantive level, the protocol prohibits anti-competitive
business conduct, which is defined to mean the following:
 ‘(a) agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations
of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Community; (b) actions
by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within
the Community; or (c) any other like conduct by enterprises
whose object or effect is to frustrate the benefits expected from
the establishment of the CSME ’.30
This broad definition is further supplemented by a long
illustrative list of specific practices, such as price fixing, supply
restriction and unauthorized denial of access to networks or essential
infrastructure.
3.2.3 Agreements between the EC and developing countries
The EC generally follows the standard practice of including
competition provisions in agreements it signs with developing
countries. A look at the EC-South Africa Trade and Development
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)31 and the Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreement between the EC and Algeria32 shows that the
EC has effectively made competition policy an essential aspect of
any preferential trade agreement that it concludes with developing
countries and follows a standard format and near-identical wording.
For example, Article 35 of the TDCA and Article 41 of the EU-Algeria
Association Agreement declare as incompatible with the proper
functioning of the respective instruments anti-competitive
agreements between private enterprises and abuse of dominant
market positions insofar as they may affect trade between the
Community and the partner countries. These provisions require that
the parties to the agreements take all necessary legislative measures
to implement the commitments contained in them. In this respect,
the TDCA specifically provides that ‘if, at the entry into force of this
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Agreement, either Party has not yet adopted the necessary laws and
regulations for the implementation of Article 35, in their jurisdictions
it shall do so within a period of three years.’33
In both cases, the enforcement of the competition commitments
is left to the respective competition authorities of the EC and the two
partner countries subject to an administrative-cooperation
commitment. Each side of the two agreements reserves the right to
take appropriate measures against any such anti-competitive
practices subject to a consultation requirement or, failing any such
consultations, after 30 working days following referral for such
consultation. Unlike the EU-Algeria Agreement, however, the TDCA
provides for a positive comity obligation under which the Parties
agree that
‘whenever the Commission or the South African Competition
Authority has reason to believe that anti-competitive
practices, defined under Article 35, are taking place within
the territory of the other authority and are substantially
affecting important interests of the Parties, it may request the
other Party’s competition authority to take appropriate
remedial action in terms of that authority’s rules governing
competition’.34
By contrast, in apparent recognition of the weaker position of
the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of countries (the ACP), the
Cotonou Agreement35 is largely limited to a restatement of general
principles and future aspirations. Article 45 of the Cotonou
Agreement simply declares the crucial importance of a sound and
effective competition policy and commits the ACP countries
‘to implement national or regional rules and policies including
the control and under certain conditions the prohibition of
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition. The Parties further agree to
prohibit the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position in the common market of the Community or in the
territory of ACP States’ (emphasis added).
This is then followed by a statement of cooperation including
technical assistance in the drafting of an appropriate legal framework
and its administrative enforcement. It is notable at this juncture that
this softly-softly approach is likely to change as competition policy
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is being pursued more vigorously by the EC in the context of the
ongoing negotiations for the establishment of Economic Partnership
Agreements with ACP subregions.36
4. Exemptions from competition law
It is noteworthy that not every cartel-like activity or every
monopoly situation is prohibited, whether at national or regional
levels. Although the economic principles of productive and allocative
efficiency underlying competition law would be undermined by most
anti-competitive activities, the laws of many countries and regions
provide for a host of grounds for exemptions from the application of
their respective competition rules. As indicated in the introduction,
the term ‘exemption’, this does not necessarily mean the total
exclusion of competition law provisions from a particular sector but
broadly to cover modifications or adaptations of general competition
law with a view to making it more lenient and accommodative of
private behaviour in a particular sector or activity. Some of these
exemptions are motivated by considerations of the strategic
significance of particular industries in an economy (for example
agriculture and the energy sector, in general); some others are dictated
by the nature of the industry – such as the so-called natural
monopolies in the network-bound industries (for example electricity
and natural gas); and still others by the mercantilistic urge to promote
exports (for example the exemption of export cartels in the US, the
EC and many other developed legal systems).37
This discussion will take the agriculture and energy industries
as case studies. The reasons for the choice of these sectors are three-
fold. Firstly, despite the obvious differences between these two sectors,
they share at least one important thing in common – both often benefit
from exemptions from the full application of general competition
law in many countries. At the same time, reflecting the decisive role
of industrial structure on competition law, the exemptions applying
to these two sectors are also different. Accordingly, because the
farming industry is largely made up of many small and individually
powerless players,38 the exemption for agriculture naturally relates
more to the collusion aspect than the market power abuse aspect of
competition law. On the other hand, because the energy sector, and
particularly its network-bound segments, is dominated by just a few
450
Exemptions from competition law
integrated and powerful utilities,39 the exemption relates more to the
market power abuse aspect of competition law than the collusion
aspect of it. In practice, this has often been manifested in the form of
utilities enjoying special status either as governmental or quasi-
governmental monopolies or as private enterprises exempt from the
full force of general competition law. The two sectors are thus chosen
as explanatory tools for the discussion on exemptions from the two
forms of anti-competitive practices.
Secondly, at the level of general international economic relations,
too, these are two sectors have been resistant to the full application
of the market-oriented rules of the multilateral trading system. Both
are considered vital and strategic industries with implications for
national security – industries on which the economic well-being and
possibly the very survival of nations could depend. Partly because of
these common features, both have been characterized by a distrust
of market forces, thereby often subjecting them to special exemptions
from key trade rules. The special subsidies regime within the WTO
applying to agricultural products, the equally generous forms of state
aid available to some forms of renewable energy sources in many
WTO member countries, and the widespread practice of government
intervention at both the producer and consumer ends of the oil
industry in the form of OPEC and the International Energy Agency,
respectively, are all proof of the strong aversion of these sectors to
the rules of the market.
Finally, these two sectors, particularly in their primary forms,
are of particular importance to the developing countries, and at a
time when many north-south RTAs are taking competition provisions
as a necessary component, it is worth analysing the lessons of other
RTAs in the treatment of these sectors.
In line with the discussion in the preceding section, the
exemptions from competition law will also be discussed according
to the two major forms of practices that fall under general competition
law – anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant market
positions. It is worth stressing at this point, however, that the search
for exemptions from competition provisions presupposes the
existence of certain RTA-wide common rules and principles of
binding competition law whose applicability could otherwise be
excluded or qualified in specific sectors. And this is far from common.
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The discussion in this section is thus largely focused on the EC as it
is difficult to find RTAs that have achieved a sufficiently high degree
of harmonization of competition law warranting the explicit inclusion
of an exemption. The absence of a truly common competition policy
in RTAs, such as those concluded between the EC and developing
countries, means that there is often nothing like a common exemption
from competition law for any specified list of sectors such as
agriculture or energy. Rather, each party retains its own policy choices
in this respect, subject to the commitment to enforce the minimum
standards contained in the text of those agreements, and often a duty
to cooperate with the other partner in the enforcement of these laws.
Some RTAs and also national systems will still be referred to in this
section as appropriate in order to show how exemptions work in
practice.
4.1 Exemptions from the ban on anti-competitive
agreements
As noted earlier, exemptions from competition law are common,
and may be general or specific, express or implied. Reflecting the
structural considerations at the core of competition law, exemptions
from the ban on anti-competitive agreements are mostly available
only to small players in the market. Special competition law regimes
are thus often created to apply to farmers, fisheries and the like, owing
to the small and fragmented nature of the individual actors in those
industries;40 the strategic significance of food production also plays
an important role. This section will look at exemptions that are
generally available in many legal systems to what are called small-
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in all sectors and proceed to
the agricultural sector focusing on farming.
4.1.1 SMEs and de minimis
SMEs often benefit from exemptions from competition law rules
prohibiting concerted practices either expressly41 or through the
minimum anti-competitive threshold requirements set by the
competition laws of many countries.42 According to the OECD, the
reasons for this include the structural concern that SMEs ‘have no
chance of survival in competition with large firms if the latter use
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economies of scale’.43 Several governments attempt to offset those
structural disadvantages of the SMEs by, inter alia, allowing them to
enter into co-operative agreements amongst themselves.44
The special treatment of SMEs may also take the form of a de
minimis requirement, although the latter is not necessarily limited to
SMEs. Under EC competition law, for example, the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) interpreted the ban on concerted practices under
Article 81(1) EC as inapplicable ‘where the impact of the agreement
on intra-Community trade or on competition is not appreciable’.45
This requirement of appreciable impact thus constitutes a de minimis
requirement for the application of Article 81 EC. Based on this judicial
interpretation, the Commission later issued a Notice in which it stated
that agreements between small and medium-sized undertakings ‘are
rarely capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member
States’.46 The Commission then defined the de minimis threshold to
mean an aggregate market share held by the parties to the agreement
not exceeding 10 per cent in any of the relevant markets affected by
the agreement for agreements between competitors, and 15 per cent
for agreements between non-competitors.47
However, not all forms of agreements among SMEs and/or within
this de minimis limit benefit from exemption. The Notice excludes
from exemption a category of agreements containing ‘hard-core
restrictions’, including price fixing, output restrictions and allocation
of markets or customers.48 Perhaps because of this, EC Commission
officials often argue that
‘EC exemptions are not exceptions to the applicability of EC
competition rules; rather, they are one of the ways of applying
competition rules, by means of Article 81(3) of the Treaty.
Agreements which do not fall within the scope of Article 81(1)
- e.g. because there is no appreciable restriction of competition
or effect on trade between Member States – are neither
exempted nor excepted: they are simply not prohibited. This
will be more often the case for SMEs’.49
In addition to this general practice of setting de minimis
requirements and the special treatment of SMEs, the laws of many
countries also allow exemptions in those special cases where anti-
competitive agreements might also have pro-competitive effects. For
example, under the EC Treaty, the Council has the power to declare
inapplicable the anti-cartel provisions of Article 81(1) EC to specific
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concerted practices and decisions or categories of them which are
deemed to contribute to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.50 This power of
exemption, which was later put under the exclusive competence of
the Commission by EEC Regulation 17 of 1962,51 came to an end with
the enactment of EC Council Regulation No 1/200352 which introduced
‘a directly applicable exception system in which the competition
authorities and courts of the Member States have the power to apply
not only Article 81(1) and Article 82 of the Treaty, which have direct
applicability by virtue of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, but also Article 81(3) of the Treaty’.53 This
Regulation also abolished the prior administrative-decision
requirement in order to exempt concerted practices that satisfy the
exceptional circumstances outlined in Article 81(3) EC, simply
declaring such agreements ‘shall not be prohibited, no prior decision
to that effect being required’.54 In practice until then, the exemptions
were often granted on individual and case-by-case bases, particularly
in the early days of EC competition law enforcement in the 1960s,
while in the later days it took the form of what in EC law are called
‘block exemptions’, often applying to vertical agreements such as
exclusive distributorship agreements. For example, Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application
of the now Article 81(3) EC Treaty to certain categories of motor
vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, provided a block
exemption for
‘agreements, for a definite or an indefinite period, by which
the supplying party entrusts to the reselling party the task of
promoting the distribution and servicing of certain products
of the motor vehicle industry in a defined area and by which
the supplier undertakes to supply contract goods for resale
only to the dealer, or only to a limited number of undertakings
within the distribution network besides the dealer, within the
contract territory’.55
Once again, however, there are limits to such exemptions. A good
example here is the ECJ finding in Volkswagen v Commission.56 In that
case, the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 102 million on
Volkswagen for forcing Italian dealers for Volkswagen and Audi
makes to sell vehicles solely to Italian customers, thereby prohibiting
re-exportation of vehicles into other members of the Community. This,
according to the Commission, hampered the objective of creating
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the common market, which is one of the fundamental principles of
the European Community. Volkswagen then brought an action against
the Commission, which was rejected by the Court of First Instance
and later confirmed by the ECJ as follows: ‘a measure which is liable
to partition the market between Member States cannot come under
those provisions of Regulation No 123/85 that deal with the
obligations which a distributor may lawfully assume under a
dealership contract’.57 This therefore shows that there are always
certain types of conduct that cannot benefit from exemptions from
anti-competitive agreements, such as agreements leading to price
fixing and the partition of markets.
4.1.2 Agriculture
The agriculture sector could be defined broadly to include the
whole supply chain from the farmer who produces the crop down to
the processing plants and the retail outlets. The discussion in this
chapter focuses almost exclusively on the upstream segment – that
is on the farming industry more narrowly defined.
There are several reasons why agriculture in this narrow sense is
often treated separately from other sectors in respect of competition
law and policy. Firstly, agriculture is the source of our food and is
often considered as too strategic an industry to be left entirely to the
workings of the market. Secondly, because the sector is largely made
up of small and often family-based producers, the need to organize
them in associations, such as cooperative societies, is apparent. Such
an organization has the object of protecting the interests of these
small and potentially vulnerable operators from the adverse effect of
market forces. One way of protecting their interests is to use their
cooperatives so as to enhance their bargaining power in negotiations
for prices and other commercial terms with the often more powerful
processors and retailers.58 Such an association of producers would of
course be illegal under the competition law regime of many developed
countries. The exemptions for agriculture are often designed to make
this legally permissible.
The EC competition law regime is a good case in point here. The
EC Treaty created common policies in both agriculture and
competition. Through the agriculture section, the Treaty tried to create
a system which aims, inter alia,
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‘(b)… to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural
community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings
of persons engaged in agriculture; (c) to stabilize markets; (d)
to assure the availability of supplies; (e) to ensure that supplies
reach consumers at reasonable prices’. 59
Some of these objectives of the common agricultural policy, such
as those on increasing farmers’ earnings and securing reasonable
prices for consumers, conflict with each other,60 and they also require
a certain degree of direct public intervention in the agricultural
market contrary to the spirit and letter of the competition chapter of
the same Treaty.61 The Treaty resolves this apparent conflict between
the objectives of the agricultural and competition policies by making
the latter subordinate to the former. Article 36 EC provides that ‘The
provisions of the chapter relating to rules on competition shall apply
to production of and trade in agricultural products only to the extent
determined by the Council within the framework of Article 37(2) and (3)
and in accordance with the procedure laid down therein, account being taken
of the objectives set out in Article 33’ (emphasis added). Agricultural
policy is thus given precedence over the aims of the Treaty in relation
to competition.62 The Council exercised the wide discretion given to
it by this provision through EEC Council Regulation No. 26 applying
certain rules of competition to production of and trade in agricultural
products63, which is sometimes taken as the first block exemption
adopted by the Council.64
Regulation 26 reaffirms that the rules on competition apply to
production of and trade in agricultural products ‘in so far as their
application does not impede the functioning of national organisations
of agricultural markets or jeopardize attainment of the objectives of
the common agricultural policy’.65 More to the point, Article 2 of the
Regulation declares that Article 81(1) of the Treaty (on anti-
competitive agreements)
‘shall not apply to such of the agreements, decisions and
practices referred to in the preceding Article as form an
integral part of a national market organisation or are
necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in Article
[33] of the Treaty. In particular, it shall not apply to
agreements, decisions and practices of farmers, farmers’
associations, or associations of such associations belonging
to a single Member State which concern the production or sale
of agricultural products or the use of joint facilities for the
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storage, treatment or processing of agricultural products, and
under which there is no obligation to charge identical prices,
unless the Commission finds that competition is thereby
excluded or that the objectives of Article [33] of the Treaty are
jeopardised’ (emphasis added).
The requirement not to include an obligation to charge identical
prices once more underlines that even in agriculture the exemption
from competition is far from complete.
The approach of CARICOM to the issue of exemptions is also
similar to that of the EU. Article 30(i)(3) of the 2000 Protocol amending
the CARICOM Treaty requires members to ensure that any
agreements and decisions falling within this broad definition of anti-
competitive business practices will be null and void unless such
practices fall in any of the exceptions provided in Article 30(i)(4) of
the protocol.66 The exceptions are couched in terms similar to Article
81(3) of the EC Treaty and none of them specifically excludes either
agriculture or energy from the coverage of competition law.67 It is
possible, however, to argue that since many of the competition rules
would conflict with the agricultural objectives of the Community
outlined under Article 49 of the Annex to the Chaguaramas Treaty,
including the objective to raise the income and standard of living of
the rural population, the scope of application of the competition
provisions is necessarily limited by those agricultural objectives.
Moreover, the protocol also provides for a de minimis rule under which
the Commission is given the power to exempt anti-competitive
business practices whose impact on trade in the CSME is found to be
minimal.68 It does not however provide any threshold figures for the
determination of this de minimis level. Finally, the Committee on Trade
and Development (COTED) has power to grant individual or block
exemptions in the public interest.69 It is not clear whether COTED
has exercised its power to exempt agriculture from the competition
rules.
In sum, a tempting conclusion from the discussion in this section
is the following: if European farmers and other SMEs are exempted
from the anti-cartel provisions of the common competition policy
due to their small size, those in the developing world are far smaller
even by their own standards and more deserving of such a special
treatment from the rules of competition law whether at the national,
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regional or multilateral levels. However, developing countries would
serve their interests best by pushing for a fuller application of
competition law in the agricultural and other similar sectors of
developed countries rather than by merely trying to copy the
catalogue of exemptions from those countries. By allowing market
forces to play a larger role in determining the distribution of market
share among the different players on the domestic market, such pro-
competition developments within countries could arguably even help
the liberalization of agricultural trade at the WTO level – an issue
that has eluded developing countries for decades.
4.2 Exemptions from the discipline on dominant market
positions
The discussion in this sub-section is even more complex than
the preceding one. While almost every competition law system
generally prohibits anti-competitive agreements among private-sector
operators, the approach to dominant market position is much more
diversified. In some countries, such as the US and Mexico, monopolies
are simply prohibited, while in others, such as the EU, monopolies
are in principle permitted and it is only their behaviour that is subject
to regulation. It is this divergence in the principles that makes any
discussion on exemptions from principles slightly more difficult.
In general, the exemptions from this aspect of competition law
are often indirect and limited to the big national utilities and natural
monopolies. Furthermore, recent developments in many countries
show that the scope and significance of those exemptions is getting
more and more limited. This section discusses such exemptions with
the help of experiences in the energy sector.70
4.2.1 Energy
The energy industry is a big and diverse industry in itself,
covering everything from coal, oil and gas to nuclear and renewable
sources of energy. This chapter focuses largely on the network-bound
energy sectors particularly electricity and pipeline gas. The discussion
is limited to the EC experience in the sector for two reasons: (1) as
noted earlier, it is already difficult to find a well-developed RTA-
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wide competition policy that applies directly to private operators
throughout an RTA; and (2) in the case of network-bound energy, the
issue of RTA-wide competition law does not arise unless the necessary
physical infrastructure exists connecting the different members of a
particular RTA, which is missing in many cases. The EU, albeit not
the only one, satisfies both requirements and provides a useful case
study for the development of regional competition law in such areas.
The application of EC competition rules to the network-bound
segments of the energy industry has been traditionally limited.
Although undergoing change over the past decade or so,71 such
networks are what are often called natural monopolies generally
immune from competition law requirements. The EC experience on
the relationship between its network-bound energy industry and its
common competition policy is thus a useful one.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC) did not expressly mention energy. The meaning
of this omission has been debated – some saying that that amounted
to giving energy a special status while others suggested that energy
is a type of good and remained subject to the general rules of the
Treaty just like any other goods.72
Unlike in some national legal systems,73 there is no explicit
exemption for energy from EC competition law; the claim is arrived
at only indirectly. Firstly, the EC Treaty provides for an exemption
for ‘undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest’. According to Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty:
‘Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in
this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far
as the application of such rules does not obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned
to them’.
The energy industry squarely fits into this description due to the
general economic interest of the energy industry and its tendency
toward monopoly. Although the EC Commission later introduced
several pro-competition initiatives for the energy sector, both in the
form of legislative proposals and judicial actions, several competing
interests conspired to keep the network-bound energy sector largely
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shielded from the EC rules of competition law for a long time.74 A
lack of political will from Member States and the cautious approach
of the ECJ in the interpretation of the EC Treaty, and particularly
Article 86(2) played a major part in this. At national level, many EC
member countries reconciled the competing demands of competition
law on the one hand and the natural monopoly status of the network-
bound sectors with their public service requirements on the other
through establishment of independent regulators as ‘a surrogate for
competition’.75 This anti-competitive role of networks is gradually
being addressed especially in the EC gas and electricity sectors,
through network unbundling and particularly regulated and non-
discriminatory third-party access to networks.76 However, it remains
that energy is still one of the least-developed common policies at the
EC level.77
5. Lessons to be learnt
This chapter has shown that competition law, whether regional
or national, does not apply equally to every economic sector or
operator; rather, it is carefully adapted to suit the realities of different
sectors of the economy in the form of exemptions or modifications.
It has been shown that the competition law provisions that are found
in almost all recent RTAs, to the extent they create any common
competition policies, do not envisage the same standards to such
traditionally exempted sectors as agriculture and energy. In this
respect, the chapter has argued that the type of competition law
applying to different sectors and operators is largely determined by
the structure of particular industries and their role in the overall
economy. The analyses on the extent of application of competition
law in the agriculture and energy sectors has demonstrated how the
obvious structural differences that exist between the two industries
contribute to some form of special treatment for these two sectors in
terms of both national and regional competition law. Furthermore, it
has been shown that, because the two are structurally different
industries, the nature and scope of exemptions are also substantively
different. In the case of agriculture, the issue is not (yet) about
dominance, as the structure of farming in many countries does not
have that many dominant players yet; it is rather about anti-
competitive agreements among the otherwise small players. Hence
the partial exemption of agriculture from the anti-cartel provisions
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of competition law, such as Article 81 of the EC Treaty. The reverse
is, however, true in the case of energy, and particularly network-bound
energy. Because the players are often large and few and possess
significant market power, the relevant rules are those on abuse of
dominant market positions and the exemptions were designed to
partially shield them from rules such as Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
At a broader level, these exemptions are also an embodiment of
a general aversion to reliance on market forces for these sectors.
Indeed, it is obvious, at least in the two sectors analysed here, that
important parallels exist in the approaches of the multilateral trading
system of the WTO and most RTAs in respect of the application of
trade law on the one hand and the application of national and regional
competition law on the other. It shows that sectors that are still subject
to a high level of governmental intervention in the form of subsidies
or high market access barriers at the border, often in derogation from
key WTO disciplines, also often benefit from special treatment in the
application of competition law to private business at the national
and regional levels.
Although the implication of these parallels for regional and
multilateral trade and competition negotiations, in general, and for
developing countries, in particular, is difficult to determine, a few
tentative conclusions may be suggested:
(1)The sectors that have proven to be resistant to multilateral trade
liberalization at the WTO are an extension of the resistance of
those sectors to the rules of the market at the domestic level.
The apparent parallels in this respect may indicate that the
causes are also somehow related and the solutions might require
an integrated approach.
(2) It cannot be ruled out that even the most far-reaching regional
or multilateral agreement on competition will not bring such
traditionally market-resistant sectors as agriculture and energy
to the same level as just any other commodity, largely due to
their strategic importance and their inherent structural features
as either natural monopolies or small and family-based holdings.
Whether this sets the outer limits of regional and multilateral
competition law in the future is yet to be seen.
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(3)From the perspective of developing countries that are in the
process of introducing competition law or have just completed
one, the choice is not between perfect competition and perfect
monopoly; it is about the introduction of degrees of competition
appropriate to different sectors of the economy, and there can
be no fixed criteria by which to determine that appropriate
degree. A thorough study of the experiences of countries and
regions with established competition law traditions is thus vital
not only for what should be covered by any such law, but also
for what should not be so covered or covered only to a limited
degree.
(4)This may also mean that the benefits of any progress at the WTO
level in terms of trade liberalization in sectors like agriculture
could be undermined unless they are accompanied by similar
pro-competition moves in terms of the private-sector barriers
at the national and regional levels. In a sector as sensitive and
vital as agriculture, the possibility of private trade barriers, such
as boycotts and refusals to purchase by retailers at the behest of
national farmers unions, taking the place of dwindling
governmental tariffs and non-tariff restrictions is a genuine
concern particularly for developing countries that have paid so
much in multilateral trade negotiations for the reintegration of
agriculture into the mainstream rules of the trading system. This
also appears to support the argument that developing countries
could benefit from proactive engagement in negotiations for a
multilateral competition agreement. The fact that virtually all
countries with a developed competition tradition not only
tolerate but also actively promote purely export cartels makes
such a multilateral instrument potentially useful, particularly
for developing countries.
(5)Also, while exemptions of particular sectors from competition
law in developing countries may well serve some specific
purpose at any given point in time, the long-term interest of
these countries would be best served by less rather than more
frequent resort to exemptions. As such, it is suggested that
further research in this area should consider whether developing
countries should campaign against exemptions and for a more
even application of competition law across sectors by their
developed country partners.
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(6) If special and differential treatment were to be really meaningful,
it should involve undertakings by more advanced countries to
eliminate exemptions and deregulate sectors before their
developing country counterparts. Developed countries should
set an example in liberalizing sectors before developing countries
and without expecting immediate reciprocity.
NOTES
1Note that the term competition law is used here in the narrow sense and does
not include such governmental or governmentally backed practices as
subsidies covered by the WTO rule book.
2See Tarullo (2000:483).
3See, for example, EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82, respectively, together with the
1989 Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21
December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.
J. 1989, L 395, pp. 1-12).
4The full text of this Act is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/
divisionmanual/ch2.htm#a. For detailed guidelines on the application of
US antitrust law, see Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations, issued by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission April 1995, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/internat.htm
5See Id. See also Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 on mergers and acquisitions.
6See Article 188 of the UK Enterprise Act of 2002, available at http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020040.htm
7Interamerican Ref. Corp. v Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
It is notable, however, that national law requirements would not serve as a
defence in a WTO-type situation where members undertake to eliminate
anti-competitive conduct. In Mexico – Telecommunications, Mexico argued
that acts by its telecommunications enterprise, Telmex, could not be anti-
competitive practices since they were required by national law. The panel
rejected this Mexican argument and rightly observed: ’International
commitments made under the GATS “for the purpose of preventing
suppliers ... from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices” are
… designed to limit the regulatory powers of WTO Members. … In
accordance with the principle established in Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention, a requirement imposed by a Member under its internal law on
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a major supplier cannot unilaterally erode its international commitments
made in its schedule to other WTO Members to prevent major suppliers
from “continuing anti-competitive practices”. The pro-competitive
obligations in Section 1 of the Reference Paper do not reserve any such
unilateral right of WTO Members to maintain anti-competitive measures.’
See Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services Report of
the Panel, WT/DS204/R, adopted on 1 June 2004, Paragraph 7.244 (footnotes
omitted).
8See, for example, the International Coffee Agreements, particularly the earlier
ones, which ‘allowed for the suspension of quotas if prices were high and
their reintroduction if prices became too low.’ See http://dev.ico.org/
history.asp#ica2.
9Although this view is widely shared among international lawyers and
competition specialists, two judicial actions were brought against OPEC
based on US antitrust law. In both cases, however, the Courts dismissed the
cases on grounds of the ‘act of state’ doctrine and service of process. For
more on this, see Desta (2003:523-551). See also Rezzouk (2004:2) who
observed that the behaviour of governments is outside ‘the conventional
range of national competition law’. Tarullo (2000:483) also notes that
‘competition law generally applies only to private conduct’.
10See Desta Id.
11Private trade barriers here refer to ‘arrangements by domestic producers such
as boycotts or refusals-to-deal that exclude imported products from their
market’. See Hudec (1999:77).
12It is in fact difficult to find any RTA competition provision that does not
mention as its primary objective the protection of the achievements of the
RTA from being undermined by private anti-competitive behaviour.
13On the extraterritoriality aspects of competition law, see Guzman (1998).
14For relevant information, see Silva (2004:7). Silva reported that ‘… in 1990,
only five nations in this region had competition laws. At present, 12 of the
33 countries of the region possess such laws, while eight — not including
Caribbean nations — are at the drafting stage and a greater number have
sectoral and constitutional laws or other relevant provisions’. This is not
accidental; it reflected the rapid growth in the number of RTAs worldwide
since the 1990s. According to a recent WTO paper, 196 RTAs were notified
to the WTO between 1 January 1995 and February 2005, while the total
number of RTAs over the 47 years lifetime of the GATT stood at just 124.
See Crawford and Fiorentino (2005:3).
15For practical experience in the application of these competition rules under
the WTO, see the panel report in Mexico Telecommunications, supra n. 7.
16Following the Cancun WTO Ministerial setback in September 2003, which was
largely attributed to agriculture and the Singapore issues (one of which is
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competition), the effort to create a WTO competition agreement has been
suspended.
17See OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Revision 2000,
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
18See UNCTAD, “The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on
Competition” (Geneva 2000 TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2) at http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf.
19For a useful and recent survey on this, see OECD (2005). Surprisingly, the
Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA) does not contain a generalized competition provision and only
specifically addresses the issue in relation to the privatization and
liberalization of Costa Rica’s telecommunications industry. See Central
American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, 5
August 2004, not yet entered into force, at http://www.ustr.gov/
Tr a d e _ A g r e e m e n t s / B i l a t e r a l / C A F TA / C A F TA - D R _ F i n a l _ Te x t s /
Section_Index.html
20See OECD (2005:9).
21The North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 15, 17 December 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994).
22Id. at Article 1501.
23OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: an OECD Peer Review, (Paris
2004), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/9/31430869.pdf (hereinafter
Mexico Peer Review).
24See Ehlermann (2000:537,540).
25See Article 83(2)(c) EC.
26Treaty signed at Chaguaramas, Trinidad & Tobago, on 4 July 1973; text
available at http://www.caricom.org/archives/treaty-caricom.htm.
27See Protocol VIII: Competition Policy, Consumer Protection, Dumping and
Subsidies: (Protocol Amending the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean
Community), signed on 14 March 2000 at Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis,
text available at http://www.caricom.org.
28See Article 30(f) of Protocol VIII, Id.
29See Article 30(b) of Protocol VIII, Id.
30See Article 30(i)(1) of Protocol VIII, Id.
31Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European
Community and the Republic of South Africa, published in O.J. L 311/296,
4.12.1999, (hereafter TDCA) Article 35.
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32See Article 41 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an
Association between the European Community and its Member States, of
the one part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, signed in
Valencia 22/04/02, text available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/algeria/docs/index.htm
33See TDCA Article 36, supra n. 31.
34See Article 38 TDCA, supra n. 31.
35See Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean
and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and Its Member
States, signed in Cotonou, Benin on 23 June 2000, text available at http://
www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/cotonou/accord1.htm
 36See, for example, Falkenberg (2004:3), who argues that trade alone is not
sufficient for development and that the Economic Partnership Agreements
should cover competition since ‘enterprises in developing countries can
stitch up markets at least as successfully as in developed countries’ which
‘plays against new entrants into the markets and hence against economic
growth and employment’.
37See Victor (1992:571,577) states that all major trading partners of the US have
some form of antitrust immunity for export cartels, an approach which is
like ‘each country trying to benefit at everyone’s expense’.
38In terms of industrial structure, agriculture, although undergoing significant
changes in recent years, is still largely characterized by small-scale, often
family-based holdings. Small family farms still  account for an
overwhelming majority of farms even in the developed world – about 90
per cent of all farms in the US in 2001. See Banker and MacDonald (2005),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib797/aib797.pdf.
39The energy industry has traditionally been a classic example of monopolistic
or oligopolistic structures controlled by a few large and often integrated
utilities usually enjoying special status under the law.
40Altman and Callmann (2005) (recognizing that under US antitrust law, some
exemptions from competition are based on ‘concern for the economic
weakness of isolated groups, such as farmers’).
41Examples include the EU, the US and Japan. For more on this, see OECD (1997).
42Examples include Canada and Norway. See Id.
43See Id. p. 8.
44For example, German competition law allows inter-company cooperation
agreements that are primarily directed to the promotion of efficiency
including ‘production, research and development, financing, administration,
advertising, purchasing and distribution’, but not agreements designed to
eliminate competition such as price fixing or market sharing. (Id. p. 11). In
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the effort to minimize the structural disadvantage of SMEs, in 1990 Germany
extended the exemption from the ban on concerted practices to joint
purchasing by SMEs on certain conditions: ‘if the participating companies
are not compelled to purchase, if competition on the relevant market is not
substantially impaired and if the agreement serves to promote the
competitiveness of SME’ (Id. p. 12).
45See Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not
appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty
establishing the European Community (de minimis) O. J. C 368/07 of
22.12.2001, recital Paragraph 1.
46See Id. Paragraph 4. SMEs under EC law are defined to mean ‘undertakings
which have fewer than 250 employees and have either an annual turnover
not exceeding EUR 40 million or an annual balance-sheet total not exceeding
EUR 27 million’ Id.
47See Commission Notice, Id. Paragraph 7.
48See Commission Notice, Id. Paragraph 11.
49See OECD (1997:42).
50See Art. 81(3) together with Article 83 of the EC Treaty.
51See Regulation No. 17 implementing the [then] Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty (Articles 81 and 82 EC), O.J. 13 of 21.02.1962. Art. 9 of this Regulation
stipulated that ‘the Commission shall have sole power to declare Article 81
(1) inapplicable pursuant to Article 81 (3) of the Treaty’.
52See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82
of the Treaty, O.J. L. 01 of 04.01.2003.
53Recital to Id. Paragraph 4.
54See Id. Art. 1:2. The Commission later issued detailed Guidelines on the
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty in Commission Notice 101/08, O.J.
C 101/97 of 27.04.2004. A former Director General of the  EC Competition
department had already described the 1999 Commission White paper which
first introduced the proposal as ‘the most important policy paper the
Commission has ever published in more than 40 years of EC competition
policy’. See Ehlermann (2000:537).
55See Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 123/85 of 12.12.1984 on the application
of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle
distribution and servicing agreements, O.J. 1985 L 15, p. 16), recital
Paragraph 1. See also Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1400/2002 of 31
July 2002 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of
vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, O.
J. L 203/30 of 1.8.2002. For more on block exemptions, see Goyder (2004).
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56See Volkswagen AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment
of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 18 September 2003, Case C-338/00.
57See Id. Paragraph 49.
58In a private correspondence with this author (27 July 2005), Professor Alan
Swinbank observed that farms produce raw materials, and the first-stage
processors are often highly concentrated. He noted as an example that there
is only one sugar-beet refiner in the UK, and so British sugar users face a
duopoly: British Sugar (the beet refiner) and Tate & Lyle (the refiner of
imported raw cane sugar).
59See Article 33(1) of the EC Treaty.
60The ECJ has recognized that these aims could be in conflict and ruled that
‘according to the settled case-law of the court  … in pursuing the various
aims laid down in article 39 of the treaty, the community institutions have
a permanent duty to reconcile the individual aims. Although that duty to
reconcile means that no single aim may be pursued in isolation in such a
way as to make the achievement of the others impossible, the community
institutions may allow one of them temporary priority in order to satisfy
the demands of the economic or other conditions in view of which their
decisions are made’. See Case 27/85 Vandemoortele v Commission [1987]
ECR 1129, Paragraph 20.
61See Title VI, Chapter 1, Articles 81-89 of the EC Treaty. The common
agricultural policy takes the form of common market organizations for
particular agricultural products. The structure of these market organizations
varies from product to product but generally it works as follows: the
European Council annually sets common prices which indicate the
politically desired price level that should prevail on the market. To ensure
that this desired price target is achieved, the system envisages intervention
purchase by the authorities, thus allowing the producers minimum
guaranteed return for their produce.
62See, inter alia, Case 139/79, Maizena v. Council [1980] ECR 3393, Paragraph
23.
63Official Journal 030, 20/04/1962 P. 0993 – 0994.
64See Goyder, supra n. 55, pp. 114-5.
65See Regulation 26, recital Paragraph 6.
66See Protocol VIII, supra n. 27.
67The only place where the protocol explicitly excludes agriculture is in the case
of prohibited subsidies under Article 30(p)(quater) of the protocol, which is
effectively copied from Article 3 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. Such publicly sanctioned anti-competitive
practices are however outside the remit of this chapter. For an extensive
analysis of agricultural subsidies with the WTO system, see Desta (2002),
Parts II and III.
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68See Article 30(m) of Protocol VIII, supra n. 27.
69See Article 30(o) of Protocol VIII, supra n. 27.
70Note however that exemptions from disciplines on dominant market positions
are not necessarily limited to the big players. Section 24 of Japan’s Anti-
Monopoly Act, for example, provides an exemption for SMEs from the anti-
monopoly law by allowing them to form cooperative unions so that ‘small-
scale enterprises that find it difficult to effectively compete with large-scale
enterprises become part of an effective unit of competition in the market,
and thereby actively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of the
fair and free competition order as set out in the Anti-Monopoly Act’. See
OECD (1997:35), supra n. 41.
71See Cameron (2002:7–9).
72According to Cameron (2002:11), the competition provisions of the EC Treaty
‘were not applied to the energy sector’.
73For example, although Mexico’s constitution prohibits monopolies and
monopolistic practices, it exempts from this prohibition specific sectors in
what it calls ‘strategic areas’ including petroleum, hydrocarbons,
petrochemicals, radioactive mining and electricity. See Mexico Peer Review,
supra n. 23 at 15.
74For more on how this provision was used to exempt the network-bound energy
industry, see Cameron (2002: Chapter 5).
75See Cameron (2002:23).
76Non-discriminatory access to upstream production (generation in the case of
electricity; imports or national production in the case of gas), non-
discriminatory access to transmission and distribution networks, and non-
discriminatory access to consumers are essential conditions for competitive
entry to occur in the energy industry. For more on this, see OXERA (2003:8-
9). See also Cameron (2002:4,23–28) and Waelde and Gunst (2004:179-212).
77By contrast, the Treaty of Rome devoted a whole section to agriculture (Title
II of the EC Treaty, Articles 32-39) and the common agricultural policy (CAP)
is perhaps “the most highly developed” of all the common policies of the
EC. See Steiner and Woods (2000:208).
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